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Developing an Effective Strategy or Encouraging Compliance with
Community Penalties
Summary
The aim of this study was to explore compliance with community penalties in order to 
develop the most effective strategies for encouraging compliance. The study 
examined compliance within the substantive contexts of probation supervision and the 
deterrent enforcement framework incorporated in probation enforcement policy. The 
study is therefore theoretically located within two broad areas of research namely, 
short term compliance with legal authorities and the deterrence doctrine. As it was 
conducted in the context of probation supervision, it was possible to explore the 
patterns and correlates of short term compliance with legal authorities. The research 
site also provided a suitable forum for examining how criminal deterrence may 
operate given the enhanced certainty, severity and celerity of punishment for non- 
compliance.
The criminological literature has tended to focus on explorations of: the aetiology of 
crime and deviance; or on the correlates of longer term desistance from crime. Whilst 
these provide valuable insights into the nature of crime and criminality, the correlates 
of conformity have not received similar attention. Departing from the trend, and 
drawing on a conceptual framework for understanding compliance devised by 
Bottoms (2001), this study examined short term conformity with legal directives from 
a criminological point of view.
Underpinned by an interactionist philosophical position, the study utilised Grounded 
Theory methodology. Sixty four interviews were conducted with probation officers 
and probationers. The study found that compliance cannot be decontexualised from 
the activities of the officers in reacting to rule violations. Compliance is essentially 
the product of the symbolic definitions that emerge during interactions. An 
examination of the processes and conditions linked to compliance yielded insights 
into the effective mechanisms for encouraging compliance and highlighted several 
policy implications.
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INTRODUCTION 
AND THESIS STRUCTURE
Introduction
The aim of this study was to develop an understanding of compliance that is grounded 
in the perceptions of the key actors involved in negotiating compliance with legal 
requirements. It is my firm belief that the concept of compliance is best understood by 
exploring the processes through which it is defined by the relevant actors. From this 
perspective, the social actor occupies an active role in the construction and 
interpretation of social phenomena. This belief reflects my longstanding theoretical 
position on the question of social ontology. In line with the tenets of symbolic 
interactionism, I believe that human action is predicated upon reflective 
interpretations of experiences during social interactions.
The motivation for this study developed from my desire to understand the correlates 
of short term compliance with legal requirements. I envisaged that the substantive 
context of probation supervision1 would provide the opportunity to explore the nature 
and correlates of short term compliance with legal directives.
The nature and extent o f  compliance with community penalties
There are National Standards that provide the legal framework for defining and 
enforcing compliance with community penalties. Although the National Standards 
that were operative during this study were the 2002 National Standards and the 2005 
National Standards, several National Standards have been introduced since the first 
standards were introduced in 1992 (Home Office, Department of Health and Welsh 
Office 1992; Home Office 2002; National Probation Service 2005; Ministry of Justice 
2007a).
The National Standards define compliance as attending appointments and complying 
with all the other requirements of the order. For instance, the 2002 National Standards
1
that were operative during this study (National Probation Service 2002) defines non- 
compliance as:
...any failure to attend an appointment or any other failure to comply
with any other requirement of an order... (2002: paragraph D21).
The subsequent standards -  the 2005 and 2007 Standards - retain the above definition 
of non-compliance (National Probation Service 2005; Ministry of Justice 2007).
In terms of enforcing the order, the Standards have been revised five times since 
1992. Thus, the 1995 Standards reduced the number of unacceptable absences before 
breach action may be commenced, from three to two while the subsequent standards 
published in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2007 provided that breach action should be 
commenced following one unacceptable absence.
As noted above, the standards define compliance as attending supervision 
appointments and complying with all the other requirements of the order. Below, an 
examination of the studies that have explored the nature and extent of compliance (as 
defined by the National Standards) reveal that many probationers fail to comply with 
the requirements of the National Standards. These findings highlight the need for 
further insights into the most effective means of securing compliance.
The relevant empirical literature focusing on the subject matter of compliance with 
community penalties is limited although some studies do provide insights into the 
nature of compliance achieved during supervision. Studies show that compliance is 
defined rather narrowly in terms of attendance whilst non-compliance typically 
assumes the form of absenteeism and in most cases, total absconsion (Ellis et al. 
(1996; Mair and May 1997). Farrall (2002a) found that incidents of non-compliance 
mainly concerned the failure to attend probation appointments (‘total absence’) rather 
than the failure to comply with specific requirements of the order.
2
Similarly, Ellis and colleagues (1996) found that other forms of non-compliance were 
ignored. They put it that: -  ‘a build up of failures to attend’ was the most common- 
form of non-compliance (p. 17). Further, Ellis and colleagues hypothesised that the 
focus on absenteeism may stem from the realisation that as a form of non-compliance, 
absenteeism does not impose a heavy evidential burden on the officers during breach 
prosecution compared with other forms of non-compliance. Similarly, Mair and May 
(1997) found that of the percentage (N=243) of offenders warned for non-compliance, 
most (3/4) were warned for failing to attend although only 6% of the sample (mainly 
those aged 16-20) were breached. These studies reveal the narrow conceptualisation 
of compliance which may be attributable to the ease of its detection and prosecution. 
Other forms of non-compliance are less visible and may impose a more onerous 
evidential burden on prosecuting officers in the event of breach action in court.
It is difficult to ascertain the exact extent of non-compliance with community 
penalties with any degree of accuracy given the findings that many incidents of non- 
compliance and the enforcement action taken in these cases are often unrecorded (see 
Farrall 2002a; Mair and May 1997; Rex and Gelsthorpe 2002). This was noted by Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP) in its inspection of enforcement practices 
across ten probation areas (Home Office 2000a). A further obstacle to making an 
accurate estimation of non-compliance rates can be traced to the paucity of official 
data on non-completion rates. It has been officially acknowledged that such data are 
not routinely collated (National Audit Office 2008). To further exacerbate matters, the 
completion figures available may also be subject to question. This is because the 
figures highlight a tendency to officially underestimate the extent of non-compliance. 
For instance, according to an official report released at the start of this study, the 
compliance rate (for all community orders) was 84% as at September 2004 (NPS
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2005). This is different from the 65% rate of completing rehabilitation programmes 
and 35% rates of completion for the Drug Testing and Treatment orders (DTTO- as 
they then were) (NPS 2005). The 84% figure may therefore be an over-estimation of 
the extent of compliance. In addition, the six month time frame covered in the report 
may be inadequate given that several studies including official statistics show that the 
likelihood of non-compliance increases proportionately with the length of the order 
(Home Office 2004). According to official statistics, most probationers typically serve 
orders of an average of twelve to twenty four months (Home Office 2004). Therefore, 
it is possible that the compliance figure cited above excludes many incidents of non- 
compliance that would occur after the initial 6 month period. In addition, the inclusion 
of licensees may further inflate the compliance rates cited in the report. Licensees are 
subject to more lenient enforcement processes (Home Office 2002). They are allowed 
more incidents of non-compliance than their counterparts on community based orders. 
Perhaps linked to this, when the compliance record of probationers (excluding 
licensees) is estimated, the figure drops to an average of approximately 57% in April 
2004 and 65% in December 2004, within the same 6 month time frame (NPS 2005). 
Again these figures fail to account for the higher rates of non-compliance that would 
according to national statistics occur as the order progresses.
Importantly, it is possible that these figures highlight the outcome of the less punitive 
enforcement procedures to which licensees are subject. The finding that they account 
for the high compliance rate cited above lends credence to the position of several 
commentators who argue that punitive enforcement polices only serve to increase the 
likelihood of non-compliance given that they effectively set offenders up to fail 
(Hedderman and Hough 2004).
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Notwithstanding the tendency to underestimate non-compliance rates, studies and 
official reports or audits have consistently shown that many probationers fail to 
comply and that non-compliance is typically in the form of absenteeism or total 
absconsion (Ellis et al. 1996; Ellis and Winstone 2002; Farrall 2002a; Mair and May 
1997; National Probation Service 2004; Underdown 1998). Several unexplained and 
unenforced absences were recorded by the survey reported by Mair and May (1997). 
Similarly, of the representative sample of 199 probationers in the study of the impact 
of probation on probationers’ lives by Farrall (2002b), 20% n=40, did not maintain 
contact with their probation officers for extended periods of up to several months and 
over a year. Several were out of touch and untraceable for the duration of the imposed 
order.
More recently, the high non-completion rates associated with accredited group work 
programmes have been documented (National Probation Service 2004; Hollin et al. 
2004). For instance, an evaluation of the ‘Think First Programme’ revealed that data 
on reconviction rates released by the first 18-24 months were questionable because of 
high dropout rates (Ellis and Winstone 2002; Home Office 2000a). Likewise, the 
study by Dawson and his colleagues (2005) found that of the 199 probationers 
participating in the ‘Cognitive Skills Booster Programme’ piloted across 14 probation 
areas in 2005, 56 dropped out of the programme whilst 9 failed to start. Of the 56, 
only 7 were formally breached in court. The authors put it that: ‘several sites, 
particularly in the community, experienced problems with attrition’ (2005:18). They 
also noted that the high attrition rates observed is typical of other Offending 
Behaviour Programmes. More recently, a study by the Oxford University Probation 
Studies Unit between 2000 and 2001 in 3 probation areas examined the reconviction 
rates of the probationers participating in the accredited ‘Think First’ program.
5
The study found that of the 650 probationers with additional requirements to attend
the program, almost half (42%) did not commence the court mandated program.
Added to this, there was a 28% attrition level, whilst only 28% completed the
program. Importantly, the study found that the reconviction rates were significantly
lower among the completers even twelve months post completion. This was not
affected by predicted risk of reconviction (NPS 2006; see also Hollin et al. 2004).
Indeed a comprehensive evaluation of accredited programs also found high rates of
non-completion among the probationers (Hollin et. al 2004). Recognising the
problems posed by attrition rates and reflecting on the ‘What Works’ initiative that
heralded the introduction of the accredited programs, Underdown (2001) states that,:
A central challenge to the probation ‘What Works’ initiative lies, I 
believe, not so much in the service’s ability to use these evidenced 
methods with skill and commitment, but rather in an issue central to 
rehabilitative work in a community setting, the issue of compliance and 
engagement’ (2001:118).
The high rates of attrition noted in the accredited programs as discussed above may 
have been linked to the expedited implementation of the ‘What Works’ initiative in 
which the relational element of supervision was overlooked as was the effective 
application of the skills identified as central to the effective implementation of 
accredited programs. Attrition rates may also be linked to the possible impact of rigid 
enforcement practices (Raynor and Vanstone 2007). More recent evaluations have 
since revealed improved completion rates and outcomes (NPS 2005; Raynor and 
Vanstone 2007). Discussing the link between the punitive enforcement framework 
and the attrition rates associated with accredited programs, Raynor and Vanstone note 
that:
...a significant obstacle to the ‘What Works’ initiatives was the 
National Probation Service’s commitment to rigorous enforcement 
and the reduction of practitioners’ discretion to show flexibility
6
even in low-risk cases or with offenders whose lifestyles were so 
chaotic that the only realistic target would be improved compliance 
rather than full compliance’ (2007:79-80).
Meanwhile, high rates of non-completion have also been observed in schemes 
incorporating strict enforcement strategies. This draws attention to the viability of the 
deterrent strategy underpinning these schemes. The Home Office sponsored study by 
Partridge and colleagues (2005) evaluated the implementation of the ICCP (an 
intensive community service scheme designed for young offenders aged between 18 
and 20 years). The scheme involves the enhanced monitoring and control of 
probationers in the community using curfew and electronic monitoring devices. It also 
involves a ‘swift’ response’ to non-compliance (Partridge et al. 2005). The study 
sampled 433 probationers sentenced between April 2003 and March 2004. The figure 
represents 86% of all those sentenced to the order in the time frame. The study found 
that only less than half of the participants (48%) were still attending appointments at 
the end of the study. 60% of the 26% breached involved frequent non-compliance.
As mentioned above, official audits also reveal the extent of non-compliance (see 
Hedderman 1999; Hedderman and Heamden 2000; HMIP 1993; 2003). A three stage 
audit of enforcement practices sponsored by the now defunct Association of Chief 
Officers of Probation (ACOP) in 1999, was a wide ranging survey of enforcement 
practices across the 54 probation services (as they then were, now 42 areas since 1 
April 2001 and the introduction of the National Probation Service-NPS). The 1995 
National Standards were in operation during the first audit which examined the case 
records of 10,008 probationers (Hedderman 1999; Home Office 1995). The 1995 
National Standards provided that breach action should be commenced following two 
unacceptable absences.
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The audit was conducted by Hedderman (1999) and it explored inter alia: the extent 
to which breach practices mirrored the requirements of the National Standards that 
breach action should normally follow a third unacceptable absence. The audit found 
that only approximately half the probationers attended their appointments with no 
unacceptable failures. This figure would therefore include those who had been absent 
at some point but were judged to have a reasonable excuse for absence (Hedderman 
1999). The second national audit of enforcement also initiated by ACOP (Hedderman 
and Heamden 2000) analysed case records covering 4,386 cases in all probation 
services (54). The cases were similar to those included in the first audit. Its aim was to 
examine any changes to practice in the six months following the initial audit. Similar 
to the contexts in which the initial audit was conducted, the 1995 National Standards 
were in operation. Comparisons were made between the findings of this audit and 
those of the first audit. It found no significant differences in the compliance rates 
observed in both audits, suggesting that compliance rates were again found to be quite 
low. Furthermore, a higher number of cases had at least one unacceptable absence in 
the second audit - 54% compared with 49%. One explanation offered for this apparent 
increase in the rate of unacceptable absences was the increased propensity to define 
more cases of absence as unacceptable (Hedderman and Heamden 2000). In the 
absence of further evidence to substantiate this contention, it is plausible to suggest 
that the decline may reflect general patterns of attendance and the reluctance to 
enforce compliance to the degree required by the National Standards. Indeed it had 
been acknowledged that changes to practice proposed by the previous audit had not 
been fully implemented at the time of the second audit. As such, enforcement practice 
could not have been closely linked to the revised enforcement policies.
The third national audit was conducted during the operation of the 2000 National 
Standards (Hedderman and Heamden 2000). The aim was to uncover the extent of 
compliance with the new enforcement arrangements. The then 54 services participated 
in the audit and 8,924 cases commencing probation orders, community sentences or 
licenses during September 2000 were included in the study. The audit revealed only 
a slight (4%) increase in the proportion of offenders that kept their first appointment. 
This was attributed to the newly created requirements to notify offenders of their first 
appointment before they leave court. Compared with the second audit, there was only 
a slight increase (2%) in the proportion of offenders who attended all appointments or 
provided a reason for absence which was judged to be acceptable. Likewise, only a 
4% increase from the 'compliance rate' recorded by the second audit could be 
observed in the third audit. Based on the more restrictive requirements introduced by 
the 2000 standards (see Home Office 2000b), this figure was reduced to a 3% increase 
when compared with the previous audit. Therefore, the effect of the new standards 
was such that it resulted in a reduction in the rates at which offenders could be said to 
have met the standards' compliance requirements.
Studies exploring the supervision of Community Service Orders11 also reveal low
compliance rates. Drawing on the study of Community Service Order pilots by Pease
and colleagues (1975), Pease and McWilliams (1980) observed that:
In practice it is clear that few offenders sentenced to community service 
appear to have a real intention of working off the hours which the court 
has ordered. It is also clear that not working off the hours is possible 
(1980.92).
This apparent reluctance to comply was accompanied by the reluctance of officers to 
pursue breach action although it remains unclear whether there were any links 
between the two.
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The foregoing highlight the nature of compliance achieved in practice and the extent 
of non-compliance. Compliance typically assumes a unilateral and narrowly defined 
form - attendance. Furthermore, many probationers fail to comply with the 
requirements of their orders. Therefore, emergent from the above examination of the 
background to this study is the need for further empirical and theoretical insights into 
the most effective mechanisms for encouraging compliance. Developing an effective 
mechanism for encouraging compliance with community penalties represents the 
empirical agenda underpinning the current study.
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Thesis Structure
The thesis comprises four parts. Part one provides a review of the relevant literature. 
It comprises two Chapters. Chapter one explores the wider structural contexts of 
contemporary probation policy in order to provide a detailed account of the theoretical 
and ideological terrain from which current supervision policy emerged. Chapter two 
extends this exploration of the extant literature. The Chapter focuses on the 
conceptual framework underpinning the study as developed by Bottoms (2001). As 
such, drawing on the relevant literature base, the Chapter explores how routine, habit, 
constraint, normative and instrumental mechanisms may operate in the context of 
securing compliance with community penalties.
Part two of the thesis details the processes of data collection and analysis. It comprises 
Chapters three to five. Chapter three describes the methodological framework adopted 
by the study, highlighting its roots in interactionism and the emphasis on the links 
between social interactions and human behaviour. Also explored in the Chapter are 
the nature of the sample achieved and implications for empirical generalisability. 
Chapter four describes the nine categories that emerged from the three phases of 
iterative data collection and analysis and also from the follow up study. The Chapter 
examines in detail the analytic processes through which the nine categories were 
developed. In keeping with the demands of reflexivity crucial for enhancing the 
intellectual rigor of qualitative studies, Chapter five provides an account of the 
analytic devices that aided the processes of developing the nine emergent categories 
detailed in Chapter four.
In Part three of the thesis, the emergent theoretical framework and the processes of its 
development are examined. Part three comprises Chapters six to nine. In Chapter six, 
the nine emergent categories were integrated into the three key categories that
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represent the emergent conceptual framework for understanding community penalties. 
The three key categories were conceptualised as: reacting to the formal rules’, 
confronting unpredictability’ and ‘adaptation techniques’. The Chapter also explores 
how a core category or the central theme underpinning the emergent conceptual 
framework was identified during selective coding. The Chapter demonstrates the 
conceptual linkages between the core category and the three key categories. The next 
three Chapters explore in detail the three emergent categories. Thus Chapter seven 
details the processes of reacting to the formal rules, Chapter eight examines the 
situational and structural contradictions that underpin the officers’ actions in 
confronting the unpredictability of the clients. Chapter nine details how the officers 
react to violations and how the officers’ reactions shape the nature of compliance 
achieved. The Chapter also examines the adaptation techniques the probationers’ 
devise in order to align their behaviour with the definition of compliance prescribed 
by the officers. In Chapters six to nine, illustrative data extracts and case studies are 
provided.
Part four of the thesis reflects on the study’s findings and the methodology employed. 
In Chapter ten, an attempt is made to juxtapose the study’s findings with that of the 
extant literature in order to highlight areas of consistency and also the new insights 
developed by the study. An account of how the central research question posed by the 
study was answered is also provided in this Chapter. Furthermore, the Chapter 
discusses the possible policy implications posed by the study’s findings. Finally, 
Chapter eleven evaluates the methodology employed by the study. It draws attention 
to the potential strengths and weaknesses of this methodology. It also provides an 
account of how the quality of the study can be ascertained whilst recognising that any 
judgements as to the quality of any study should proceed with due reference to the
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study’s philosophical position. Further, Chapter eleven outlines the efforts made to 
maintain ethical standards. The Chapter also identifies areas for future research.
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PART ONE: 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter One: Enforcing community penalties: the social and political contexts
Compliance is negotiated within social and political contexts. As such, an exploration 
of the legislative changes and other developments that presaged the National 
Standards governing the supervision of community penalties should facilitate a 
contextualised understanding of the experiences of probationers and their officers in 
securing compliance.
1.1: The diverse ideological bases of current policy
The theoretical and ideological basis for current enforcement policy can be traced to 
the convergence of neo-conservatism, populism and ‘penological pragmatism’ 
(Cavadino and Dignan 1997, quoted in Brownlee 1998.7; Cavadino and Dignan
2002). In the well documented shift from penal modernism111 (Hudson 2002) to late 
modernity1'', a populist neo-conservative ideology emerged in the 1970s. It set in 
motion a series of developments that culminated in the official reformulation of the 
traditional ethos of the service from a predominantly welfarist orientation to a more 
punitive orientation (see for example, Brake and Hale 1992; Cesaroni and Doob 2003; 
Downes and Morgan 2002; Garland 2001; Raynor and Vanstone 2002; Young 2002,
2003). The effort to reformulate the ethos of the service was more marked in official 
discourses about probation policy. However, at the level of actual policy making it 
appears that there has been a fusion of ‘populist punitiveness’ and the more muted 
‘penological pragmatism’ both of which underlie the development of restrictive 
community based penalties (see Bottoms 1995). Within this ideological framework, 
‘predominantly pragmatic’ sentencing polices emerged to enhance diversion from 
custody in order to reduce the fiscal costs of rising prison numbers (Cavadino and 
Dignan 2002; Brake and Hale 1991). Therefore, although political rhetoric was 
centred on the need for enhanced punitiveness, this rhetoric was devised for public
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consumption and politically expediency. The rhetoric coexisted with more muted but 
pragmatic diversionary strategies designed to implement the official drive to reduce 
the fiscal costs associated with rising prison numbers (see also Cavadino and Dignan 
2002).
1.1.1: Pragmatism: prioritising diversion
As the arbiter of rehabilitative interventions, the probation service was at the forefront 
of the search for viable alternatives to custody. It has been argued that in order to 
foster this role within an increasingly punitive policy climate it appeared imperative to 
render community penalties more punitive in order to ensure their credibility with the 
courts. Therefore, to sustain the pragmatic agenda, efforts were made to enhance the 
diversionary potential of community penalties (Cavadino and Dignan 2002). For 
instance, the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1982 introduced the possibility of more 
demanding requirements such as attendance at specified centres, and more punitive 
enforcement strategies. Further, the CJA 1991 incorporated a principled approach to 
sentencing. It sought to restrict the use of custody and solidified the diversionary role 
of the service (Raynor and Vanstone 2002). Importantly, it transformed community 
penalties from alternatives to punishments to demanding punishments in their own 
right (Brownlee 1998; Raynor and Vanstone 2002). As such, in current enforcement 
policy and probation policy in general, a prima facie punitive stance designed to fulfil 
the populist agenda coexists with a more muted pragmatic policy making agenda.
1.1.2: Contemporary policy developments
Other policy developments that presaged the current policy arrangements include the 
New Labour government’s modernising agenda that extended the managerialist 
agenda of its predecessor. Thus, current policy incorporates the hallmarks of 
managerialism: demands for accountability and standardised practices.
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Also underlying current policy are reduced professional autonomy and increasing
centralisation (Hopkinson and Rex 2003). Commentators argue that the managerialist
agenda focuses on outputs rather than outcomes (Humphreys and Pease 1992; Raynor
and Miles 2007) or on the prioritisation of ‘quantifiable behavioural modification’
over actual behavioural modification (Nellis 2006: 53). In a recent performance audit
of probation practice it was noted that ‘the probation service’s performance targets do
not focus sufficiently on outcomes’ (National Audit Office 2008:2). The audit
recommended that performance targets should also incorporate:
...how well offenders are being managed and the extent to which 
outcomes of community orders are achieved (p.6).
The focus on quantifiable performance or ‘outputs’ at the expense of ‘outcomes’, has
been linked to the managerialist concern to enhance public sector performance in
order to ensure cost-effectiveness. Humphrey and Pease point out that with
managerialism, effectiveness appears to be equated with cost effectiveness at the
expense of other elements of practice:
... in the 1980s, there has been a tendency for public sector organisations 
which have managed to reduce their operational costs to be defined as 
effective, without consideration of the corresponding impact on wider 
matters of service quality (1992.32).
It is argued that the introduction of the key performance indicators (KPIs) traversing 
several aspects of practice is a manifestation of the managerialist concern to enhance 
performance (Hough 2006). For instance, in enforcement practice in 1998/1999, a 
new Key Performance Indicator (KPI) was introduced to measure the service’s 
performance in achieving the target of enforcement action before a third unacceptable 
failure in 90% of appropriate cases (see also, Home Office 2000c). The official focus 
on enforcement rates as the indices of effectiveness creates a paradox in which the 
failure to successfully engage offenders in their orders is officially endorsed as 
effective practice in the narrow focus on effectiveness. Moreover, since the
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implementation of the first National Standards in 1992, the HMIP has used the 
Standards to measure the quality of aspects of the Services' work including 
enforcement practice. Also incorporated in contemporary policy is the evidence based 
approach to community supervision. The approach is based on social learning theory 
and the belief that behavioural and attitudinal change can be achieved by 
reconditioning predisposing cognitive deficiencies linked to offending behaviour 
(McGuire and Priestley 1995; McGuire 2002; Hopkins-Burke 2005).
The interrelated discourses of risk management and public protection also underlie 
current enforcement policy. The risk focussed approach reflects wider social and 
cultural trends. It has been traced to developments in the late modem era which led to 
cultural changes and the reorganisation of community and social relations culminating 
in a preoccupation with reducing risks and excluding those classified as ‘dangerous’ 
(see Feeley and Simon 1994; Garland 2001; Loader and Sparks 2002). Whatever the 
reason for the prevailing concern to minimise risks, the discourses of risk 
management and public protection were formalised in penal policy with the 
publication of the White Paper, Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public in 1990 
(Home Office 1990; see also McNeill and Robinson 2004). Kemshall and Wood note 
that:
By the close of the twentieth century risk had come to preoccupy much 
of the probation services agenda. This reflected increased policy, media 
and public concern with high-risk offenders, and most notably sex- 
offenders, followed by a raft of legislation to deal more proactively with 
those deemed to present the highest risk of harm. As a result, policy 
trends and legislation had firmly enmeshed the Probation Service in a 
new penology of risk (2007:381).
Manifestations of the focus on risk management in contemporary policy include the
Sex Offender Register introduced by the Sex Offender Act 1997, the Sex Offender
Order introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and the Multi Agency Public
Protection Panels (see also Kemshall and Wood 2007). Added to these is the
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development of sophisticated risk assessment tools including the Offender Groups 
Reconviction Scale (OGRS) risk prediction tool, the Level of Service Inventory 
Revised (LSI-R) tool, the Assessment Case management Evaluation (ACE) and more 
recently, the Offender Assessment System (OASYs) tool. Over time these assessment 
tools have evolved into tools that may be applied to the more productive aim of 
ensuring that interventions are adequately tailored to assessed criminogenic needs, 
risk of harm and risk of re-offending (see generally, Aubrey and Hough 1997; Raynor 
et al. 2000; Mair et al. 2006; Bonta and Wormith 2007).
An additional policy development that is central to contemporary practice is the 
formal requirement that the service should engage in partnership working 
arrangements with external agencies and other organisations within the voluntary 
sector. Again several commentators identify links between these policy developments 
and wider social concerns. They posit that the multi agency criminal justice 
partnerships represent part of the responsibilisation approach adopted by late modem 
governments (Garland 2001; Minkes et al. 2005). According to the responsibilisation 
thesis, several developments since the advent of the late modem era prompted a 
growing realisation that crime reduction cannot be effectively managed solely by the 
state through its criminal agencies amidst rising crime rates and empirical studies 
questioning the effectiveness of criminal agencies. Consequently, the state sought to 
undermine the hitherto unquestioned professionalism of criminal justice practitioners. 
Professionalism and state control of crime reduction matters were replaced with a 
neo-conservative criminal justice approach to crime control in which the state 
underemphasises its role but extends the responsibility for crime reduction to the 
wider community (Garland 2001; Minkes et al. 2005). With neo-liberalism, the 
macro-structural factors associated with crime are ignored in the attempt to locate the
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causes of crime within the family or within society in general (see also Brake and 
Hale 1992). The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provided the statutory basis for 
partnership or multi agency collaborations. Local authorities were mandated to form 
multi agency working partnerships that should have representation from criminal 
agencies including the probation service and also from sections of the community. 
Detailed above are the social and political contexts from which contemporary 
probation policy emerged. It appears that contemporary policy changes reflect wider 
social developments that have impacted on perceptions of crime and its management. 
The current enforcement framework incorporates provisions that reflect the rudiments 
of contemporary penal policy particularly, punitiveness, pragmatism, managerialism 
and risk management/public protection.
Having placed the current enforcement policy in its wider socio-political contexts, an 
examination of the nature of probation enforcement since the introduction of the first 
national standards is pursued below.
1.2: Streamlining enforcement: The National Standards
Since 1992, several National Standards of general application incorporating 
enforcement requirements have been introduced (Home Office, Department of Health 
and Welsh Office 1992; Home Office 2000b; Home Office 2002; Home Office 2005; 
NOMS 2007a)v. As mentioned above, the standards reflect wider policy concerns 
including populism, pragmatism, managerialism, risk management/public protection 
and partnership working. Successively, the standards have been become increasingly 
prescriptive and restrictive. They are prescriptive because in the quest for 
accountability, they seek to streamline supervision practices by curtailing the use of 
discretion. For instance, although the 1992 standards permitted the judicious use of 
discretion, the 1995 standards were more prescriptive limiting the use of discretion by
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requiring the intervention of a manager in appropriate cases. Furthermore, the
standards provide for detailed recordings of enforcement decision making.
In pursuing their restrictive agenda, the standards also set out the conditions for
mandatory enforcement. As mentioned earlier, whilst the 1995 standards reduced the
number of unacceptable absences before breach action from three unacceptable
absences to two unacceptable absences within any twelve month period, subsequent
standards (the 2000 standards - revised in 2002, the 2005 standards and the 2007
Standards) permit only one unacceptable absence before breach action. Importantly,
the generic order introduced by the 2005 Standards may encourage sentencers to
impose a combination of orders that in effect, impose excessive restrictions and
demands on offenders, thus potentially increasing the chances of failure. In predicting
this possibility, Brownlee responds to earlier attempts to create a generic order with
the statement that:
A further problem is the danger that in an effort to make non-custodial 
disposals appear convincingly punitive by 'stacking up' community 
penalties in ever more demanding combinations, sentencers will create 
the conditions under which failure and breach are more likely than not 
(1998.133).
Extending these punitive provisions, Schedule 8 of the CJA 2003 revokes disciplinary 
breach action. Under previous arrangements, the courts were permitted to simply 
reprimand the probationer for failing to comply with their order. Schedule 8 provides 
that in responding to breach, the courts must either amend the order by adding further 
requirements or by extending its duration, or, revoke the order and re-sentence the 
probationer. The courts are no longer permitted to ‘take no action, issue a warning or 
impose a fine’ without punitively amending the order (see also NOMs 2005: section 
2). Consequently, previous efforts to ensure that the offender was able to complete 
their order may be undermined by the new arrangements. Indeed, in the study by Ellis
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and his colleagues (1996:12), most of the officers described the efficacy of 
disciplinary breaches as a harmless yet effective deterrent. Disciplinary breaches were 
used for almost all cases of first breach. The recommendation of a revocation of the 
order was typically reserved for cases where the order had broken down or for 
persistent incidents of breach. It is possible that the decision to remove this 
disciplinary measure represents a pragmatic attempt to reduce breach rates. It may be 
that probation officers are being implicitly encouraged to minimize the rate at which 
they initiate breach given that court hearings for a simple reprimand (disciplinary 
breach) may not be a cost effective approach to enforcement/1 High breach rates may 
also engender ‘net widening’ where more probationers become vulnerable to more 
severe sanctions for minor incidents of breach.
Meanwhile, by requiring celeritous/11 certain and severe punishment for non-
compliance, the standards rely on the deterrent mechanism of compliance.
Furthermore, reflecting wider policy trends, since the introduction of the 1995
standards, risk management and public protection have superseded earlier concerns to
protect the probationer’s rights. The concern with risk management was extended by
the 2005 standards which provided for the categorisation of probationers across tiers
of predicted risk levels. The standards specifically targeted those classed as liigh or
very high risk' for increased surveillance and punitiveness:
For Tier 3 and 4 cases, it is expected that the combination of all the 
requirements will lead to a significant level of contact and restriction on 
liberty' (National Standards 2005.14).
Added to enhanced surveillance, and departing from the previous standards, the 2005 
Standards provided that risk assessments should be prioritized over assessments of 
needs or other difficulties that may underlie offending. The most recent standards 
published in 2007, retains the restrictive and a prescriptive provisions of the previous
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standards although they permit a more individualised enforcement approach. They 
encourage officers to employ compliance strategies such as home visits and reminders 
using their discretion in any given case.
The deterrent strategy underpinning the restrictive provisions is not underpinned by 
empirical evidence of the effectiveness of deterrent mechanisms of compliance 
(Bottoms 2001). In addition, it is quite possible that onerous reporting and 
enforcement requirements may engender higher rates of non-compliance particularly 
where a strict enforcement approach is not balanced against compliance strategies that 
take into account several circumstances that may affect compliance (Underdown 
2001). The prescriptive format has been rejected by several commentators who posit 
that such an approach would encourage covert discretionary practices (Vass 1984). 
Nevertheless, incorporated in the enforcement framework is the implicit presumption 
that deterrent enforcement will encourage compliance. However, as noted in Chapter 
one, studies show that many probationers fail to comply with their orders despite the 
prescriptive and restrictive enforcement framework.
There is therefore an apparent disparity between policy objectives and actual 
outcomes and this disparity highlights two issues. Firstly, policies do not translate into 
practice in any straightforward manner. They have to be implemented. Therefore to 
understand this disparity between policy objectives and outcomes there is a need to 
examine the practical implementation of policy requirements. This pertains directly to 
the activities of the two parties, namely the probation officers and the probationers. 
The second issue that may provide insights into the nature of this disparity rests on the 
actual effectiveness of the current prescriptive and restrictive framework governing 
supervision. The question implied in this is: if it is found that policies are 
implemented as intended by policy, how effective is the deterrent framework in
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ensuring compliance? Both issues are central to this study. They direct attention to the 
nature and effectiveness of enforcement policy and practice. The literature on the 
effectiveness of the enforcement framework is explored in more detail in Chapter 
Two. Meanwhile, a detailed overview of the relevant literature on enforcement and 
supervision experiences will be pursued next. The empirical literature may provide 
insights into the practical implementation of policies.
1.3: Reflecting on enforcement practice: Key themes from the extant literature
As noted above, only a few studies have explored the subject matter of compliance 
and enforcement. In most of the studies cited here, both concepts have tended to be 
peripheral to analysis. Nevertheless, the studies provide useful insights.
1.3.1: Deviating from policy-prioritising welfarism over correctionalism 
Studies consistently show that officers are typically reluctant to apply strict 
enforcement polices. This represents a tendency to depart from policy provisions and 
may contribute to the noted disparity between policy objectives and outcomes. 
However there is limited evidence of a link between strict enforcement and 
compliance. Indeed the evidence points to the reverse and this is considered in more 
detail in the next chapter. Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the reluctance to enforce 
orders as strictly as prescribed by policy and also, the tendency to prioritise the 
provision of help and support have been noted by several studies. In the 1980s Willis 
(1983) for instance, found that probationers and their officers tended to focus upon 
addressing socio-economic difficulties such as accommodation, employment and 
family related difficulties. There seemed to be a general reluctance to enforce the 
terms of the order rigidly. Studies exploring the supervision of Community Service 
Orders in the 1980s also found evidence of this reluctance to enforce orders as strictly 
as prescribed by policy. Pease and McWilliams (1980) explored the enforcement of
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Community Service Orders. They suggested that although there was some 
acknowledgment of the need to enforce Community Service Orders if  the order was to 
retain some credibility with the courts and fulfil its diversionary possibilities, the 
traditional disinclination of many officers to enforce breach was evident in the low 
rates of breach despite high rates of absenteeism. Vass’s (1984) study of the 
enforcement of Community Service Orders also found a general reluctance to enforce 
compliance. He employed an overt participant observation technique in an attempt to 
explore the interactional contexts and experiences of supervision and how these affect 
outcomes. He found that enforcement was a matter of constant negotiations between 
officers and their supervisees. There was a general tendency to overlook many 
violations in order to avoid breach processes and the further assimilation of the 
offender into the criminal system.
It therefore appears that this reluctance to enforce was very much maintained during 
the 1970s and 1980s despite the political upheavals that culminated in the shift 
towards correctionalism as noted above. Before this shift, enforcement was a marginal 
aspect of supervision practice. The ‘rehabilitative ideal’ was intact and the primary 
objective was to ‘treat’ or ‘rehabilitate’ the probationer. Strict enforcement may have 
been at odds with the prevailing orthodoxy. Thus, there was an apparent lack of 
concern with streamlining enforcement practice both at policy, organizational or 
practice levels and this may be traced to the humanitarian principles (Bochel 1976) or 
the moralistic principles (Mair 1997) that underpinned probation supervision in its 
early formations. Nevertheless, studies show that at the level of practice, there has 
been a sustained concern with providing a social work oriented service even after the 
implementation of the first National Standards in 1992 which sought to streamline 
enforcement practice and introduce more punitive requirements. Ellis and his
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colleagues (1996) found that officers were reluctant to enforce strictly in most cases. 
For instance, in cases involving substance dependent probationers participating in 
rehabilitative programs, officers were reluctant to enforce as strictly as required, 
believing breach action to be counterproductive. Equally, an internal audit of 
enforcement practice conducted after the implementation of the more restrictive 
National Standards in 1995, found a general reluctance to enforce compliance 
(Hedderman 1999). In cases involving more than three unacceptable absences, the 
audit found that breach was not initiated as a 'matter of course' as would be expected 
in line with the requirements of the National Standards. Indeed, three cases involving 
more than 10 unacceptable absences did not attract breach action (Hedderman 1999). 
1.3.2: Prioritising diversion over enforcement
Apart from welfarist concerns, other factors may explain the noted reluctance to 
enforce orders strictly. As mentioned earlier, post-1970s saw the advent of neo­
conservatism, populism and penological pragmatism. Diversion from custody became 
a key policy objective with the service occupying a pivotal role. Raynor’s (1988) 
study of an intensive probation project with diversionary aims found an initial 
tendency to recommend a custodial sentence where offenders were reconvicted for 
breach. This practice was subsequently revised in favour of more diversionary 
practices which sought to avert the ‘up-tariffing’ potential of the initial approach. ‘Up- 
tariffing’ would have undermined the diversionary objectives of the project. Decision 
making was left to the courts although the officers were inclined to suggest a more 
lenient alternative where the probationer had indicted a willingness to comply. In all, 
Raynor observed that:
There was no automatic punitive response towards those whose 
compliance was unsatisfactory, and the court was prepared to listen to 
constructive suggestions’ (1988.106).
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The study suggests that diversionary aims were prioritised at policy and practice 
levels over strict enforcement practices that could impinge on the successful diversion 
of probationers from custody.
1.3.3: Convoluted breach processes
Administrative inconvenience associated with the breach process may also contribute 
to the reluctance to enforce requirements. Vass (1990.9) found that officers were in 
general, reluctant to initiate breach proceedings and that 'considerations of time and 
expense also led to some delay or avoidance in initiating breach proceedings'. 
However the general tendency to overlook many violations in order to avoid 
convoluted breach processes was tempered with the effort to avoid the further 
assimilation of the offender into the criminal system. This was central to the 
negotiations that underpinned community service supervision.
Added to the reluctance to enforce orders, studies have revealed the significant degree 
to which officers apply their discretion in all aspects of supervision including 
enforcement.
1.3.4: Discretionary enforcement
It appears that until the publication of the National Standards, the use of discretion
was implicitly endorsed at policy and organisational levels (Hedderman and Hough
2000). Indeed, the National Standards 1992 provided room for professional discretion
in enforcement (Home Office, Department of Health and Welsh Office 1992). For
instance, one of the four objectives set out by the standards was to:
...build on the skill and expertise of practitioners and service 
managers...by enabling professional judgment to be exercised within a 
framework of accountability.
It also recognised that;
No two offenders are identical. It is essential that supervision takes 
adequate account of the individual needs and circumstances of each 
person (1992.3).
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It is the argued that 1992 National Standards sought to: 'regularise rather than 
eliminate the exercise of professional judgment in dealing with absences and other 
failures to comply' (Drakeford 1993: 151). Subsequent standards have since reversed 
this trend, although the most recent Standards published in 2007 appear to encourage 
more individualised enforcement (NOMs 2007a).
Meanwhile, the studies conducted before the introduction of the first National 
Standards highlight the excessive professional discretion underpinning enforcement 
practice. Lawson (1978) found the widespread use of professional discretion and the 
tendency to resort to breach as a last resort and after due consideration of all 
extenuating circumstances. Similarly, earlier studies had found inconsistencies in 
practice marked by the widespread use of discretion, with little attempt at coercion or 
control (Folkard et al. 1974).
It appears that discretionary practices survived the introduction of the more restrictive 
National Standards. Studies and external official audits reveal that this is the case 
(Ellis et al. 1996; Mair and May 1997; HMIP 1993; HMIP 2003). The audit by the 
Home Affairs Select Committee on Alternatives to Custody for the House of 
Commons in 1998 found widespread discretion in enforcement (House of Commons
1998). Similarly, internal audits of enforcement reinforce these findings (Hedderman
1999).
Studies also suggest that probation officers tend to apply their discretion to a greater 
extent than the Community Service Officers. They are also more likely to offer more 
flexible responses to non-compliance than the Community Service Officers (Ellis et al 
1996; Hedderman 1999). For instance, Mair and colleagues (1994) found conflicts 
between probation and community service officers implementing the orders. The 
latter rejected the perceived leniency of the former whilst probation officers were
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critical of the purported severity of the Community Service Officers. Nevertheless, 
there is empirical support for the contention that the supervision of Community 
Service Orders has also been subject to widespread discretion (Pease 1977; Vass 
1986).
1.3.5: Disparities in supervision practice
Discretionary enforcement would necessarily engender disparities in practice. Mair 
and May (1997:1) state that: ‘wide diversity of practice’ has traditionally been the 
hallmark of probation practice. There is significant empirical support for this 
observation. For instance, The Home Office sponsored study by Pease and colleagues 
(1975) examined the implementation of CSOs in the six trial areas, Shropshire, 
Nottingham, Inner London, Durham, South West Lancashire and Kent. In the pilot 
studies, they found significant variations in supervision and breach practice. There 
were disparities across areas pertaining to what constitutes an acceptable explanation 
for absence. Likewise, the Home Office commissioned study by Ellis and colleagues
(1996) explored the methods of securing compliance with Community Service Orders, 
Probation Orders and Combination Orders (as they then were). It also examined 
breach decision making and the breach process. The study was conducted during the 
operation of the 1992 National Standards. However, it found also widespread 
disparities in breach practice across the five probation areas studied. This was the case 
‘within and between probation areas’ (Ellis et al. 1996:12).
Although enforcement practices are subject to professional discretion and would tend 
to vary across jurisdictions, the studies also suggest that there are several conditions 
under which breach action would be almost certain. Persistent absenteeism with no 
notification provided would usually attract breach action. The failure to attend the first 
appointment also increases the likelihood of breach. In all, a positive relationship
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between both parties should ensure greater flexibility particularly in cases where the 
officer can (utilising their discretion) confidently identify non-compliance as an 
atypical behavioural pattern (see in particular, Ellis et al. 1996; Hedderman 1999). 
1.3.6: The officer's biography
Studies also suggest that the personal attributes of the officer may affect the nature of 
supervision and outcomes. The older and longer serving officer’s experiences may 
equip them with interpersonal and other skills required for effective negotiation 
(Bottoms 1999). Other factors that may potentially affect the quality of supervision 
include the officers' background, general life experiences, and experiences of working 
with other clients, personal values, experiences, 'practice wisdom', 'organizational 
expectations' and the pressures to operate in certain ways (Trotter 1996.6). Meta- 
analytic studies have also found links between individual officer skills and outcomes, 
highlighting that specific skills are more effective in ensuring the effective 
engagement of the client (Dowden and Andrews 2004). Furthermore, younger staff 
lacking experience may be more inclined to resort to formal and more restrictive 
disciplinary procedures when confronted with minor issues of non-compliance. 
Likewise, the newly qualified officers trained under the new style training 
arrangements may employ strict enforcement measures more readily than their more 
experienced counterparts. The new training arrangements introduced in 1997/98 
effectively removed the Social Work component of probation training replacing the 
Diploma in Social Work with the Diploma in Probation Studies. It has been argued 
that the new training style may be too focused on contemporary policy prescriptions. 
For instance, the inflexible application of rules may be encouraged in training in order 
ensure that managerialist, punitive and other policy objectives can be translated in 
practice (see Nellis 2003). However, there is evidence to suggest that the newly
29
trained officers may not necessarily be committed to the rigid application of the 
prescriptive enforcement provisions incorporated in current policy. Treadwell’s 
(2006) study explored the impact of the new training arrangements on supervision 
practice and found that the orientation of newly trained officers is not as avowedly 
correctionalist as predicted although the managerialist influence on the new training 
arrangements may be such that the quest to preserve job security encourages rigidity 
at the expense of reflective and theoretically informed practice (Treadwell 2006). 
Nevertheless, variations in officer biographies may fuel inconsistencies in practice.
The studies cited above suggest that policy directions do not necessarily translate into 
practice directly. The studies reveal several factors that may mediate the direct 
application of policy requirements. These include the tendency to prioritise a welfarist 
approach, pragmatic diversionary objectives, the administrative inconvenience 
associated with breach action, discretionary decision making, disparities in practice 
and differing officer attributes.
1.4: The probationer’s perspective
This section examines the empirical literature on the probationers’ perceptions and 
experiences of supervision. The literature may provide insights into the nature of 
compliance and may also illuminate the factors that contribute to the documented 
disparity between policy objectives and outcomes.
1.4.1: Positive evaluations
Studies show that many probationers expect practical, therapeutic and other support 
during supervision (Davies 1969; Willis 1981). For many, this is perceived to be the 
primary objective of the order. Perhaps this explains in part the findings that 
probationers would tend to offer positive evaluations of their officers and of their 
supervision experiences. Rex’s (1999) qualitative study sampled 21 officers and 60
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probationers in order to explore the possible impact of supervision on desistance. Her 
study was conducted in the context of the newly established punitive policies 
accompanying the introduction of the CJA 1991. She examined how the shift towards 
punitiveness impacted on the rehabilitative objective of the probation order as 
perceived by the officers and the probationers. Rex found that (88%) of the 
probationers defined the central role of their officer in welfarist terms. Only three 
probationers failed to define the officer’s role as being primarily welfare based and 
rehabilitative. Furthermore, Rex (1999) found that 68% of her sample offered positive 
evaluations of supervision. Ford and his colleagues (1997) also found positive 
evaluations of supervision among the probationers sampled in their study. The 
positive evaluations may have been influenced by the underlying belief that the 
objective of the service is primarily welfarist. The study revealed a clear expectation 
of support during supervision. Most responses (87%) identified securing rehabilitation 
as the key role of the officer. Reinforcing the view that the officer’s brief is not 
punitive but rehabilitative, most of the probationers sampled by Ford and Colleagues 
did not subscribe to the view that the role of the officer parallels that of a prison 
officer. In line with previous studies, most reported that the function of the officer is 
to provide socio-economic support such as help with employment (72%), 
accommodation (70%), and family related and personal problems (69%). The studies 
cited above suggest that the role of probation officers was widely perceived by 
probationers to be primarily welfarist. Indeed, despite the correctionalist trend in 
contemporary policy, the prevailing view of probation with the wider public is that of 
a welfare oriented service and not a punitive organisation responsible for public 
protection (Chapman et al. 2002; Editorial; Howard Journal 2003).
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1.4.2: Therapeutic benefits
The literature also suggests that most probationers value the role of their officer in 
listening to their problems. This represents the therapeutic role of the officer. Ford and 
colleagues found that the opportunity to discuss problems with the officer appeared to 
supersede the importance of providing help and support in the probationers’ 
estimation. In the study (71%) of the responses indicated that this as the ‘best’ aspect 
of supervision whilst 34% cited practical help as the best aspect of supervision. Mair 
and May’s (1997) study reinforces these findings. They reported on a survey which 
explored supervision processes, utility, and impact, as perceived by supervisees. The 
survey also examined the socioeconomic circumstances of the supervisees in order to 
contextualise their perceptions of the utility of supervision. The aim was to utilise 
their perceptions as an alternative measure of the effectiveness of supervision, thus 
diverging from the typical reliance on reconviction rates. The study included a 
random sample of 1,213 probationers on combination or probation orders across 22 of 
the then 55 probation areas.
In the survey, many probationers expressed positive comments about their officers. 
Many also said that they could speak to their officers about personal difficulties and 
highlighted the therapeutic relationship they shared with their officer. The study 
found that in terms of the positive aspects of supervision, the common view was that 
the order provided a therapeutic outlet. Less common were its role in providing 
practical help and advice or in ensuring desistance. According to Ford and his 
colleagues, this may be because, although most probationers felt that providing 
practical support is the key function of the officer, only few reported that the officers 
were able to perform this role with any degree of success. Other studies reinforce this 
finding that in resolving social problems, a facilitative role is preferable to the direct
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intervention of the officer. For instance studies such as McCulloch (2005) and Rex 
(1999) have found that probationers do not necessarily expect their officers to directly 
resolve their practical problems; rather, the probationers welcome the guidance 
provided by their officers as they seek to resolve these problems themselves.
The foregoing suggests that there is a clear expectation and experience of welfarism 
during supervision. The links between a welfarist approach and compliance is unclear. 
What remains apparent is that according to studies and official statistics cited earlier, 
the rates of non-compliance (mainly absenteeism) appear to exceed the limits 
prescribed by the National Standards.
1.4.3: Interactions
In illuminating the micro contexts of supervision, studies suggest that the ‘relational
dimension’ of supervision is central to achieving compliance with Probation Orders
(Rex 1999) and with Community Service Orders (Vass 1984). The relational
dimension of supervision has been sidelined in organisational policy and in the
literature as the focus has shifted, since the 1990s to evaluations of the effectiveness
of accredited programmes. As such, the nature of the interactions between both parties
and also the potential impact of such interactions on outcomes have largely been
ignored. Consequently, Hedderman writes that:
Lack of adequate and consistent systems for monitoring and evaluating 
day-to-day work or special initiatives is the biggest obstacle to 
discovering what works' (1998.4).
It appears that the absence of sufficient policy and empirical interest in the ‘relational 
dimension’ of supervision affects all spheres of probation supervision including 
enforcement practice (Hedderman 1998.4). Therefore, the importance of the officer- 
client relationship has been overlooked in recent decades in the shift from a social 
work oriented service to a more correctionalist service. It is not surprising that the
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potential impact of interactions between both parties during supervision on outcomes 
has not received sufficient policy attention. This is because the relational aspect of 
supervision is rooted in social work principles that are inconsistent with current policy 
objectives of control and risk management (see also Raynor and Maguire 2006). 
Notwithstanding these developments, there appears to be a growing recognition in the 
literature that the nature of the interactions between the probation officers and the 
probationers may affect outcomes (Burnett and McNeill 2005). The importance of the 
officer’s therapeutic role as alluded to by many probationers has been discussed 
above. Aligned to this, studies exploring probation practice have identified some 
supervision skills that may be linked to compliance or to the successful engagement of 
the probationer. These skills include the ability to develop a good rapport with the 
probationer and continuity in supervision (Folkard et al 1974; Farrall 2002b), 
collaborative decision making, empathy, accessibility and the willingness to listen to 
the probationers’ problems and discuss possible solutions (see for example, Mair and 
May 1997; Rex 1999: 372). The studies also reveal the supervision approaches linked 
to resistance and failure: undue control (Folkard et al 1974; Farrall 2002b); 
intrusiveness, being judgemental, patronising or disrespectful (Ford et al. 1997; Rex
1999). Added to studies within specific probation settings, meta-analytic studies 
exploring effective practice skills also point to several communication techniques that 
effectively engage the probationer and effect change (see generally, Dowden and 
Andrews 2004; Raynor and Maguire 2006:23). An exploration of the interactional 
contexts of supervision is therefore necessary for understanding compliance.
1.4.4: The macro contexts o f supervision— sociological variables
The macro contexts comprise the wider socio-structural factors that may affect how
probationers comply with their orders. These are the dynamic and static attributes
34
incorporating the indices of social deprivation that have been found to impinge on 
compliance. Potentially, macro structural factors may contribute to the disparity 
between policy and outcomes. Generally, studies show that unemployment or a 
sporadic employment history, accommodation difficulties, and financial problems are 
linked to non-compliance (Lawson 1978; Davies 1969; May 1999). Also found to 
affect compliance are peer group influences and adverse family relationships (Davies 
1969). In addition, practical problems may hamper compliance. In Mair and May
(1997), the probationers sampled defined the negatives of supervision in terms of the 
difficulties imposed by the requirement to attend and also travel related difficulties. 
Poor mental health is also an obstacle to compliance (Davies 1969). It has been noted 
that probationers within this category are more likely to fail (Stone 1998). A request 
for alternative National Standards for this group was rejected by HMIP in 1993 (Stone 
1998.3). Other variables associated with non-compliance are substance misuse (Mair 
and May 1997; May 1999), a period in the care of social services (Mclvor 1992; Mair 
and May 1997) and literacy and learning difficulties (May 1999). Some studies show 
that previous criminal history may affect probation outcomes and that probationers 
with previous convictions are most likely to fail (Radzinowicz 1958; Mclvor 1992). 
By contrast, other studies have shown that previous history has no impact on 
compliance rates (Farrall 2002a). Furthermore, studies also show that previous 
offences particularly dishonesty offences such as having a burglary conviction may be 
inversely linked to compliance (Mclvor 1992; Mair and May 1997).
It is possible that the age and gender of the probationer may also affect compliance. 
The ‘undeniable’ link between growing older and a decline in offending has been 
established in the desistance literature (Rex 1999; 366). Lebel and colleagues put it 
that:
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Most persistent offenders eventually abandon criminal activity (or 
‘desist from crime’ as they get older’ (2008: 131-158; Emphasis in 
original).
Other studies highlight the ‘gender gap’ in offending rates, pointing out that male 
offending occurs at a higher rate than female offending (Heidensohn and Gelsthorpe 
2007). Similar findings also emerge in the probation literature in terms of short term 
compliance with community penalties. Mair and May (1997) found that women and 
older probationers were more committed to their orders and least likely to suffer 
breach action for non-compliance. Male probationers were more likely to have their 
orders terminated compared with their female counterparts. Likewise other studies 
show that older offenders were more likely to have their reasons for absence judged 
as being acceptable compared with those aged under 21 (Hedderman 1999; 
Hedderman and Heamden 2000).
Studies suggest that levels of self motivation may affect compliance (Dawson et al. 
2005). The evaluation of offending behaviour programs by Dawson and his 
colleagues (2005) traced the high attrition rates observed to the low levels of 
motivation demonstrated by the probationers. According to the officers sampled, the 
motivation to participate should form the basic criteria of eligibility to participate in 
the program. Equally, in his study of the aspects of probation supervision that may be 
linked to desistance, Farrall (2002b) found that the motivation to desist is an 
important criterion for desistance. Further, Farrall found no significant link between 
OGRS scores or the nature of supervision and desistance. Of more importance than 
these variables were the social and personal circumstances of the probationers 
sampled. Added to these personal attributes described above, studies posit a link the 
length of the order and non-compliance. Although Mclvor (1992) found quite limited 
links between the duration of the order and the 'likelihood of breach’, official statistics
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suggest that probationers serving longer orders are more likely to fail (Home Office 
2004).
1.5: Gaps and Limitations
The studies cited above advance our understandings of the nature and extent of 
compliance with community penalties. They also highlight several factors that may be 
linked to the discrepancies between policy objectives and outcomes. From the 
officers’ perspectives, studies show divergences from policy requirements. Likewise, 
from the probationer’s perspective, studies point to intervening factors that may 
mediate the impact of policy even where implemented as intended. Below an attempt 
is made to uncover possible gaps in knowledge and also, some methodological 
limitations affecting these studies. Finally, a proposal is offered for an alternative 
research agenda for exploring compliance with community penalties.
1.5.1: Sample selectivity
In studies such as Davies (1969) and Rex (1999) which examined consumer views, 
the achieved sample is likely to be selective. Where probation officers recruit the 
potential participants, the sample would typically comprise those probationers who 
are more likely to express complimentary views of their experiences. In most cases, 
they are also likely to be the more compliant probationers (see also Mair and May 
1997).
1.5.2: Equating enforcement with compliance
Some studies focus on the extent to which the officers comply with the rigid 
enforcement framework. Reflecting policy presumptions, these studies proceed on the 
basis that strict enforcement somehow equates with compliance and this presumption 
is implicit in official studies and audits (Hedderman 1999) where high breach rates 
automatically become the indices of effectiveness even where compliance rates
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remain comparably low. One might argue that the rate of enforcement is not an 
accurate measure of effectiveness because such a measure ignores the more important 
indicator of effectiveness which is the rate of compliance. Furthermore the 
operationalisation of effectiveness in terms of enforcement rates also reflects the 
policy focus on enforcement as the key compliance strategy in which compliance is 
linked to enforcement in an almost unproblematic fashion. In general, studies 
reflecting this misguided focus on the rate of enforcement as the indicator of 
effectiveness would tend to provide limited insights into the possible compliance 
strategies employed by probation officers and into the nature of compliance itself. For 
instance, by focusing on instrumental compliance (the use of disincentives), the 
studies that examine links between enforcement and outcomes would also necessarily 
omit from analysis other forms of compliance that are not linked to instrumental 
concerns such as normative compliance (Bottoms 2001).
1.5.3: Presenting one-sided accounts -  decontextualised analysis 
In some of the studies cited, the methodology employed is the secondary analysis of 
case records and this may be plagued with several imitations. For instance, in these 
studies the operationalisation of key concepts may be open to question given that they 
do not derive from the definitions of the key actors. In Hedderman (1999) 'compliance 
rate' was operationalised by combining the cases that had no unacceptable absences 
with those involving 3 or less unacceptable absences. This ignores the ambiguity 
surrounding the definition of an 'unacceptable absence'. One might argue that it 
remains as ever, subject to the discretion of individual officers. Consequently, a 
measure of compliance that ignores the arbitrariness of these decisions may be an 
invalid measure.
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Studies reveal the general reluctance to enforce orders as strictly as prescribed by the 
National Standards. Therefore it is possible that cases involving no unacceptable 
absences or with 3 or less unacceptable absences would include those probationers 
who had their orders ratified as acceptable despite several incidents of absenteeism. 
Consequently, recorded decisions as to the acceptability or unacceptability of 
absences may not provide an accurate picture of compliance even in its unilateral 
sense -  attendance. Given these limitations, the rates of compliance observed (albeit 
unacceptably low rates) may have exaggerated the extent of compliance. Moreover, 
just as official crime statistics necessarily exclude undetected and unrecorded 
offences, enforcement records may exclude incidents of non-compliance. As noted 
above, studies have found that many incidents of non-compliance and the reasons 
given are unrecorded (Hedderman 1999). Vass (1984:3) also found this to be the rule 
rather the exception in the supervision of community service orders. This was despite 
the official requirement that ‘supervisors’ (frontline supervisory staff) were mandated 
to advise ‘organisers’ (responsible for monitoring the work of supervisors) of: 
incidents of non-compliance defined as: ‘...successes and failures in the course of the 
performance of tasks’ and ‘any instances of non-compliance, absenteeism and 
misbehaviour’. It is therefore likely that despite the emphasis on maintaining records 
of enforcement practices at the time of the audits (see also NS 2002; 2005), there may 
have been occasions where enforcement decisions were unrecorded. In sum, given the 
noted unreliability of enforcement records, studies relying on these records will 
provide limited accounts of the actual processes of compliance and enforcement.
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Added to the problem of their unreliability, enforcement records also provide one­
sided accounts of the interactions between both parties. It is argued that case records 
are primarily a one-sided account provided by the officer that may exclude detailed 
information of the probationers' experiences and perceptions particularly where the 
probationer chooses not to disclose these (Farrall 2002b). These one-sided accounts 
cannot effectively capture the myriad of factors that form the contexts of interactions 
during supervision. According to Hedderman (1998.10) interactions during 
supervision form the core of probation supervision and would therefore have a 
significant bearing on outcomes. As Farrall puts it:
...official data sources severely limit the nature of the analyses 
undertaken. Although data relating to the courses completed by the 
probationer during the probation order and the eventual outcome of the 
order (completed successfully, terminated early for good progress of 
breached) are available, it cannot be guaranteed that all information 
relevant to assessing the impact of the order will have been 
recorded...the reliance on official records limits the analysis undertaken 
solely to those topics about which information is routinely collected 
(2002b. 19).
May (1999) acknowledged this in his study. He writes:
...the study is restricted to a consideration of the factors these services 
routinely collected: it does not claim to cover comprehensively every
social factor that may be related to reconviction (1999: vii).
Therefore studies relying on official data would necessarily ignore the nature of 
interactions between both parties, the strategies officers use to encourage compliance 
and the extraneous factors that affect compliance and enforcement. It follows that a
view of enforcement practice based on the records maintained by probation officers is
somewhat problematic from a methodological perspective in many respects. 
Crucially, it marginalizes the decision making processes underlying those records and 
also, the perspectives of the probationers who are subject to enforcement practice.
To uncover actual processes and interactions, case records should be supplemented 
with the perspectives of the probationers and their officers. Likewise, studies that
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focus solely on the views of the probationers (Rex 1999) or solely on the views of the 
officers (Ellis et al. 1996) would also tend to provide a one dimensional view of 
supervision. The perspectives of the key parties involved in supervision, namely the 
officer and the client should be included in any analysis of the impact of any aspect of 
supervision including compliance and enforcement. Although there are several studies 
focusing on the views of the probationers, few have explored practitioner views of 
compliance and these tend to focus narrowly on enforcement practice (for instance 
Ellis et al. 1996). Also closely linked to the limitation of presenting one-sided 
accounts is the tendency to overlook the importance of the interactions between both 
parties. It has been rightly argued that the nature of interactions and the content of 
supervision contribute significantly to outcomes (Burnett and McNeill 2005).
1.5.4: Proposing an alternative research agenda
To overcome these limitations, the current study adopted an alternative methodology. 
It did not focus on strict enforcement as the primary mechanism of compliance. 
Rather, it included in its analysis an examination of the processes of enforcement and 
compliance. To this end, it explored the perspectives of probationers and probation 
officers. The aim was to place the viewpoints of the key actors at the forefront of 
analysis in order to generate a contextualised and holistic understanding of 
compliance which reflects the realities of practice. Furthermore, it did not rely 
exclusively on official case records. These records were triangulated with 
observations of interactions, in-depth interviews and informal discussions.
Although the participating probationers were recruited by their officers, attempts were 
made to ensure that interview appointments were fixed to coincide with routine 
appointment dates. This provided some insights into compliance patterns.
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Importantly, the researcher was specific about the categories of probationers required 
particularly in the latter stages of the project when sampling became purposive.
1.6: Conclusion
Under current policy, enforcement is the primary strategy for securing compliance 
although there appears to be no empirical basis for this (see also Bottoms 2001). This 
reliance on enforcement is in part traceable to the socio-political developments that 
were described above. The developments may have precipitated the effort to replace 
the altruistic foundations of the Probation Service with a more correctionalist ethos. 
Notwithstanding this focus on enforcement at the expense of compliance strategies, 
studies show that many probationers would ultimately fail to comply with the formal 
requirements of their orders. Worse still, the studies reveal that many cases of non- 
compliance involve total absconsion. These highlight a disparity between policy 
objectives and outcomes. So far, explorations of how the strict enforcement 
requirements translate in practice reveal that probation officers would tend to 
prioritise addressing socioeconomic and other welfare needs over enforcement. 
Studies also suggest that enforcement practice is typically subject to the officer’s 
discretion. In addition, the studies highlight the apparent reluctance to enforce orders 
to rigid standards. It is possible to argue that the reluctance to enforce orders as 
strictly as prescribed by policy may explain the disparity between policy objectives 
and outcomes. However, there is limited empirical evidence to support this 
contention. Rather the study by Heamden and Millie (2003) provides additional 
empirical support for the findings of the studies cited earlier which reveal that a 
controlling approach produces negative outcomes (Farrall 2002b; Folkard et al 1974).
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Heamden and Millie (2003) found that the reconviction rates of the probationers 
exposed to punitive enforcement practices tended to be higher than the reconviction 
rates of those exposed to more lenient enforcement.
Also providing insights into the nature of compliance are the studies that explore the 
probationers’ experiences of supervision. These reveal an explicit expectation of help 
and support despite the correctionalist image projected in policy discourses. The 
studies also highlight the importance of the therapeutic role of the officer in listening 
to the probationers’ problems. In all, the studies suggest that the perception of 
probation as an altruistic and welfarist response to offending pervades the thinking of 
many probationers. However, despite these positive evaluations, the studies cited 
earlier indicate that many probationers violate their orders. Thus one might argue that 
an inquiry into the most effective means of securing compliance is required.
A compliance strategy is required to fulfil theoretical, organisational and humanitarian 
objectives. On a theoretical level, only few studies have explored this subject matter 
and this makes for limited theoretical insights into the nature of compliance. With 
most studies examining probation policy and practice in general, the concept of 
compliance has tended to be incidental and not central to analysis. Moreover the 
studies were conducted before the implementation of the more punitive National 
Standards in 2005 which were in operation at the time of this study, and also, before 
the introduction of the current National Standards 2007 (See NOMS 2007a).
Perhaps, the limited empirical literature on compliance with community penalties may 
explain why there appears to be limit insights into the extent of, or the correlates of, 
short-term non-compliance (Bottoms 2001; Farrall 2002a; Hedderman and Hough 
2004). This study aimed to fill this gap in theoretical and empirical knowledge.
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As an organisation, the service has in the past three decades become vulnerable as its 
ability to effectively deliver its brief has come under increasing media and political 
scrutiny. High rates of non-compliance may exacerbate this vulnerability where they 
are interpreted as the inability to deliver effective services particularly within a 
managerialist policy climate. This may also ultimately affect the credibility of 
community penalties as effective alternatives to custodial sentences (Hedderman and 
Hough 2004).
Successful compliance strategies may also serve a humanitarian purpose. For 
instance, the number of cases receiving custodial sentences for breach has been 
estimated at approximately 9000 a year (see NOMS 2005; Raynor and Vanstone 
2007). Further, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 makes compliance a more pertinent 
issue and targets persistent non-compliers for disproportionately severe punishments. 
As such, the ability of offenders to comply with their orders will be of significant 
importance once the Act is fully implemented. Therefore, an understanding of the 
correlates of and obstacles to compliance is necessary given that the current deterrent 
enforcement framework may place an increased number of offenders at greater risk of 
custody for non-compliance. The research literature also suggests that sporadic 
involvement in treatment programmes may be counterproductive in terms of 
subsequent reoffending and reconviction (Raynor and Vanstone 1997; Joint Prison 
Probation Accreditation panel 2000; May and Wadwell 2001; Ellis and Winstone 
2002.350). There is therefore a need to generate empirical and theoretical insights into 
the correlates of compliance.
Finally, although the current empirical literature provides useful insights into the 
aspects of supervision that may be linked to an understanding of compliance, the 
insights emerged from studies in which compliance was peripheral to analysis.
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Therefore, we are left with a limited understanding of what the key correlates of 
compliance are. It is however apparent that the strict enforcement framework has a 
limited impact on actual compliance rates. This is because non-compliance rates 
remain unacceptably high. There is a need to explore this apparent disparity between 
policy objectives and outcomes. A study of compliance which explores the views of 
those involved in the processes of negotiating compliance should provide a useful 
starting point. To examine the theoretical correlates of compliance the next chapter 
will critically analyse several theoretical explanations of compliance with specific 
reference to the theory of compliance that influenced the current study.
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Chapter Two: Compliance: theoretical and empirical analysis 
2.1: Introduction
This chapter critically reviews the conceptual framework for understanding 
compliance that guided this study. The study drew on the framework advanced by 
Bottoms (2001) which incorporates four mechanisms of compliance. These are 
constraint-based, habitual, normative and instrumental mechanisms. Constraint based 
mechanisms reduce the opportunities for non-compliance whilst habit mechanisms 
operate through the established non-criminogenic routines that ensure compliance. 
Normative mechanisms, particularly in the form of the perceived legitimacy of 
authority, are held to produce the most sustainable form of compliance given that 
compliance arises without instrumental considerations of the costs and benefits of 
compliance. Of the four mechanisms, current policy relies almost exclusively upon 
instrumental mechanisms of compliance as defined by Bottoms (2001). The emphasis 
is on the use of deterrence strategies (and to a less significant extent, incentives) to 
encourage compliance.
The deterrence literature reveals that empirical efforts to estimate the effectiveness of 
deterrent strategies have yielded results that contradict the tenets of the deterrence 
doctrine. There is limited empirical evidence to show that increasing the levels of 
objective risk associated with non-compliance produces deterrent effects (Doob and 
Webster 2003). Similarly, studies exploring the deterrent effect of probation 
enforcement practice have found limited evidence that strict enforcement practice 
produces deterrent effects (Heamden and Millie 2003).
To explore the nature of compliance, this study drew on the four mechanisms of short 
term compliance with the law as developed by Bottoms (2001). These have been 
outlined above. In this chapter, an attempt is made to examine the empirical literature
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pertaining to each mechanism with specific reference to the deterrence literature given 
that the current enforcement framework is deterrent in its objectives.
2.2: Defining the correlates of routine and habit compliance 
Routine compliance arises from internalized conformist behaviour that becomes 
routinised over time. According to Bottoms (2001.93), habit compliance 'occurs 
unthinkingly' more so than the other types of compliance. Bottoms hypothesizes that 
criminogenic routines evolve from normative processes such as poor socialization and 
inadequate involvement with social institutions (for example, schools) which 
inculcate discipline. He points out that ‘mental dispositions’ acquired over time may 
predispose one to compliance or non-compliance (p.93). For instance, the noted 
gender differences in the rates of offending may be traced to internalised dispositions 
which reduce women’s inclination to commit crime. These mental dispositions may 
be 'innate...or acquired, constant or mutable' and may be altered to achieve desired 
behavioural change (Wollheim 1984, cited in Bottoms 2001.94).
2.2.1: Cognitive behavioural mechanisms
In discussing the possible means of developing habit compliance, Bottoms refers to
the cognitive behavioural approaches based on social learning theory. These seek to
revise not only overt behaviours but also mental dispositions. The cognitive
behavioural approaches may stimulate the cognitive changes that encourage the
development of non-criminogenic or conformist habits. Bottoms writes:
This, essentially, is the kind of change that cognitive-behavioural 
programmes seek to achieve: an altered way of thinking (disposition) of 
the offender that is linked (in a two-way process) to altered behavioural 
routines...cognitive behavioural programmes seek to alter the offender’s 
thinking patterns, or depositions, and thus hopefully to enhance 
compliance by mechanisms of habit or routine’ (2001:94/97).
Therefore, in community based rehabilitation programs, probationers are taught how 
to develop the skills necessary for prosocial lifestyles. Cognitive behavioural
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approaches have become central to rehabilitation programmes since the introduction 
of the ‘What Works’ initiative discussed briefly in the previous chapter. A recent 
official document published by the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) 
states that the:
...key stages in the change process involve ...training in new cognitive, 
social and life skills, and consolidating that new learning into routine 
behaviours.. .(NOMS 2006a: 17).
Within cognitive behaviourism, it is clear from the literature base that a punitive 
enforcement approach produces less productive outcome than an approach rooted in 
more subtle forms of disapproval that are accompanied by praise and rewards (Trotter 
1996).
2.2.2: Prosocial modelling
In the delivery of cognitive behavioural programs, added to the objective of revising
antisocial cognitive or thought processes by encouraging the probationer to learn new
skills, pro-social modelling techniques are also deemed useful for achieving
behavioural change. Rex puts it that:
‘Prosocial modelling has now gained currency in British probation 
practice, following the raising of its profile by HMIP’s Effective Practice 
guide as ‘a necessary input for effective program delivery (2001:73;
HMIP 1998:49-50, cited in Rex 2001).
It is argued that prosocial modelling techniques ensure that cognitive or internal 
change is achieved alongside external behavioural change (see McGuire 2000). 
Advocates of prosocial modelling techniques point out that people become committed 
to specific behavioural patterns or values which attract positive reaffirmations or 
rewards and which are modelled by others (Trotter 1996). This encourages the 
probationer to replace antisocial attitudes and behaviours with prosocial attitudes, 
behaviours and lifestyles. Studies have shown the efficacy of prosocial techniques. 
For instance, Sinclair (1971) examined the links between the nature of the regime
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operating in specific probation hostels and the long term compliance record of 
offenders held in these hostels. The study found that the criminal antecedents of the 
offenders and the social demography of the offenders were not as significantly linked 
to outcomes as the impact of the operative regime. Hostels where staff exhibited 
prosocial skills such as ‘emotional warmth (kindness and understanding of the boys’ 
problems alongside clear and consistently enforced rules produced the most positive 
outcomes.
Prosocial modelling has been shown to improve compliance with community orders 
(Trotter 1996; Mclvor 1996). The approach may also facilitate the development of a 
good relationship between probationers and officers (Loney et al. 2000), or bonds 
between the officers and their clients in ways that may encourage compliance with the 
order. Rex’s (1999) study found an observed link between the ability of probationers 
to perceive supervising officers as role models and the ‘sense of obligation’ deriving 
from the positive support and encouragement offered by the probation officers (Rex 
1999.378).
Similarly, Rex and Gelsthorpe (2002) examined the outcomes emerging from three 
approaches used in seven pathfinder projects, namely, prosocial modelling, skills 
accreditation and tackling other offending needs. The evaluation found promising 
results in cases where prosocial modelling techniques were used. Projects that utilized 
the ‘work element’ of community punishment to address offending-related needs did 
not yield similar positive outcomes. Dowden and Andrews (2004) reported on a meta­
analysis which explored the link between practitioner skills and rehabilitation 
outcomes. They found that the skills incorporating prosocial modelling techniques 
produced the best outcomes.
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Prosocial modelling approaches de-emphasize the use of negative enforcements in the 
form of threats. Rather, encouragements and rewards are used to stimulate the 
probationers’ commitment to the rehabilitation programme. This is incompatible with 
the current focus on the use of enforcement to secure compliance.
2.3: Constraint-based mechanisms
As mentioned above, according to the framework developed by Bottoms (2001) 
constraint based mechanisms may also affect compliance. Similar to the tenets of the 
situational crime control theories -  Clarke’s (1992) rational choice theory and with 
some variation Felson’s (1986) routine activities theory - constraint based 
mechanisms operate on the basis that crime is the product of opportunity. From this 
perspective, the decision to offend is based on calculations of the costs and benefits of 
offending. Reflecting the classicist position, constraint based mechanisms are 
underpinned by the presumption that human behaviour is rationalistic and 
opportunistic. Therefore, crime prevention is best achieved through restraints that 
reduce crime opportunities and increase its risks. These restraints may be in the form 
of external restraints such as the situational structures designed to reduce crime 
opportunities or incapacitative custodial sentences (von Hirsch et al. 1999). Constraint 
based mechanisms may also operate in the form of structural restrictions involving the 
use of coercive strategies imposed by intimidation within 'power based' relationships 
(Bottoms 2001:93). Importantly, in this latter form, compliance does not derive from 
normative beliefs or instrumental considerations. It is coercively obtained and 
emerges where there is limited opportunity to deviate (Bottoms 2001).
2.3.1: Community based constraint mechanisms
Directly pertinent to this study are the surveillance techniques employed by officers to 
ensure constraint based compliance. In probation supervision, there are several
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constraining measures designed to reduce risks and enhance public protection. For 
instance, home visits may be employed to ensure increased surveillance. The latest 
standards provide that where a high risk of harm is posed to the public, the decision to 
make home visits should be based on public protection considerations which must 
override human right issues (NOMS 2007a). Further, the probationers classed as ‘high 
risk’ are subjected to enhanced surveillance through the multi-agency public 
protection arrangements (MAPPA). These arrangements were introduced in 2001 and 
comprise members of the police, prison and probation services and other agencies. 
The objective is to ensure greater surveillance particularly in cases identified as 
posing a high risk of harm to the public (NOMS 2007b).
Nevertheless, revealing the limited effectiveness of this constraint based measure, 
high profile incidents of serious re-offending whilst under MAPPA arrangements 
have been recorded. For instance, the case of Anthony Rice who committed murder in 
2005 whilst subject to MAPPA supervision (see also Wood et al. 2007). Similarly, 
studies evaluating the community based penalties that incorporate more intensive 
surveillance designed to enhance constraint based compliance, reveal no significant 
impact on short term and longer term compliance. For instance, based on research 
purporting to show that the significant proportion of crime is committed by a core 
group of persistent offenders (contrast Farrington 2005 and Garside 2004), the 
government introduced the prolific and persistent offender programme in 2004 for the 
intensive supervision of probationers categorized as prolific and persistent. Early 
evaluations of these programmes were unable to identify definite links between 
intensive supervision models and reductions in reconviction rates given that other 
variables could have accounted for these reductions (Dawson 2005; Dawson et al. 
2005; Dawson and Cuppleditch 2007). Further, in terms of short term compliance
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with the order, the evaluation of an intensive surveillance programme by Partridge
and colleagues (2005), cited in the previous chapter, found high rates of non-
compliance despite intensive surveillance practices. Similarly, Homes and colleagues
(2005:2) evaluated the intensive supervision and monitoring scheme targeted at
‘persistent adult offenders’, requiring ‘swift action and penalties for non-compliance’.
They found that of the 542 participants, less than one third (127 - 23%) completed the
program whilst almost half (223 - 41%) were breached for non-compliance or
absconded from the program. The researchers recognised that:
...it is possible that more offenders breached or did not complete the 
scheme than those who completed’ (2005:35).
These findings reveal the limited effectiveness of constraint based mechanisms of 
compliance. Imprisonment is perhaps the most potent constraint based mechanism of 
compliance (Bottoms 2001). Yet studies have alluded to incidents of non-compliance 
in prisons (Wright 1991; Sparks et al. 1996). Latest official statistics reveal that in 
2005 there were 146 ‘proven offences’ committed per 100 prisoners, making a total of 
110, 650 offences including violent offences (NOMS 2006b). These suggest that 
constraint based mechanisms may, to a significant extent, be ineffective in their aims.
2.4: Identifying the central issues in normative compliance
Normative compliance is a multidimensional concept. It may arise from the impact of 
internalised norms, the influence of others with whom a person shares social bonds in 
the form of ‘emotive attachments’ - akin to Hirschi’s (1969) social control theory, - or 
the influence of social bonds with other individuals or institutions perceived to 
possess legitimate authority (Bottoms 2001:91).
It is widely accepted that to a certain degree, there are societal norms that become 
internalised during socialization. Differing opinions on this issue arise in respect of
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the degree to which these norms can be said to affect human behaviour (see Downes 
and Rock 2003). As mentioned earlier, studies have shown that, in encouraging more 
normative forms of behaviour and attitudes, cognitive behavioural approaches have 
produced positive outcomes. In addition, supporting Hirschi’s social bonds theory, 
several studies particularly within the desistance literature base, have shown that 
social bonds and their underlying dimensionsvm as devised by Hirschi (1969) can, 
alongside several variables, exert normative influences that produce compliance 
(Graham and Bowling 1995). These findings are reinforced by resettlement studies 
(Haines 1990) and deterrence studies (Zimring and Hawkins 1973; von Hirsh et. al 
1999).
Whilst the impact of social bonds with significant people in one’s life may encourage 
compliance, it has been argued that positive relationships with people in authority 
may exact a similar impact. Studies show that relationships between probationers and 
their officers characterised by ‘support and encouragement’ may also be crucial for 
ensuring normative compliance (Rex 1999:379). Such relationships engender a sense 
of loyalty and a sense of obligation. They create a ‘bond’ between both parties 
(Bottoms 2001). Where loyalty and obligation are internalised, compliance is the 
likely outcome. Officers are therefore able to exert a ‘positive moral influence over 
probationers’ (Rex 1999:380). One might argue that interactions based on these 
premises should engender normative compliance based on the internalised obligation 
to obey that evolves during the interactions. This is linked to the perceived legitimacy 
of authority and studies show that legitimacy also pertains directly to the nature of the 
relationships between figures of authority and the recipients of that authority (Tyler 
1990). The links between supervision relationships and compliance have been 
explored in the previous chapter in the discussion about the relevance of interactions
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or the micro contexts of supervision for understanding compliance. Here the concept 
of the perceived legitimacy of authority as a compliance mechanism (and its empirical 
basis) is explored in its broader context.
2.4.1: Socio-psychological perspectives on legitimacy
Arguing from a socio-psychological perspective, Tyler (1990; 2001; 2003; 2005) 
develops this dimension of normative compliance further. He argues that compliance 
is more achievable where internalized perceptions of the legitimacy of the law or of
authority engender a perceived obligation to obey. This contention is reinforced by
Bottoms’ observation below:
Indeed the law's perceived legitimacy may induce persons to obey even 
where they regard the particular directive as being positively 
objectionable....in Britain some of those who in the late 1980s 
disagreed on moral grounds with the then newly enacted Community 
Charge ("Poll Tax") nevertheless felt bound to comply because the tax
constituted a validly enacted measure of a democratically enacted
government' (Bottoms 1999:253).
With the internalised obligation to obey irrespective of self interest, individuals 
routinely cede control over the values that should guide behaviour. They effectively 
empower the legal authority to formulate appropriate behavioural rules in the given 
situation. The obligation to obey overrides personal considerations of morality or self 
interest (Tyler 2005).
It is argued that perceived legitimacy becomes internalised during interactions with 
figures of an authority. On the basis of these interactions with individual members of 
an organization, people make judgments about the perceived legitimacy of the entire 
organization (Bottoms 2001). Where perceived legitimacy is internalized, the 
obligation to obey becomes normative. These internalized beliefs may be reinforced 
or undermined depending on the quality of interactions between people and legal 
authorities (Tyler 2003). As such, the nature of interactions between probation
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officers and the probationers they supervise may shape the ability of the probationers 
to endorse the legitimacy of both their supervising officers and other regulatory 
aspects of serving a community sentence.
Bottoms (1999) considers these issues in the context of maintaining order within 
prisons. He argues that transactions between prison officers and prisoners produce 
implications that transcend the situational context within which such transactions 
occur. Ultimately, interactions between both parties shape the prisoners’ perceptions 
of the legitimacy of the prison officers’ authority and also of the prison service as a 
whole:
...ordinary everyday encounters between staff and prisoners can have 
crucial implications for the nature of the power relations in the prison, 
and to the validity of the staffs claims to justified authority - that is, to 
legitimacy' (Bottoms 1999:256 Emphasis in Original).
Thus, in order to achieve voluntary and sustained compliance, legal authorities should 
strive to reinforce internalized beliefs in the legitimacy of the law and authority. 
Tyler’s (1990) longitudinal study provides empirical evidence that appears to 
highlight the normative influence of the perceived legitimacy of authority. Although 
Tyler focuses on the regulatory activities of the police and the courts, he rightly notes 
that the issues raised in his analysis also pertain to encounters with members of other 
legal authorities. He conducted a telephone survey of a sample of 1575 Chicago 
citizens. Of this number, 804 were re-interviewed after a twelve month period. The 
study found the perceived legitimacy of authority to be the most significant factor 
encouraging compliance.
In his study, Tyler (1990) identified perceived procedural justice (which manifests as 
‘perceived fairness’) as the key antecedent of perceived legitimacy that is particularly 
linked to voluntary compliance. This concerns the fairness of the decision making
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process during encounters with people in authority and not the outcome of the 
decision made during these encounters. Refuting previous findings which tended to 
cite the perceived favourability of outcomes as the key antecedent of the perceived 
legitimacy of authority, studies show that it is the fairness of the decision making 
process and not the outcome of the decision that is pertinent to questions of 
compliance (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Tyler and Huo 2002; Sunshine and Taylor 
2003). It has also been shown that perceived fairness engenders trust in the motives of 
legal authorities and encourages compliance (Tyler 1990; Murphy 2005). There is 
further empirical support for these findings. A secondary analysis of data on men 
convicted of domestic abuse in a state in the United States revealed that those who 
believed that they had received fair treatment from the police at the earlier stages of 
the criminal process (arrest) were least likely to be reconvicted for domestic violence 
compared with those who felt they had been unfairly treated (Paternoster et al. 1997). 
Other studies have explored people’s experiences during encounters with prison 
officers (Cooke 1989). Collectively these studies point to the crucial role of perceived 
legitimacy in encouraging compliance.
2.4.2: Socio-legal perspectives on legitimacy
The concept of normative compliance based on the perceived legitimacy of authority 
has also been explored from a socio-legal perspective. Theorists within this field have 
focused on the substantive context of tax evasion and compliance in their effort to 
understand the correlates of short term compliance with civil regulations (see for 
example Murphy 2005). Although they draw attention to useful correlates it is 
difficult to fully extrapolate from their work to the activities of the wider probationer 
population given the differing demographics and regulations involved in tax 
compliance on the one hand, and short term compliance with legal orders in a criminal
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justice setting on the other hand. The sites of interactions and the consequences of 
non-compliance are widely different. Indeed the socio-legal theorists acknowledge 
that the regulations governing civil transactions including tax paying activities differ 
from those deployed within the criminal system given the potentially different 
demographic groups concerned (Murphy 2005).
Nevertheless studies within this field contribute useful insights into the nature of 
compliance. They cite the concept of ‘responsive regulation’ (similar to Tyler’s 
‘procedural justice’) as the more productive alternative to coercive compliance 
strategies. Coercive strategies have been shown to undermine the perceived 
legitimacy of the tax authority, and to engender non-compliance (tax-evasion) or other 
forms of compliance that fall short of policy expectations (Murphy 2005). Unlike the 
‘deterrence model’ pervading current penal policy, responsive regulation is an 
‘accommodative model’ of regulation that is restorative in its aims and operates on the 
principle of securing compliance rather than enforcing compliance (Murphy 
2005:564). It seeks to secure compliance through ‘persuasion and dialogue’ (Murphy 
2005:587). This may involve providing several opportunities to the non-compliant to 
comply by reminding them of their normative obligations, offering incentives and 
generally being responsive to their concerns (Murphy 2005).
Socio-legal theorists conceptualise perceived legitimacy as a two dimensional concept 
comprising on the one hand, an acceptance of the legitimacy authority which coexists 
with an internalised commitment to comply, and on the other hand, a more superficial 
form of compliance that ‘involves finding ways to accomplish compliance with the 
letter of the law while totally undermining the policy intent or spirit behind the 
legislation’ (Murphy 2005:563). Murphy’s (2005) longitudinal study of tax evasion 
explored the roles of procedural justice and legitimacy in producing tax compliance
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compared with the influence of deterrent strategies. Similar to Tyler’s findings, the 
study found that perceptions of legitimacy ultimately affect the decision to defer to 
authority and such perceptions are typically based on the nature of the encounter with 
legal authorities and in particular, the nature of treatment received - ‘procedural 
justice judgements’ (Murphy 2005:585). Coercive compliance strategies tended to 
generate perceptions of unfair treatment and non-compliance. Like Tyler, the study 
found that deterrent strategies aimed at increasing the costs of non-compliance 
(financial costs) were not as effective as the perceived fairness of decision making in 
securing compliance.
2.4.3: Perceived fairness and situational limitations
Although Tyler (1990) makes a strong case for the role of procedural justice in 
encouraging compliance, some studies highlight the marginality of procedural justice 
considerations in cases where decision outcomes are potentially serious (Tyler 1991). 
Tyler found that in more serious encounters with legal authorities, people are less 
likely to define both the processes and outcomes of decision making as fair. Serious 
encounters will include instances where the offence in question is an arrestable or 
imprisonable offence. Likewise, in courtroom encounters, considerations of fairness 
were more likely to arise in civil disputes than in criminal cases involving substantial 
punishment. The notion of justice becomes relevant where the outcomes of decision 
making are minimal in their impact as was the case in the study by Tyler (1990). 
Further, in Tyler’s (1990) study, procedural justice considerations became more 
pertinent where the authority involved was the court and not the police, and also, in 
dispute resolutions, during voluntary interactions and where the outcome was 
perceived to be unfavourable.
58
Notwithstanding these, one implication of the findings of the legitimacy literature is 
that the manner of exercising authority may have a direct influence on the perceived 
legitimacy of that authority. This finding cannot be ignored because the studies also 
reveal that links exist between the perceived legitimacy of authority and compliance. 
When applied to the specific context of probation supervision and enforcement 
practices, it is possible that subjective assessments of the fairness of decision making 
processes may affect perceptions of legitimacy and ultimately, the willingness to 
comply with the directives of supervising officers.
2.5: Instrumental mechanisms
The fourth mechanism of compliance is conceptualised by Bottoms as ‘instrumental 
mechanisms’. Similar to the theoretical foundation of constraint based compliance, 
instrumental mechanisms derive from classical theory and the belief that a high 
degree of rationality and free will underlies human behaviour. Further, the social actor 
is deemed to be motivated by considerations of self interest. Therefore, crime 
prevention through instrumental mechanisms would entail the careful balance of 
incentives and disincentives in order to ensure that the costs of non-compliance 
outweigh its benefits.
In penal contexts, incentives are not typically offered for complying with the law; 
rather, disincentives are used to discourage non-compliance (von Hirsch et al. 1999). 
Although some incentives (for example, terminating the order early for good 
behaviour) are offered, the current policy governing the enforcement of community 
penalties focuses on instrumental enforcement mechanisms. It seeks to encourage 
instrumental compliance through deterrent penal strategies. In order to understand 
how deterrence may be achieved in the contexts of enforcing community orders, it is 
helpful to explore the literature on deterrence within wider criminal justice contexts.
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2.5.1: Deterrence
Deterrence may operate as specific deterrence, general deterrence or marginal 
deterrence.1* Specific deterrence is concerned with the possibility that the actual 
experience of punishment would deter an offender from re-offending in the future. 
General deterrence on the other hand, focuses upon the likelihood that the existence of 
punitive sanctions would deter the general public from engaging in prohibited 
behaviour. Both are not different mechanisms rather; they are ‘the same mechanism 
applied to different populations’ (Beyleveld 1979.211). Marginal deterrence is 
concerned with the possibility that increasing the severity and certainty of punishment 
produces a deterrent effect (von Hirsch et al. 1999).
It is accepted theoretically and empirically that the criminal justice system acts in 
conjunction with informal social controls to deter crime. The specific issue explored 
by deterrence studies is whether changes to the severity, certainty and celerity of 
punishment can produce marginal deterrence, that is, a ‘preventive effect’ (Nagin 
1998:3; von Hirsch et al. 1999; Robinson and Darley 2004). The present study set out 
to explore this issue. As mentioned earlier, successive National Standards have aimed 
to increase the certainty, severity and celerity of punishment for non-compliance. 
Therefore, to understand the relevance of this instrumental approach to securing 
compliance, the study explored whether increasing the objective certainty, severity 
and celerity of punishment in this manner produces marginal deterrent effects as the 
deterrence doctrine proposes. The probation setting provides the opportunity to 
explore how variations in specific legislation may affect perceptions of risk and 
behaviour. This is lacking in most perceptual studies (Nagin 1998; von Hirsch 1999).
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2.5.2: Key research on deterrence
Before the advent of perceptual deterrence studies in the 1970s, studies exploring 
deterrent effects tended to ignore the subjective perceptions of those targeted by 
deterrent strategies. Rather, the studies tended to focus on analysing the deterrent 
effects of variations in officially recorded crime and punishment rates. These studies 
typically utilized the association/ecological design or the interrupted time-series 
design.
With the association or ecological design, the studies explore the links between crime 
rates and variations in the objective certainty and/or severity of punishment across 
different jurisdictions. An inverse link between crime rates and higher levels of 
certainty and severity of punishment is held out as evidence of deterrent effects. 
Interrupted time series studies attempt to identify temporal deterrent effects by 
observing statistical associations between variations in criminal justice policies and 
crimes rates over a period of time (longitudinal design) (Ross 1982). The aim is to 
explore the effect of specific policy measures on target populations. Studies 
examining the marginal deterrent effects of mandatory minimum sentencing laws (the 
‘two strikes’ laws) typically employ this design. Both association and times series 
studies have found limited evidence of the effectiveness of variations in the severity 
of punishment. Rather, stronger evidence of the deterrent effects of variations in the 
certainty of punishment has been found.
The study by Marvell and Moody (1994) utilised the association design. It posited a 
link between higher prison numbers and reduced crime rates. The study utilised the 
rising prison population as the measure of severity. One limitation posed by this 
measure is the possibility that rising prison populations may produce an extraneous 
variable (incapacitation effects) that could also explain the reduction in crime rates
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(see also Levitt 1996; Nagin 1998:2; von Hirsch et al. 1999). The study by Zimring, 
and colleagues (2001) utilised the interrupted time series methodology. It traced the 
reductions in arrest rates in California to the ‘three strikes’ laws introduced in that 
area. The study has been criticised for utilising limited data points before and after the 
implementation of mandatory sentencing legislation (Doob and Webster 2003).
Large scale reviews of the deterrence literature also find that the increased severity of 
punishment produces limited deterrent effects (Blumstein et al. 1978: Cook 1980; 
Nagin 1998; Doob and Webster 2003). Certainty variables pertaining to the risks of 
apprehension (for example, arrest) on the other hand, have been found to produce 
more significant deterrent effects (Zimring and Hawkins 1973; Doob and Webster
2003). The Home Office sponsored review of the deterrence literature by von Hirsch 
and his colleagues (1999) examined the deterrent effects of the severity of 
punishment. The review found limited evidence of marginal deterrence and concluded 
that:
... the studies reviewed do not provide a basis for inferring that 
increasing the severity of sentences generally is capable of 
enhancing deterrent effects (1).
These studies suggest that the more significant deterrent is the increased certainty of 
punishment. However, there are several methodological and conceptual limitations 
that may impinge on the findings recorded by deterrence studies utilising association 
or interrupted time series designs.
2.5. 3: Methodological limitations
Association and interrupted time series designs utilize aggregative data drawn from 
jurisdictions, offences and people who offend. Variations in criminal justice 
processes within these areas and also differing offending and offender characteristics 
may affect crime rates apart from deterrent strategies. The same can be said for
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studies that compare enforcement practices across different probation areas thus 
aggregating different probation areas, probationers and probation officers (Hedderman 
and Hough 2004; May and Wadwell 2001). Recognising that people who offend are 
not a homogeneous group, penal theorists highlight the need for a ‘disaggregation as 
to offender type’ and also, as to offence type (von Hirsch et al. 1999; Zimring 1971). 
Further, given the nature of the design employed, the studies suffer from the 
possibility that observed effects are spurious and cannot be attributed solely to 
deterrence but to extraneous variables including sociological and criminological 
variables. From a sociological perspective, macro structural factors such as peer and 
family influences for instance, may influence behaviour. Perceptual deterrence studies 
reveal that informal sanctions may override or complement the deterrent effect of 
formal sanctions (Erickson et al. 1977; Paternoster and Iovanni 1986; Foglia 1997). 
Association and interrupted time series designs rely on official records. From a 
criminological perspective; the reliance on official records raises the issue of the 
reliability of official crime data.x Such data are dependent on reporting and recording 
practices which may vary across jurisdictions. Further, several variables linked to 
criminal sanctioning also affect outcomes. These generally pertain to the perceived 
risks of apprehension and punishment. For instance, criminal processes such as plea 
bargaining, selective prosecution and variations in police enforcement practices may 
reduce the perceived certainty of punishment (Nagin 1998; Robinson and Darley
2004). Similarly, the possible use of discretion despite strict National Standards 
guidelines may be a cause of variations in enforcement practices between probation 
areas (Hedderman 1999). The failure to account for extraneous variables such as these 
also increases the likelihood of simultaneity. This concerns the direction of imputed 
causality and it occurs where the deterrent effects observed may be spurious and
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explainable by extraneous variables (Blumstein et al 1978; Doob and Webster 2003; 
von Hirsh et al. 1999).
Association and interrupted time series studies also ignore a crucial element of 
deterrence - its perceptual dimension. This is a significant conceptual limitation given 
the findings that the perceived risks of apprehension and punishment may not always 
accord with actual risks. Findings show that many potential offenders are unaware of 
the exact nature of formal sanctions (Roberts 2002). Further, insights from 
psychological research reveal that even in cases where a person becomes aware of the 
objective probabilities of ‘achieving a particular goal, a person’s estimate of his own 
chances of success will often differ from objective probabilities’ (Zimring 1971.36). 
Therefore a proper interpretation of the deterrence doctrine may be that it is the 
perceived risks of formal sanctions that may affect behaviour and not the objective 
risks as suggested by these studies.
2.5.4: Perceptual deterrence
There is a need to countenance the perceptual element of deterrence given that the
populations targeted for deterrent measures should at least be aware of the existence
of these measures. Zimring (1971) observes that:
‘Passing a new law will, by itself, have no effect on the perception of 
those whose conduct the law seeks to alter... (1971.59).
Thus to achieve marginal deterrent effects, the target audience should be aware of the
variations to criminal sanctions:
Unless differences in the level of consequences threatened are 
known by members of a threatened audience, a marginal deterrent 
effect cannot be attributed to raising penalties... the moment of truth 
in the life of a potential deviant seldom takes place in the local law 
library’ (1971.58-61).
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This suggests that for deterrent strategies to succeed in their aims, the severity, 
certainty and celerity of punishment should be such that they alter the perceived risks 
associated with offending (Pogarsky and Piquero 2003). Unfortunately, (at least from 
a deterrence perspective), potential offenders are generally unaware of the actual 
severity of sanctions, or the levels of seriousness the law attaches to many offences 
apart from the most serious offences to any degree of specificity.
Since the 1970s, perceptual deterrence studies have emerged to examine how 
perceptions of risks affect behaviour. Perceptual studies differ from the other research 
designs because its unit of observation are people not places, and the source of data is 
surveys not primarily official records. To establish the possible links between 
perceptions and self-reported offending behaviour, they typically utilise one of 4 
designs- cross sectional design, panel or longitudinal design, scenario design or 
qualitative exploration of decision making processes preceding the commission of an 
offence (see also von Hirsch et al. 1999).
2.5.5: Cross sectional studies
Cross-sectional surveys draw on self reported previous offending, or intentions to 
offend to assess how perceived risks affect behaviour. Like the association studies and 
the time series studies, the cross sectional studies tend to find weak negative links 
between sentence severity and self reported offending. Instead, the studies typically 
find that self reported offending tends to be lower for those who ‘perceive sanction 
risks and costs to be higher’ (certainty and severity) (Paternoster 1987). Other studies 
support this finding that the fear of apprehension exerts a greater deterrent effect than 
the fear of punishment (D’Alessio and Stolzenberg 1998; Varma and Doob 1998). 
However, Grasmick and Bryjak’s (1980) cross-sectional perceptual study found that 
perceived severity and certainty of punishment operate conjointly to deter crime. The
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study has been criticized because the measure of severity used did not adequately 
separate the deterrent effect of informal sanctions from formal sanctions (Paternoster 
and Iovanni 1986).
One obvious methodological difficulty affecting cross sectional studies, is the 
difficulty of establishing whether any observed negative association between risk 
perceptions and self reported offending reflects experiential effects rather than 
deterrence effects. This is because cross-sectional studies derive their inferences from 
the effect of current perceptions of risk on past behaviour. With deterrence theory, 
such perceptions should be contemporaneous with behaviour. It is possible that with 
cross-sectional studies, reports about the links between perceived risks and reported 
offending would tend to reflect experiential effects not deterrent effects (Greenberg 
1981; Paternoster et al 1982; Nagin 1998von Hirsch et al.l999).xl 
2.5.6: Panel survey studies
In panel studies, respondents are questioned about the impact of their perceptions of 
risk on their behaviour. Follow-up interviews enable the researcher to examine how 
perceptions may have affected behaviour in the interim. Longitudinal studies have 
produced mixed findings. Some have not found significant links between probability 
of punishment (certainty) and offending (Paternoster 1997; von Hirsch et al. 1999). 
Others like Paternoster and Iovanni’s (1986) panel study of a group of 15-17 year old 
students, found that the perceived severity of punishment was not a significant 
deterrent, rather, informal sanctions tended to exert more deterrent effects.
This design averts ‘the reverse-causality problem’ associated with cross sectional 
designs, because some of the offending occurs after the initial measurement of the 
perceptions of certainty or severity of punishment’ (Nagin 1998). However, it is 
crucial to ensure that the time-lag between the initial and follow up interviews is not
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extensive in order to retain the required proximity of perceived risks to actual 
offending.
2.5.7; Scenario studies
In scenario-based studies, respondents are presented with a vignette and asked to 
describe how the perceived risks of committing a crime detailed in the vignette would 
affect their decision to commit the crime. Some use the self-reported intentions to 
commit an offence as the indication of limited deterrent effects (Klepper and Nagin 
1989; Nagin and Paternoster 1994; Piquero and Pogarsky 2002; Wright et al. 2004). 
These studies also find that the perceived certainty of punishment produces a more 
effective deterrent than increased severity (see also, Tittle and Rowe 1974).
Scenario studies also avert the limitations posed by inaccurate causal ordering because 
the simulation exercises provide the opportunity to maintain adequate proximity 
between perceptions and behaviour. A potential limitation is that it is based on 
scenarios rather than real life experiences. As such, it is difficult to ascertain the exact 
variables that ultimately affect perceptions in real life crime incidents. In addition, 
scenario studies tend to focus on the deterrent effects of informal sanctions and the 
perceived certainty of punishment (see also von Hirsch et al. 1999) particularly in the 
realm of civil matters such as tax compliance (Klepper and Nagin 1989).
At best cross-sectional, scenario and panel studies illuminate the links between 
reported behaviour and the respondents’ perceptions of the severity or certainty of a 
given sanction. They do not reveal the extent to which such perceptions may be 
alterable by policy changes. According to Nagin (1998:15) the issue of importance is 
no longer whether the deterrent effects of sanctions are such that people respond to 
their perceptions of sanction threats- this has been confirmed by perceptual studies, 
but the issue of whether such perceptions are manipulable by policy. That is, how far
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changes in policy affect perceptions to achieve a deterrent effect, von Hirsch and his
colleagues write that:
...the studies do not tell us to what extent, and under what 
circumstances, an increase in the actual severity of sentences will result 
in potential offenders’ believing that they will face tougher punishment 
should they choose to offend. At most, the survey studies only tell us 
what offenders’ behaviour might be if they perceive a particular level of 
sanction risk. With this crucial link to criminal policy missing, survey- 
based studies, despite their considerable intrinsic interest, are only of 
limited value for policy purposes’ (1999:35).
The foregoing suggests that people are influenced by their perceptions of risk
however inaccurate these perceptions may be. The current study aimed to address
these issues. To delve further into the thought processes of potential offenders, other
perceptual studies have utilised qualitative methods of inquiry.
2.5.8: Qualitative studies o f offender decision making
Only a few deterrence studies have adopted this approach and they typically question 
prisoners, active or ex-offenders about the thought processes that underpinned their 
most recent offences (Bennett and Wright 1984; Cromwell et al. 1991; von Hirsch et 
al. 1999; Heamden and Magill 2004). Contradicting the tenets of the deterrence 
doctrine, the studies have found that extraneous variables such as the quest for 
immediate gratification or the need to resolve perceived problems, override 
considerations of risks (Wright and Decker 1994; Heamden and Magill 2004). In 
general, there is evidence that potential offenders do try to minimize risks although 
not to the extent or with the degree of accuracy presumed by the deterrence doctrine. 
For instance, studies show that many potential offenders do not conduct detailed 
estimations of potential costs before they commit a crime. Shover’ s (1996) study of 
thieves found limited evidence that the decision to offend is preceded by the degree of 
planning or the detailed calculations of possible costs presumed by the deterrence 
doctrine. The study by Piliavin and colleagues (1986) also found limited evidence of
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the estimation of costs held to precede offending. Other qualitative studies have found 
that the risks of social censure may operate interactively with the risks of formal 
sanctions to produce deterrent effects (von Hirsch 1999). As such, these studies 
reinforce previous findings that deterrent policies (particularly increases to the 
severity of punishment) produce limited effects.
Limitations of the qualitative design include inaccurate recollections or 
reconstructions of the decision making preceding crime events (von Hirsch et al. 
1999). In addition, Zimring (1971) argues that data generated from offender groups 
may be unreliable because in his view, reducing the severity of sanctions may be 
perceived to be in their personal interest. One acknowledges that the issue of 
unreliable data based on inaccurate reports is a limitation that potentially affects all 
studies relying on self reports. The inference that offenders are more likely to provide 
inaccurate responses when questioned about current sanctions compared with 
potential offenders may be considered a moot point. Putting this speculative 
observation to one side, it is arguable that where the objective is to develop a multi­
dimensional or holistic perspective on deterrence, then the view points of offenders 
who are arguably more aware of the operations of the criminal system are also 
relevant. Indeed, Zimring concludes with the argument that:
‘The only method of testing punishment as a special deterrent is the 
study of future criminality among punished offenders, but any such 
test will show the results not only of special deterrence but of the 
many other positive and negative influences that punishment might 
have on future criminality, because a particular form of punishment 
will produce a mix of effects’ (1971.104).
As such, focusing on potential offenders may produce limited knowledge of the nature 
of the phenomenon. Active offenders and ex-offenders are best placed to provide 
insights into why deterrent sanctions have failed in their objectives.
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2.6: Deterrent enforcement and compliance with community penalties
Only a few studies have explored the effects of the deterrent enforcement framework 
governing probation supervision. May and Wadwell (1996) concluded (albeit 
tentatively) that enforcement action appeared to reduce the predicted reconviction 
rates for all offender groups included in the study. However, most studies have found 
no significant links between deterrent enforcement and compliance. Pease (1977) 
explored the correlations between enhanced enforcement practices, increased severity 
of punishment for breach and compliance in the Rotherham pilot CSO scheme.
The area was revealed as a ‘reasonably tough’ area in its response to absenteeism 
although enforcement was reserved for cases of persistent non-compliance (Pease and 
McWilliams 1980.102). The study found limited evidence of deterrence even where 
the new punitive arrangements had been publicized.
Other studies of enforcement and compliance limit their inquiry to ascertaining the 
effects of strict enforcement practices (high breach rates) on reconviction rates. This 
pertains more specifically to longer term compliance (Hedderman 1999; May and 
Wadwell 2001). Hedderman (1999:159-160) found that the rates of reconviction were 
49% for the ‘tough’ or ‘high breaching areas’ and 47% for the more lenient areas. 
This suggests that strict enforcement may indeed inflate reconviction rates. Another 
study exploring a similar theme was by Hough and his colleagues (2003). They found 
that probationers who were allowed to complete their Drugs Testing and Treatment 
Orders recorded significantly low reconviction rates (53%) compared with general 
reconviction rates observed (80%). Those who had their orders revoked prematurely 
recorded a reconviction rate of (91%). The researchers - Hough and his colleagues - 
noted that:
‘The evidence that we have assembled ...offers no grounds for
thinking that the deterrent effect of enforcement ensures fuller
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compliance, and some grounds for thinking that tough enforcement 
can lead to low retention rates in programmes, which in turn leads to 
high reconviction rates’ (2004.163).
Similarly, as noted earlier, Heamden and Millie (2003) found in their study that the
probationers breached at court were more likely to be reconvicted than those who had
been allowed to complete their orders or those who had their orders terminated early
for good behaviour. Similar to the findings recorded by the third audit,xn the authors
observed that compliance rates were significantly diminished by the introduction of
the stringent requirements in the NS 2000.
Perhaps in an attempt to avert this outcome, several officers were at the time of the 
third audit less willing to fully comply with the requirements of the National 
Standards published in 2000. These findings suggest that deterrent enforcement may 
be counterproductive.
Official statistics also highlight the limited effectiveness of deterrent enforcement. 
Home Office statistics for instance reveal that despite the introduction of deterrent 
enforcement strategies breach rates for non-compliance have nearly doubled, rising 
from 14% in 1995 to 27% in 2005 (NOMS 2006b). These figures may reflect higher 
enforcement rates, or may be representative of an increase in the numbers serving 
community penalties. Importantly, they may on the other hand reveal that incidents of 
non-compliance continue unabated despite the increased certainty, severity and 
celerity of punishment for non-compliance. Indeed it is possible that these figures 
underestimate the extent of non-compliance given the findings that many absences are 
unrecorded.
Like the studies that explore the deterrent effects of wider criminal justice sanctions, 
studies exploring the deterrent effects of probation enforcement policies have tended 
to ignore the perceptual element of deterrence. Hedderman and Hough (2004)
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acknowledge the absence of a crucial element in ascertaining the correlations between
enforcement and reconviction rates, namely offenders’ perspectives:
‘More information on offender characteristics and an understanding 
of the offender perspective on the impact of enforcement would also 
be useful’ (2004.160).
This reiterates the importance of the perceptual element of deterrence. Given these
limitations it is rightly stated that: The link between enforcement practice and
reconviction is unclear' (Hedderman and Heamden 2000). Further, studies that rely on
reconviction rates would tend to suffer from the limitations of official crime records
as described earlier.
2.7: Conclusions
The framework developed by Bottoms (2001) is a useful conceptual tool for exploring 
the nature of compliance. Routine mechanisms draw attention to the influence of 
socialization processes and the internalised routines that are held to encourage 
compliance. Habit mechanisms target the criminogenic dispositions and behaviours 
that according to some commentators may produce non-compliance.
The current enforcement framework incorporates instrumental mechanisms and to a 
less significant degree, constraint based mechanisms. Studies have shown that in 
community based supervision, constraint based mechanisms such as intensive 
supervision programs have not produced significant increases in compliance rates. 
Similarly, the empirical evidence provides limited support for the efficacy of 
instrumental mechanisms of compliance operating in the form of disincentives. The 
review of the deterrence literature above reveals that in most cases, the increased 
severity of punishment produces no significant deterrent effects, although the 
perceived certainty of punishment may deter non-compliance. These findings
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contradict the presumptions of the deterrence doctrine that the risks of severe 
punishment should effectively deter crime, that is, the presumption of rationality.3"11 
The deterrence doctrine appears to offer (at least in the face of it), a straight forward 
explanation which locates the cause of crime within the individual (and their rational 
estimation of costs or benefits) whilst ignoring the possible influence of the 
sociological and criminological variables that may affect offending behaviour. 
Although the focus on rational decision making may be propitious from a policy 
perspective, on an empirical level, studies have revealed that sociological and 
criminological variables may interact (jointly or severally) with deterrence strategies 
to influence behaviour. These processes are not easily identifiable by studies using 
methodologies that marginalize the perceptions of those targeted by the deterrent 
strategies. If the notion of the rational offender, actively calculating the consequences 
of engaging in certain behaviour is anything to go by, then surely the thought 
processes of potential offenders deserve a place in any empirical analysis of deterrent 
effects. Consequently, it is possible that the attempts to empirically interpret the 
deterrence doctrine have been hampered by the failure to account for the processual 
and situational nature of human behaviour. Realising the importance of the perceptual 
element of deterrence, several studies have explored the perceptions of those 
threatened for deterrent sanctions.
In sum, the current reliance on instrumental mechanisms lacks adequate empirical 
backing. There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of disincentives. By contrast 
studies examining the impact of the perceived legitimacy of authority on compliance 
tend to show that approaches that are perceived to be fair may enhance the perceived 
legitimacy of authority and hence, encourage normative compliance.
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So far, most studies exploring the concept of legitimacy have focused on encounters 
involving dispute resolutions particularly, criminal trials and encounters with legal 
authorities - the courts and the police or both (Tyler 1990). This does not illuminate 
the pertinence of perceived legitimacy during encounters with legal authorities such as 
the probation service that has historically operated on a ‘service culture so deeply 
entrenched in a social work tradition’ (Raynor and Vanstone 2007:63). Thus, the 
service is traditionally presumed to be welfare oriented.
Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that the terms justice and fairness may be 
culturally determined (Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002) and that procedural justice 
perceptions would vary with the type of authority involved, the nature of transactions- 
and with the nature of outcome.
A qualitative research design examining these issues within a probation setting should 
provide a contextualized understanding of the processes through which compliance 
arises during routine interactions (routine appointments) and during dispute 
resolutions (enforcement appointments). The probation setting also provides the 
opportunity to explore the importance of perceived legitimacy as a compliance 
mechanism where the authority is perceived to be traditionally welfare-oriented. 
Although the current study borrows from the compliance framework advanced by 
Bottoms (2001), it places the views of the key parties at the forefront of analysis. It is 
the manner in which they interpret their experiences during interactions and act on 
these interpretations that ultimately affect their behaviour. This is the fundamental 
position of the interactionist tradition that influences this study. It is discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter.
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PART TWO:
DESIGN: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Chapter Three: Research strategy
3.1: Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology employed by the study. The chapter also 
describes the characteristics of the probation area included in the study. It outlines the 
socio-economic profile of the area and the probationers. The aim is to locate the 
attributes of the area within the wider context of national trends in probation policy 
and practice. The chapter also defines the processes of obtaining access to interview 
participants and official documents. Several difficulties encountered during the data 
collection phases will be discussed, highlighting the potential impact on the quality of 
the achieved data. The chapter concludes with a description of my experiences in the 
field. It details the efforts made to secure ‘cultural’ access to the participants even 
after initial physical access had been granted at management level.
3.2: Grounded Theory methodology within the interactionist framework 
The theoretical framework underpinning data collection and analysis is the Grounded 
Theory methodology espoused by Strauss and Corbin (1998). The methodology is 
rooted in the symbolic interactionist tradition. It would appear that several 
interactionists trace their theoretical orientation to the posthumously organised work 
of George Herbert Mead (Meltzer 1972). He is cited as ‘the chief architect of 
symbolic interactionism’ (Manis and Meltzer 1972: xi), and the ‘founding father of 
interactionism’ (Downes and Rock 2003.86). Mead argues that human behaviour is 
the product of several processes through which the social actor actively interprets the 
meanings that emerge in the course of social interaction. These processes are 
distinctive of human action (Manis and Meltzer 1972). Mead emphasises the 
introspective quality of individual behaviour which he defines as inherently social
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because it is not simply a response to the actions of others, it also incorporates the 
behaviour of others. Mead’s ontological view of the nature of human behaviour 
influenced the work of prominent neo-Chicagoans or ‘second-generation’ theorists of 
the Chicago school of sociology (Downes and Rock 2003.57) including Blummer 
(1998)x,v and Anselm Strauss, a key exponent of the Grounded Theory methodology. 
In developing and extending Meadian interactionism, these theorists adopted 
tangential interactionist perspectives although several points of convergence may be 
deduced. These represent the core ontological basis of interactionism.
First, following Mead, there is a focus on the introspective aspect of human 
behaviour. Therefore, diverging from a positivistic ontology, interactionists accept 
that the covert processes underlining behaviour constitute proper objects of social 
science inquiry. However, there remains some disagreement over epistemological 
considerations relating to the appropriate techniques to be employed in the study of 
human behaviour (Manis and Meltzer 1972). Secondly, there is a degree of consensus 
among interactionists that the social actor plays an active role in defining their 
behaviour. Human beings do not merely respond to external stimuli. They process and 
interpret external information introspectively, conversing with the self, in order to 
align behaviour with the expectations of others (Mead and Morris 1934; Blummer 
1998; Denzin 1992; Plummer 2000). This represents the influence of pragmatism 
which constitutes, along with formalism, the ontological foundation of interactionism 
(Plummer 2000; Downes and Rock 2003).
3.2.1: Pragmatism
This has been hailed as ‘the most significant intellectual foundation of symbolic 
interactionism’ (Williams and May 1996; Plummer 2000: 197). With pragmatism,
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human experiences or social reality in general are not objectively existing phenomena. 
They emerge from the active interpretations and reactions of social actors to the 
phenomena that confront them. Experience cannot be divorced from the interpretive 
processes from which it emerges. Therefore, for interactionists, actions and objects 
lack intrinsic qualities. They are the product of the meanings and interpretations 
developed during introspective interactions between the other and the self. These 
interactions are contingent, contextual and situational. As such, definitions undergo 
continuous stages of definition and redefinition depending on the situation 
confronting the social actor. This idealism reflects the belief that human beings do not 
react to facts as they really are; rather, they react to their interpretations of the 
situations that confront them during interactions with others (Rock 2001).
Also central to an interactionist perspective is the notion of commonly shared 
meanings within any society. These provide the mechanism (mainly through the 
symbol of language) through which social actors learn to interpret events or other 
social objects. Behaviour is therefore a reflection of the symbols emergent from 
interactions and modified introspectively by the actor (Denzin 1992). The fusion of 
pragmatism as developed by Robert Park of the first generation Chicago school of 
sociology and Simmelian formalism (Downes and Rock 2003) characterises 
interactionism.
3.2.2: Formalism
Formalism averts the ontological and epistemological relativism suggested by 
pragmatism. It asserts the existence of objectively or independently existing forms or 
social structures which transcend the substantive contexts of constantly evolving 
human action and which can operate across diverse sites of human action and
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interaction (Downes and Rock 2003). Describing Simmelian formalism, Plummer
points out that Simmel:
...distinguished between the ‘content’ of social life (such as wars, 
education, politics) and the ‘forms’ (for example conflict) which cut 
across such areas and through which social life is patterned. Conflict as 
a ‘form’ may be found in diverse situations such as war and politics; 
and certain common features accrue to it. While ‘contents’ varied, 
forms emerged as the central organising features of social life 
(2000:199; emphasis in original).
Translated in practical terms, formalism represents the idea that sociological inquiry
should focus not on specific instances of or the substantive elements of human
experience but on ‘the more general forms which consciousness employs to organise,
interpret and name experience’ (Downes and Rock 2003.60, Rock 2001.28). This
‘quest for forms is at the heart of the interactionist exercise...they provide sensitising
linkages across diverse substantive fields and highlight underlying processes at work
through which interaction is accomplished’ (Plummer 2000: 199) Generating
knowledge of forms of social situations and human behaviour is tantamount to
developing formal theory of social phenomena which can be generalised to other
forms of social life. For instance, Whyte’s (1943) study of youth subcultures in an
inner city setting, has been generalised to other situations or conditions in other
neighbours and within different time periods, such as ‘individual performance, group
structure, and the social structure of neighbourhoods’ (Yin 1994.4). Strauss and
Corbin note that:
More formal theories are less specific to a group and place, and as such, 
apply to a wider range of disciplinary concerns and problems (1998.23).
Therefore, unlike substantive theory, formal theory can transcend the immediate
spatial and temporal contexts from which it emerges. Simmel proposed that human
behaviour assumes forms which vary only in content. The interactionist seeks to
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uncover these universally applicable ‘behavioural forms’ located within differing 
contexts (Denzin 1992.87). The above suggests that a study grounded in symbolic 
interactionism will seek to document the processual and contextual forms of human 
behaviour. Likewise, such a study will seek to remain faithful to the view points of the 
research subject, paying close attention to how they perceive and define the situations 
that confront them. These will be prioritised over the operationalisation of a priori 
concepts. Rock rightly puts it that:
...any research grounded in symbolic interactionism will be tentative, 
empirical and responsive to meaning...The social world is taken to be a 
place where little can be taken for granted ab initio...It does not do to 
presume too much in advance’(2001.29).
Likewise it is argued that:
It is all too easy to impose an alien explanatory scheme that obscures 
vision, ignores problems and pre-empts solutions...Data that do not stay 
close to the events, actions or texts being studied are always suspect’
(Gusfield 1968 quoted in Downes and Rock 2003. 179).
As such, interactionist researchers necessarily emphasise a high degree of empiricism,
paying close attention to the level of data and eschewing all attempts to theorise ahead
of data collection.
3.2.3: Grounded Theory Methodology
Grounded Theory methodology consists of inductive and systematic strategies for 
rigorous data collection and analysis. It asserts the mutuality of the processes of data 
collection and analysis. In its original form, Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) approach 
draws on two different ‘philosophical and research traditions’ (Strauss and Corbin 
1998:9). Their approach incorporates the core pragmatist assumptions of symbolic 
interactionism which may be traced to the influence of Anselm Strauss, one of the 
second generation Chicago School Sociologists. It also encompasses rigorous
79
processes of data collection and analysis, and an empiricism that has been traced to 
Barney Glaser’s training in positivist inspired methods emphasising comparative 
analysis methods and inductive theory development (Strauss and Corbin 1998). It has 
since been extended in different directions although the divergences are more 
epistemological than methodological.
3.2.4: Straussian Grounded Theory and Interactionism
This study adopts Strauss’s version of Grounded Theory because it facilitates a 
rigorous and systematic approach to theory development. It retains the fusion of 
pragmatism and formalism engendered by interactionism. By recognising that human 
action is the product of the meanings that social actors ascribe to things, it accords 
with interactionist ontology. Describing the interactionist approach to the study of 
deviance, Downes and Rock write:
Activities are necessarily grounded in working definitions which are 
situated and negotiable. Central to such conceptions are the names and 
symbols upon which definitions are built: as names change, so do 
actions (2003.181).
Therefore, human action cannot be separated from the definitions and contexts from 
which it emerges. Furthermore, in Grounded Theory research the researcher focuses 
on generalising from the specific in order to develop formal theory. The researcher 
explores the dimensional level of the properties of concepts and generalises from the 
specifics of one incident to more general forms of social phenomena. This enables the 
researcher to progress from the more specific instances in data to the general and 
abstract forms manifested by these instances which transcend their immediate 
contexts and may be applicable to other contexts of human interactions and 
experience.
80
Downes and Rock (2003.62) put it that concepts such as:
Conflict...and invasion are processes which appear to transform events 
in predictable ways. For certain purposes it is practically irrelevant 
whether conflict is waged between the partners of a marriage, street 
gangs or nations. It is still conflict and it manifests a number of those 
special qualities which are peculiar to itself (2003.62).
These quotes also encapsulate the ontological basis of symbolic interactionism which
derives from Simmelian formalism as described above. Formalism makes it possible
to develop theoretically generalisable explanations of human behaviour (see also,
Denzin 1972.87; Yin 1994).
Straussian Grounded Theory is not merely a method of data collection and analysis. It 
is a ‘methodology,xv which encompasses the interactionist view of the complexity and 
fluidity of social phenomena and the importance of ascertaining meanings rather than 
taking them for granted. It accords primacy to the ‘words and actions of the people 
studied’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998.6). Thus, following Mead and general interactionist 
standpoint, Straussian Grounded Theory Methodology recognises the socially 
constructed nature of knowledge. As such, Strauss and Corbin (1998) highlight the 
importance of exploring every object in data for its full range of possibilities and 
ascertaining the characteristics that appear to be the most significant. Furthermore, in 
line with interactionist epistemology, Straussian Grounded Theory emphasises 
empirically derived theory rather than the formulation or application of grand theories 
that are not empirically grounded in data. As summarised by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998.10), Straussian Grounded Theory methodology emphasises: the active role of 
the individual in defining and responding to social phenomena, the primacy of the 
meanings underpinning human action, the processes of definition and re-definition of 
meanings through interaction and how these affect human action, the processual
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nature of human behaviour, action and social phenomena, ‘an awareness of the 
interrelationships among conditions (structure), action (process) and consequences’.
3.3: Planning to implement the research agenda
The aim of this study was to explore compliance in order to develop an effective 
strategy for encouraging compliance with legal authorities. It was envisaged that a 
probation setting would provide the opportunity to witness how the mechanisms of 
compliance detailed in the previous chapter would operate in a situation where people 
are bound by law to comply with specific requirements. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the primary compliance mechanism employed in probation policy is the 
deterrent approach. Probation officers are required by the law to prosecute 
probationers for non-compliance after any second failure to attend without providing 
an acceptable reason. Failing to attend is a form of non-compliance that is visible and 
easily detectable. The setting is therefore adequate for examining the impact of the 
certainty, severity and celerity variables underlying deterrence doctrine. It also 
enables one to examine the role of constraint mechanisms given their increasing use 
for classes of probationers assessed as high risk and who have increasingly become 
subject to constraint mechanisms. In addition, given that the compliance strategy is 
enforcement based, the setting provides the opportunity to examine how the manner 
of using authority may affect legitimacy considerations and compliance. Finally, the 
setting should also facilitate an examination of how habits and routines may affect 
compliance.
A careful review of the literature revealed the paucity of research on the subject of 
short term compliance with community penalties and its corollary enforcement
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practice. Raynor and Vanstone (2007:80) suggest that one possible explanation for 
this is that an explicitly punitive enforcement framework is politically expedient:
...the practice of enforcement in community sentences cries out 
for an evidence-based review, which it has not so far received 
because it has been seen as an inescapable political requirement’
Therefore little is known about the extent of, or the reasons for, short-term non-
compliance although studies suggest that many probationers fail to comply with the
requirements of their orders™ (Bottoms 2001; Farrall 2002a; Hedderman and Hough
2004). Further, much of the literature base traversing the principal mechanisms
employed in probation enforcement namely, constraint based and instrumental
mechanisms have utilised quantitative methods of enquiry. Although these provide
insights into the mechanisms associated with compliance they fail to illustrate how
these mechanisms operate, that is, how they affect behaviour to ensure compliance.
Consequently, there appeared to be a need to contribute new insights into the nature of
compliance using a methodological approach that facilitates the development of an
understanding of processes linked to compliance with authority. The study utilised a
qualitative approach which accords with Strauss and Corbin’s (1998.11) definition of
qualitative research. They define qualitative research as the discovery of ‘concepts
and relationships in raw data and then organising these into a theoretical explanatory
scheme’. The qualitative approach has been adopted because the research questions
posed should be addressed using qualitative methods of inquiry. It has been argued
that the choice of methods in social research should be based on the nature of research
problem (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Bryman 2001). Furthermore, other commentators
assert that qualitative methods are best suited for addressing specific types of ‘how’
and ‘what’ research questions (Yin 1994). The research questions posed in this study
are mainly of the ‘how and why’ variety requiring knowledge of the in-depth views
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and experiences of research participants. Central to these would be the meanings and 
definitions with which they make sense of their actions and with which they adapt to 
changing conditions. Ultimately, the aim is to understand the mechanisms that may 
affect compliance with community penalties.
The methodology employed was chosen for several additional reasons:
1. It is rooted in symbolic interactionism which emphasises that the subjective 
meanings that social actors use to interpret their interactions and experiences 
are valid sources of knowledge about the social world;
2. The interactionist approach recognises the role of social actors in the 
construction of knowledge about the social world;
3. The approach ensures that any insights emerging from the study are grounded 
in the experiences and perceptions of the relevant actors;
4. The analytic devices central to Grounded Theory methodology enabled the 
researcher to retain a degree of objectivity in analysis.
One acknowledges that analysis is always the product of second level interpretation, 
that is, the researcher’s attempts to decipher and interpret the participant’s viewpoints. 
Nevertheless, analytic tools such as ‘asking questions’ and ‘making comparisons’ 
ensure that the researcher does not become too engrossed in the data. By forcing the 
researcher to consider all possible and alternative explanations of emergent concepts, 
the analytic tools help to ensure that the researcher is able to maintain some distance 
from the data. The tools also help to prevent the super-imposition of presumptions, 
‘common sense views’ or worse still, stereotypical notions onto the concepts 
emergent from data. In doing so, the researcher is able to resist the premature 
foreclosure of analysis. Consequently, the methodology enables the researcher to 
explore events in the data at a conceptual level taking into account the range of
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conditions and actions that may pertain to emergent concepts. In sum, Grounded 
Theory methodology facilitates a rigorous and systematic approach to data collection 
and analysis. This enhances the quality of the study.
3.4: Constructing the research questions and interview schedules
The central question this study set out to answer is: as perceived by the key actors 
involved namely, the probation officers and the probationers they supervise, what are 
the mechanisms that affect how people comply with community penalties? The 
mechanisms of compliance developed by Bottoms (2001) formed the study’s 
conceptual framework. On the basis of this research question, and following a detailed 
review of the literature, ten empirical questions that would inform the contents of the 
interview schedules were devised (see Appendix 1).
The data were generated from a wide range of sources. The primary source of data 
was interviews. Added to these, access to the case records of some of the probationers 
were sought and obtained subject to the consent of the specific offenders involved in 
the study. Additional sources of data were official documents including the National 
Standards, other legislation regulating supervision practice and official statistics. 
These sources of data were carefully selected on the basis that they would contribute 
to a holistic and accurate depiction of the realities of enforcement given the themes 
emerging from the literature review. A final source of data was observations of 
interactions between participating probation officers and offenders, particularly where 
enforcement was the subject of such interactions.
As mentioned above, the study utilised semi structured qualitative interviewing 
methods to generate data. A conversational style of interviewing was employed. This 
enabled the participants to express their perceptions of matters pertaining to 
compliance and non-compliance at some depth. The aim was to generate insights into
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how participants perceive, define or understand the issues surrounding compliance 
and enforcement. As such, participants had considerable power over how the 
interview proceeded. They were free to change the course of discussions by raising 
issues relating to compliance which were significant to their individual experiences of 
the phenomena under study even where these issues did not substantiate the 
mechanisms of compliance outlined above.
Interview schedules were devised for this purpose on the basis of the central research 
question and the empirical questions. The questions were designed to subtly elicit 
information about the participants’ perceptions and experiences of current restrictive 
policies (see Appendix 5). It is worth noting that the interview schedules served as 
guides. There was no conformity to any standardized interviewing schedule. Rather, 
interviewing was flexible, enabling the participants to discuss the relevant issues on 
their own terms. The schedules served as prompts to ensure that all relevant aspects of 
the empirical questions were addressed.
3.4.1: The content o f  interviews
Interviews with the probation officers explored their experiences of enforcement, their 
views about current enforcement policies and their philosophical approach to 
enforcement. Interviews with the probationers examined their demographic attributes, 
their compliance record so far, the nature of their interactions with their officers, their 
understandings of the consequences of non-compliance, their views of supervision, 
how such understandings impact on their behaviour, their views about the specific 
factors that motivate them to comply or the obstacles to compliance. The interviews 
also covered aspects of probationers’ social lives, daily routines, and their 
relationships with family and friends. The officers were notified that because the aim 
of interviewing would be to obtain in-depth views from people who offend, the
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researcher would need to inform the probationers at the start of the interview that any 
information given would not be relayed to their probation officers. The interviews 
with the probationers were on average, 30 minutes long, whilst the average duration 
of interviews with the officers was one hour. Furthermore, subject to the consent of 
each participant, all interviews were tape recorded.
3.5: Sampling: Introducing the probation area
The study was conducted within a probation area in Wales. However, five additional 
interviews with probation officers and senior officers were conducted in the Jersey 
Probation and Aftercare Service (see Table 3.8). The Jersey Service was selected on 
the basis of the theoretical sampling technique in which sampling is based on the need 
to develop emergent categories. As such, the decision to generate further data from 
the Jersey Service was motivated by the need to further delineate the patterns and 
variations of a key category that emerged in the first two phases of the study. This 
verification process is central to Grounded Theory methodology (see Strauss and 
Corbin 1998), and the outcome will be described in more detail in the next chapter. 
Meanwhile, given that the study was conducted within a probation area in Wales, one 
acknowledges that the findings may in part reflect the dominant professional culture 
within the probation area studied or within probation areas in Wales.
The probation area in Wales in which the study was conducted comprises several 
semi-autonomous administrative offices headed by divisional managers. The offices 
cover sparely populated rural areas that are located within a significant land mass. As 
such, transportation was an important issue in most of the areas as the probationers 
often had to rely on limited transport provisions. In one administrative office for 
instance, some probationers needed to travel more than ten miles to attend their 
appointments. Of the 9 offices visited, 7 were located in different counties whilst 2
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were located within the same county. All the counties covered a significant land mass 
which were quite sparsely populated compared with the rest of Wales. Indeed, the part 
of Wales in which the probation area is located has a population density that is lower 
than the average for England and Wales. Further, less than 1% of the probation 
officers located in the area come from black or other ethnic minority groups compared 
with the national average - 13%. Perhaps this is reflective of the wider population in 
Wales which comprises approximately 1% black and other ethnic minority groups 
compared with the 9% average for England and Wales (Ministry of Justice 2007b). 
The rate of recorded crime in the probation area is almost less than half the average 
rates recorded in England and Wales although the rate of recorded violent crime is 
comparable to the national average. Officially, the probation area has been described 
as one of the smallest probation areas in England and Wales in terms of an estimation 
of its funding budget. Further, staffing levels are low. Compared with almost all the 
other probation areas in England and Wales, the offender management and 
interventions staff employed by the area are among the lowest in number. 
Nevertheless, a consideration of the ratio between low staffing levels and allocated 
caseloads within the probation area sampled, leads one to conclude that the workload 
within the study area is almost directly comparable to what obtains in other larger 
areas.
Generally, official statistics reveal that compared with England, Wales suffers lower 
employment rates, lower levels of income™1 and lower levels of educational 
attainment, although recorded crime rates are significantly lowerxvin (Office for 
National Statistics 2006; Welsh Assembly Government 2007). Equally, within each of 
the Welsh counties in which the offices were located, official statistics reveal that
there are several indices of social deprivation. These include, low income, high 
unemployment and low educational attainment (ONS 2006).
3.6: The study sample
The data collection process began in July 2005 and ended in October 2006. The 
sampling technique employed was theoretical sampling. As such, the initial sample 
was a convenience sample comprising participants meeting the following criteria:
• 1 male probation officer
• 1 female probation officer
• 1 probationer commencing his/her order
• 1 probationer at the end of his/her order
Thus, during the initial sampling phase, two probationers and two officers were 
selected on the basis of convenience sampling. The objective of selecting an initial 
sample fulfilling the above criteria was to generate initial concepts which would direct 
the course of future sampling. Subsequent sampling was purposive and based on the 
need to develop emergent categories (see also Strauss and Corbin 1998). This 
sampling technique represents the theoretical sampling technique central to Grounded 
Theory methodology.
The original intention was to sample:
• 10 probation officers;
• 30 of their clients comprising;
• 10 probationers beginning their orders;
• 10 nearing completion and;
• 10 probationers who had been breached for non-compliance
During analysis the emergent theoretical framework meant that 28 officers and 26 
probationers at different stages of their orders were interviewed. Of these numbers, 10
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participants (comprising 8 probationers and 2 officers) were re-interviewed after a six 
month period. Below, an attempt is made to provide an overview of the basic 
characteristics of the achieved sample.
3.7: The probationers
The probationers’ attributes varied in terms of age, offence type, order type, stage of 
order, duration of order, previous antecedents and levels of assessed risk. In all, 26 
probationers were interviewed. Table 3.1 below outlines the stages at which the 
interviews were conducted. One interviewee was serving a Suspended Sentence Order 
and has been excluded from analysis for failing to meet the required criteria given that 
the enforcement requirements are less punitive and may affect perceptions of risks or 
the other variables central to the study. Consequently, analysis was restricted to the 
data generated from 25 probationers. This figure comprises 15 (60%) male 
probationers and 10 (40%) female probationers. The gender distribution differs from 
the national distribution of probationers in which the percentage is 85% males and 
15% females (see Table 4.3 NOMS 2006b). This disparity is not surprising given that 
the sampling method used was theoretical sampling in which sampling proceeded on 
the basis of the theoretical insights emergent from the data.
Table 3.1: Probationers Sampled
Stage of order Number
Beginning 9
Midway 9
End 7
Total 25
Some of the 25 probationers sampled had experienced breach action at some point of 
the current order. Likewise, most would have failed to attend their appointment at 
some stage. This would have exposed them to the enforcement strategies adopted by 
the officers. Therefore, it is quite possible that their responses pertaining to the
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impact of perceived risks on their behaviour may have stemmed from experiential 
effects. However, the extent of violations suggests that the deterrent framework 
largely fails to achieve its objectives. Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, the 
methodological difficulty posed by experiential effects can be averted by conducting 
follow up interviews so that the links between perceived risks and interim behaviour 
(between the initial interviews and the follow ups interviews) can be analysed. As 
such, follow up interviews were conducted approximately six months after the initial 
interviews. The follow-up interviews served two purposes. First they helped to 
address the above mentioned problem of temporal ordering in which the variables 
central to deterrence theory (perceived risks and behaviour) do not occur in the order 
intended by deterrence theory. With deterrence theory, perceived risks should precede 
behaviour. Follow up interviews provide the opportunity to explore deterrent effects 
by examining how perceived risks affect future behaviour.
During the follow up interviews, it emerged that two of the probationers interviewed 
during the initial stages had since been breached for non-compliance. Moreover, some 
of the probationers re-interviewed reported additional incidents of absenteeism and 
non-compliance. The violations occurred despite the heightened perceptions of risks 
reported during the initial interviews. This finding further illuminated the marginal 
impact of the deterrent framework. Secondly, the follow up interviews facilitated the 
implementation of Grounded Theory techniques- theoretical sampling and 
comparisons.
The largest age group of the sampled probationers fell within the 26 and over age 
range and the lowest group were those aged below 26 years (see Table 3.2). This is 
broadly consistent with the wider probation population (NOMS 2006b).
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Table 3.2: Probationer Age Range
N
20& under 7
21-25 4
26-39 9
40 & over 5
Total 25
Most of the probationers had previous convictions (see Table 3.3), and of the total 
sampled, 8 had served custodial sentences for offences ranging from alcohol induced 
violence to drug related offences.
Table 3.3: Criminal Antecedents of the probationers sampled
N
No antecedents 9
Second conviction 7
Multiple convictions 9
Total 25
Further, two thirds of the probationers sampled were unemployed. Thus of the 25 
probationers, 18 were unemployed and in receipt of social security benefits, whist 7 
were employed in low skill and low paid jobs such as: factory work, JCB/forklift 
driving, construction work and bar work. Of the unemployed probationers, one had 
previously been employed as a market stall assistant and another as a carpenter. 
Others included bricklayers, nursery assistants, hairdressers and factory workers. 
Most had left secondary school with no qualifications. This is consistent with the 
findings reported by several studies that most probationers suffer significant socio­
economic deprivation. Rex writes that:
One striking factor was the range and multiplicity of problems recorded 
on probation files. As well as the lack of stable employment which 
pervaded the entire sample, over a third of the probationers (24) 
apparently experienced at least three of the following kinds of 
difficulties: unsatisfactory or unstable accommodation; shortage of 
money and /or debt; addiction to alcohol or drugs; mental health; and 
relationships. This is consistent with the findings of other researchers...
(1999: 367).
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Likewise, drawing on studies confirming the high incidence of socio-economic
disadvantage among probationers, Ford and colleagues observe that:
There is substantial evidence that offenders as a group are significantly 
atypical of the general population in terms of the constellation of 
personal difficulties that they face. Commonly they will have a range of 
associated psychosocial problems, such as unemployment, housing 
difficulties, poor educational achievement, disruptive family 
relationships and mental health problems; a substantial minority will 
have attempted suicide, or misused drugs and alcohol... almost a third 
of probationers have been in care as children, and as a subgroup of the 
total probation caseload, they show significantly more disrupted and 
disturbed behaviour and problems than those who have not been in care 
(1997:42-43).
These were reflected in the study sample. Added to these, in the specific area 
sampled, 90% of the probationers are assessed to have low basic skills and for 50% of 
probationers supervised in the area, it is estimated that their basic skills fall below the 
range expected of 11 year olds. Further, an examination of a sample of fifteen case 
records revealed the indices of social deprivation described above including low basic 
skills, periods in care, unstable family relationships and living arrangements, financial 
difficulties and several other socio-economic difficulties. The risk profiles of some of 
the probationers sampled are outlined in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Probationer Risk Profile
N
Low risk reoffending/low risk harm 4
Medium risk reoffending/low risk harm 7
Medium risk reoffending/high risk harm 1
High risk of reoffending/medium risk harm 3
Total 15
Table 3.4 shows that of the 15 probationers whose records were analysed, most (8) 
were assessed as posing a medium risk of reoffending.
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Table 3.5: The probationers sampled-offence type*
N (%) National Statistics %
Robbery - - 1%
Indictable motoring offences - - 1%
Other indictable offences - - 9%
Violence against the person 10 40% 12%
Sexual offences 1 4% 2%
Burglary 1 4% 5%
Theft and handling 3 16% 17%
Fraud and forgery 3 12% 3%
Criminal damage 2 8% 3%
Summary motoring offences** 2 8% 24%
Other summary offences*** 3 12% 23%
Total 25 100 100%
♦Offence types correspond with the categories used in official probation statistics 
(NOMS 2006b)
♦♦ The probationers categorised here were serving their orders for drink driving offences.
♦♦♦The probationers categorised here were serving their orders for child neglect offences.
Many probationers were serving their orders for offences of violence linked to
substance misuse (see Table 3.5). Although there is an overrepresentation of
probationers within this category of offending compared with the national statistics,
this is consistent with the general characteristics of probationers supervised within the
probation area sampled. For 74% of the probationers supervised by the area a link
exists between offending and substance use. The second largest offence group was
theft and handling.
The largest group of probationers sampled (13) were serving the old style probation 
ordersxlx (see Table 3.6). Further, almost all the probationers were given additional 
requirements to participate in one or more offender behavioural programmes, mainly 
the ‘one to one’ programme and/or substance misuse programmes. There were 4 
probationers on the old style community punishment and rehabilitation order.
3.7.1: The probationers sampled - the new style orders
Of the 25 probationers, 8 were serving the new style orders introduced during the 
study. Of this 8, 3 were serving the new style community order with supervision 
requirements™, 4 were serving the community order with supervision and unpaid
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work requirements and 1 was on the community order with unpaid work order. The
new style orders were introduced during the study period. As such the achieved
sample will differ from the national average.
Table 3.6: The probationers sampled- order profile
N % National Statistics%
CRO 13 52% 42%
CPRO* 4 16% 14%
CO**___________________ 8___________ 32%______________ 44%____________
Total 25 100% 100%
* Community punishment and rehabilitation order.
**The new style community orders
The probationers also varied according to the lengths of their orders (see Table 3.7). 
As mentioned in the Chapter one, although Mclvor (1992) found no links between the 
length of an order and the 'likelihood of breach’, official statistics suggest that 
probationers serving longer orders are more likely to fail (NOMS 2006b). To explore 
this further, although the study focused mainly on probation orders, the study sampled 
several probationers serving longer terms. In all, probationers serving orders of up to 
36 months were included in the study. As Table 3.7 below depicts, most of the 
probationers sampled (11) were serving 12 months orders. Broadly, this is consistent 
with the national average given that probationers typically serve orders of 12-24 
months (NOMS 2006b). Further, for 9 probationers with orders incorporating the 
unpaid work or community service element, the hours imposed ranged from 50 hours 
to 200 hours.
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Table 3.7: The probationers sampled- order duration
Length N
6 months 1
12 months 11
18 months 5
24 months 5
36 months 3
Total 25
It is worth noting that the sampling technique employed was theoretical sampling in 
which sampling proceeds on the basis of the emergent theoretical framework. As 
such, the achieved sample will differ somewhat from national statistics although areas 
of concordance exist.
3.8: The officers
As mentioned earlier, the study was conducted within a probation area in Wales and 
five additional interviews were conducted in the Jersey Probation and Aftercare 
Service in order to develop an emergent category (see Table 3.8).
Table 3.8: The Officers 
Number
Probation Officers Management Unpaid work staff Total
Wales 19 - 4 23
Jersey 2 3 - 5
Total 21 3 4 28
As Table 3.8 above shows, 3 members of management were interviewed in the Jersey 
Probation Service. Further, the 2 main grade officers interviewed in Jersey had been 
in service for less than six years. Of the 19 main grade probation officers sampled in 
Wales, the average lengths of service reported by the officers was just over eight 
years. This is consistent with the national average for probation officers (Ministry of 
Justice 2007a). According to official statistics collated at the end of 2006, the national
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average length of service for probation officers is eight years, the implication being 
that most probation officers would have been trained under the new style training 
arrangements introduced in 1997/98 (See generally Nellis 2003; Ministry of Justice 
2007a). Thus in terms of training style, the sample of officers is also broadly 
reflective of the national population of probation officers (Ministry of Justice 2007a).
Table 3.9: The officers sampled in Wales - length of service
Length of service (yrs) Number
Under 1 4
I-5 7
6-10 1
II-15 3
16-20 2
Over 20 2
Total 19
In all, 16 female and 12 male staff were interviewed. This comprises 12 female 
probation officers and 9 male probation officers. The higher proportion of female 
officers may be reflective of national trends in which the female probation officers 
outnumber the male officers by a ratio of almost 2 to 1 (Ministry of Justice 2007a). 
This gender discrepancy has been described as ‘the feminisation of the workforce’ 
(Worrall and Hoy 2005; Bailey et al. 2007:126; NOMS 2006b; Ministry of Justice 
2007a).
In sum, compared with the wider population of probation areas, officers and 
probationers in Wales, the study sample has several distinctive features. The 
probation offices were located in a predominantly rural area with low rates of 
recorded crime compared with other probation areas. There is also a high rate of 
socioeconomic deprivation in the area. Other distinctive features include the small 
population density despite the large land mass which poses transportation problems, 
the small size of the probation area in terms of its revenue budget and staffing levels
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and also the under-representation of ethic minorities although the latter is reflective of 
the wider population of Wales in general.
Alongside these disparities, there are some consistencies between the study sample 
and the national average. Chief among these are the average lengths of service 
reported by the officers and the finding that most of the officers were trained under 
the new training arrangements for probation offices. Also comparable to the national 
average are the greater representation of female officers and the officers’ workload. 
The latter tends to be commensurate with staffing levels (Ministry of Justice 
2007b).The probationers sampled also possess attributes that are consistent with the 
wider population of probationers. These include the age range of the probationers, the 
degree of socioeconomic deprivation afflicting most of the probationers sampled and 
the duration of their orders.
3.9: The follow up interviews
On the basis of theoretical sampling, 17 participants (7 officers and 10 probationers) 
were selected for follow up interviews (see Table 3.9).
Table 3.10: The follow up interviews 
Number
Intended Absent Achieved
Probationers 10 2 8
Probation officers 7 5 2
Total 17 6 10
Of the 17 intended participants, 3 officers were no longer based at their offices at the 
time of the follow up interviews, and 1 officer was away on long term sick leave. 2 
probationers persistently failed to attend on the appointed dates (which were set to 
coincide with their supervision appointments). In all, 10 follow up interviews were 
conducted comprising 2 officers and 8 probationers.
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3.10: Conclusion
The processes of obtaining access to the study participants clearly mirrored Rex’s 
(1999:368) earlier observation that: ‘Gaining access to research participants requires 
negotiations at every level’. There were five levels of negotiations involved in 
obtaining access. After initial access was granted by the gate keepers- those at the top 
of the organisation (at management level) - I had to negotiate with divisional 
managers in charge of each of the ten offices visited. Formal letters describing the 
proposed study and the sample required were sent to each office (see Appendices 
3&4). The letters also detailed the components of the interview, outlining the intended 
format and duration. In addition, the letters initiated the process of obtaining informed 
consent. With some offices, despite constant requests and reminders through emails 
and phone calls, there were significant delays in obtaining second level access to the 
officers and probationers. Once this was granted, third level negotiations began. This 
consisted of inviting the officers to participate and to recruit the probationers willing 
to participate. This stage often required a second round of written reminders and 
requests for interviews.
The fourth level of negotiations began in the follow up period. The methodology 
employed requires iterative analysis. As such, I had to revisit several offices in 
widespread geographical locations. Access became more difficult because of the 
unpredictability of probationers, staff turnover and redeployments. I had to constantly 
renegotiate the terms of access with additional officers in order to fix appointments 
within limited time scales.
Having gained physical access, the fifth stage of negotiations consisted of attempting 
to obtain what has been termed ‘cultural access’ (see also Oakley 1981.52). This 
entails the ability to secure the trust and respect of the research participants. This was
99
crucial for maintaining the quality of the data for several reasons. The subject matter 
of this study was potentially contentious and it subsequently became topical. In terms 
of the latter, the highly publicised crimes committed by probationers and the ensuring 
negative media coverage fuelled speculation about the ability of the service to 
perform its public protection role. Similarly, the subject matter of study was 
contentious because of the significant changes the service has undergone in recent 
years, in the effort to reconstitute its image. Historically, the service offered welfare 
based alternatives to punishment. In current policy, the orientation of the service has 
been changed and it is now responsible for providing community based punishments 
with strict regulations for enforcing compliance. Studies suggest that officers resort to 
covert discretionary practices for several reasons including the attempt to overcome 
the limitations posed by unwieldy policy requirements (Vass 1980). Enforcement 
practice may have therefore been a potentially contentious issue.
I believe that the qualitative interviewing method I used enabled me to develop the 
degree of rapport necessary for ensuring that the participants were able to invest a 
degree of trust in me in a way that may have enabled them to provide honest and in- 
depth views of their experiences.
100
Chapter Four: Data Analysis: Developing the emergent categories 
4.1: Introduction
This chapter describes the processes of data collection and analysis. In line with 
Grounded Theory methodology, analysis proceeded on the basis of open sampling, 
open coding, axial coding and theoretical sampling. The categories that emerged from 
analysis and the processes of their development are also described in this chapter. 
These categories appeared to suggest that compliance cannot be decontextualised 
from the activities of the officers in defining what constitutes compliance.
4.2: Open sampling
Three phases of interviewing were conducted using theoretical sampling and based on 
the emergent concepts and categories. Initially, sampling was speculative and as 
mentioned earlier, the respondents were chosen for their ability to open up lines of 
enquiry and direct the course of future sampling. As noted in the previous chapter, 
care was taken to ensure that the sample included respondents with varying 
demographic characteristics. In the first phase, the intention was to generate the data 
that would offer a broad perspective on the research problem.
4.3 First stage of analysis: open coding of the initial data
The process of data analysis began with open coding. This is the process of 
conceptualising incidents in the dataxxl. It was an iterative process in which I worked 
back and forth interpreting and coding the data. Central to this inductive process was 
microanalysis or the Tine by line’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998:57) analysis of the data. 
This expedited the coding process. In conducting microanalysis, each sentence was 
read in detail and was explored for possible concepts.
4.3.1: Integrating concepts into categories and axial coding
During open coding and microanalysis, several concepts were identified (see
Appendix 6). These were subsequently integrated into categories™11 and sub-
categoriesxxni (see Appendices 6&7). Once these categories had been generated I 
began axial coding. This involved reorganising the data fragmented by open coding 
processes. To this end, ‘relational statements’ were used to elucidate the relationships 
between each emergent category and its subcategories (See also, Strauss and Corbin 
1998). Subsequently, the focus of analysis shifted from identifying categories and 
their properties, to ascertaining the relationships between the emergent categories and 
their subcategories. In formulating these hypotheses, I employed an analytic device - 
‘the paradigm’ - (Strauss and Corbin 1998:128). This device comprises three 
components namely conditions, actions/interactions and consequences. It enabled the 
process of identifying the categories representing each of these components. The
objective was to link the evolving processesxx,v identified in the data with the
structural conditions underpinning themxxv.
The participants’ actions and interactions are classified as processes, whilst the 
conditions that pre-empt these processes and their consequences are conceptualised as 
the structural factors underpinning the observed processes. Using relational statements 
during axial coding, theoretical links were made between emergent processes and 
their structural contexts. The aim was to understand the nature of compliance by 
observing its interactional and structural contexts. Strauss and Corbin point out that:
‘Our concern as analysts is not so much with causality as with 
conditions...and the way in which they criss cross to create events 
leading to actions/interactions’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998:133).
Therefore, the concern was not to establish causality in any deterministic manner.
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All three components of the paradigm were identified in the data. Using relational 
statements to link the emergent categories to their subcategories enabled this process. 
In sum, each category was analysed and depending on the properties they exhibited 
when linked with existing categories, they were identified as either the ‘conditions’ 
that inform other categories classed as ‘actions and interactions’ or as the categories 
that represent the ‘consequences’ of these actions/interactions.
4.4: Unravelling compliance: the emergent categories
Nine categories emerged from the three phases of data collection and analysis. The 
categories were conceptualised as:
• Officer defined mechanisms
• Probationer defined mechanisms
• Policy defined mechanisms
• Reacting to the formal rules
• Obstacles to compliance
• Confronting unpredictability
• Policy constraints
• Informal rules
• Adaptation techniques
Together, these categories represent the processual and conditional factors that could 
aid an understanding of the nature of compliance. They were developed using the 
analytic tools and devices described above and also described in more detail in 
Chapter five. The first three categories represent the mechanisms of compliance cited 
by the participants. Chapter five will detail how the 9 emergent categories described 
below were integrated into 3 key categories linked to compliance.
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4.5 Officer defined mechanisms
The officers reported that they make attempts to address potential obstacles to 
compliance. For instance, structural problems such as a lack of suitable 
accommodation and employment are addressed by referrals to relevant agencies; debt 
management advice may be offered for financial difficulties. To alleviate practical 
problems for instance, the officers reported that at an organisational level, travel costs 
may be reimbursed although the provision for this is limited. Some of the officers 
also offer reminders and flexible appointments to accommodate the unpredictability 
posed by chaotic lifestyles fuelled by substance misuse. They may also make home 
visits to alleviate reporting difficulties. Substance misuse/lifestyle related obstacles 
are also addressed by making referrals to the appropriate agencies. These are the 
routine based obstacles that engender chaotic lifestyles. Non criminogenic routines 
that affect compliance (mainly employment commitments) are addressed through 
more flexible reporting arrangements. Further, literacy deficiencies that may affect 
compliance are addressed by referrals to appropriate agencies and by compliance 
strategies such as reminders.
Added to the effort to address needs, other mechanisms employed by the officers are 
linked to their interactions with the probationers. The officers reported that they 
strive to maintain positive relationships with their clients. Importantly, to ensure that 
the probationers are able to complete their orders without undue recourse to breach 
action the officers would typically apply informal rules that permit more flexible 
enforcement.
Although these officer defined mechanisms can potentially stimulate normative 
compliance, the study found that they tend to be interpreted by the probationers as 
incentives designed to encourage compliance (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Developing the category - officer mechanisms
Referrals Reimbursements Flexible appointments
Instrumental mechanisms 
Incentives
It is arguable that talks and other benefits can serve normative ends. However, this is 
more likely where the benefits are communicated to the probationers as normative 
mechanisms and are understood by them as such. Potential avenues for 
communicating the normative objectives of interactions are provided by insights from 
the effective practice literature. Prosocial modelling techniques for instance, 
emphasise the importance of communicating to the probationers the consequences of 
their actions. Thus to enhance normative compliance, the officers can complement 
their efforts to resolve the structural, practical, and routine based obstacles to 
compliance with the use of skills emerging from the effective practice literature such 
as prosocial modelling or motivational interviewing skills (Dowden and Andrews 
2004). Studies show that these skills can emphasise the normative aspects of the 
officers’ interactions with the probationers in order to encourage short term and 
longer term normative compliance (Dowden and Andrews 2004).
4.6 Probationer defined mechanisms
The probationers’ descriptions of their experiences of supervision were consistent 
with the findings of existing studies. The probationers offered positive evaluations of 
their officers and their supervision experiences underpinned by the expectation of 
support. From the probationers’ perspective, the help and support offered during 
supervision served as incentives to attend appointments. Central to these was the 
therapeutic role of the officer - listening to problems.
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Added to instrumental mechanisms through the use of incentives, some of the 
probationers cited other instrumental factors that affect how they comply and these 
are mainly informal control mechanisms such as the influence of social bonds with 
significant persons in their lives such as a partner or other dependents and stakes in 
conformity - accommodation and employment - as defined by (Hirschi 1969). Some 
probationers also cited the belief that compliance expedites the completion of the 
order as an additional motivating factor.
However, in describing the central factor that motivates them to comply, most of the 
probationers cited mainly instrumental mechanisms in the form of incentives that are 
consistent with the mechanisms cited by the officers (see Figure 4.2). Although some 
of the probationers (16) acknowledged the normative aspect of the order only 2 
probationers cited normative mechanisms as the central factors motivating them to 
comply. For most the probationers, interactions with their officers were likely to 
produce compliance where there were perceived benefits accruing from these 
interactions.
Figure 4.2: Developing the category - Probationer mechanisms
Instrumental
mechanisms
Social control 
mechanisms
Expedite
completion
Perceived benefits 
of interactions
Therefore, the main mechanisms were instrumental in the form of incentives based on 
the perceived benefits of supervision: the opportunity to ‘talk out’ problems in order 
to relieve mental stress and solve problems, the role of the officer in listening to
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problems, providing advice and making referrals. According to the probationers, these 
were important motivational factors.
4.7: Policy defined mechanisms
As observed by Bottoms (2001), the current enforcement framework is deterrence 
based. Thus, it is rooted in the belief that the severity of punishment for breach should 
deter all potential and persistent non-compliers. The category -  policy defined 
mechanisms -  conceptualises this approach to securing compliance because it 
comprises several mechanisms for enhancing the objective severity, certainty and 
celerity of punishment for non-compliance. These were conceptualised as: efficient 
enforcement machinery, the new sentencing arrangements for breach, the provisions 
for early revocation and the proactive rule clarification during induction (see Figure 
4.3)
Figure 4.3: Developing the category: policy mechanisms
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clarification
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In each of the offices visited, there appeared to be efficient machinery for the 
delivery of breach proceedings. The machinery operates through an efficient breach 
administration framework that is designed to facilitate the implementation of the 
deterrent framework. In most offices there is effective division of labour with the 
Probation Service Officers responsible for breach administration and a Court Duty 
Officer available to prosecute breaches. Another policy defined mechanism that may
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have been developed to serve as a corollary to the deterrent framework is the 
abrogation of disciplinary breaches. As noted above, with the new sentencing 
arrangements, the courts are required to impose a sentence for breach. Under previous 
arrangements, the courts could simply reprimand the probationer or impose a fine. 
The policy intention may be to utilise the new provisions as deterrent mechanisms 
given that probationers can no longer receive a mere reprimand but must be re­
sentenced for breach. It may also be designed to reduce breach rates by discouraging 
the officers from escalating minor incidents of breach. Frequent hearings to secure a 
reprimand may not be deemed cost effective. Nevertheless, the officers have lost the 
ability to employ constructive breach as a mechanism of compliance and they believe 
this will engender higher rates of non-compliance. The officers believe that the new 
enforcement arrangements will make non-compliance more likely given that 
probationers are likely to become encumbered with onerous requirements that would 
render them more susceptible to violations.
Another policy mechanism designed to enhance the deterrent potential of the 
enforcement framework was categorised as ‘proactive rule clarification’. This 
conceptualises the strategic actions and interactions entailed in defining the 
boundaries of expected behaviour as dictated by the formal rules. Proactive role 
clarification begins during induction. It consists of a range of strategies namely, 
defining the formal rules and ensuring rule clarity.
During the process of defining formal rules, the probationer is informed of the full 
consequences of non-compliance. According to the data, the probationers may fully 
comprehend the formal rules (rule clarity), or may demonstrate limited knowledge of 
the formal rules (rule ambiguity). The three stages of analysis revealed that of the 25 
probationers interviewed, only 8 had accurate knowledge of the formal rules. The
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reminder (17) displayed limited knowledge of the rules although all the probationers 
interviewed reported that the rules had been communicated to them during their 
induction. However, all the probationers demonstrated heightened perceptions of 
risks.
5 possible reasons for the high level of perceived risks also emerged:
1. Previous experience of breach action
2. Threats made by the courts (during sentencing) that severe consequences will 
accompany non-compliance
3. The perception that the current offence was serious enough to warrant a 
custodial sentence
4. Information gleaned from peers
5. The belief that a severe outcome is likely because the order is an alternative to 
custody which if  breached would be construed by the courts as a failure to take 
full advantage of a ‘second chance’
Although the five factors listed above and derived from the probationers’ accounts
appeared to explain the possible reasons for the heightened perceptions of risks
observed, the data revealed limited links between the objective existence of the policy
defined mechanisms or the impact of the five factors above on the actual behaviour of
the probationers.
Early revocation of the order for good compliance is the key incentive devised by 
policy to encourage compliance. Again it is an instrumental mechanism that seeks to 
encourage instrumental compliance.
The policy mechanisms described above are designed to facilitate the effective 
implementation of the deterrent framework. By incorporating instrumental strategies 
in the form of disincentives and also in the form of incentives, the policy mechanisms 
reflect an instrumental view of compliance.
However, the data revealed that despite the policy defined mechanisms and despite 
the heightened perceptions of risks observed, most of the probationers would violate 
the formal rules. The rates of violations suggest that the policy mechanisms and also,
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the perceived risks stemming from previous experiences of breach action or from 
negative court encounters did not appear to engender a high degree of risk aversion. 
4.8: Reacting to the formal rules
This category represents the probationers’ reactions to proactive role clarification (see 
Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Developing the category - proactive rule clarification and reacting to 
formal rules
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As Figure 4.1 shows, the probationers’ reaction to the formal rules as defined during 
rule clarification would typically be in the form of violating the formal rules. All of 
the 25 probationers sampled had missed appointments for a variety of reasons. Of this 
number, 17 reported that their absences were for invalid reasons. The largest group of 
probationers (8) cited substance misuse (among other factors) as the reason for 
absence. In some of these cases the reliance on drugs or alcohol rendered the 
probationer unable to attend routine appointments.
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4.8.1: The reasons fo r violations and absences
The reasons for violations and absences as described by the probationers may be 
broadly categorised as situational, lifestyle, personal and practical. These may 
contribute to a failure to prioritise probation appointments. According to the 
probationers, the reasons for violations were:
• Negative interactions with the officer
• Visiting the pub
• Substance misuse
• Forgetting appointments
• Travelling
• Shopping
In terms of the first above, the indices of negative relationships that triggered 
violations were described by the probationers involved as: perceived poor quality 
treatment characterised by the inability to state one’s case during decision making; 
disrespect stemming from a rigid application of rules, the absence of a ‘rapport’ 
whereby both parties are able to converse freely; a domineering approach, an 
approach lacking in empathy and an intrusive approach. The latter arises where there 
is discontinuity in supervision and the probationer struggles to re-establish trust with a 
different officer. Violations linked to negative interactions with the officer may also 
be triggered by the belief that the officer has been unable or unwilling to provide any 
incentives in the form of support and other desired or anticipated help.
Visiting the pub and substance misuse are lifestyle factors. These may engender a 
failure to prioritise probation appointments. Likewise, forgetting appointments, 
travelling and going shopping represent the failure to prioritise probation 
appointments.
I l l
Absences not defined as violations by the probationers were mainly caused by 
socioeconomic, lifestyle and practical problems. They are outlined below:
1. Travel difficulties
2. Childcare problems
3. An injured toe nail
1. Work commitments
2. Viewing a house
3. Having a fight with a neighbour
4. Accommodation problems
5. Child care
6. Travel costs
7. Disliked unpaid work
8. Ill health
9. Family problems
10. Substance misuse fuelled by emotional difficulties
Although fighting was not described as an invalid reason for absence by the 
probationers involved, it may also be classified as a lifestyle obstacle given that the 
two probationers involved tended to become involved in fights whilst under the 
influence of substances.
Some probationers were not interviewed because they failed to attend their probation 
appointment on the day scheduled for the interview. They contacted the office to 
provide excuses linked to socioeconomic, domestic and other practical factors:
• A domestic abuse incident involving a knife attack
• 111 health
• Travelling
Others scheduled for interviews did not contact or the office on the day of the 
appointment. Of this group, two failed to attend their first appointment and several 
appointments afterwards.
4.8.2: Breach patterns
The infrequency of breach despite the high rate of violations was noted. Of the 25 
probationers interviewed, only 8 were breached and the data reveals that their 
absences were frequent and no contact was made with the office.
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4.8.3: Compliance patterns o f  the follow up group
All the 8 probationers interviewed during the follow up study also revealed that they 
had missed appointments. 2 had been breached for non-compliance since the initial 
interview. The reasons for violations were again socioeconomic, lifestyle and 
practical factors:
• Accommodation problems
• Substance misuse
The remaining 6 missed appointments for the following reasons:
• Hospitalisation after a fight
• Travel costs
• Attending a burial
• Family problems
• Work commitments
Of the 8 interviewed during the follow up phase, 2 reported that they believed that 
they qualified for the early revocation of their orders although their officers were 
reluctant to implement this. The officers defined both probationers as ‘technical 
compilers’ who had only maintained the minimum compliance required namely, 
attendance. Thus, they had failed to adequately fulfil other terms of the order.
The foregoing demonstrates that the rates of violations were high despite heightened 
perceptions of risks. Based on the accounts of both parties, several factors that may 
undermine perceived risks were identified:
• information gleaned from peers;
• variability of sentencing for breach;
• the variability of the officers’ responses to violations
Added to these are the obstacles to compliance explored further below. It was clear in 
the data that no clear link exists between the objective existence of the policy defined 
mechanisms and the actual behaviour of the target audience (the probationers). From a 
deterrence perspective, the obvious issue raised by this finding is that although the
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probationers are aware that there are risks associated with non-compliance most 
violate the formal rules. Further, most of the probationers did not cite the perceived 
risks of non-compliance as the central factor motivating them to comply. Of the three 
mechanisms discussed above, the perceived benefits of supervision (particularly the 
officer’s therapeutic role) according to most of the probationers, tended to motivate 
compliance. Added to the mechanisms described above, several additional categories 
were identified and developed during analysis. They are explored below.
4.9: Obstacles to compliance
This category represents the several obstacles that may affect compliance as identified 
by the participants. The obstacles are the conditions that impinge on compliance 
patterns. There are the emotional, structural, practical, situational and routine based 
obstacles to compliance. Emotional problems are typically caused by relationship 
problems. Structural problems include accommodation related problems, 
unemployment and literacy deficiencies. The practical problems are largely travel 
related given the wide geography areas covered by the probation area and the unstable 
public transport facilities. There are also accommodation problems, substance misuse 
problems and employment related obstacles. Financial problems are also practical 
obstacles to compliance where the probationers are unable to afford transportation 
costs. Further, ill health and child care difficulties also pose practical obstacles.
The probationers revealed additional conditions that may discourage compliance. 
These are mainly the situational factors linked to the content of supervision and the 
nature of the relationship between both parties. Negative relationships may engender 
non-compliance (in two cases leading to breach). The features of negative interactions 
as defined by the probationers are as mentioned earlier: the perceived poor quality of 
treatment characterised by a dictatorial enforcement approach which denies the
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probationer the opportunity to state their case; a rigid application of the formal rules 
without reference to the specific circumstances of the case; the failure to develop a 
‘rapport’ or an egalitarian relationship in which both parties are able to communicate 
freely and in which the officer displays a degree of empathy. Where there is 
discontinuity in supervision, the probationer is more likely to describe a supervisor’s 
approach as intrusive. The impact of negative relationships is described in more detail 
in Chapter Seven.
Added to these, there are routine based obstacles which are mainly criminogenic 
routines involving the use of illegal substances. Substance misuse related problems 
impinge on compliance patterns. Sometimes, non-criminogenic routines may 
constitute obstacles- such work commitments. One mechanism not particularly 
identified by the probationers as a significant obstacle is the difficulty posed by their 
low basic skills. However, the officers identified ‘literacy deficiencies’ as an 
important obstacle which may hamper the ability to understand enforcement or other 
important correspondence.
4.10: Confronting unpredictability
This category appeared to be directly linked to the nature of compliance. The category 
depicts the officers’ reactions to the rule violations. The data revealed that the officers 
adopt a unilateral definition of non-compliance. As such, the type of violation that 
would typically generate a reaction from the officers would be the failure to attend 
appointments. Confronting unpredictability is therefore a reaction against 
absenteeism. The data revealed the possible implications of this reduced definition of 
compliance. It tended to encourage technical compliance whereby the probationer 
fulfils minimum attendance requirements but fails to work towards fulfilling the
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overall objectives of the order. It may also encourage the normalisation of other forms 
of non-compliance.
By violating the formal rules, the probationers reveal a high degree of unpredictability 
typified by sporadic compliance patterns or by complete absconsion.
The Officers internalise this unpredictability. I witnessed several of these incidents of 
unpredictability. For instance, as noted above, during the effort to track down 
probationers commencing new orders, two probationers were to be recruited to the 
study. However they failed to attend their initial appointments and subsequent phone 
calls revealed that one had totally absconded.
Given this unpredictability, the officers realise that they are working under conditions 
of consistent unpredictability displayed by probationers. This perceived 
unpredictability sets the context/condition for confronting unpredictability.
4.10.1: Typologies
Perhaps illustrating the internalised perception of unpredictability, typologies of the 
compliant or non-complaint probationer were derived from officers’ accounts. They 
reflect the categorisation of groups of probationers according to expected compliance 
patterns. These typologies are in terms of the nature of offence, degree of involvement 
in substance use and age. Most of the officers reported no gender related 
discrepancies affecting compliance patterns.
Table 4.1: The typologies
Compliant N on-compliant
Drink drivers/ Sex offenders Substance misusing probationers
Older probationers Young probationers
116
4.10.2: Exploring typologies
Based on the participants’ accounts, an attempt was made to analyse the variations in 
compliance patterns according to the above typologies, namely, nature of the offence 
degree of involvement in substance misuse and age.
To explore these typologies further, specific probationers fitting the typologies were 
sampled (see Table 4.1) above.
4.10.2.1: The nature o f  the offence
Confirming the officers’ observations, the probationer convicted of sex offending 
reported that he had complied fully with the order, although further analysis revealed 
that his compliance levels were more consistent with the levels set by the informal 
rules. Therefore, although he had missed several appointments he ensured that he 
maintained the required contact. Similarly, although the 2 probationers convicted of 
drink driving offences reported violations, they were able to comply with the informal 
rules and none were breached at any stage.
4.10.2.2: Involvement in substance misuse
The highest incidence of violations and absenteeism was noted amongst the 14 
substance using probationers. All of the 14 reported several absences. Furthermore, 9 
of the 14 reported that they had violated their orders, and 5 were breached during the 
current order. This is consistent with the officers’ observations about the difficulties 
of ensuring that this group of probationers comply with their orders.
4.10.2.3: Age
The older probationers particularly those aged over 30 were more likely to report that 
they were motivated to comply because they were at the stage of their lives where 
they needed to make a change. Further, the proportion of probationers aged below 26
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breached in court during the current order was higher (36%) compared with 28% of 
those aged 26 and over.
4.10.3: Other demographic variations
An attempt was made to analyse the variations in compliance patterns according to 
other demographic variables noted in the literature. As noted in chapter one, most 
probationers suffer socioeconomic disadvantage such as unemployment, 
accommodation problems, financial difficulties, adverse family and peer relationships 
and also, poor basic skills. The study sample reflects this national trend. Therefore the 
possible variables that may affect compliance patterns would reside in the 
probationers’ individual characteristics such as: previous antecedents, gender, nature 
of the offence, and order duration. Therefore, added to an exploration of the 
typologies described above the study explored variations in compliance patterns 
across these 4 variables.
4.10.3.1: Previous antecedents
Of the 9 probationers who reported that they had no criminal antecedents, 4 reported 
that they had violated the formal rules. This is consistent with the findings of studies 
cited in chapter one which found that probationers with criminal antecedents are more 
likely to violate their orders.
4.10.3.2: Gender
The officers did not perceive a gender difference in the propensity to comply with an 
order. Confirming this is the finding 67% male probationers reported rule violations 
compared with 70% of the female probationers interviewed. Further, a higher 
proportion of female probationers 40% were breached for non-compliance compared 
with 27% of the male probationers. It is important to consider the possible impact of 
the nature of the sample on this finding. 15 (60%) male probationers and 10 (40%)
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female probationers were sampled. Thus, fewer male probationers and a greater 
proportion of female probationers than would obtain in the wider population of 
probationers were sampled.
4.10.3.3: Nature o f  offence
In line with existing studies that highlight links between a conviction for dishonesty 
offences and the likelihood of non-compliance, the probationers serving their orders 
for dishonesty offences such as fraud, theft or burglary offences were more likely to 
report violations (5 out of the 7 within this category). Of the 7, 4 were breached 
representing half of the number of all the probationers breached. Contrary to the 
expectations of an additional probationer within this group, the officer reported that 
she was reluctant to revoke the order early for good compliance because the 
probationer -P8F - had only achieved technical compliance, maintaining the 
minimum compliance required -  attendance.
4.10.3.4: Length o f  order
Violations and breaches were more frequent among the groups of probationers serving 
orders of 12 months and above. Although this appears to be broadly consistent with 
the national average, it is possible that they also reflect the nature of the sample 
achieved. As Table 3.9 in Chapter three depicts, the largest proportion of probationers 
sampled were serving orders of 12 -24 months.
In all, a degree of caution is advised in interpreting these findings as evidence of 
variations across demographic attributes. The variations observed may also be a 
reflection of the nature of the achieved sample. Chapter three provided a description 
of the study sample.
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4.10.4: Implications o f  typologies
The study examined the possible impact of the typologies devised by the officers on 
the officers’ reactions to violations. Although it found that the categorisation of 
probationers did not appear to affect decision making, the categorisations were linked 
to the degrees of optimism displayed by the officers concerning the possibility of 
change. Whilst some officers were optimistic about the possibilities of effecting 
change in the groups of probationers defined as ‘non-complaint’, others were more 
pessimistic. Some of the optimists acknowledged that the probationers’ 
unpredictability occasionally challenged their ideological position on the 
rehabilitative potential of community penalties. Despite the limitations posed by the 
realities of practice, the optimists were more likely to demonstrate a fundamental 
belief that supervision can produce rehabilitative outcomes even with the unmotivated 
probationer. With the pessimists, the data also suggests that as with the optimists, the 
unpredictability of the clients tended to fuel this pessimism. Further, the pessimists 
were more likely to cite the lack of motivation as the most potent compliance 
obstacle. According to the pessimists, where this is lacking, compliance and longer 
term change becomes almost impossible to achieve.
The study explored how degrees of optimism and the officers’ biographical attributes 
and theoretical perspectives may affect the deployment of enforcement or the 
compliance strategies adapted by the officers. Most of the officers irrespective of 
levels of optimism about rehabilitation or individual biography reported that their 
reactions to violations are individualised. Further, the officers reported that reactions 
to violations would tend to vary according to the extent to which the officer 
‘knows,XXV1 the case and the nature of the violation amongst other variables (see 
Figure 4.5 below).
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4.10.5: Compliance as the product o f confronting unpredictability 
So far, it appears that the typologies are consistent with the compliance patterns 
revealed in the data. Further analysis revealed that compliance is most closely linked 
to the symbolic definitions communicated during interactions between both parties. 
These emerge from the officers’ response to the unpredictability of the clients. Thus, 
the meaning of compliance emerges in the process of confronting unpredictability. 
The probationers subsequently adopt this definition. Below is an elucidation of the 
officers’ actions in confronting unpredictability.
Figure 4.5: Developing the category - confronting unpredictability
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As noted earlier, the officer’s actions in responding to violations are closely linked to 
two factors namely, the nature of the evolving relationship between both parties and 
the nature of the violation.
121
4.10.5.1: Evolving relationships
The data revealed that the stage of the relationship or the extent to which both parties 
have become acquainted did tend to affect enforcement decision making and in some 
cases, the nature of the compliance strategies employed by the officers. This was 
primarily linked to the extent to which the officer is aware of the client’s personal 
characteristics and circumstances. In most cases, flexible enforcement is more likely 
where there is an established relationship and the officer believes that the client can be 
trusted and is therefore unlikely to blatantly violate their order. This assessment is 
typically based on the probationer’s compliance record. Thus, flexibility is more 
likely where the probationer is seen to be committed and engaged. It is also likely 
where the specific circumstances of the case warrant flexibility such as probationers 
with chaotic lifestyles or childcare problems.
Equally, compliance strategies such as reminders and home visits are typically 
reserved for clients with chaotic lifestyles or other established difficulties. Thus, more 
flexible enforcement and more flexible reporting arrangements are more likely in 
cases involving mental instability, or other difficulties that render routine attendance 
virtually impossible. The case of P1M, an alcohol dependent male probationer whose 
dependency affects his lifestyle, illustrates this. His attendance was at best sporadic 
and at some later point in his order, he failed to attend his appointments for a 
sustained period. In this time, he was seriously wounded in a fight. I noticed his 
absence because I attended the office regularly to secure an interview with an equally 
elusive probationer -  P6F. PI M’s supervisor (P03F) informed me that she had no 
intention of enforcing his order given her understanding of his predicament. 
Employing her professional discretion, she recognised that such action would be 
counterproductive. Previously, following an episode of absenteeism, his supervisor
122
had paid him a visit and found that he had taken a drug overdose. In sum, these 
categories of probationers are offered more flexibility particularly where there is an 
existing relationship and the officer is fully aware of their difficulties.
Generally, flexible enforcement is based on ‘personal professional discretion’xxv”. 
Thus, reactions to violations are individualised and would tend to vary according to 
the extent to which the officer ‘knows’xxvlu the case amongst other variables. Most of 
the officers believe that a flexible approach that is responsive to needs is more 
effective than rigid enforcement.
4.10.5.2: The nature o f  the violation
Reactions to violations also varied according to the nature of the violation. Two 
officer-defined violations were identified; namely, persistent and minor violations. In 
most cases, the difference between persistent and minor violations rests on whether or 
not the probationer contacts the officer or the office in the event of an absence. With 
persistent violations, absences may be consistent and may develop into a pattern but 
ultimately the key factor that would trigger enforcement is the failure to contact the 
officer or the office before or after the absences. Minor violations on the other hand, 
involve absences that may be frequent, infrequent or sporadic, but notification is 
provided before or after the absence.
The data revealed that full deactivation -no warning letter sent- occurs where the 
officer is notified before the event of absence (minor violation) (see Figure 4.6 
below). This suggests that the conditions influencing the decision to activate, 
deactivate or ignore violations would vary according to the degree of violation. That 
is, according to whether the violation is defined by the officer as persistent or minor. 
As noted above, with minor violations, notification is made before or after the 
absence. An interesting finding was that the types of violations described by the
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officers as either minor or persistent will typically exceed the boundaries set by the 
National Standards - one final warning after the first unacceptable absence and breach 
on the subsequent absence. The officers reported breach action is typically reserved 
for cases of aggravated or persistent violations. Breach action constitutes the full 
activation of the enforcement requirements. Like the interview data, the data 
generated from an examination of breach reports and attendance records also revealed 
that only persistent absenteeism would attract breach action. The case records 
revealed that in some cases, several absences were permitted before breach action was 
commenced and these absences exceeded the limits set by the National Standards.
This finding that breach action is typically reserved for persistent violations was also 
reinforced by the finding that the 8 probationers breached reported that they missed 
several appointments (sometimes up to 6 appointments) without notifying the office. 
This finding was confirmed by their case records. Given that they had failed to make 
adequate contact, their absences were tantamount to persistent violations warranting 
breach action.
In confronting the unpredictability of the probationer, the officer may use their 
professional discretion to activate the enforcement process or ignore the violation (See 
Figure 4.6 below). As Figure 4.6 depicts, activation may be full or partial. Partial 
activation occurs where the officer reacts to an absence by sending out a final warning 
letter. Where notification is provided after the absence, the officer would typically 
withdraw the letter. Where absences are persistent and no excuse is provided 
afterwards, the officer may fully activate the enforcement process. The nature of 
violation precipitating this reaction is typically persistent and would exceed the limits 
permitted by the National Standards.
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Full activation is a strategic act of employing either constructive or punitive 
enforcement procedures. Constructive enforcement is the typical response where the 
probationer complies in the interim before breach hearing in court. The officer 
commences court breach action but recommends a reprimand rather than a revocation 
and a resentence. This is colloquially termed ‘constructive breach’. An analysis of 
several breach reports also revealed that the reports tended to contain a 
recommendation for a more a lenient response where the probationer had resumed 
attendance.
Figure 4.6: Developing the category: responding to absences
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Thus, ordinary enforcement may subsequently evolve into constructive enforcement 
depending on the nature of the breach report prepared by the officer and presented to 
the court. In this case, the officer adopts a defence role and produces a positive 
report. The courts would usually accept the officer’s recommendation. Much will 
depend on whether the probationer complies in the interim.
Punitive enforcement action by the officer is reserved for violations by the 
probationer in the interim between initiating breach action and the breach hearing in 
court. Where the probationer fails to comply in the interim, the officer adopts a 
prosecutorial role and produces a negative breach report. The failure to re-engage in 
the interim places the probationer at greater risk of a custodial sentence for breach. 
The court’s willingness to accept the recommendations made by the officers during 
constructive breaches indicates a degree of collaboration with the officers to ensure 
compliance although a higher degree of collaboration was observed in the Jersey 
Probation and Aftercare Service. As already mentioned, new sentencing arrangements 
removing the possibility of constructive braches were introduced during the study. 
Reprimands are no longer permitted; rather, the courts are required to impose a 
sentence. This affects the previous levels of collaboration accompanying constructive 
breaches.
In invoking either a prosecutorial or defence role, the officers would justify their 
actions to the probationers by adopting a projected role- one of the unwilling/reluctant 
enforcer. The projected role is a strategic act designed to foster good relations 
between both parties. Probationers confirm this tendency to invoke a projected role. 
As such, the projected role achieves its intended objective.
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In sum, it appears that activation (lull or partial) would usually be the response where 
there have been several absences with no notification provided. The nature of the 
explanation provided is not as vital as the act of providing the explanation itself.
4.11: Policy constraints
In confronting and managing unpredictability, officers operate within policy 
constraints. They are the conditions that may shape the negotiations occurring 
between both parties (see Figure 4.7). A subcategory/concept of the category ‘policy 
constraints’ is ‘poor quality supervision’. This subcategory represents the 
consequences of the restrictive policy conditions that impinge on the quality of 
supervision. Additional subcategories -deskilling, high case loads and increasing 
bureaucracy - emerged during the examination of the concept- poor quality of 
supervision. These are the products of recent policy changes and they impact on the 
quality of supervision by limiting the amount of time and commitment the officers can 
expend on their client.
According to some of the officers, the subcategory ‘deskilling’ represents the 
systematic delegation of functions traditionally reserved for probation officers. It 
appears that this is designed to alleviate heavy caseloads although for some of the 
officers, the delegation of functions to external agencies or to ancillary staff has 
engendered the gradual erosion of the probation officer’s skills. In addition, although 
reporting centres are used to alleviate excessive case loads, one of the officers 
expressed the belief that reporting arrangements lacking any qualitative content (for 
example, intervention focused or other work with the probationer) may discourage 
attendance. Added to these, the increasing amount of paper work and computer based 
functions was held by one of the officers to be another element in reduced levels of 
contact with clients and the erosion of professional skills.
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Figure 4.7: Developing the category -policy constraints
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An additional policy constraint stems from the requirement to ‘demonstrate 
enforcement’XXIX. This is linked to the ‘performance culture’ and the managerialist 
objectives of accountability and cost effectiveness. Central to this category are the 
subcategories: ‘limited enforcement options’ and ‘prescriptive rules’. The category 
‘limited enforcement options’ pertains to the abrogation of constructive breach known 
in common parlance as ‘disciplinary breach’ whilst the subcategory ‘prescriptive 
rules’ represents the rigid enforcement requirements. In sum, the requirement to 
demonstrate enforcement is accompanied by provisions that aim to reduce 
autonomous decision making. The data revealed the processes through which the 
officers are able to reassert a degree of autonomy by formulating more flexible rules 
using their professional discretion.
4.12: The informal rules
A concept that emerged in the second phase of analysis is -  informal rules. It 
represents the revised enforcement rules the officers employ to confront the 
unpredictability of their clients. The concept emerged as an attempt was made to 
explore how it was that the officers appeared able to override restrictive policy
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requirements in confronting unpredictability. To understand this phenomenon, the 
officers were questioned about their ability to deactivate enforcement in conditions 
that override policy requirements. Responses revealed the ease with which officers are 
able to withdraw warning letters using their discretion. There is apparent flexibility of 
enforcement practice in the early stage of the enforcement process when the officers 
may ignore violations, activate the enforcement process (send a warning letter) or 
deactivate the enforcement process (withdraw a warning letter). The flexibility of 
enforcement practice explains the officers’ ability to override policy requirements and 
restrict enforcement to types/degrees of violations that exceed policy prescriptions. 
These processes facilitating discretionary practices remained constant across the 
different offices. Warning letters are withdrawn manually by stamping the letter and 
dating it, emailing the administrative staff, or by simply removing the letter from the 
post tray. Electronically the letters are withdrawn retrospectively by entering the 
reason for the withdrawal into the computerised case management and recording 
system - CRAMS. According to the National Standards operative at the time of the 
study, the probationer is required to provide evidence that an absence is for valid 
reasons (National Probation Service 2002). However, again in practice, this 
requirement is dependent on the discretion of the individual officers.
A question that arose was the extent to which the probationers are aware of the 
minimised definitions of non-compliance and the flexible enforcement practices. 
Deterrence theorists would argue that such awareness would undermine perceived 
risks and hence defeat deterrent objectives (Paternoster 1987; von Hirsh et al. 1999; 
Doob and Webster 2003). It became clear in the data that the probationers become 
aware of the revised enforcement rules during induction and also, through their 
experience of the officers’ reactions to rule violations (see Figure 4.8.).
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Figure 4.8: Developing the category -Informal rules
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Where violations are minimised (partial activation -  sending and subsequently 
withdrawing warning letters) or ignored (full deactivation- no warning letters sent), 
the probationers soon realise that normally, only persistent absenteeism (with no 
contact made to the officer) would warrant enforcement.
The new concept -‘devising informal rules’ - was used to explain these processes. The 
concept provides a theoretical explanation of the processes by which the officers 
implement alternative rules in order to secure compliance. The activities of the 
officers in devising informal rules appeared to contribute to an understanding of the 
nature and extent of compliance with community penalties. Therefore, although the 
study intended to sample only 10 officers, several more officers were recruited into 
the study and another jurisdiction was visited in order to explore the concept of
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informal rules more closely. As with the other processes and conditions of confronting 
unpredictability, the processes of establishing the informal rules are underpinned by 
the use of unofficial professional discretion.
4.12.1: Making comparisons: the Jersey study
As noted in Chapter three, five additional interviews were conducted in the Jersey 
Probation and Aftercare Service. The Service was selected on the basis of theoretical 
sampling -  a technique for sampling new data sources in order to explore and develop 
the emergent categories. The analytic objective of sampling additional officers based 
within the Jersey Service was to further develop a category that emerged in the 
second phase of the study - ‘informal rules’. This category appeared to be a key 
strategy for securing compliance and central to an understanding of compliance. It 
represents the process through which probation officers replace what they perceive to 
be a prescriptive enforcement framework with more responsive informal rules. As 
mentioned above, although the study originally intended to sample 10 officers, it 
became necessary to sample additional officers given that the emergent category 
‘informal ‘rules’ appeared to be pertinent to an understanding of compliance. Thus, to 
explore the category ‘informal rules’ further in order to fully develop it, the study 
employed a analytic device central to Grounded Theory methodology known as 
‘making comparisons’. This device provides the opportunity to explore an emergent 
category from a wide range of perspectives in order to fully develop the category by 
highlighting its patterns and variations (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Thus in 
implementing the device, the objective was to explore the emergent category 
‘informal rules’ further by making comparisons between the compliance strategies 
employed by the officers in the probation area in Wales which operates a prescriptive 
enforcement framework (the ‘prescriptive rules’) and the compliance strategies
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employed by the officers in the Jersey Service which operates a less prescriptive 
framework. It was envisaged that comparing practices across offices located within 
different jurisdictions which operate different policy frameworks would contribute to 
an understanding of how compliance strategies vary across different policy 
conditions.
Unlike the policy requirements stipulated in the National Standards of England and 
Wales which provide that enforcement action should follow a second unacceptable 
absence, the Jersey Service offers a three stage enforcement process. Likewise, a 
client centred approach operates at both organisational and policy levels. Compliance 
is achieved through corroborative processes between the service and the courts. It 
follows that the collective goal is one of securing compliance rather than a focus on 
enforcement.
A total of five respondents were sampled comprising 2 members of senior 
management, 1 senior probation officer and 2 main grade officers. The data revealed 
that a client-centred approach which is endorsed at management level permeates all 
aspects of practice including enforcement. There is widespread use of discretion in 
enforcement. Further, the officers are appointed as officers of the courts. As such, 
securing compliance becomes a collaborative effort between the probation service and 
the courts service.
Broadly, in both jurisdictions a client centred approach to securing compliance 
operates accompanied by more flexible and individualised enforcement strategies. 
The crucial difference is that whilst the client-centred approach and individualised 
enforcement are endorsed at policy and senior management levels in Jersey, the policy 
climate in England and Wales prevailing at the time of this study reflects a more 
punitive agenda. Importantly, there appears to be greater collaboration between the
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court service and the probation service in Jersey to ensure compliance. By 
discouraging a frequent resort to breach action, the courts in Jersey actively convey to 
the practitioners the need to devise strategies to ensure compliance.
4.13: Adaptation techniques
Another category that emerged is ‘adaptation techniques’ (see Figure 4.9). On 
internalising the informal rules, the probationers develop breach avoidance techniques 
in order to adapt to the shift from the formally defined rules to the informal rules. The 
avoidance techniques consist of ensuring that notification for an absence is provided 
before or after the absence.
Figure 4.9: The new category: adaptation techniques
Avoid breach
Internalise the informal rules Excuse before or after absence
Adapting to informal rules
Most of the probationers breached during the current order reported that they had 
failed to maintain contact during their absences. They recognised that this contributed 
to the officers’ decision to fully activate the enforcement process. Therefore, from 
the start of the order, the probationers internalise the flexible enforcement processes 
with the knowledge that:
• Compliance is restricted to attendance
• Frequent absenteeism exceeding policy prescribed limits is defined as 
compliance provided notification is received
• Officers readily reschedule supervision appointments
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• Therefore, there is no obligation to adhere to fixed appointments 
The implications of these are considered below and also in the subsequent chapters. 
4.13.1: Consequences o f adaptation
Compliance defined in its reduced form may encourage technical compliance as 
discussed above. Further, it may engender the normalisation of violations whereby 
violations become redefined as compliance provided the minimum requirement -  
notification -  is met. The probationers sampled tended to normalise violations by 
classifying behaviour that would normally constitute non-compliance as compliance. 
This was the case even where absences were supported by reasons that the 
probationers themselves defined as invalid such as: forgetting to attend an 
appointment or providing false excuses. There was an observed tendency to adapt to 
the informal rules and to internalise the revised definition of compliance inherent in 
these rules. The redefined term is markedly different from the definition intended by 
policy. This tendency to internalise the revised definition of compliance inherent in 
the informal rules was captured by the research question posed to probationers;
Have you ever missed any appointment since you started this order?
It is worth noting that all the probationers sampled had indeed missed one and in most 
cases, several appointments at some point of the order. Nevertheless, all responded 
that they had not missed any appointment. Their absences had been validated under 
the revised rules and were not perceived to be a breach of requirements although it 
may have been clear to them that it would constitute a breach of the formal rules that 
were inculcated in them during ‘proactive rule clarification’. The high ‘degree of 
assimilation’ demonstrated by most of the probationers would support this hypothesis. 
It became apparent that a revision of the question was required. Consequently the 
question was revised to read:
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Have you not been able to come in to this office fo r  your appointment for any reason 
since this order started?
This yielded more productive responses which uncovered the extent of absenteeism 
with impunity that was permitted by the informal rules. The revised questions 
enabled me to examine compliance patterns without focusing entirely on the types of 
behaviour normalised by the informal rules.
Another implication arising from adaptation stems from the officers’ readiness to 
reschedule appointments. This necessarily engenders unstructured attendance patterns. 
As such, it reduces the opportunity to utilise structured appointment as a mechanism 
for encouraging compliance with non-criminogenic routines. Yet another implication 
of adaptation is the possibility that the internalisation of the flexible enforcement 
patterns undermines the perceived certainty of punishment for breach.
The foregoing represents the axial coding of the 9 emergent categories using 
relational statements. In the next chapter, the analytic tools used during open and axial 
coding are described.
4.14: Conclusion
The findings suggest that of the 4 mechanisms of compliance developed by Bottoms 
(2001) which also constitute the conceptual framework guiding this study, the 
participants perceived instrumental mechanisms based on incentives to be more 
closely linked to compliance than the other 3 mechanisms. However, the rate of 
violations appeared to be high suggesting that incentivised compliance may be as 
unproductive as the deterrent enforcement framework. The data reveals that more 
closely linked to compliance are the actions of the officers in confronting 
unpredictability and devising informal rules. The next chapter describes the analytic 
tools utilised to develop the 9 categories.
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Chapter Five: Describing the analytic devices
As mentioned above, several analytic tools were used during data collection and 
analysis. These are ‘asking questions’, ‘making comparisons’ and ‘theoretical 
comparisons’. They were used to interrogate the data during the conceptualisation of 
incidents in the data.
5.1: Asking questions
The act of ‘asking questions’ of the data was a useful technique for discovering the 
specific propertiesxxx and dimensionsxxxl embedded in each emergent concept. An 
example of asking questions in order to develop the category ‘reacting to the formal 
rules’ is provided below:
The category ‘reacting to the formal rules’ describes how the formal enforcement 
framework impacts on the probationers’ compliance patterns. To develop it further, 
several theoretical questions were posed:
1. How do the probationers react to the formal rules?
2. What affects how they react?
3. How do the officers react to violations?
4. How do the officers’ reactions affect compliance?
Armed with these questions, further inspection of data (theoretical sampling) revealed 
that despite proactive rule clarification, the probationers would typically ‘violate the 
formal rules’. In answer to number 2 the data revealed several obstacles, mechanisms 
and responses to violations that might affect how the probationers react to these rules. 
The data highlighted the officers’ actions in responding to violations as central to an 
understanding of the nature of compliance. Thus, an exploration of question 3 above 
revealed the answer to question 4. It appeared that compliance is linked to the 
officers’ reactions to compliance which would typically involve the definition of 
compliance in its unilateral sense, the tendency to ignore certain violations, or to 
deactivate enforcement or activate the enforcement process. The officers’ reactions 
may also be linked to the nature of the violation as defined by the officers or to the 
extent of the evolving relationship between both parties. Therefore, in terms of 
question 4 above, the data revealed the links between the nature of the officer’s 
reaction and the nature of compliance achieved. The data appeared to suggest that the 
actions of the officers in ‘confronting unpredictability’ exert a significant impact on 
compliance.
Answering these questions highlighted the links between several concepts. For 
instance a link between ‘obstacles’ and ‘violations’ was observed.
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Thus, asking questions ‘sensitised’ or directed the researcher’s attention to the 
incidents in the data that best explained the emergent concepts (Strauss and Corbin 
1998:75).
5.2: Constant comparisons
The objective of comparing incidents along different properties and dimensional 
ranges is to establish how each emergent concept varies in different conditions. 
During analysis, constant comparisons took the form of examining and 
conceptualising incidents in the data and comparing the conceptualised incident with 
other incidents in the data. The aim was to label the incidents exhibiting similar 
characteristics (properties) under the same code and to establish the different patterns 
that each emergent concept exhibits. This ensured that each emergent concept was 
explored as fully as possible for its patterns and variations (see also Strauss and 
Corbin 1998). Importantly, although the existing concepts served as guides to relevant 
properties and dimensions, each new incident provided the opportunity to develop 
new insights which were further explored during constant comparisons. Therefore, 
during microanalysis, each new incident was a potential source of concepts.
Below is an example of making comparisons by comparing the concepts: ‘literacy 
deficiencies’ and ‘rule clarity’
So far, the data suggests that many probationers suffer severe literacy deficiencies. 
Indeed three of the officers reported that literacy deficiencies may hamper the ability 
to fully comprehend the enforcement rules.
One needs to compare the concepts -  literacy deficiencies - and -  rule clarity -in  
order to understand how literacy deficiencies may affect the extent of rule clarity and 
ultimately, compliance. Further areas for theoretical sampling arise from the 
questions: How do the probationers become aware of the rules? How far do they 
understand the rules?
If one extends this line of questioning, one can make theoretical comparisons by 
drawing on the deterrence literature and the concept of perceived risks described in 
chapter two. It is held that potential offenders are only deterred by their perceptions of 
the risks of offending. A question posed by the finding that literacy deficiencies
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hamper rule clarity is: How does the degree to which the probationers comprehend the 
formal rules affect their behaviour? These were explored during the second and third 
phases of sampling. The data revealed the probationers demonstrated high levels of 
perceived risks although there were factors that appeared to undermine perceived 
risks. It appeared that more closely linked to the nature of compliance achieved are 
the officers’ actions in confronting unpredictability and the adaptation techniques 
adopted by the probationers.
5.3: Theoretical comparisons
A corollary to constant comparisons is making theoretical comparisons. To examine 
the emergent categories in more detail, theoretical comparisons were made by 
comparing them with other concepts derived from the relevant literature. This was 
used mainly where the meaning of the incident was not immediately apparent in the 
data. As such, the relevant literature was examined for examples of comparable 
phenomena. The ideas derived from the literature did not replace the data. Rather, 
they provided a base against which a concept or an idea contained in data in order to 
could be interrogated in order to gain a better understanding (Strauss and Corbin 
1998). This does not mean that all emergent concepts were verified by the literature. 
They were verified by data instead. In all, the literature was used as an analytic tool 
and not as an alternative to data. Ideas imported from the literature were subjected to 
rigorous testing by comparing them with incidents in data. Below is an example of 
making theoretical comparisons by referring to a concept that was derived from the 
relevant literature namely ‘demonstrating enforcement’.
The concept ‘demonstrating enforcement’ was borrowed from Heamden and Millie 
(2004). They use it to describe how managerialist enforcement policies prioritise 
quantifiable enforcement strategies that also produce quantifiable outputs. With the 
concept ‘demonstrating enforcement’, officers are required to demonstrate 
enforcement by attaining set targets, whilst the objective of ‘securing compliance’ is 
underemphasised (Hearden and Millie 2004). As mentioned above, there are 
monitoring processes established to ensure compliance with the enforcement policy. 
The focus is on quantifiable outputs that easily demonstrate levels of compliance and 
not on outcomes which are not as easily condensed into numerical measures.
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I became interested in the extent to which this concept ‘demonstrating enforcement’ 
affects enforcement practice and compliance. Most of the officers acknowledged that 
they apply discretion in enforcement despite the strict monitoring of practices. The 
question asked of the data to further develop the concept is: How does strict 
regulation and the requirements to demonstrate enforcement by implementing 
prescriptive rules affect compliance? Further data collection and analysis revealed the 
use of unofficial discretion to formulate more responsive informal rules. Thus the 
concept ‘demonstrating enforcement’ borrowed from the literature, was useful for 
understanding the possible implications of restrictive enforcement requirements.
The memo facility provided by Nvivo also aided the analytic processes. It enabled me 
to create and link memos containing theoretical comparisons and theoretical questions 
(and other questions forming part of the data interrogation process), to specific texts 
in the data. These questions provided the basis for further data collection. They 
informed the content of subsequent interview schedules (theoretical sampling).
5.4: Theoretical questions to guide theoretical sampling
During initial analysis, it emerged that perceived risks and compliance are not linked 
in any straightforward manner. Rather, the nature of compliance achieved appeared to 
be more linked to the adaptation techniques developed by the probationers to ensure 
that they are able to comply with the informal rules devised by the officers.
The axial coding of the 9 emergent categories revealed several situational, structural 
and practical contexts underlying the processes from which compliance emerges, that 
is, the contexts within which the actions that may affect the nature of compliance are 
located. Several policy constraints and also, the probationers’ unpredictability affect 
the actions of the officers as they interact with the probationers to secure compliance. 
To secure compliance within these contexts of policy constraints and client 
unpredictability, the officers formulate informal rules using professional discretion. 
The probationers are also affected by several factors that might affect their 
compliance patterns. These were categorised as: structural factors such as
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socioeconomic difficulties, practical factors such as transportation problems and 
situational factors such as the nature of their interactions with their officers. The 
officers attempt to resolve these problems in order to secure compliance using the 
officer-defined mechanisms described above. They also devise more responsive 
informal rules. Compliance is achieved where the probationer adopts adaptation 
techniques in order to adapt to the informal rules devised by the officers.
To develop the 9 emergent categories, in each of the three phases of interviewing, 
additional interviews were conducted with participants selected on the basis of the 
emergent theoretical framework. This sampling technique is the process of theoretical 
sampling. The following theoretical questions guided the theoretical sampling 
process. They were designed to aid the further development of the emergent 
categories:
How do perceived risks affect compliance patterns?
As the deterrence doctrine would have it, does a link exist between perceived risks 
and behaviour?
The data suggested that despite the noted tendency to overestimate risks, the extent of 
violations among the probationers was quite high suggesting that perceived risks have 
little impact on compliance patterns.
Another theoretical question that arose is:
Why do the probationers appear to overestimate the risks of non-compliance?
One possible explanation is that their previous experience of breach makes them more 
risk averse. This assumption is somewhat countered by the probationers’ reports of 
rule violations after breach action.
A third theoretical question emerged from this observation:
How do the probationers acquire knowledge of the risks of non-compliance?
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As noted in previous chapters, 5 possible reasons for the high level of perceived risks 
emerged:
• Previous experience of breach action
• Threats made by the courts (during sentencing) that severe consequences will 
accompany non-compliance
• The perception that the current offence was serious enough to warrant a 
custodial sentence
• Information gleaned from peers
• The belief that a severe outcome is likely because the order is an alternative to 
custody which if  breached would be construed by the courts as a failure to take 
full advantage of a ‘second chance’.
In terms of the first two listed above, the study found that despite the perceptions of
risks triggered by both factors, many probationers tended to violate their orders even
where they had been breached during the current order. The effects of perceived risks
were therefore minimal. Further, several factors that may have undermined perceived
risks have been described as:
• Information gleaned from peers
• Variability of sentencing for breach
• The variability of the officers’ responses to violations
• Obstacles to compliance
Additional theoretical questions that emerged were:
How to do the probationers react to the formal rules following proactive rule 
clarification?
How do typologies affect enforcement decisions?
Initial analysis and subsequent analysis based on theoretical sampling revealed that 
the probationers would typically violate the formal rules. In addition, it emerged that 
enforcement decision making appeared to be more closely linked to the evolving 
relationship between both parties and the nature of the violation.
Exploring these theoretical questions revealed the factors that appeared to be most 
closely linked to the nature of compliance. At the initial stage, the data suggested that 
the activities of the officers in responding to violations were central to an
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understanding of compliance with community penalties although not in the manner 
envisaged by the deterrent enforcement policy. Officers permitted rule violations that 
appeared to exceed policy requirements. To explore this phenomenon, additional 
officers were recruited for interviews. The study found that compliance is ultimately 
linked to the actions of the officers in confronting the unpredictability of their clients 
and the adaptation techniques adopted by the probationers. Thus, the data suggested 
that ultimately, compliance is the product of the definition applied by the officers to 
the probationers’ behaviour. Though based on a unilateral definition (attendance), it 
may assume one of several forms. Two key examples are provided below:
1. Absences exceeding the limits set by the formal framework constitute 
compliance where they are accompanied by notification
2. Attendance constitutes compliance even where the probationer fails to commit 
to the order or to fulfil some other requirements although the officers are 
reluctant to offer early revocation in these cases.
In all, the theoretical questions focused upon during theoretical sampling revolved 
around the insights generated from the emergent categories. These questions were 
answered during the further development of the emergent categories.
5.5: Theoretical Sampling: recruiting additional participants 
As mentioned above, with Grounded Theory, the mutuality of data collection and 
analysis is emphasised. This permits sampling to proceed on the basis of the emergent 
concepts and categories. Theoretical sampling aided the process of developing the 
emergent categories described above. Three phases of interviewing through 
theoretical sampling were conducted in order to saturatexxxn the emergent categories 
and generate new categories (Strauss and Corbin 1998). As such, once the initial 
categories were identified, analysis shifted from induction and became deductive.
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Relational statements describing the links between the categories in the previous 
chapter formed the provisional hypotheses to be explored during the second stage of 
data collection and analysis. Based on these hypotheses several questions were 
devised for exploration during theoretical sampling and subsequent analysis. The 
questions that guided theoretical sampling have been discussed above.
The hypotheses were verified or discarded after further comparisons with the existing 
or incoming data. For instance, below are the provisional hypotheses derived from 
defining the subcategory/concept ‘proactive role clarification’. The 
concepts/subcategories are italicised.
Proactive role clarification conceptualizes the strategic actions and interactions 
entailed in defining the boundaries of expected behaviour as dictated by formal rules. 
Proactive role clarification begins during induction. It consists of a range of strategic 
actions namely, defining the formal rules, and ensuring rule clarity. The latter is the 
condition underlying the definition of formal rules.
In defining the formal rules, the probationer is informed of the full consequences of 
non-compliance. Most probationers reveal a high degree of rule ambiguity but an 
overestimation o f risks. Despite this, in reacting to the formal rules, they tend to 
violate the formal rules. Factors that may contribute to rule ambiguity include literacy 
deficiencies and time lapse. The tendency to overestimate risks may be linked to 
previous experiences of breach action for non-compliance amongst other factors.
These provisional hypotheses were tested using the processes of theoretical sampling,
asking questions and making comparisons. The aim was to verify the hypotheses
against the incoming data by making constant comparisons in order to refine or
discard of some of the propositions based on insights derived from the incoming data.
Theoretical sampling, making comparisons and asking questions of the data in order
to develop the concept ‘proactive rule clarification’ yielded further insights into the
conceptual links between the concept and compliance. For example, insights into the
factors affecting the degree of rule clarity (for example, time lapse) emerged to further
develop the concept ‘proactive rule clarification’. Further data also revealed the
tendency to overestimate the risks of non-compliance. Importantly, the data revealed
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that most of the probationers will tend to violate their orders irrespective of the degree 
of rule clarity. This highlighted the conceptual links between the following concepts 
and compliance patterns: ‘proactive rule clarification’, ‘rule clarity’, ‘rule ambiguity’, 
‘overestimating risks’, ‘reacting to the formal rules’. It emerged that in reacting to the 
formal rules, irrespective of the perceived risks of non-compliance; most of the 
probationers would tend to violate the rules. In analysing the existing data and also, 
the incoming data, the three techniques employed during open coding were employed; 
namely, making constant and theoretical comparisons, and also, asking questions. 
Further, during the second and third phases of data collection and analysis, the 
interview schedules were revised to reflect the focus on seeking answers for the 
theoretical questions in order to develop the emergent categories further.
5.6: The three phases of interviewing
The table below illustrates the distribution of the sample across the three phases. In 
all, the offices visited were in different geographic areas ranging from urban to rural 
areas, and from densely to sparely populated areas.
Table 5.1: Interviews conducted during the three phases of interviewing
Numbers sampled
Phase Officers Probationers Total
One 4 4 8
Two 4 10 14
Three 20 11 31
Follow-up 2 8 10
Total interviews 63
The offices had different social and economic topographies and different 
organisational ideologies. The aim was to increase the variability of emergent 
categories. Theoretical sampling guided the selection of additional data sources. In the
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third phase, all subsequent theoretical sampling became hinged on the attempt to 
sample the specific data sources that were deemed highly relevant at this stage of 
analysis.
5.7: Conclusion
In sum, open coding entailed the use of microanalysis to identify concepts. Once a 
concept was identified, its properties and possible dimensional ranges were 
enumerated in a memo. With these in mind, I explored the data comparing further 
incidents in data with the emergent concepts. Axial coding extended analysis by 
facilitating the categorisation of groups concepts into 9 categories. Relational 
statements were used to explain the processes and conditions (conceptualised as 
subcategories) pertaining to each of the 9 categories.
The analytic tools employed enabled a systematic approach to generating categories 
which ensured the embeddedness of the categories in the data. The emergent 
categories revealed that compliance is linked to actions of the officers in reacting to 
non-compliance by devising the informal rules that the probationers subsequently 
adapt to.
145
PART THREE:
THE EMERGENT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
MANAGING CONTRADICTIONS AND SECURING COMPLIANCE
Chapter Six: Identifying the core category 
6.1: Introduction
In the third phase of analysis an attempt was made to identify the ‘core category’ 
which represents the central theme emergent from the data. This chapter describes the 
identification processes highlighting the resort to theoretical comparisons to aid the 
process. The chapter also demonstrates the conceptual links between the core category 
and 3 key categories that appear to explain how compliance with community penalties 
is achieved. The 3 categories were developed during the integration of the 9 emergent 
categories described in Chapter 4.
6.2: Selective coding: integrating the categories
To begin the process of identifying a core category that illuminates the central 
processes and conditions underlying the mechanisms of compliance, two analytic 
tools were employed namely: the paradigm and the conditional matrix as devised by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998). Both analytic tools were useful for integrating the 
processual and structural components of the emergent analytic framework. ‘The 
matrix’xxx,n facilitated the identification of the structural conditions and the processes 
pertaining to compliance. The objective was to ensure a contextualised understanding 
of compliance. This was done by exploring the existing and the incoming data 
(theoretical sampling) in order to identify the conceptual links between the categories 
representing the contextual aspect of compliance and the categories representing its 
processual element. Thus, the matrix extended the function of the paradigm utilised 
during axial coding.
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6.3: The three key categories
To identify the micro and macro conditions pertaining to compliance, the 9 emergent 
categories described in Chapter 4 were examined and re-categorised into 3 key 
categories according to their attribute as either representing the processes 
(actions/interactions/strategies) or the structure (consequences/conditions) linked to 
compliance. Three key categories emerged: reacting to formal rules, confronting 
unpredictability and adaptation techniques (see Appendix 8). Each of the three 
categories incorporates the processes and underpinning conditions that are central to 
an understanding of compliance with community penalties.
Thus the first category -  reacting to the formal rules -  incorporates the subcategories 
‘probationer defined mechanisms’, ‘policy defined mechanisms’ and ‘obstacles to 
compliance’. The subcategories represent the structural, situational and practical 
factors that confront the probationers as they react to the formal rules (mainly by 
violating the formal rules communicated to them during proactive rule clarification).
In terms of the policy mechanisms, most probationers demonstrated rule ambiguity 
despite proactive rule clarification processes although for those who reported that they 
were fully aware of the rules, their comprehension of formal rules appeared to have no 
impact on their behaviour as most of the probationers violated the formal rules. The 
factors that helped explain why high perceptions of risk appeared to have limited 
effects on compliance patterns resided in the probationers’ awareness of the 
variability of sentencing for breach. This awareness stems from previous personal 
experience of breach and also from the experiences of their peers. Further, those who 
had experienced breach action also reported that they received lenient outcomes. 
Added to this is the flexible enforcement strategies permitted by the informal rules.
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The second key category -  confronting unpredictability - incorporates the 
subcategories: ‘officer defined mechanisms’, ‘policy constraints’ and ‘informal rules’. 
The subcategories also represent the structural and the situational factors underlying 
the officers’ actions in reacting to violations (confronting unpredictability). The 
development of the informal rules is an integral aspect of the second key category -  
confronting unpredictability. The informal rules permit greater flexibility in 
enforcement based on the degree of violation. Persistent absences with no excuse will 
result in breach action, whilst minor absences with excuse, certified or not, will result 
in flexible enforcement processes. These processes are internalised by the 
probationers and they subsequently develop adaptation techniques to avoid 
enforcement action. Therefore, - adaptation techniques -  represents the third key 
category central to an understanding of the nature of compliance with community 
penalties. Like the first key category ‘reacting to the formal rules’ the key category -  
adaptation techniques -  also incorporates the subcategories ‘probationer defined 
mechanisms’ and ‘obstacles to compliance’. Again, the two subcategories represent 
the structural, situational and practical factors that may affect adaptation. In adapting 
to the informal rules, the only ‘policy defined mechanism’ that assumes any 
significance is the possibility of early revocation. Thus, of the 9 emergent categories 
described in Chapter four, most of the subcategories linked to the category ‘policy 
defined mechanisms’ (enforcement machinery, new sentencing for breach and 
proactive rule clarification) appeared to be of limited significance to an understanding 
of compliance.
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6.4: The core category: managing contradictions to secure compliance.
As noted above, the core category represents the central theme emergent from 
analysis. The key categories should be theoretically linked to this core category. 
Therefore, once it became apparent that the existing categories had been fully 
developed, the study proceeded with the process of selecting the core category. The 
theoretical comparison technique of referring to the literature in order to enhance 
sensitivity to the data was used to broaden the search for the core category. The 
concepts ‘industrial deviance’ and ‘contradictions’ were subsequently derived from 
the literature (Pearson 1975). Industrial deviance represents the formulation of more 
responsive rules to overcome the contradictions posed by the formal rules. The latter 
are perceived to be unresponsive to the realities of practice. The concept of industrial 
deviance also reflects the arguments of the interactionists who traced deviance and 
compliance to the activities of those with the power to confer such labels (Becker 
1963). The links between control and deviance will be explored in more detail further 
below.
With the concept of industrial deviance in mind, the data was further interrogated and 
the structural, situational and practical factors linked to the processes of securing 
compliance were conceptualised as - ‘contradictions’. The category ‘contradictions’ 
appeared to be significant to the subject matter of the research. It represents the 
underlying conditions that contribute to a contextualised understanding of 
compliance. The core category was conceptualised as: managing contradictions to 
secure compliance. Compliance can be understood as the process through which the 
probationers adapt to the informal rules that the officers devise in response to the 
probationers’ actions in violating the formal rules. Underpinning the actions of the 
probationers and the officers are situational, structural and practical contradictions.
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The officers attempt to resolve the contradictions confronting the probationers by 
utilising several compliance strategies such as: addressing socioeconomic difficulties; 
making home visits and scheduling flexible appointments. Ultimately, compliance is 
linked to the actions of the officers in managing the contradictions posed by several 
policy constraints and the unpredictability of the clients by devising more responsive 
informal rules.
6.5: Theoretical links between the core category and the key categories
The core category is ‘managing contradictions to secure compliance’. Here an attempt 
is made to demonstrate the theoretical links between the core category and the three 
key categories (see Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: Diagrammatic representation of the possible links between the major 
categories
The core 
category
Confronting
unpredictability
Adaptation
techniques
(Compliance)
Reacting to 
formal rules 
(Violations)
Managing 
Contradictions 
To secure 
Compliance
The core category at the centre of Figure 6.1 is demonstrably and conceptually linked 
to each of the key categories reacting, confronting and adaptation. Compliance 
emerges from 3 key processes. Underpinning these processes are practical, structural 
and situational contradictions. The officers devise several strategies to manage these 
contradictions in order to secure compliance. Central to the strategies developed by
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the officers are the informal rules that are more responsive to the contradictions that 
confront the probationers.
6.6: The contradictions confronting the probationers
In reacting to the formal rules, the probationers are confronted with practical, 
situational and structural contradictions. Practical problems comprise travel related 
problems and other lifestyle obstacles, for instance, substance related chaotic 
lifestyles that impinge on compliance. Situational contradictions are posed by the 
nature of interactions between both parties. As mentioned earlier, in two cases, 
negative interactions produced non-compliance. The circumstances as described by 
the probationers involved will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.
The policy mechanism (the deterrent framework) and the various obstacles to 
compliance described earlier also constitute structural contradictions. The deterrent 
enforcement framework discountenances the obstacles that affect compliance. Later in 
the order, the probationers will adapt to new and more flexible rules facilitating 
‘compliance’. The type of compliance achieved would typically fall short of policy 
prescriptions. The informal rules are created by officers exercising their professional 
discretion and the rules help to overcome the contradictions posed by the inflexible 
formal rules.
6.7: The officers: managing contradictions
Similarly, in confronting the unpredictability of their clients, the officers have to 
overcome practical, structural and situational contradictions. The practical and 
situational contradictions are posed by the unpredictability of the clients. Structural 
contradictions are posed by the policy constraints that necessitate covert professional 
discretion in enforcement. Professional discretion is a key ingredient of the effort to 
overcome these contradictions (see also Figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.2: The processes of managing contradictions to secure compliance
Adaptation techniques
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As Figure 6.2 shows, there are contradictions that affect the processes of securing 
compliance. The role of the officers in managing contradictions by replacing the 
formal rules with more flexible rules using their professional discretion is central to an 
understanding of compliance. The officers’ actions ensure that the enforcement rules 
applied in practice are more responsive to the practical and other problems that may 
affect compliance. Given its centrality, the concept ‘managing contradictions to 
secure compliance’ was selected as the core category.
6.8: Conclusion
In sum, compliance is the product of the definition applied to specific behaviour. It 
evolves from three complex processes in which probationers initially violate the 
formal rules communicated to them at the start of the order. This triggers the 
processes of confronting unpredictability in which the officers react to the violations 
based on the nature of the evolving relationship between both parties and the nature of 
the violation. The processes of confrontation reinforce the importance of adapting to 
the informal rules. Furthermore, underlying the activities of both parties are several 
contradictions or conditions.
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Chapter Seven: Reacting to the formal enforcement rules 
7.1: Introduction
The previous chapters elaborated the processes of data collection and the analytic 
tools that were used to analyse the data. They also described the emergent conceptual 
framework for understanding compliance with community penalties as revealed by 
the data. According to the data, interactions between three key categories contribute to 
an understanding of the nature of compliance with community penalties. This chapter 
and the next two chapters explore these three categories with reference to relevant 
extracts from the data.
In this chapter, the category -  reacting to formal rules -  is examined. It depicts how 
the probationers respond to the provisions of the formal enforcement framework 
communicated to them at the start of their orders. Several illustrative case studies are 
also provided.
7.2: Structural contradictions: the deterrent framework
The study examined the possible impact of the deterrent framework on compliance
patterns. Efforts are made to proactively communicate the formal rules to the
probationers at the start of the order. Proactive rule clarification begins during the
report writing stage before a sentence is imposed. The process is repeated during the
induction meeting. The objective is to ensure that a key element in ensuring
deterrence is present, namely awareness of the formal rules (perceived risks).
The probation officers and the probationers interviewed confirmed these processes.
To cite one example, below a probation officer explains the processes involved:
At what stage do you tell them [the probationers] what would 
happen i f  they fa il to comply?
Well they’ll be told at the stage prior before them going to court 
because most offenders come to us for a PSR. So we will discuss 
the disposal and if it’s going to be a Community Order then we
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would have explained to them what the circumstances will be of 
breaching that order. What the consequences might be for them so 
they know. P06M 10-20
Therefore, care is taken to communicate the formal rules. Despite this, most
probationers revealed limited awareness of the rules. The data revealed that of the 25
probationers interviewed, only 8 had accurate knowledge of the formal rules. The
reminder (17) displayed limited knowledge of the rules although all the probationers
interviewed reported that the rules had been communicated to them during their
induction. The quote below demonstrates the limited awareness of rules observed.
P12M is a male probationer on a CPRO for burglary:
Did you know how many times you could be absent [before you 
were breached in court] ?
No
So he [your probation officer] didn ’t explain it to you then?
He did b u t... basically for me to understand all of it I think I might 
as well have a book on the law like you know? That’s the way it’s 
gonna work, they should get every criminal, every whatever, a 
book on the law. So they know everything. So they got a better 
insight into it... P12M
Other probationers also revealed rule ambiguity. As mentioned earlier, according to
the National Standards operative at the time of the study, breach action should be
commenced after a second failure to attend appointments without an acceptable
reason (National Probation Service 2002). The probationers below demonstrate
limited understanding of this rule:
You get all the leaflets and stuff from the first appointment. Gives 
you all the regs you know? ..but I think you get, you miss one 
appointment, I think you get a warning letter. No you miss one 
appointment then you’ve got to either bring in a sick note or give a 
damn good reason why you missed that appointment. If you miss 
again you get your warming letter, three times, if  you miss the 
third that’s it you’ve breached and then you’re back to court. I 
think its three, but I’ve got a funny feeling it’s only two. Two, 
three at the most I think, but on your third I think you’re breached 
definitely and you’ll be back to court” P6F
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I think it’s you have two warnings and then one back to court then, 
so its three innit? P26M
To exacerbate matters, the study found that knowledge of the rules appeared to be
affected by time lapse as the order progressed:
Did she [your probation officer] say how many appointments you 
could miss before that [court breach] would happen?
No I don’t recall ...it’s been a while....there was, on the first week 
of probation there was about three new people coming in and we 
all gathered round the table and talked through, went through the 
leaflets with one probation officer. So everything was explained if 
you had any questions you could ask... P23M
Initially, it was hypothesized that in line with the deterrence doctrine the extent of rule
clarification would have an impact on compliance patterns. Therefore, the high degree
of rule ambiguity observed may be a possible explanation for the high rates of
violations. As such, the study explored how proactive rule clarification may be linked
to compliance. In doing so, it became possible to explore the presumption inherent in
deterrence theory that knowledge of risks is crucial for achieving deterrent effects.
However, it became apparent that the degree of rule clarity was not linked to
compliance patterns. This is because, 6 of the 8 probationers who demonstrated a full
understanding of the rules also reported violations. P3M below for instance, a male
probationer on a Combination Order for violence was fully aware of the formal
compliance rules:
You were told about what would happen i f  you don’t attend 
weren ’t you?
Yes
Was it in written form or were you told verbally?
I think both I’m not sure. You gotta sign at the start that explains 
everything. They give you leaflets and pamphlets when you first 
start so you know all about it... if I don’t turn up like say through 
skiving then I get breached which is a warning, they give me a 
warning on paper. Then if  I do it again then they send me back to 
court. So then you got two options one which is more likely to 
happen that they send me away...because it’s a major offence.
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...I’ve been on this 3 times now probation, if you actually behave 
yourself, turn up and not cause many troubles they cut it down ...if 
you turn up I cant remember how much it is think its about 3/4s 
away from your what sentence given to you in court if you behave 
yourself they can take you back to court and say he’s turned up and 
he’s done it all and they cut it down and stuff...you’ve only got two 
strikes in this place. P3M
However P3M above reported that he had violated his order. Below he describes the
circumstances:
...I was in [a]show cos we didn’t want to travel back on the 
Thursday night because of the traffic. We travelled back on the 
Friday morning. So I said that I might not be able to make it. So 
she [probation officer] was like alright don’t worry about it cos she 
already knew I was there, cos it’s not too bad. P3M
Below other probationers who reported full awareness of the formal rules describe the
circumstances of their violations:
I’d just ring up and make an excuse. I’ve done that before. I wanted 
to go shopping with my little boy..I done that once.
And what did they say?
They just said its fine ...they threatened to send me to court twice, 
which I think that was on the last order though that was about a 
year ago now, they’re pretty soft here... P24F
.... I have turned up pissed up before like [the] drunk and alcohol 
counselling pissed up because they used to put it on a pay day 
...They weren’t happy you know I mean? But I’m sorry like 
.. .change the day of probation, its pay day like. . .PI  5M
But on the two occasions that you've had warnings can you 
remember why?
Because I just couldn't be bothered. It's just like one of those days 
you know... I remember once I was in the pub and I was having 
such a good time and I thought I'm going so I phoned and said I 
can't come. So I phoned from outside the pub.
Was it during this order or the previous ones?
It might be this one actually and I've actually turned up on 
probation absolutely hanging drunk once.
And what were you told?
Well [P03M my probation officer] just (makes eyes gesture) just 
one of her looks. As soon as I walked through the door I said yes I 
know I'm drunk I apologise that's all I could say. P6F
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Although many probationers displayed limited awareness of the formal rules, they 
also demonstrated heightened levels of perceived risks. Like P3M above many 
probationers reported that a custodial sentence is the likely outcome of non- 
compliance:
I know people who have been breached for probation and they’ve 
gone back to prison.
Did you know that before you started the order?
Oh yeah.
So you were in no doubt then that the courts might react with a 
custodial i f  you are breached?
Yeah definitely...well I knew it’s all circumstantial I am aware of 
the fact it depends on the circumstances and every case is relevant 
to whatever is happening in that case yeah, but yeah I know that 
prison was not ruled out of you consistently breached. P2M
P2M above violated his order despite this apparent perceived severity of punishment. 
Below another probationer demonstrates heightened perceptions of severity:
What do you think the court will do?
They’d retry me for all my, for the original offence which possibly 
because I’ve gone and breached my probation order there’ll be bye 
byes prison
Were you told that at the start o f the order?
No I already know that. P6F
Notwithstanding these perceptions of risk, like P2M above, P6F (also cited above, a
female probationer on a CRO for violence) reported several violations already
described above. The heightened sense of perceived severity was linked to 5 factors:
previous experience of breach action, threats made by the courts (during sentencing)
that severe consequences will accompany non-compliance, the perception that the
current offence was serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence, information
gleaned from peers and the belief that a severe outcome is likely because the order is
an alternative to custody which if breached would be construed by the courts as a
failure to take full advantage of a ‘second chance’.
158
The quotes below demonstrate the impact of these factors. For example, P13M below
demonstrated heightened perceptions of the severity of punishment for non-
compliance stemming from previous experience of breach action:
... I f  (P08 F your probation officer) takes you back to court what 
do you think the courts will do?
TheyTl send me back to jail, well not back because I haven’t been 
to jail before, they’ll send me to j a i l ...
Did anyone tell you this is what the courts will do?
I’ve been told the consequences. You could be taken back to court 
and your other offences brought back up. P13M
Similarly, P5F below reported that her heightened perceptions of severity for non-
compliance stemmed from threats made by the courts during sentencing:
What do you think the courts will do i f  they take you there?
TheyTl send me to prison 
You think so?
Yeah I know for a fact. They said next time you’re in trouble we’ll 
send you to prison and I know that for a fact... P5F
For P9M below, the perception that the current order warranted a more severe
punishment explained his heightened perceptions of severity:
... I was a hair’s breadth from being sent to prison. I know that for 
a fact. It was serious offence ...P9M
Finally, P6F below reported that she had heightened perceptions of severity because 
of the belief that non-compliance and breach would be interpreted by the courts as the 
failure to take full advantage of a ‘second chance’:
Do you think i t ’s likely the court will impose a prison sentence?
If I’ve got good enough circumstance then the court might take it 
leniently and then say right, this is your last final warning. If we 
see you before the court again there will be no second chance. I 
know these words off by heart. P6F
As mentioned above, the probationers were also aware of the severity of punishment
through information gleaned from peers:
159
What happens to your friends when they miss probation...when 
they ’re taken back to court?
...they take things like that very seriously I think. I know a couple 
of people who missed probation who ended up in prison...P19F
Added to heightened perceptions of severity most probationers believed that non-
compliance would result in breach action in court. They fully recognised and accepted
the enforcement role of the officer:
But do you really think that (P07F your probation officer) will 
take you to court i f  you don’t attend?
It’s not down to her ... it’s what is specified in the law. So it 
wouldn’t be like her decision. I mean if I didn’t turn up and I did 
go back to court I couldn’t stand here and say well (P07F) is a 
cow for letting me ..Cos it’s not her fault....Her hands are 
tied...P8F
The high levels of perceived certainty and severity reported did not appear to affect
compliance patterns. As noted above, the incidence of rule violations was high despite
high perceptions of risks. 17 of the 25 probationers sampled reported rule violations.
Furthermore, only 5 probationers cited perceived risks as a motivating factor. For 4 of
this number, the perceived risks interacted with the perceived benefits of supervision
to motivate compliance as can be seen in the quote below by P5F a female probationer
already cited earlier. Below she discusses the factors that motivate her to comply:
...otherwise you get taken back to court you know? Because the 
courts have told you that this is what they’ve given you. They 
could have sent you to prison but they’ve given you a chance.
They’ve given you a probation order and you’ve got the probation 
officer who you confide in and if you’ve got any problems then 
you talk them out... I just think that you get something out of it. I 
can’t really explain. It’s hard to explain something like that to put 
over but in a way it’s good. You can talk out if you have any 
problems or anything. P5F
Further still, 4 probationers in the 5 probationers who cited perceived risks as a 
motivating factor reported that they had violated their orders. Of this number, one was
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interviewed early in his order and a further 2 were breached in the interim between the
initial interview and the follow up interviews. An example is the case of P15M a male
probationer convicted of theft offences and sentenced to a Community Order with
Unpaid Work and Rehabilitation requirements. He reported in the first stage of
interviewing that he was motivated to comply because of the need to secure his newly
acquired accommodation:
How has being on probation affected you i f  at all?
Its alright I mean, [its] weekly...so I might as well just pop down.
Never used to bother before because I couldn’t be a**** like but 
well I was homeless at the time. But now I’ve got somewhere to 
live and I don’t wanna screw it up by not turning up to probation.
P15M
During the follow up interview he reported that he had since been breached for
several violations:
Since the last time I  spoke to you in March have you not been able 
to come in for your appointments for any reason?
Emmm no. I missed Community Service that’s because I’ve been 
working or too drunk...
What happened then when you couldn’t come in?
I got breached and they gave me more hours like ...120 hours...
How many times have you not been able to come in do you 
remember?
Only went to one community service.
Do you think it was fair that the officer took you back to court?
Yeah. At the end of the day they give me loads of chances. Been 
called up to court loads of times but didn’t used to turn up to court 
either. So I had a lot of chances like. P15M
The second probationer (PIOF) breached in the interim between the initial and follow
up interviews also reported clear awareness of the formal rules:
So about being taken back to court, who told you that would 
happen?
If you like miss your days to come here and you don’t phone them 
they can send you back to court... PI OF
P10F had reported in the initial interview that she was motivated to comply mainly by
instrumental reasons:
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...if I don’t attend them I’ll be taken back to court and I could be
imprisoned I’m doing it for my daughter basically because I
don’t want to go back to court and I don’t want her to go through 
all this again for her sake either... So it’s just easier. P10F
In the follow up interview she reported that she had since been breached for
violations. She reported that she had become homeless and the need to secure an
accommodation overrode any perceived risks of non-compliance:
When you missed the appointments because o f  the difficulties you 
had did you think that you would end up in court?
I knew I was gonna end up in court because they told me, but at 
the time my head was so messed up that I didn’t really care 
whether I ended up in court, which is a bad attitude to have but I 
had so many other things. I was trying to find a home; I was trying 
to get my daughter back. I had 20 million things going through my 
head all at the same time and (it’s a) bad thing to say but 
community service came very low on the list of priorities at the 
time. PI OF
Thus when confronted with socioeconomic difficulties such as homelessness and 
other obstacles to compliance, the need to resolve these could override considerations 
of risk.
7.3: Factors potentially undermining perceived risks
Given that most probationers reported several violations despite high perceptions of 
risk, the study sought to understand why risk perceptions appeared to exert no 
significant impact on behaviour.
7.3.1: Peers, previous experiences and variability o f  official reactions 
The data revealed that just as information from peers enhanced perceived risks they 
may also undermine perceived risks where they alert the probationers to the 
variability in sentencing for breach. Probationers also learn of this variability through 
personal experience. Further, the individualised and flexible rules formulated by the 
officers undermine the perceived certainty and celerity of punishment. Likewise, 
perceived severity is undermined by the individualised and sometimes lenient
162
sentencing for breach. The probationers became aware o f this through previous
personal experiences. The quote below demonstrates this:
Do you think i t ’s likely the court will impose a prison sentence [or 
breach]?
It all depends on how (P03F my probation officer) will put across 
how my probation order is going at the moment and if I’ve got 
good enough circumstance then the court might take it 
leniently... P6F
Perhaps also undermining perceived severity is previous experience of a lenient
sentence for breach. Below the probationers who reported several violations after
breach action in court describe their experiences in court:
So what happened in court then when you were breached?
They just told me to continue my order end of. P2M
What did the courts say when they took you court?
They were alright about it you know they just, they didn't give me 
any more hours, they just give me the court costs and you know 
more money really £70 quid. P12M
Indeed, for some of the probationers the possibility of custody for breach was not a
significant threat:
So i t ’s not the fact that (P03F your probation officer) might take 
you back to court that would make you come in?
No no no not at all. That doesn’t bother me. I’ve been to prison 
and prison is not hard it’s the easiest... it’s a holiday camp 
Really?
It’s a holiday camp, ( ...)’s a holiday camp...well it’s a good place 
to go and have a rest innit? P1M
The officers provided insights into one additional factor that might affect perceived 
risks. They revealed that poor literacy skills pose a significant obstacle. According to 
the officers, this problem which afflicts the majority of their clients may undermine 
the accurate comprehension of rules. Asked what the main obstacles to compliance 
are, POIM a probation officer states:
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Literacy if we don’t acknowledge that I just think it’s one we 
need to acknowledge and we need to ensure that our 
correspondence is easy to understand for those varying needs...
Most of the officers noted the high incidence of poor literacy skills.
Huge problem, huge problem. I couldn’t believe until I started this 
job how big an issue literacy is in this area... When you do a PSR 
you do the self assessment form. I had one guy filling it in asking 
me how to spell need and ...you know, really bad. You know they 
were putting ‘no’ down as ‘know’...And the way the warning 
letter and a lot of written information here, the way they are its 
almost as if  they expect people to have very high basic skills 
levels. But you find that most, not most but many probationers will 
probably struggle with some correspondence. P013F
Like the officer above, other officers also acknowledged that poor literacy levels may
affect the probationers’ ability to understand enforcement correspondence.
I don’t think they (warning letters) are very good. We get a lot of 
offenders who are here and they’ve got low basic skills and we 
know they got low basic skills because we test everybody who 
comes through the PSR process and it’s really difficult because 
that’s the only way we got of warning somebody who isn’t in the 
room and it’s the only way we’ve got of actually proving that 
we’ve actually warned them. P018M
To overcome this problem, officers ensure that the enforcement rules are clearly
defined to all probationers:
It [the enforcement rules] is always explained to them verbally, 
you never just give them a piece of paper particularly in cases 
where you either know there are literacy difficulties or if you don’t 
know whether there are or not, then you have to assume that they 
might not be able to. .. .P03F
Despite the officers’ allusion to poor literacy skills as a significant problem that may
affect accurate rule perception, the probationers reported that they have no difficulties
understanding the formal rules. One officer recognised the possibility that the
probationers are unwilling to reveal this potentiality ‘embarrassing’ problem:
... the thing is some people are too embarrassed to say that they do 
have issues and I had one the other day who has got major issues
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with reading and writing and doesn’t want to do anything about 
it. P012F
According to the officers, added to poor literacy skills there are several additional
factors that may undermine rule clarity. The probationer may be overwhelmed by
their experiences that they are unable to assimilate the wealth of information. Further
they are inundated with too much information at once.
I think the main problems are, this is my personal opinion, that 
they’re in the induction stage, I think it’s too many leaflets given 
out, too many bits of paper. I think it would more successful if 
they were given one piece of paper which says this is your
order I think we give out too many leaflets. I am sure as soon
as they walk outside..., I am sure they are all in the bin out there 
on the floor. That’s my feeling, and I think some people can be, if 
they haven’t been on probation before, if it’s their first visit, can be 
a bit dazed if you know what I mean? ... and also obviously some 
people have got reading and memory difficulties which is a 
problem. I think it doesn’t help...P09F
These quotes illustrate the factors that may impinge on the levels of rule clarity. 
Notwithstanding these, as mentioned above, the probationers demonstrated high 
perceptions of risk, which appeared to have little impact on compliance patterns.
7.4: Structural contradictions: the obstacles to compliance
The obstacles to compliance also pose structural contradictions. Financial and travel
difficulties for instance, affect attendance:
Since you started have you not come in for any reason at all?
I think I’ve missed one appointment that was because my benefit 
money stopped and I didn’t have any money to come and I didn’t 
fancy going pinching to get any. P26M
The wide geographic area covered by the probation area and the rurality of most of
the areas covered, meant that transportation posed a significant problem. Below a
probationer recounts his experiences.
165
The probationer P2M regularly travels more than 10 miles to attend his appointments:
Do you always find someone to bring you in?
No that’s why I missed quite a few appointments but he’s [POIM 
my probation officer’s] given me other appointments to cover 
them but yeah it’s been terrible. It’s been murder getting here 
definitely. Like when I leave here tonight I don’t know how I am 
getting home you know I got my boss to drop me off on his way 
through to (...) P2M
Lifestyles and routines may also pose practical difficulties. An attempt was made to 
ascertain how these affect compliance in line with Bottoms’ (2001) conceptualisation 
of routine compliance. The study found that most of the probationers lead 
unstructured lives. Many are unemployed and often involved in substance misuse, 
some up to the level of dependency. This fuelled chaotic lifestyles which in turn posed 
significant obstacles to attending routine appointments. In the previous chapter, 
substance misuse related violations appeared to be prevalent. The quote below 
demonstrates how this may affect compliance. The probationer cited is substance 
dependent:
Is there anything that makes attending here difficult... ?
Sometimes if it’s early in the morning because I am not very good 
at getting up early in the mornings. Just because my sleep pattern’s 
all over the place because I’ve been taken off my sleeping tablets.
So like it takes me a long time to get to sleep. I wake up in the 
night and then I end up sleeping till about 11 o’clock in the 
morning. And then I looked in my diary this morning and I seen 
that I had probation and I thought oh!
Have you missed appointments then because o f the difficulty o f  
getting up in the morning?
I think I’ve missed maybe about two appointments cos if you miss 
more than 3 they can take you back to court. P5F
Non criminogenic routines such as employment commitments also affect attendance 
patterns:
Does it affect your job...?
It has done, that’s why I've had to ask, because I’ve had to stop 
jobs that I needed to go out on time and I had to leave them to
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attend here. That’s why I’ve asked to have appointments after 5 
o’clock now so that it’s not interfering with my work. P13M
These obstacles may also explain why the probationers tended to violate the formal
rules despite perceived risks. The data suggested that compliance patterns appear to
be more directly linked to the ability to adapt to the informal rules that are designed to
accommodate these obstacles.
7.5. Situational contradictions: the limited impact of normative mechanisms
Most of the probationers cited instrumental reasons for compliance. 16 of the 25 
probationers acknowledged the normative dimensions of supervision by reporting that 
the order constitutes appropriate retribution for their actions, or by acknowledging the 
perceived obligation to comply. Notwithstanding this, the 16 probationers did not cite 
these normative considerations as the central factors motivating them to comply. Only 
2 probationers -  P2M and P23M cited normative mechanisms: the perceived 
obligation to obey as the central factor motivating them to comply with their orders. 
Both were male probationers aged 33 and 22. The 33 year old probationer -  P2M - 
was on a twelve month CRO for fraud offences whilst the 22 year old -  P23M - was 
on a 24 month CRO for a violent offence.
7.5.1: Normative mechanisms: an illustrative case study
Although P2M above was breached for non-compliance he continued with his order 
and completed it successfully. When asked how the experience of breach affected him 
he replied:
It didn’t affect my decision to come in no not at all. I came in 
because as I said I was taking my punishment on the chin. This is 
what my punishment was so get it over and done with... I am a 
great believer in, this is my personal opinion, if you commit a crime 
if you do something that is against society then you got to take it on 
the chin. If you get caught you got to take it on the chin there’s no 
point moaning about it P2M.
167
The experiences of P2M above illustrate the impact of perceived legitimacy as
defined by Tyler (2003) on compliance. P2M was interviewed at the end of his order.
During the interview, he revealed that he was breached early in his order for missing 6
appointments. He reported that the key reason for his failure to attend was his belief
that he had been treated unfairly and without respect. Below he recounts his view of
his officer’s actions:
Can you remember what he did specifically...?
One time I was on appointment and I phoned up and I told him. I 
said I can’t, I am struggling my lift hasn’t turned up and I don’t 
know how I am gonna get there and his reply to that was well its 
part of your order you have to get here and he was all negative and 
he didn’t come back with any ideas or with any support. It was just 
totally negative like, almost bullying like, you’ve got to get here and 
I was not having that basically. ... alright fine, I broke the law, I got 
a probation order but that doesn’t mean I have to be treated like 
nobody yeah, I bet he wouldn’t talk to his son like that if his son 
phoned up late for an appointment or something. So you can’t treat 
me less of a human being just because I’ve committed a crime. So 
then I ended up with POIM (a second probation officer) P2M.
This case illustrates one of the antecedents of perceived of perceived legitimacy -
‘perceived fair treatment’. Perceived unfair treatment led to non-compliance. The
features of unfair treatment were disrespect in the form of a rigid application of the
unresponsive formal rules, and also a domineering and dictatorial enforcement
approach in which the probationer was denied the opportunity to state his case. The
quote below by the probationer (P2M) highlights how perceived legitimacy may be
enhanced where decision making processes are perceived to be fair. This is so even if
the outcome is negative:
...He [POIM -  the current probation officer] breached me but in the 
same breath he breached me but he didn’t breach me cos he 
understood what happened. He took the time to look into why, ... 
cos I didn’t actually start the cognitive thinking thing till I think it 
was about week 5 and up till then I’d been on time and every 
week....And then that ‘one to one’ and then puff, and I think POIM 
took the time to see that and in the breach report done for the courts 
he said : I believe that if P2M continues to do his probation
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properly the he can carry on with the order....it was done with 
respect, I felt that he always treated me like I was a worthwhile 
human being. Never made me feel small, never made me feel like a 
criminal, never made me feel any less of a person than he is you 
know?...It’s most important you know, you can’t have 
communication unless you have that, because it won’t be equal. If 
the communication is not balanced someone’s not listening and 
someone won’t be hearing and you’ll be talking, it will be going like 
that phew... and POIM just got that to a T. P2M
P2M above validates the decisions and actions of the second probation officer stating
that although the second officer prosecuted him for breach, the process was fair
because he was given the opportunity to state his case and also because a fair account
was given to the court. These were perceived by P2M to be the indices of fair
treatment. The case also demonstrates that even where the perceived obligation to
obey the law exists, perceived unfairness may engender non-compliance.
Thus, negative outcomes do not undermine the perceived legitimacy of authority as
long as the process through which the outcome is reached can be regarded as fair. In
addition, the opportunity to present one’s case is a key element of fair procedures as is
the perception that one has been treated fairly. These findings are consistent with the
empirical literature discussed in Chapter two. We can recall that studies have found
that the perceived legitimacy of authority may encourage compliance with legal
authorities and legal rules (Tyler 1990; 2003; 2005). Tyler argues that in encounters
with people in authority, outcomes are not nearly as important for preserving
perceived legitimacy as the actual decision making processes.
Therefore, although it was the second probation officer POIM that eventually
implemented the breach, P2M described his relationship with this officer in positive
terms contrasting it with his relationship with the previous officer who he believes
treated him unfairly as described above:
I tell you the first PO I met here (...) didn’t like him at all 
Why didn’tyou like him?
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....he was very, he was a robot, by the book kind of there was no 
humanity and I am sorry to achieve an effect in someone’s life you 
have to have some love no matter how distant you have to be and 
how professional you have to be you have to express ... I told him 
how I felt about the way he talked to me that he was very negative 
... to achieve any effect on a human being you have to have a 
positiveness and support..
Asked about how his order affected him, P2M replied:
It’s changed my life you know but actually if I’m honest, it’s not the 
probation service that’s helped me its [POIM my current probation 
officer]. As I said it all comes down to the probation officer. You 
can have any set of rules and regulations but if they’re put across by 
the wrong person they’re not gonna do anything.
The quotes above also highlight the importance of the ‘relational element’ of
supervision.
7.6: Situational contradictions: the impact of interactions
The foregoing suggests that interactions between both parties may also affect the
probationers’ ability to adapt to the informal rules. These findings prompted further
explorations of the importance of the interactions between both parties. Further data
reinforced the finding that a disrespectful and dictatorial approach undermines
perceived legitimacy and may affect compliance. A similar case was presented by
probationer P23M. Like probationer P2M above, P23M also cited normative reasons
for compliance based on perceived obligation:
I committed the crime; I have to take some kind of punishment 
...P23M
However, P23M failed to comply with the directives of his officer because of the
quality of treatment he received. Like P2M, he rejected what he perceived to be a
domineering approach and a lack of empathy:
...the way he [my probation officer] was coming across was a bit 
not to my liking, we clashed straight away so I knew I wouldn’t like 
him but I put on a front,... he was just talking to me like I was a 
child, a school boy sort of thing, he didn’t put himself across very 
well from my perspective that’s the thing..
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What type o f things will he say...?
Just mainly about: have I got a better work? How is your
relationship with your mother?...Don’t you think you should do 
this? don’t you think you should do that? Sorry mate you don’t live 
in my house you don’t know what it’s like. P23M
The quote above also reveals that an approach that is perceived as intrusive and 
lacking in empathy may also engender non-compliance. The officer’s approach is 
more likely to be perceived as intrusive where an established relationship is lacking as 
can be the case where the probationer is supervised by more than one officer. For the 
probationer - P24F, an approach that she believed to be intrusive led to a failure to 
defer to the authority of a probation officer with whom she had not developed an 
established relationship.
... I won’t speak to him (the probation officer), it’s just I don’t 
know, I can’t get on with him...he goes on about how he wanted me 
to write out a drinks diary how much I drink, I just wasn’t having it 
because I’ve got other agencies that deal with that. So I say no I’m 
not doing it. (my current probation officer) did not ask me to do it, I 
aint doing it and she’s my probation officer...he’s slow, I just find 
him stupid...It seems too personal to me... probation they’ve got to 
know a lot about you but there are things that I just won’t discuss 
with people...Well no I just refused I said cos I do actually, I’ve got 
a (substance misuse rehabilitation) worker, I said I won’t. P24F
So far it appears that in interacting with the officer, the perceived quality of treatment
may be undermined if perceived to be:
• Disrespectful
• Dictatorial/domineering
• A rigid application of rules
• Lacking in empathy
• Intrusive
Therefore, the quality of interactions as perceived by the probationers may affect 
compliance. The examples cited above suggest that negative interactions based on 
perceived disrespect for instance, may trigger non-compliance even where the
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probationer reports that they are primarily motivated to comply by normative 
considerations.
Exploring these issues also revealed additional features of the interactions between 
both parties. These are linked to the motivational strategies primarily relied on to 
encourage compliance.
7.7: Instrumental compliance mechanisms: the centrality of incentives
In describing the central factor/s motivating them to comply, most of the probationers 
pointed to the importance of their interactions with their officer. They described their 
relationships with their officers in positive terms. During initial analysis, this provided 
a prima facie case for interpreting the nature of the relationship in normative terms. 
That is, the relationships may be such that the officer is able to exert a normative 
influence on the probationer which produces compliance. Further, positive evaluations 
of authority may indicate perceived legitimacy (Tyler 2003). However, subsequent 
analysis revealed that the central element of the relationships between both parties 
that was cited by the probationers as motivating compliance was not its potentially 
normative dimension. Rather, the perceived benefits accruing from these relationships 
underpinned the positive evaluations. This is because the probationers described their 
relationships with their officers in positive terms highlighting the importance of the 
perceived benefits accruing from these relationships.
7.7.1: Describing supervision relationships in instrumental terms 
Most of the probationers evaluated relationships with their officers and their 
experiences during supervision positively mainly because of the opportunity to ‘talk’ 
to their officers or confide in their officers in order to overcome mental or emotional 
stress. The quotes below reinforce this point.
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What do you think is the best thing about being on probation?
The best thing about probation? I’ve got to let some of my feelings 
out rather than bottling it up P13M
I enjoy coming into probation, it’s like having somebody sensible 
and straight to talk to. Somebody that I know I can trust as well, I 
can tell them whatever I need to tell them and I know [P013F -my 
probation officer] will try and help me as well... P17F
It was nice talking to [P017F - my probation officer], having 
someone, and it was nice having someone to talk to you know, if 
you’ve got problems, someone else outside of the family to talk 
to, it won’t go further and all that. That’s nice about probation, and 
I can’t say anymore than that... P25F
The quotes above also demonstrate that the probationers invest a high degree of trust
in the probation officers. Other probationers reinforce this:
She’s [P08F -my probation officer’s] brilliant she’s good to talk 
to. She’s a good listener. ...she listens to me well, she’s good. It’s 
nice to have someone to talk to. I can talk to my girlfriend and 
stuff but not about the stuff that’s happened. P13M.
... I can sit there and tell him almost anything you know? So he 
gets a lot off my mind because I can’t really speak to my girlfriend 
about some things my head thinks about and me and my family 
sort of broke up but and that P7M
It is difficult to maintain this degree of trust where there is discontinuity during
supervision. The quotes below reveal the difficulties posed by discontinuity:
...few times I’ve seen someone else. I prefer to see [P09F-my 
current probation officer]. [A certain probation officer] gets on my 
nerves.. .just asking me question after question that I just don’t feel 
is appropriate ...you start getting on with someone you trust 
them...I prefer to stick to the same person but if she’s off ill can’t 
be helped. P24F
[P06M- my probation officer] sort of plans my route out a bit. It 
helps me cos I have suffered with mental illnesses and stuff you 
know? After I came out of the army my head was up my a** you 
know? I weren’t really thinking straight and my marriage broke 
down and I did go the wrong way down the path like. But I sit 
down and try and talk to him about what I wanna do and just 
personal stuff and like I don’t feel like I can talk to the other 
people like that because I haven’t spent as much with them you 
know? P7M
The disruptive impact of lack of continuity during supervision was reiterated by the 
officers:
Do you think changing the supervisor affects relationships?
I think so yes
In what way do you think?
Well we did notice that once when we had an idea, somebody had 
an idea of a report centre where people would just come and see 
whoever happened to be at the office on that day. We found that 
attendance dropped off tremendously. This was before we were 
quite strict on enforcement admittedly but people seem to get in a 
relationship with that probation officer and they don’t seem to 
want to talk to somebody else. I think it’s to do with the feeling 
that the first person knows quite a lot about you and then if  you go 
and see somebody else that doesn’t know much about you, you’re 
starting from scratch and as a probation officer it’s not so easy sort 
of picking up a case half way through either cos you’re thinking,
oh my goodness! I can’t remember now, what they did if you
got it right from the beginning you tend to remember more about 
them. P07F
This view was reiterated at management level in Jersey during a discussion about 
discontinuity in supervision:
I don’t like changing. We try to keep changing to the absolute 
minimum. Sometimes it happens. Sometime it has to happen, a 
probation officer leaves. Occasionally probation officers and 
offenders clash. We’ve had a case of that recently. The probation 
officer said I don’t get on with this client I really don’t. I feel 
unsafe, I think she feels unsafe can we change. So that’s okay. But 
we do try to have, like I said before, the SER (Social Enquiry 
Report) writer will work generically. We don’t have specialist 
teams, and they will supervise that person in the community and if 
that person goes to prison they will supervise that person as 
well.... JPOIM
The finding that supervision relationships are described in instrumental terms was 
constant even among the probationers who also reported normative reasons for 
compliance. P2M for instance, cited normative mechanisms such as perceived 
legitimacy as the central factor motivating him to comply. However, he also reported
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that the emotional/mental benefits of the talks with his probation officer constituted
another important motivating factor:
[POIM - my current probation officer] is amazing ... With [my 
previous probation officer] I felt that he was sitting there with a 
case, yeah, that’s how I felt. I felt that I was case. When I am 
talking to POIM I feel that he’s sitting there talking to a young 
man he needs to help. He’s here to help and he can help....I come 
and I spend half an hour to a quarter of an hour here and me and 
POIM chat. But with [my previous probation officer]... it was like 
..yeah yeah goodbye....you know? ..I used to go wow! Man! That 
just cost me six quid and like I travelled for ten times longer than I 
was here and that just seemed pointless. That is when it just 
seemed like they were just trying to p*** me off, just give me a 
dig, just put a bigger lump in my week really... P2M.
Thus, according to the probationers the key element of interactions or relationships 
with the officer motivating compliance was the problem solving role of the officer 
especially the officer’s role in listening to problems and relieving mental stress. This 
was a recurring theme that underpinned the positive evaluations of supervision offered 
by the probationers.
Added to the benefits of the therapeutic role of the officer, most of the probationers 
were of the view that the primary objective of community penalties is to provide 
support and help to overcome problems. It was not perceived to be a punishment. This 
may also explain the positive evaluations of supervision offered. Positive evaluations 
of an authority would normally indicate the perceived legitimacy of that authority. 
However, it has been argued that distinctions can be made between positive 
evaluations based on perceived legitimacy and positive evaluations based on the belief 
that the authority is primarily concerned with solving problems and providing other 
benefits (Tyler 2003). The latter would indicate an instrumental view of interactions 
with that authority and may engender instrumental compliance.
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7.7.2: Welfarist objectives: the benefits o f supervision
The view of community penalties as an alternative to punishment was observed 
despite the sustained efforts by successive governments to rearticulate the image of 
the service from a welfarist organisation to a correctionalist service. For instance, the 
2002 National Standards that were in operation during the most part of the study cited 
the provision of a ‘rigorous and effective punishment’ as the first objective of 
community penalties (National Standards 2002). Notwithstanding these 
developments, most of the probationers rejected the idea of probation as punishment. 
They perceived the primary objective of community penalties to be the provision of 
help and support:
P23M the 22 year old male probationer serving a 24 month CRO for violence (already
cited above) describes his experiences of supervision:
I find it to be a positive thing. It’s working out really well. For me 
it’s just somebody to actually tell my problems to ... P23M.
At worst, the order was perceived to impose a constraining influence given the
requirements to attend routine appointments. Most of the probationers perceived the
order’s objective to be the provision of practical and other help. For many, the
anticipated benefits of supervision motivated them to comply:
... in a way it’s a bit of a punishment because it takes a day out of 
your week you know to come here and stuff, but just get to sit 
down and speak to [P06M my probation officer] and let out my 
problems or whatever.. .No it’s not punishment no.P7M
... It’s gonna help which is what I needed. Punishment wouldn’t 
have done anything I don’t think so... P8F
...they [the probation officers] are only trying to do the best for 
you, you know? That’s what they’re there for, to help you. They’re 
not here to punish you or anything like that. They’re here to help 
you. That’s why I wanted to be put on probation and that... P5F
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...if I could change what happened I would but what I said to the 
Judge like yeah, I want to get on college courses and things. So 
like I gotta come here see? It’s to my advantage you see? If I can 
get something out of it... P 19F
Reinforcing the view of community penalties as a welfare-based alternative to
punishment, some probationers viewed their orders as tantamount to being given a
‘second chance’ as an alternative to being punished:
... I committed the crime, I have to take some kind of punishment 
and that punishment could have been prison or it could have been 
coming here and I know which I would prefer. So it’s really kind 
of like a second chance almost. I appreciate being given it. P23M
These quotes suggest that from the probationer’s perspective, the anticipated benefits
of supervision provide significant motivation to comply. The tendency to cite
perceived and anticipated benefits as central motivating factors remained constant
across probationers at different stages of their orders. In the five examples above, two
of the probationers (P7M & P5F) were midway through their orders and (P23M) was
interviewed at the end of his order. P8F a female probationer serving a six month
CRO for benefits fraud was interviewed at the beginning of the order. In the follow up
phase, she maintained her earlier position about the perceived benefits of supervision:
...they’ve been so helpful and I mean I am now on monthly 
reporting but I know that if I need to speak to someone any other 
time I can. Cos that was one of the first things I asked before I 
went on this monthly thing was if I needed to speak to somebody 
are you gonna be there?...
And so what would you describe as the best and the worst aspects 
o f being on probation
The best bit is probably knowing that you’ve got somebody there.
P8F
P8F’s supervisor subsequently reported during the follow up interview that P8F’s 
compliance pattern had been tantamount to technical compliance. This case is 
discussed in more detail further below. Other probationers interviewed during the
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follow up reinforced the importance of the perceived and anticipated benefits of 
supervision. Below a probationer -P1M -  states that he is motivated to comply by the 
opportunity to talk to his officer:
Is there anything that makes it difficult for you to attend your appointments?
Me head, that’s the only thing really, it’s me head, if I get too depressed or I get too 
negative about things then I find it difficult to get in but apart from that I quite enjoy 
coming i n ..
Why do you enjoy it though?
Why? it means I can, I get to see somebody I get to interact with people and I get to 
be able to say what I need to say about what’s happening in my life. I think that’s 
important, that’s very important...I think that’s probably more important than a lot of 
the other stuff that goes on you know? Yeah I think that’s very important.
The last time we spoke you were saying that you were trying to make new friends now, 
better friends. Have you been able to?
The old friends are beginning to fall off they’re not coming as much as they used to 
which is quite good. I find it quite lonely at times because a lot of the old people 
don’t come anymore P1M
The quote above reveals that although the opportunity to attend and discuss problems 
can be considered an important element of supervision, adequate emphasis should be 
directed at equipping the probationers with skills that can ensure longer term 
compliance following supervision when the opportunity to interact with the officers 
and discuss problem ceases. Compliance should not be motivated primarily by the 
opportunity to discuss problems or to obtain other accruing benefits. Although this 
may encourage short term instrumental compliance, longer term compliance may 
become more difficult to achieve where these perceived benefits are no longer on 
offer.
7.7.3: Perceived benefits: an illustrative case study
A case study may be provided to further illustrate these findings. P5F a female 
probationer serving a 12 month CRO for theft was interviewed midway through her 
order. She was breached early in her order for failing to attend several appointments 
without notifying the office. She reported that she failed to attend because she disliked
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her officer. The underlying reason for this dislike was the belief that the officer was
unable to provide the anticipated help.
When you were with [your previous probation officer] were you 
attending all the time?
No I wasn’t.
Why was that?
Because he was going on about his wife and kids and things like 
that...and I didn’t want to know about that and I thought I am not 
going to attend something that I don’t wanna hear about you know 
what I mean?...I just didn’t get on with him...he just didn’t seem to 
be putting in enough input like into my probation...
What did you expect him to put in?
Well he used to be talking about his wife and kids most of the time 
and I thought I don’t want to know about your b***** wife and 
kids you know I mean? I felt like [he should be] supervising me, 
sort of helping me because I’m on probation and that.
What sort o f  help did you want?
Well somebody to talk to I suppose really, and to advise you about 
things ....P5F
The quote above demonstrates that the provision of help and support is a key factor in 
ensuring compliance. The probationer above failed to comply and was breached for 
persistent absenteeism. The reason for non-compliance was the perception that 
supervision was lacking its essential ingredient: anticipated help.
7.7.4: Reconceptualisingperceived welfarist benefits as instrumental mechanisms 
As mentioned above, during initial analysis, the perception that the primary objective 
of community penalties is to provide help was categorised as a normative mechanism 
of compliance. This is because I interpreted the officers’ therapeutic role (listening to 
problems) and also their welfarism (addressing the difficulties confronting the 
probationers) as normative mechanisms. However, subsequent analysis revealed that 
the office’s therapeutic role and welfarism were perceived by the probationers to be 
the benefits accruing from short term compliance.
We can recall that normative compliance mechanisms encourage compliance based on 
perceived legitimacy. Normative mechanisms include the fair application of authority,
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fair treatment and trustworthiness. In addition forming bonds which encourage 
adherence to pro-social behaviours may also encourage normative compliance. 
Alternatively, the use of incentives to encourage compliance is more likely to 
encourage instrumental compliance based on perceived benefits.
A careful reflection on these issues led to the reconceptualisation of the central 
mechanism of compliance cited by the probationers namely, the officers’ therapeutic 
and welfarist roles, as instrumental mechanisms that encourage compliance based on 
perceived and anticipated benefits. This is because in interacting with the officers, 
several benefits were anticipated and described as central motivating factors by the 
probationers. These include: the mental relief and other benefits linked to the talks 
with the supervisor, the new qualifications that may be acquired by participating in 
rehabilitation programs, the advice provided for debt management, the referrals to 
agencies providing assistance with socio-economic and other difficulties.
7.7.5: Some recognition o f normative dimensions
Some of the probationers recognised the normative objectives of supervision. In
recognising these, the probationers were able to make the connection between the
incentives offered and possible longer term objectives particularly- reduced offending.
Below P22F a 22 year old probationer serving an 18 month CRO for alcohol fuelled
violence describes the role of the officer:
 that’s what they [the officers] are here for really to advise you
not to commit crime. They do advise you not to commit 
crime....like every time I get a bit wound up and I have to come 
here, they say to me calm down...do you know what I mean? And 
that stops me from doing it then. So basically it stops me from 
committing crime.. .P22F
For P22F, the quote above appeared to reflect a recognition of the normative
dimension of supervision. Despite this recognition, there was still a tendency to
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emphasise the instrumental dimensions of the objectives of supervision. The quote
below made by the same probationer illustrates this:
.... I know probation is there to help you and [P011F my 
probation officer] is there to help. She does help me a lot, so I go
to all my appointments normally it’s helped me a lot. ...But
probation has helped me. Like if I need to talk to someone and I 
want to open up to someone or there’s things in my head that I 
can’t tell other people, I can tell POl IF as well and she helps me 
with it and she says right keep your head under water do you know 
what I mean? She explains things to me, like other people won’t 
tell me that. TheyTl be like ‘sort them like this’, but probation, 
they give you the right advice and then if you’re lucky ...let’s say 
if you’re homeless, they help you if you want to get qualifications, 
they help with stuff like that. ...P22F
Thus, added to the immediate short term benefits motivating compliance such help 
with socioeconomic difficulties, there appears to be some recognition of the 
normative dimension of supervision -  its longer term rehabilitative objective. This is 
quite different from the narrow focus on the short term benefits accruing during 
supervision which were cited as central motivating factors by most of the 
probationers.
7.8: Officer Mechanisms: the reliance on incentives
The officers’ accounts also appeared to reinforce the finding that incentives represent 
important compliance mechanisms. Below two female probation officers illustrate 
this:
... I think it is made clear at the beginning of every order that if 
they comply then they will receive incentives...if alcoholism is the 
main factor contributing to their offending then that’s what we 
have to concentrate on...P02F
...you get the odd few who actually don’t need incentives because 
they can actually see that something’s happening and something’s 
working and that things are getting better so with others it’s the 
carrot and stick approach ... a lot of them come here because, or are 
happy to come here because they know that we are actually helping 
them sort out other stuff. Although we do the accredited programs
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that are very much aimed at the offending behaviour, there is still 
an awful lot of other work that goes on like alcohol counselling, 
helping them get employment, helping them find accommodation...
We got we’ve got one partnership agency that actually comes in 
and sees people in the office once a fortnight but we also refer to 
another alcohol agency depending on which is more appropriate, 
whether its harm reduction or abstinence that they’re working 
towards.. So we can refer to either, but the housing and the 
employment can be a very big incentive for people to comply. P3F
This tendency to emphasise the instrumental benefits of compliance was also
observed in Jersey:
... if someone is a bit motivated to attend probation, then I think 
there will be an amount of selling it ...you’ll be talking about what 
might be on offer to support them to change their behaviour. So 
you’ll be looking at ... unemployment and other criminogenic 
factors. Mainly be looking at ways that maybe probation could 
support that....We really try and sell it, sell it to them, that there’s a 
number of benefits ...” JP03M
Instrumental mechanisms which operate through the use of incentives to encourage
compliance may encourage instrumental compliance based on perceived and
anticipated benefits. Thus the effort to communicate to the probationers the incentives
on offer in order to encourage compliance may equally encourage the probationers to
view the objectives of supervision primarily in instrumental self interested terms
rather than in normative terms. Perhaps this reflects the policy focus on instrumental
mechanisms of compliance as is evident in the deterrent strategies and also in the use
of an incentive -  early revocation -  to encourage compliance. A normative view of
supervision may encourage compliance even where no tangible benefits can be seen
to accrue from complying with the order. Compliance is then achieved because the
authority of the officer and the law in general, are deemed to be legitimate and
deserving of obedience.
182
7.9: Balancing instrumental mechanisms against normative mechanisms
Of course one acknowledges that short term welfare based interventions are crucial
because they help to address the needs that may pose obstacles to short term
compliance and indeed to longer term change. Studies reveal this to be the case. For
instance, McCulloch (2005) explored the processes through which probation
supervision may address the social problems linked to offending. 6 practitioners and 6
of their probationers were interviewed. The participants pointed to a clear link
between addressing social problems and reduced offending. Probation was perceived
to be an appropriate forum for facilitating this link although the study found ‘limited
success’ in the attempts made by the officers to address social problems (p. 18),
The current study reinforces these findings. Help provided to resolve problems is
according to the probationers, a central factor motivating them to comply. However,
the degree of success with which the officers were able to address problems was
limited in some cases. For instance, the officers acknowledged the limited provisions
available for reimbursing travel costs. Likewise, the provisions for addressing
accommodation related obstacles are limited:
Those agencies are they effective in addressing those problems as 
far as you know?
Some of them are. I mean we have problems with housing in this 
area simply because there isn’t enough of it. But they are doing 
their best. It’s a bit unfortunate recently because (a housing 
agency) has lost some funding in this area and so they’re having to 
cut back and they were incredibly effective at dealing with 
particularly people who were having unfair evictions or 
substandard accommodation...So that’s going to be quite a lot and 
we always need more. We could do with an alcohol counsellor 
here everyday not once a fortnight but on the whole I’d say yeah 
it’s pretty good. P03F
The case of the probationer PI OF cited in Chapter eight illustrates the importance of 
providing help to resolve problems as a useful compliance strategy. PI OF a female
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probationer on an unpaid work order for benefits fraud reported that she was highly
motivated to complete her order. She was interviewed at the start of her order and she
reported that the only potential obstacle that would affect how she complies with her
order would be accommodation related difficulties. The probationer - PI OF - was
subsequently breached in court for non-compliance in the interim following the initial
interview. During the follow up interview, she reported that she became homeless and
as such, she became more preoccupied with securing adequate accommodation for
herself and for her daughter. At that time, compliance ceased to be a priority. Below is
the discussion with PI OF in the initial interview. Asked what motivates her to comply
she cited instrumental factors:
...if I don’t attend them I’ll be taken back to court and I could be
imprisoned I’m doing it for my daughter basically because I
don’t want to go back to court and I don’t want her to go through 
all this again for her sake either... So it’s just easier. PI OF.
In the follow up interview she described the circumstances that led to her failure to
attend and subsequent court breach:
Back in November time I had trouble with a partner that I was 
with at the time and he went to prison and I ended up homeless. So 
I breached my Community Service. I didn’t go a few times and I 
had to go back to court and I got some extra hours which wasn’t 
too good...I just didn’t turn up because I was homeless at the time 
and I had nowhere to live and I was trying to find somewhere for 
me and my daughter to live so.... I didn’t turn up for about four 
appointments or so, and I did get in touch once but the letters were 
getting sent out to an address I wasn’t living at anymore. So I 
didn’t realise what was going on cos I wasn’t getting my mail and 
stuff so it was all a bit awkward really but....I am supposed to get 
in touch, but my head was all over the place. I’d been assaulted 
and I had nowhere to live. I had sent my daughter away to live 
with her grandparents for six weeks. I had a property up in 
Leicester as well a house up in Leicester, and I lost all the stuff in 
that property and everything went wrong at one time and even 
though I should have been doing my Community Service it was 
sort of the last thing on my mind, do you know what I mean?
Because I had so many other things to try and sort out...P10F
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The last quote demonstrates that when confronted with obstacles, compliance
becomes a less significant issue. In addition, perceived risks also become
insignificant in that they produce no deterrent effect. The probationer also reported
that she received limited support:
I  am sorry to hear about all the difficulties, but did you tell them 
(the officers) that you had accommodation problems?
Aha
What did they do then?
They didn’t really help me a lot ha ha!..I didn’t really get much 
help. [UWOIF unpaid work officer] wrote off to [a homeless 
agency] for me. I met the woman from [the homeless agency] 
twice but nothing came of it.
I  wonder why that was.
They just couldn’t find me anything and there was problems 
because I still had a property in Leicester so that was a bit difficult, 
but like I said I have given up that property now, found myself a 
flat in town....when I was having all these difficulties nobody 
really helped.
How do you feel about that?
At the end of the day I managed on my own. I did come in here 
once and was quite upset. I spoke to [UWOIF unpaid work 
officer] when she was still here. She got me the interview with [the 
homeless agency] but that never came to nothing. It didn’t really 
help but she did do that for me so I suppose they did do something.
P10F
The case discussed above illustrates the importance of addressing needs and the 
limited success with which this can be done during supervision. Furthermore, some of 
the officers reported that although the probationers are reimbursed their travel 
expenses, the reimbursements are not nearly adequate in some offices. In terms of 
securing compliance, this becomes a pertinent issue in those offices covering wide 
geographic areas.
Desistance studies reveal that being responsive to social and economic needs may be 
useful for achieving longer term compliance with the law. Indeed insights emerging 
from the literature on effective practices reveal the importance of targeting the needs 
of those who offend as one of the key principles of effective practice (Dowden and
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Andrews 2004) although addressing social and environmental needs in isolation 
without due reference to interventions targeted at cognitive and behavioural 
development is not advocated (Poporino and Fabiano 2007). Further, it has been 
acknowledged that being unresponsive to these needs may undermine the perceived 
legitimacy of authority (Tyler 2005). However, an unduly narrow focus on addressing 
needs may fuel the perception that the primary objective of probation is to provide the 
help or assistance needed to overcome the problems confronting the probationers. 
Such a perception overlooks the normative dimension of supervision. The latter is 
more concerned with encouraging both short term and longer term compliance 
because of the obligation to obey regardless of any accruing benefits. Meanwhile, so 
far it appears that for most of the probationers, the perceived benefits accruing during 
interactions with their officers motivate compliance.
7.10: Conclusion
This chapter described how the probationers react to the formal rules. As noted 
earlier, the probationers’ reactions are mainly in the form of violations. Although 
most of the probationers displayed limited knowledge of the consequences of non- 
compliance, they demonstrated high levels of perceived risks. The levels of perceived 
risks did not appear to have a significant influence on behaviour. Rather, the 
probationers reported that they were primarily motivated to comply by the perceived 
benefits accruing from their interactions with their officers.
Having violated the formal rules, the probationers will experience the actions of the 
officers in responding to the violations. We can recall that these actions were 
categorised as - ‘confronting unpredictability’. The category ‘confronting 
unpredictability’ which represents the officers’ reactions to violations, appears to be
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directly linked to the nature and extent of compliance achieved. The category 
‘confronting unpredictability’ is described in more detail in the next two chapters.
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Chapter Eight: Confronting unpredictability: the situational and structural
contradictions 
8.1: Introduction
In the early stages of analysis, it appeared that the probationers were sometimes able 
to violate the formal rules with impunity. To understand how this could be so despite 
the prescriptive enforcement rules, the study explored the activities of the officers in 
responding to rule violations. The study found links between the officers’ activities 
and the nature of compliance with community penalties. Before undertaking a detailed 
exploration of the officers’ reactions to non-compliance and how these appear to 
shape compliance, the situational and structural contradictions that affect the officers’ 
actions will be examined in this chapter. An understanding of these conditions should 
ensure an accurate contextualisation of the officers’ actions.
Thus, this chapter begins with an exploration of the structural contradictions affecting 
the officers’ efforts to secure compliance. These are mainly posed by rigid policy 
requirements. The chapter also examines the situational contradictions posed by the 
unpredictability displayed by the probationers. The chapter concludes with an 
examination of how the officers manage these contradictions in order to ensure an 
individualised and responsive approach to securing compliance.
8.2: Structural contradictions: the policy framework
There are conditions that affect how the officers react to violations, these have been 
conceptualised as situational and structural contradictions. The situational 
contradictions stem from the unpredictability of the clients whilst the structural 
contradictions stem from policy provisions. As would apply in other public sector 
organisations, there are policy requirements that guide probation practice (see Home 
Office 2000b; 2005, NOMS 2007a). Chapter one revealed that enforcement policy
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reflects wider trends in probation policy and hence, in line with the managerialist
agenda, there are demands for accountability and standardisation in enforcement.
There are also target-driven policies that link performance ratings to resource
allocation in order to ensure cost effectiveness. These encourage a focus on producing
quantifiable outputs rather than outcomes (Humphreys and Pease 1992; Raynor and
Miles 2007). Cost effective practice is prioritised over the quality of work done with
the probationer. In practical terms, enforcement and breach are prioritised over
securing compliance. The officer below describes the implications of target driven
practices and managerialist objectives:
How can we be equated to a business? ...we don’t have profits 
here and margins and losses. We are dealing with people. We’re 
dealing with people and we have targets and we have KPIs (key 
performance indicators) right? How can we equate that to people? I 
mean yeah, that’s what they tell us, but I got my own morals my 
own values and my own system as well and I know how I don’t 
want to be treated so I treat my people with the same due respect.
But yes, policy changes they’re changing again we got NOMs, 
now. To me it’s reinventing the wheel. We’re here with people. I 
know we need monitoring and I know we need risk assessment and 
I know we need lots of things, but lots of what we have Pam is not 
fit for purpose. OASYs I wouldn’t say it’s a joke but it’s just 
laborious and I wonder who put that together. You know, it’s not 
fit for purpose. We’ve got Charles Clarke who’s gone, we now 
have Reid [the then home secretary], I mean this is my own b**** 
here. I have been a member of the labour party all my life. But you 
know, they’ve just gone to the right and they’re sort of, to me as far 
as I am concerned, the policy changes are just about vote winning.
It’s about vote winning it’s not about people... POl IF
The quote demonstrates discontent with managerialist objectives, the bureaucratic
functions that affect the quality of supervision, and the perceived politicisation driving
populist yet inadequate policies. According to some of the officers, additional policy
provisions that affect practice include perceived deskilling; heavy case loads and the
increasing bureaucracy that are held to undermine the quality of supervision.
Contradictions are also posed by the requirement to demonstrate enforcement. There
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are prescriptive rules that are unresponsive to the realities of practice and also, there 
are limited enforcement options.
8.2.1: Deskilling
As mentioned in Chapter one, reflecting wider trends in criminal justice policy
making, the probation service has a statutory duty to work collaboratively with
external agencies and ancillary staff. The study examined the impact of these
developments on compliance and the officers’ comments reflected mixed views about
the implications of delegating the roles traditionally reserved for probation officers.
Some officers believed that this is necessary given the time constraints that impinge
on their work with probationers:
..with the drive towards partnership agencies we’ve actually got a 
lot of ways in which we can deal with that [obstacles to 
compliance]. Whereas if we had to do it all yourself there simply 
won’t be time...But if you’ve got somebody who’s got alcohol and 
accommodation and employment [problems] we’ve got 
partnership agencies that we can refer to address that as well as us 
... P03F
Delegation may also ensure that specialist care is available to the probationers 
although the quality of care provided by the external agencies is in some cases 
questionable:
I think it’s better now in the sense that various expertise that we 
had to try and master the whole lot and we couldn’t possibly do it.
Now you actually say well: ‘drug and alcohol go to that 
counselling agency’. Problem is we know it’s there but its hit and 
miss whether it’s functioning well enough really. But I mean it’s 
better than me trying to do it because I really don’t have the time...
P08F
Other officers rejected the increasing requirement to delegate to agencies and 
ancillary staff. They defined it as an element in the longstanding effort to erode the 
caring aspect of the officers’ role and to deskill probation officers.
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The officers decried the current arrangements in which officers increasingly find
themselves preoccupied with the bureaucratic and enforcement aspects of supervision:
... It’s changed so much from what it used to be. It’s more a case 
management role where, they come in; we refer them to other 
people. P02F
...my role is more and more monitoring people really....my role is 
getting less and less working with people it’s more overseeing 
it....when I trained you did the alcohol counselling, you did all the 
work really, programmes, one to one work. And it’s getting more 
and more specialised...so you’re just the case manager really 
overseeing it all... Some people get seen by the agencies so you 
don’t see them as much but what I find difficult is job satisfaction.
You are stuck in front of the computer doing lots of paper work 
whereas I’d rather be working face to face with people.
Do you think i t ’s important to he able to maintain that contact?
Oh yes I think it’s is otherwise you get distance from it and you 
lose your skills. P04M
The delegation of duties engenders discontinuity and it has been noted in Chapter six
that from the probationers’ perspective, this can affect supervision relationships and
ultimately compliance. Some probationers reported that having built a degree of trust
with one officer, they were often quite reluctant to invest their trust in a different
officer. The quote below reveals that the probationer failed to attend her appointments
for three months. She did not maintain adequate contact because her probation officer
was absent when she contacted the office and she did not wish to confide in anyone
else.
How did you breach in the three months?
I had a miscarriage ... I was seeing this boy in Cardiff, so I went 
up there for a couple of months cos me and my mum don’t talk, 
we’re so much alike we argue like cats and dogs we clash. So I 
went up there for a couple of months to sort my head out. So I 
moved back down here now. So I am back down here. So I come 
to probation. But I did phone up in December after it happened but 
[POl IF my probation officer] wasn’t here and I didn’t want to 
speak to anyone else. So I just left it and thought I’d come back in 
January ...P22F
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The reluctance to confide in a different officer in the absence o f her probation officer
appeared to escalate the violation and render her liable to breach action in court.
Furthermore, this reluctance can impinge on the quality of disclosure and undermine
the problem solving process. Some of the officers alluded to the possible links
between discontinuity and undermined levels of disclosure:
.. .1 wonder as well with compliance, ... .1 do wonder, I know what 
I would prefer, seeing the same person and I think if you come on 
a Wednesday you see session people and I think in the end you 
won’t wanna talk you just say yep, no... Cos it’s always a stranger 
you see when you come in, isn’t it? ...But I would imagine that if  it 
was me that would be an issue with compliance because I prefer to 
see my own offenders... P09F
How do you feel that affects motivation to comply where 
probationers have, see different (people)?
Very very badly. I think that’s where we lose a lot of people to be 
quite honest. Because we’re telling people, you’ve got to comply 
with this order, this is important, that’s important. So important 
that you won’t see the same person every week and you’ll be 
asked exactly the same questions. Because basically in that sort of 
emergency situation, you’re just monitoring risks. You’re not 
really getting to know that person or working on change. You’re 
trying to be a bit of a detective and work out what’s going on with 
their life to work out if he’s alright to be managed ...no matter 
whether if he’s gonna go off and stab somebody. I shouldn’t really 
say that but its true that does happen unfortunately and I really 
disagree with it. Unlike a lot of my colleagues, and I am not 
putting people down. I see all my own cases myself the majority of 
the time unless I am off ill, sick, training whatever. But if I’m 
training and I know I’m gonna be training, then I’ll rearrange so 
that my cases will see me on another day. And I found that by 
taking that approach even though it’s very stressful, its paid 
dividends in terms of building a relationship with people. Because 
I know that I will very much resent somebody telling me what I 
need to do with my life and how I need to change it particularly if I 
have only met them three times. P013F
... you need continuity. If you don’t get that continuity, usually it 
will have a negative impact and you will have a higher rate then of 
non-compliance.POl 5M
The quotes above also suggest that discontinuity can trigger non-compliance.
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8.2.2: Heavy caseloads
Large case loads also affect the quality of supervision and ultimately, compliance. 
Some of the officers stated that their large case loads and also, time constraints 
impinge on the level of contact with probationers thus undermining the quality of 
supervision:
It [the level of contact] is declining because of the fact that we’re 
forced to see everybody in three days of the week instead of five.
And like today there’s two of us needing the rooms and in fact if 
[UWOIF the unpaid work officer] gets anybody from the 
Community Punishment it’s going to be three of us needing the 
rooms and we’ve got case loads of a hundred and something to see 
in those three days. Therefore you’ve got to cut it down to half an 
hour sometimes if they’re nearly over their order, compliance is 
great and they’re near the stage where they’re going to discharge, 
you see them for five minutes, quarter of an hour, whatever, 
which I don’t like because I was first told (before I was a trainee 
actually I was a volunteer) it’s the squeaky wheels that get the 
most oil but it’s the quiet wheels that you need to worry about the 
ones that don’t seem to need the input otherwise they go off the 
rails ..I hate that I hate the fact that we have to cram it into three 
days a week...P07F
The new tiering system of supervision in which the probationers are categorised
across tiers based on levels of assessed risks as described in chapter one extends the
delegation of duties by empowering probation service officers to manage the cases
assessed as lower risk. Some of the officers reported that the restructuring of functions
in this manner may help to alleviate their heavy caseloads:
.... I did have about 30 odd people you know? I wasn’t managing 
very well then because I had too much work to do and I was only 
working part time. And so it’s not just managing people I was 
falling behind but sort of risk assessments and stuff. And so I did 
say you got to do something about that. But the tiering thing is 
coming in at the same time. So now I’ve got about 13 people 
instead, and [a probation service officer] has got the rest of the 
people still on my case load but she manages them so she liaises 
with me. POl OF
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In addition, the use of reporting centres to redress the problems posed by rising case 
loads was noted. In these centres the probationer is required to simply report and 
record their attendance. However, one officer believed that many probationers are 
discouraged to comply given that this type of supervision lacks any qualitative 
content:
Those who are working they don't wanna come here after work 
because they feel like they are not getting anything out of it. And a 
lot of the time they are not because nothing has been done with 
them because there's just no time. And that becomes difficult and 
they sometimes don't turn up...P02F
Such poor quality supervision whereby the probationer simply reports their attendance
may be prompted by large case loads. Whatever the cause, this type of supervision
may trigger non-compliance. For instance, P02M the probationer below describes his
experience of poor quality supervision:
But with [my previous probation officer]... it was like ..yeah yeah 
goodbye....you know? ..I used to go wow! Man! That just cost me 
six quid and like I travelled for ten times longer than I was here 
and that just seemed pointless. That is when it just seemed like 
they were just trying to p*** me off, just give me a dig, just put a 
bigger lump in my week really... P2M
The quote suggests that supervision lacking any perceivable qualitative content can be 
viewed negatively by the probationers. The probationers valued the opportunity to 
‘talk’ with their supervisor during supervision. As mentioned in the previous chapter 
this served as a major motivation to comply in many cases. Routine appointments 
simply to report or register their attendance denied them this opportunity. P07M 
below also introduced in the previous chapter cited the opportunity to ‘talk’ with his 
probationer officer as an important mechanism encouraging him to comply. 
Supervision appointments lacking this important mechanism are perceived to be 
unfair and unproductive:
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You don’t see [P06M-your probation officer] all the time?
No sometimes he’s got an appointment and stuff so I miss him 
now and then. But majority of the time I do see P06M.
Are you happy to see someone else? Does it make any difference?
Well it does if I can’t really sit down and talk to them like the way 
I do to P06M. I just go in there and they write me my next 
appointment and just see how I’ve been and stuff like that and 
that’s it.
So you prefer it when you come and you have a sit down with 
P06M  and talk things through?
[P06M- my probation officer] sort of plans my route out a bit. It 
helps me cos I have suffered with mental illnesses and stuff you 
know? After I came out of the army my head was up my a** you 
know? I weren’t really thinking straight and my marriage broke 
down and I did go the wrong way down the path like. But I sit 
down and try and talk to him about what I wanna do and just 
personal stuff and like I don’t feel like I can talk to the other 
people like that because I haven’t spent as much with them you 
know? P7M
The last quote above highlights the problem of discontinuity in supervision. This is 
linked to large case loads and the accompanying delegation of functions to ancillary 
staff.
8.2.3: Increasing bureaucracy
Another policy constraint that may impinge on practice is the rise in bureaucratic 
functions. The quote below by a female probation officer of 6 years experience 
demonstrates discontent with the bureaucratic functions that affect the quality of 
supervision.
I don’t sit comfortably with the policy changes. Making money the 
ethos is. I feel I’m a very poorly paid probation officer but a well 
paid administrator. I can be like this all day Pam, this is what 
irritates me. I’m here to work with people. And you know some 
days you’re sitting doing a report and somebody says oh! [a 
probationer’s] turned up and you almost feel irritated that you’ve 
gotta stop and I pull myself back and I say no, people come first.
Every single time they can wait, but we’re being tied more and 
more into this. This is becoming like big brother as well. But that’s 
how I feel I don’t sit comfortably with it at all. Yes we need to be 
looked at and yes we need monitoring and yes we need 
inspectorate but not driven by market forces, not driven by making 
profit, not driven by how can we make money. I don’t agree with
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it Pam at all, we are a public service not a business corporation...
POl IF
This view that contemporary policy changes have created a rise in bureaucratic 
functions that impinge on the levels of interactions was reiterated by other officers. In 
enforcement practice for instance, the officers are required to record their enforcement 
decisions. Further, the focus on risk management and public protection has been 
accompanied by the need to complete voluminous and sometimes convoluted 
assessment tools. According to some of the officers, the rise in bureaucratic functions 
impinges on practice because it exacerbates the problem of time constraints, leaving 
the officers with limited time to interact with their clients. Nevertheless, some of the 
officers strive to maintain contact:
... if  someone comes on like I got cases that are quite dependent on 
agencies, and if someone came here 3 o’clock in the afternoon on 
day that I am doing paper work, then I suppose it’s my nature to 
get up and see them if it was quite a serious problem... POl 5M
Not all officers are able to maintain adequate contact. In some cases, the case manager
loses contact almost completely. The only input would be where the need for
enforcement arises:
Are there probationers on your case load that you case manage 
but you don’t supervise on a regular basis...?
There are, not so many as before because the probation service 
officers now have their own cases. When somebody goes on a 
program, then I’ll case manage them until they come back off. I 
will see them at some points through the program. But from week 
to week basis then it will just be case management duties.
How do you feel about that?
... It’s very easy then to forget about them unfortunately. I just wait 
for an email telling you that they’ve, you know they’re in prison or 
whatever. But you know it is okay you gotta keep them in mind 
and you gotta meet up with them every so often. But it’s okay I 
mean as long as you got confidence in the group work that’s going 
on then you can quite happily pass them on to the program and 
then you have them back. PI 8M
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Added to the problems posed by the increasing levels of paper work, there is a
requirement to ‘demonstrate enforcement’. As such, the officers are monitored to
ensure that they comply with rigid enforcement rules. Below an officer describes the
rigidity of the enforcement framework:
I think from my perspective and my philosophy they’re trying to 
run it like a private business and its not. It's a public service we're 
not dealing with people who live normal lives, whatever normal 
lives is. A lot of people with chaotic lives. I think it seems to be 
getting really prescriptive and tick box, like we're dealing with 
robots or something. They will turn up on time, ... I know people 
who, if people are late they will breach them .... We have our 
notes monitored. There’ll be a comment there’s no proof but I 
record that I’ve accepted it. I could be overruled ...It is getting 
more prescriptive... P04M
It appears that the policy intention is that accountability in enforcement should be
achieved if  enforcement decisions adhere to strict National Standards and are duly
recorded. This implies that the policy focus is on monitoring the officers’ compliance
with the enforcement standards. The activities of the officers in engaging the client
and ensuring compliance are somewhat marginalised whilst enforcement becomes the
key policy focus. The officers below state that the monitoring exercises examine the
extent of compliance with the enforcement framework and not the extent to which the
officers successfully secure compliance:
Are you monitored by a senior probation officer?
We have audits as well we have certain audits that check on how 
we are complying with National Standards. POIM
Each month so many cases are checked and it will be checked but 
other than that no, it’s down to the officer really.
In checking those cases is the extent to which sending out breach 
letters or the extent to which you are able to successfully engage 
offenders. What’s the definition o f success?
It’s more...just a sample exercise where they check to make sure 
that letters were sent within time and things like that. P02F
Just as the monitoring exercises examine the extent to which the officers comply with
the enforcement standards rather than the extent of engagement, official performance
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audits report the rate and celerity of breach action (see for instance HM Inspectorate
of Probation, HM Inspectorate of Courts Administration and HM Inspectorate of
Constabulary 2007). The timeliness and rates of breach are held out as the indices of
effectiveness rather than the rates at which the officers are able to secure compliance
with community penalties. Whilst breach rates represent quantifiable outputs; the rates
of successful engagement represent outcomes that may not be readily amenable to
quantification. Furthermore, from an objective standpoint, enhanced accountability
should ensure standard enforcement practices. However, in actual practice, when
confronted with the reality that individual circumstances vary substantially, the
officers opt for ‘consistency in outcomes,xxxlv and not necessarily the ‘consistency in
treatment’xxxv envisaged by policy. The officer below articulates this by describing his
individualised approach to enforcement:
...you aim for consistency but it’s impossible to be totally 
consistent in your policy of approaching breach because different 
people have got different characteristics and different needs. Then 
you will go for a consistent outcome but then employ a variety of 
different methods. For one individual I may, if they don’t turn up 
I’ll just send them a letter. But if I know that someone generally 
does turn up, or if I know they’ve got difficult circumstances at 
that time, then I’ll phone them and find out what’s going on.
Aiming for consistency but then you know looking to 
accommodate their needs. And sometimes the sort of the person 
that you may at the beginning of the order send a warning letter to, 
towards the end of the order you’ve learned that they are reliable 
and therefore something unreliable may have happened so you do 
phone them in those circumstances. P18M
This underpins the individualised approach to enforcement alluded to by almost all
the officers. The approach is made possible by the use of professional discretion. It
underlies the caring role articulated by most of the officers and confirmed by the
probationers.
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Added to the perception that the current enforcement framework is prescriptive some
of the officers reported that a flexible approach that is responsive the needs of the
probationer is the more productive approach to enforcement:
I really do believe if you take a very authoritarian approach to 
people quite often you’re gonna to come to a brick wall.
That’s why I  am wondering about the current enforcement 
framework you know two strikes and you ’re out, I  don’t know how 
that would work with probationers...whether that’s an effective 
deterrent i f  at all?
I don’t think there’s anything to show that it is, do you see what I 
mean? I think all that does is just basically mask the problem up.
There’s only so long that can go on for anyway, everyone is gonna 
be locked up you know? P013F
So you are able to use your professional discretion?
That’s right yeah...and I think if people realise that we are not sort 
of hard-line, straight down the middle they’re much more willing 
to be compliant and engage with us..
So how do feel about your ability to define absences as acceptable 
or unacceptable...
I think I’m soft ha ha ha. There are times when I do sort of think to 
myself afterwards, should I have accepted that? But then when I 
look at the success rates with my orders I think this is working 
okay and as long as you retain a bit of flexibility....
How do you determine whether an absence is valid... ?
We give more leeway than, we obviously give more leeway than 
we should. If I stuck to the -if you’re not here within 15 minutes 
you get two warnings -you won’t get much of a caseload... P07F
Further exacerbating the problems posed by the prescriptive rules and the demands to
demonstrate enforcement is the new policy prohibiting the use of disciplinary
breaches. This was introduced during the study. The new policy provides that
additional or more onerous requirements should be imposed during sentencing for
breach (CJA 2003). According to some of the officers, the more punitive response to
breach intended by the new policy may become counterproductive. This is because it
is likely to engender further unpredictability given that the probationers who have
been unable to comply with their orders would become encumbered with even more
onerous requirements:
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There are now new provisions restricting the court's decision in 
breach cases how do you feel that will affect compliance...?
... I think it makes it much harder for people to comply because it’s 
imposing more restrictions on people who are already struggling 
with what they’ve got ...I was happier when we were able to ask 
the court to give a warning or a fine. P08F
What do you think the courts will go for now more with the new 
CJA?
Additional requirements to start it off until they see that it won’t 
work because they’ll be having them back again. P07F
These predictions highlight the possible implications of the new arrangements. If the
courts resort to revocations and resentence as predicted, more probationers may
become vulnerable to custodial sentences, particularly those probationers serving the
higher tariff orders. The officers below highlight this:
Was custody a likely option [following disciplinary breach]?
Not unless somebody had been quite persistent in their lack of 
contact with us and really seemed to be not engaging at all. But to 
get to the point of custody I think we’ve got to look at the types of 
offenders as well ... If a high risk offender breached then it 
probably would be more likely to happen. After April the fourth 
[2005] with the new CJA [2003] I think people will be finding their 
feet a bit with breach because they [the courts] have to take some 
action now they can’t just not do anything. They have to sentence 
somebody to something and I think then may be that might have a 
sort of knock on effect of making custody more likely... P05F
How do you feel about the loss o f  the ability to take disciplinary 
breach action?
Well you’re gonna end up with a lot more people going to prison I 
think and getting more community punishment you know, they’re 
struggling through community punishments already and they’re 
getting more hours. P04M.
Thus the officers believe that the new enforcement arrangements may make non-
compliance more likely and may also render more probationers vulnerable to a
custodial sentence for non-compliance
8.3: Situational contradictions: the unpredictability of clients
Added to the high rates of absenteeism reported by the probationers, another factor 
that highlights the extent of unpredictability displayed by the probationers is the rate
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at which the officers commence initial activation of the enforcement process (sending 
a final warning letter following an absence). This somewhat illuminates the extent of 
absenteeism:
... We send warning letters all o f  the time. So it happens every week... P02F
Have you ever sent warning letters?
Yes, yeah, yeah, I  do frequently... P07F
At an early stage of the study it became apparent that the officers found the question 
‘have you ever sent a warning letter’ laughable given the frequency of this practice: 
Yeah ha ha ha every weekl POl IF 
Yes I  have, bucket loads... P015M 
Yes ha ha, loads! P018M
Oh yeah pretty regularly I  done one this morning... P016M
Ha ha yes! But I  have withdrawn lots o f  them though because obviously you send the 
warning letter and then they get a week then to explain to you. I  usually give them an 
appointment within a week's time anyway so I  do withdraw lots o f them anyway. 
POl OF
The last quote above indicates the ease with which the early stages of enforcement 
can be deactivated. This is explored in more detail further below.
Given the high rates of absenteeism, it became apparent that the next stage after the 
initial violations by the probationers would be the reaction of the officers to these 
violations. The processes of reacting to violations were conceptualised as ‘confronting 
unpredictability’. This is because the probationers have revealed a degree of 
unpredictability evident in the tendency to violate the formal rules.
The officers internalise the unpredictability of the clients. Apart from frequent 
absenteeism, incidents of total absconsion also fuel this internalisation.
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One o f the officers cited the example o f three o f his clients who have absconded:
... I’ve got at least three [probationers] where there are warrants 
outstanding ...these warrants have been outstanding for three 
months...I have this suspicion they’ve left the country... I found 
that since I moved down here from England that because we are 
right next to the port from Ireland, southern Ireland that’s where 
they go. That’s where I think the last two have gone. POIM.
Thus, complete absconsion and high levels of absenteeism contribute to the
internalised unpredictability. Added to these are the incidents of frequent absenteeism
I witnessed during the attempt to recruit probationers for the study.
In the previous chapters I described some of these experiences. Another example
concerns my effort to interview P5F a female probationer serving her order for theft
offences. She is a heroin dependent probationer receiving a rehabilitative course of
methadone. On several occasions I attended her probation office in order to interview
her on her appointment date but she failed to make her appointments for reasons
ranging from forgetfulness due to her chaotic lifestyle, to the inability of her officer to
ascertain her whereabouts. Another example pertains to the case of a probationer who
failed to attend his appointment. His officer’s remarks cited below demonstrate the
extent to which the officers internalise the unpredictability of their clients:
So the person I  am going to see is it a female or male 
probationer...
Oh the one that hasn’t turned up, it was a male...
Do you think he will still turn up?
He’s a half an hour late I don’t think so...
What do I  do then? Is he on a weekly or a monthly?
Weekly I think because the thing is he’s not my offender, I’m 
seeing him on behalf of somebody else, and what I will do now is 
rearrange for him to see somebody else instead of me...so he is on 
weekly but I know next week he’s starting the program next 
Thursday if he does what he’s supposed to do today you 
know?...he’s half an hour late so I don’t have great expectations 
for him really... P 12F
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The quote above reveals the uncertainty with which the officer discusses the 
possibility that the probationer would attend the appointment. I decided to wait for 
the probationer but he failed to turn up for his appointment. This scenario almost 
became the routine in my efforts to recruit the probationers into the study. Many 
probationers scheduled to be interviewed on their appointment date did not attend 
their appointment and the interviews had to be rescheduled. Their officers 
demonstrated little or no optimism about their likelihood of attending on that day or 
on other appointment dates.
Therefore, given this unpredictability, I hypothesized that the officers recognise that 
they are working under conditions of consistent unpredictability displayed by 
probationers.
8.4: Internalising unpredictability- the role of typologies
In examining the factors that affect how the officers react to rule violations, it 
emerged that having internalised the unpredictability of their clients, the officers 
devise typologies of probationers based on expected compliance patterns. These 
typologies are mainly in terms of demographic attributes namely, the nature of the 
offence, the degree of involvement in substance misuse and the age of the client. For 
some officers, these attributes are linked to degrees of motivation.
8.4.1: The nature o f the offence
Some of the officers pointed to offence type related compliance, suggesting that those 
serving their orders for specific offences (sex offences and drink driving offences) are 
more likely to comply with their orders. The noted difference in the compliance 
patterns of probationers serving their orders for drink driving offences or for sex 
offences may be linked to the demographic attributes of these groups of probationers. 
They are more likely to be employed and their social orientation is more given to
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compliance than other groups o f probationers. The officers below describe their
compliance patterns.
People who commit certain offences are more compliant. Sex 
offenders are more complaint cos they’re usually adults...older and 
not offenders as in dishonesty offences...So they’re sort of 
employed and their lives usually aren’t like our usual cons...
P04M
The most compliant are sex offenders, are drink drivers and 
women generally are more compliant and older men.... the sex 
offenders on the whole they span society as you know it’s not a 
class crime really. On the whole they are older as well and they are 
frequently more intelligent and although the sex offenders they 
turn up for probation, their non-compliance takes the form of 
manipulating you. They do what they need to do to get by ... they 
will turn up if they have to but their non-compliance is often just 
sitting there and not responding to you but they turned up so what 
do you do, you know? P017F
The last quote also suggests that those serving their orders for sex offences are more
likely to demonstrate technical compliance.
8.4.2: Degree o f  involvement in substance misuse
For some of the officers, the substance misusing probationers were the group most 
likely to violate their orders. Below the officers describe the groups categorised in 
this typology:
Main causes [of non-compliance]? Alcohol misuse and drug 
misuse those can just sort of detach people. They just become sort 
of oblivious to coming in here. ... I’ve sent people to [substance 
misuse rehabilitation] to have counselling and they’ve had one 
session and that’s enough. They’ve done an assessment and they 
don’t want anymore even though the [substance misuse 
rehabilitation] counsellor is saying: I need to see you again. But 
they just don’t wanna end up complying with that. And sometimes 
what we see as a problem they don’t see as a problem... P015M
The link between substance misuse and non-compliance was traced to the chaotic
lifestyles it engenders.
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8.4.3: Age
Most of the officers did not perceive significant gender differences in rates of 
compliance or violations. It was acknowledged that any gender-related discrepancy in 
compliance rates can be attributed to the greater representation of male probationers 
on probation. Meanwhile, the younger probationers were categorised as being 
typically non-compliant. The officers below illustrate this:
... I mean probably you’re probably looking at over 30 are a bit 
more compliant. People I’ve had who are over 40 have generally 
been compliant and I haven’t supervised a large number of women 
because you know the nature of the job you generally do get very 
small ...proportions of female offenders and again a female 
offender who’s been sentenced who’s a mature woman is generally 
reliable in terms of compliance and when you get to the 18 and 25 
year olds then it’s difficult to know. P018M
We very rarely find that many differences between the male and 
female offenders in their attendance and compliance. P07F
The officers traced the link between age and compliance to several factors: the
younger probationers are less able to maintain the degree of structure required for
routine appointments, they are less likely to display consequential thinking or to
assume responsibility for their actions and the experience of less onerous reporting
requirements or enforcement practices within the Young Offending Teams. According
to most of the officers, the older clients tend to be more compliant particularly
because they are at a stage in their lives where they feel they need to make a change.
This serves as a motivational factor:
The older clients I think have got to an age where they know that 
they can’t go on and it’s become, not necessarily that they have 
become better people it’s just that they have got more of an 
understanding of what they need to do to survive to get by. So its 
turn up for probation becomes a survival mechanism and not 
getting into more trouble. And they’ve got families and they’re 
older and wiser...POl 9F
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The probationers aged over 30 were more likely to indicate that they were at a stage
of their lives where they quite motivated to make positive changes. P6F below is a
female probationer already cited earlier. She was serving a Combination Order for
violence and she stated that:
I think it’s a bit easier actually, maybe because I am older...I’ve 
got more patience. Whereas when you’re younger you’re just like:
‘do we have to be here you know?’ it’s just attitude, that attitude is 
gone because I’m older now... I’ve actually said I’m not going 
back to court anymore...Because I’m getting to old for all this 
malarkey, I’m getting too old for it, I’m bloody 38 for ...sake and 
it’s like I need to put my life in a different direction you know?
I’ve got myself a new fella even though we have our arguments 
because of drinking. But on the whole we got a very good 
relationship and it’s nice for a change you know? My life is a lot 
happier than it’s ever has been, you know? P6F
Thus, the older probationers aged thirty and over were more likely to report that they
felt ready to make a change in their lives and desist from offending. As such, they
were also motivated by this decision to attend their appointments.
8.5: Level of motivation
Some officers pointed out that compliance is closely linked with the self-motivation to
comply. The quote below by a male probation officer illustrates this:
...We’ll find that you will get the same the same difficulties if that 
particular person isn’t committed or ready to be involved in that 
kind of order....I think they say they vote with their feet is that one 
of the phrases? They would not attend ...POIM
Officers emphasising the link between levels of motivation and compliance were
more pessimistic about the rehabilitative potential of supervision.
...do  you think that rehabilitation is an aim that can be achieved 
at all?
I think they can be but it depends on their motivation at the time 
it’s not gonna work for everybody. There those that it does work 
for yes. P02F
According to this group of officers, with the unmotivated client, the best you can 
achieve is ‘technical’ compliance as described below:
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...a lot of them say they will comply at PSR stage cos they'll do 
anything to stay out of prison. Then once they've actually got the 
order they'll think well f*** I don't wanna be here. I don't wanna 
do that. Particularly those who have been found guilty at trial they 
don't even think that they should be punished so that could be a 
problem. I've had people on probation who don't think they've 
done anything wrong and they can be incredibly difficult to deal 
with....some of them are hostile. Some of them are just incredibly 
withdrawn. They don't want to engage properly, they just grunt in 
answer to a question ... P03F
The difficulties posed by the unmotivated client did not alter the officers’ efforts to 
encourage compliance in these cases. As in other cases, the officer offer incentives, 
attempt to address obstacles, and offer more flexible enforcement processes to ensure 
compliance.
8.6: The criteria for flexible enforcement
It emerged at an early stage of analysis that flexible enforcement is more likely where
both parties have had a degree of interaction (usually through supervision). The quote
below demonstrates this.
... if I’ve got a working relationship with the offender and it’s good 
normally and he comes in and says I can’t evidence but and I 
know that there’s an 80% element of truth in what he’s saying, I’ll 
take that risk and accept it yeah they can sack me if they want to...
P016M
Furthermore, on the basis of their interactions with the probationers, the officer makes
a personal assessment of the trustworthiness, circumstances and general characterises
of the probationer.
We know people and we are professionals...We know people who 
are not compliant and people who have missed for genuine reasons 
...you do learn who's not complying, who's trying to pull the wool 
over your eyes or stuff like that you do know the people you work 
with... P04M
Thus, flexibility is more likely where a relationship has been established and also 
where the officer is assured of the trustworthiness of the probationer. In these cases,
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the officers are more likely to believe that the excuse provided is genuine. The quotes
above also suggest that factors such as the probationer’s past compliance record may
also affect enforcement decision making:
...I can’t remember where I read it; it’s in one of the books we’ve 
got. But the best predictor of future behaviour is past behaviour. I 
think basically that’s what we have to go on. So I will sort of 
check what their response has been like. If they’ve had previous 
orders, look at response to supervision in the past. To try and get 
an idea of is this person trying to pull a fast one? Can I accept this 
reason? P014M
Other personal circumstances also influence enforcement decision making. For 
instance, the officers consider the mental stability of their clients when making 
enforcement decisions. They are unwilling to breach probationers with mental health 
problems:
I made a decision the other day not to breach based on the person’s 
stability. They were quite unstable and I think to take someone 
back to court at that stage would have been you know...I mean 
there were mental health issues. Her children had been taken away 
she was trying to sort of come to grips with a lot of things in her 
life and to actually breach at that point, I think would have 
probably tipped the balance, you can lose someone. But as it is 
now, I didn’t breach. I got some sort of input from that person.
Now they are working with us. P015M
Here the decision not to enforce the order was based on the belief that breach would
impinge on the ability to successfully secure compliance. Securing compliance was
prioritised over enforcement.
Having examined the structural and situational factors that affect how the officers 
react to violations, the section below explores how the officers overcome these 
contradictions in order to secure compliance.
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8.7: Managing structural contradictions: client centred strategies
It has been noted in the wider literature that since the 1980s the changes to
contemporary probation policy have been characterised by the shift from welfarism to
correctionalism (Raynor and Vanstone 2002). This did not appear to affect the
efforts of the officers to secure compliance. Although the officers acknowledged the
impact of correctionalist policy trends such as the focus on risk management and the
prescriptive enforcement rules, most relied on a client centred approach to securing
compliance. This was mainly in the form of individualised responses to violations.
The informal rules devised by the officers facilitated a more responsive approach to
encouraging compliance. Further, there was an articulated preference for building
and sustaining positive working relationships as part of the effort to encourage
compliance. This was considered by the officers to be more productive than applying
rigid enforcement rules. The quote below provides an example:
I like having the discretion because I don’t want to breach people 
unless I have to breach people because I don’t think it’s very 
useful...I just like to try to sort of get some sort of relationship 
going with people and try and help them make the changes that 
they need and so there’s not that many that I’ve had to sort of 
breach really. PI OF
Similarly some officers described their role in welfarist terms differentiating it from
other criminal justice agencies that have been traditionally associated with an
enforcement ethos namely, the police and the prison services. Below an officer trained
in the new style correctionalist approach describes his role:
We do assess risk a lot but everything about reducing the 
offending is good for an individual who is on an order because if 
they are reducing their own reoffending then they are building up a 
productive and prosocial life style. I do try and convey that.
Rather than just say you are in breach we are gonna get you. I’m 
not here as a prosecuting agency or as part of a prosecuting 
agency; I’m here for the individual. P018M
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Added to these, the data revealed how the officers ensure that their enforcement 
functions do not impinge on their relationship with their clients. They do so by 
adopting a projected role. This role serves the purpose of preserving the welfarist or 
caring image of the officer in a punitive policy climate. It may also preserve 
relationships given that they encourage the probationers to view their officers as 
reluctant but mandated to pursue the control aspect of their role. The tendency for 
probationers to accept this projected role has been noted above. Below, an officer 
describes how this role is communicated:
...to be honest, sometimes I actually want to pass the buck. I say 
well, the court says we have to breach you after two. I like to not, 
but the court says we have to. And sometimes I’m not trying to 
protect myself but I think that’s useful in allowing them to try and 
have a relationship with me without it tainting cos we might 
have had quite a good relationship ..I have to breach you, they can 
understandably be a bit snippy but I find if you can kind of push 
the breach over to someone else, then you can try and get your 
relationship back on track. P09F
It has been shown in Chapter six that the projected role achieves its intended
outcomes. This is because the probationers acknowledged the control aspect of the
officer’s role. So far, it also appears that despite the policy attempt to re-define their
role in correctionalist terms, to secure compliance or to engage the client, the officers
would tend to prioritise a caring role.
8.7.1: Responsiveness and flexibility
The caring ethos is reflected in the compliance strategies many of the officers employ. 
These are designed to address the obstacles to compliance. The strategies include 
listening to problems and encouraging disclosure as part of the problem solving role, 
making referrals to relevant agencies in order to address substance misuse problems, 
accommodation difficulties and unemployment. Further there are organisational 
provisions for reimbursing travel costs and in some offices, for child care provision.
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The officers also make home visits to alleviate child care and travel difficulties, offer 
reminders to ensure compliance, offer flexible appointments to accommodate the 
needs of probationers with chaotic lifestyles or other problems and devise flexible 
enforcement practices that are designed to accommodate unstructured lifestyles and 
other presenting difficulties that impinge on compliance.
These compliance strategies have been conceptualised as representative of the caring
ethos because the officers are not mandated to implement all these compliance
strategies. Indeed several officers reported that they tended to responsibilise the
probationer. The latter approach places the responsibility for compliance entirely on
the probationer. In such cases the officers are unwilling to make home visits or to
offer reminders as part of a comprehensive compliance strategy:
I wouldn’t normally phone because at the end of the day any order 
made between the court and the offender is between them. We 
don’t make the order, we stand back and we supervise it. So it’s 
actually the offender’s responsibility to comply. By constantly 
phoning and chasing people you’re actually removing that 
responsibility from them and that then in my opinion makes the 
order less onerous. They are on a Community Order for 
committing an offence. So they’ve committed an offence against 
the laws of society So therefore part of the consequences is that 
they know what their order is about, they know they have to 
comply, and that is their responsibility. So I see probation as a job 
with two hats: one of a social aspect and one of enforcement...
P014M
The current National Standards (published after the interviews) encourages the 
officers to adopt compliance strategies such as reminders or home visits (NOMS 
2007a). The standards operative at the time of the study, were silent on this issue 
(National Probation Service 2002). At the time of the study, most of the officers 
reported that they would make home visits as additional compliance strategies. For 
instance; the officer below reported that home visits can be vital for ensuring 
compliance:
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... I have thought it’s risky but I felt I had to go out because people 
are not gonna come in... PI OF
Although, most of the officers reported that they make home visits to follow up an
absence, it appeared that the use of home visits as a compliance strategy is limited to
specific cases. It is not an automatic response to an absence. Therefore, for some
officers this is a compliance strategy that is used in specific circumstances:
I f  they miss an appointment will you make a home visit to find out 
why?
Yes I mean yes with the lady last week this happened I actually 
went on a home visit to find out a little bit more. And yeah, I mean 
I’ve used home visit after missed appointments. I mean sometimes 
I haven’t used home visit after a missed appointment. But I mean 
circumstances, different circumstances. P015M
Home visits are also used to alleviate reporting difficulties:
... I have used the home visits one yeah. For people who find it 
very difficult to come in I’ll say if you come in 4 times I’ll come 
round and once very fifth appointment I’ll come out and you know 
generally that would work. P02F.
Travel is a biggy round here as well. I mean people from (...) 
which must be 20 miles...30 miles away, and the bus service is not 
very regular here. So you will take into account... People live out 
in the countryside and if they don’t drive, or they are banned from 
driving you can’t force them to. So you know you drive out, home 
visits... P04M
Home visits may be used to follow up absences where the officer is particularly 
concerned about the probationer. In one case, a home visit to follow up an absence 
proved to be a life saving act:
If he [PIM - her probationer] suddenly disappears that usually 
raises alarm bells as to what sort of emotional state he’s in. So he 
did it last week where he didn’t come in and we went and did a 
home visit and it turned out he’d actually taken an overdose the 
previous night. So in those sort of cases we would actually, 
because there are concerns as to his emotional health. P03F
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Below, the probationer in question (P1M) recalls this incident. To him, the action of
the officer represents a manifestation of the caring approach that prevails in current
supervision practice.
I missed the appointment but I mean they actually came down to 
see whether I was alright. So I was quite, (I mean that didn’t used 
to happen in the old days you know? Nobody turn up) and that 
made me feel like wow! Hang about there is hope here. They do 
care. I think that’s the difference nowadays I think people do care 
and they show it a lot more. Maybe they cared in the past I don’t 
know but it’s shown more now... P1M
On an organisational level, the probationers are reimbursed for part of their travel
costs although the officers pointed to the limited provision for reimbursements.
...it (travel expenses) can be a problem, we can refund bus fares I 
think we can I mean they’re tightening up on the budget all the 
time. At the moment I think we can still refund bus fares. Some of 
our people live miles from a bus stop even that’s very difficult.
Sometimes we can do home visits. That’s frowned upon though...
P08F.
Added to making home visits, some officers contact their clients to remind them of 
their appointment in order to ensure compliance particularly where the probationer 
has established difficulties. The officer below describes this process:
Do you call them to remind them?
Yes there are few people we actually call to remind ...We don’t 
ring many of them to remind them but if absolutely necessary we 
will especially if they got other issues going on in their lives as 
well. P07F
Some of the officers reported that they do not contact the probationers to remind them 
of their appointment. One reason is the responsibilisation discussed above. Another is 
the possibility that telephone reminders cannot serve as adequate evidence in the 
event of a contested breach. Added to the use of reminders, the officers may also 
offer flexible appointments to alleviate reporting difficulties.
Flexible appointments are mainly used to counter the problems posed by chaotic 
lifestyles that are fuelled by substance misuse or to alleviate problems posed by
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childcare difficulties. The officers below describe the flexibility permitted in cases
such as these:
...we try to arrange appointments...time of day that is best of them.
So if people have to take medication maybe first thing in the 
morning, we arrange it for later on. Some people just can’t 
function in the morning whereas other people would rather come 
in before they start drinking... P2F
Do all probationers have that (flexible appointments)?
If they’re chaotic and unwell through their alcohol or drug use we 
will sort of use that, if they’re here we will see them and that’s it 
and we also tend to be a bit flexible by whether it’s a Monday or a 
Wednesday and sometimes they turn up they’re supposed to be 
here on Friday and they turn up on Monday and you can’t send 
them away and say come back Friday. You can sometimes, 
depends on how busy you are. If there’re rooms available you’ll 
see them and I suppose it’s not really great for engendering 
compliance according to instruction yeah but at least its 
compliance in that they know they’re gonna do something if they 
come into the office . But if they come in and they’re actually off 
their faces on alcohol or drugs we turn them away. P07F.
...you have to be aware of school holidays coming up and how 
you’re going to get round that. It just takes a bit of planning...
P08F
In sum, reminders and flexible appointments are used encourage compliance although
mostly for probationers with chaotic lifestyles or whose involvement in substance
misuse have affected their ability to lead structured lives. The probationers
acknowledge these efforts. For instance the probationer below has been involved in
substance misuse for over 40 years. She describes the efforts her officer makes to
ensure compliance:
Have you told P05F about the difficulty o f  getting up in the 
morning?
Yeah she knows that, she tries to make the appointments for the 
afternoon. She’s very good. She knows that I do have difficulties 
of like getting up in the morning... P5F
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Another probationer discusses the use o f reminders:
Does anyone in the office do they do anything, do they remind you 
or..?
Yeah they phone me up and all and send me letters out cos before 
some of my letters were going missing from where I used to live 
and just... that’s why I phone them now and I say what day do you 
what me in? And they tell me and...You know its better like that.
P12M.
Just as flexible appointments are used to accommodate specific needs in order to
ensure compliance, fixed appointments are made in specific cases for the same
reasons. For instance, P03F’S client below reports that the fixed nature of his
appointments makes it possible for him to attend his appointments:
How does [your probation officer] help to make sure that you 
attend your appointments?
.. .normally I would just turn up on Tuesdays at eleven o’clock. Its 
Tuesday’s eleven o’clock every week which is quite good. I could 
keep that in my mind you see? Tuesday eleven o’clock I know 
where I gotta be. That’s good, that’s one thing...They never 
changed my times about. They always keep my time. They always 
keep it at eleven o’clock which is good; cos I wouldn’t get here 
otherwise I just wouldn’t... P1M
The probationers’ quotes highlight the importance of reminders in specific cases.
An additional means of overriding the punitiveness intended by policy is the
formulation of more flexible informal rules using professional discretion. This
constitutes a fundamental aspect of the officers’ reactions to violations. The officers
reported that without the discretion to introduce a degree of flexibility in enforcement,
breach rates will escalate to unmanageable proportions. This important compliance
mechanism is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
Meanwhile, the quotes above reveal how the officers ensure that they remain 
responsive to the potential obstacles to compliance in order to ensure compliance. The 
quotes also suggest that the compliance strategies are subject to each officer’s 
discretion. Further they suggest that in the care/control dualism characterising the
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probation officers’ role, a caring approach prevails. The quote below encapsulates the 
philosophical approach many officers adopt:
...my philosophy [is] I want people to get through the order and 
that is why...I phone them up if they miss an appoint to see why...
P04M
The finding that many probation officers utilise these compliance strategies indicate a
more caring approach to securing compliance and a desire to ensure that the
probationers are able to complete their orders. In all, the officers reported that an
approach to securing compliance that is responsive to the needs of the probationer
particularly those needs that affect compliance, is more productive than the strict
policy framework. The quotes below also support this finding:
....I mean the whole point, the reason people get into trouble is 
that they have, well one of the reasons is the difficulties in their 
lives and so to reduce the risk of re-offending you’ve got to look at 
those areas and work on them... you’ve got to take things a stage at 
a time and look at the priorities but you can’t expect people to do 
huge amounts of work while they’ve got lots of practical 
difficulties that are really worrying them... P08F
...we acknowledge like the Offender Manager side that individuals 
have lives of stress and you’re sort of trying to understand where 
that person is in their lives. Especially if they’re homeless.
Probation might not feel a priority for them when they’re like 
trying to find somewhere to sleep. It’s like trying to get the right 
balance which is hard but you sort of do it ...you’ve got guidelines 
but you’re sort of flexible according to the individual’s needs...
P019F
The unpaid work officer below also subscribed to this view that being responsive to
needs is more productive than strict enforcement:
I think that obviously there’s an element of punishment but if 
you’re not trying to address the reasons behind someone’s 
offending or the reasons behind them worrying or being stressed 
and committing their crimes, then all you’re going to be doing 
really is shutting the door after the horse is gone really aren’t you? 
every time, and its not going to improve their situation. They’re 
probably going to go on to re-offend. So if you could do anything
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while they’re on community service to help then I think that’s 
probably great...
Do you think then that the warning letters and breach are effective 
in making them complaint or do think an alternative approach is 
required in terms o f  getting them to comply?
I would say probably alternative approaches are required if they are 
attending their [substance misuse rehabilitation] appointments that 
helps a lot. ...Emm I have had one male and a female hard drug 
user both of whom, one had his order revoked and was re­
sentenced and he just wasn’t attending his lifestyle is chaotic and 
he’s now on rehabilitation. The female is currently in a Spanish 
prison in Tenerife... UWOIF
In sum the officers’ reactions to violations are flexible, individualised and responsive
to individual needs.
8.8: Managing situational contradictions: client centred strategies
Several theoretical frameworks guide practice but the basis of practice is client 
oriented and the aim is to secure the successful engagement of the client. Most of the 
officers reported that they tend to apply an ‘ eclectic,XXXV1 mix of skills and theories in 
practice.
I suppose we’re asked to be fairly eclectic about the approach we 
take. So that if you had someone say, who their problems were 
more of a psychological kind, say I mean the issues are 
relationships maybe domestic violence, sex offending, arson, 
offending where there is perhaps quite a strong kind of 
psychological component then we would take that kind of 
approach with someone. Whereas if  the issues are much more 
kind of budgeting or kind of practical things and personal 
management then you wouldn't necessarily kind of be looking to 
analyse their personality and behaviour in that sort of way. I mean 
cognitive behavioural approach is the one that is kind of in at the 
moment but I certainty wont rule out intuition as being important 
because I think sometimes you can get a feeling about somebody 
when you meet them. You know that there's kind of more to it or 
there’s something that kind of alerts you to something else...
P06M
Below another officer reiterates the above point:
I don’t think any one theory really underpins my own approach.
And I think that’s because there as so many theories out there you 
can think of. By the time you finish the probation theory and by 
the time you get into the job, all the theories are kind of like a
217
mash in your mind and you do kind of pick little bits and draw on 
certain things and I’m really not sure if there’s one thing that I can 
pick out... P018M
Though influenced by wide ranging theoretical frameworks, most of the officers
reported that establishing a good working relationship is the most productive
approach. It should underlie the effort to successfully engage the probationer:
Forget about motivational interviewing yeah? A lot of it is hot air.
At the end of the day you’ve got to build relationships that’s all it 
is. They can teach you all the techniques in the world. I’m sure 
you know about motivational interviewing...So all the training in 
the world is great but unless that person likes you and they’ve got 
to like you, then they’re not gonna work with you unless they feel 
appreciated... P017F
Another officer echoes this:
I say again and I am quite convinced, the longer I do this job the 
more important I see that it is. No matter what is spilled out to us 
from government, no matter what they keep changing, with ‘what 
works’, with marketing us, that I think is horrendous, whatever 
works is my relationship with these people. It’s how we set off 
from day one. But I am human, I do listen to them, I will give 
them scope within the parameters of what I think is acceptable, but 
I think it’s the relationship Pam, and motivating them, motivating 
them... POllF
Below another officer emphasises the importance of developing relationships in order 
to secure compliance:
How do you encourage compliance... ?
...it’s about trying to develop a good working relationship with 
them from the very beginning so that they feel that there’s actually 
some point to them coming here. P03M
The quote below encapsulates the approach endorsed by most of the officers:
What do you think are the most important, the most productive 
ways o f  motivating compliance?
Engaging, engaging with them getting alongside them. It’s no 
good hitting somebody with a big stick because they’ve had that 
all their lives. It like a dog, you hit a dog, you kick a dog, 
eventually it will bite you. You have to get down to their 
emotional level and they have to see that you’re there. It doesn’t 
mean that you have to befriend them and be one of them. In fact 
that’s the furthest thing from my mind actually but by doing that
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they automatically warm to you. They see you as a professional 
person with an awful lot of authority being able to open doors and 
being able to talk to them in their language and then talk to other 
people in their language and then convey the message I think that’s 
the strength in probation. And to come in and not have that 
engaging process is dangerous and I think that’s one of the skills 
lacking in training if I’m honest. I think that they do it on site 
straightaway. I remember when I did my training we did 
counselling skills, managing aggressive behaviour skills; these are 
hands on training before you even met that client do you know 
what I mean? And so you went out feeling confident you know?
But I really believe that, my style of working and we all do 
differently ...first of all is to be honest and never deviate from 
your honesty even if it’s saying something that’s not very pleasant 
for somebody to hear. It’s about being honest; it’s about being 
respectful of them. You have to respect them. They’re entitled to 
respect... P016M
It appears that from the officers’ perspective, a ‘good working relationship’ based on 
empathy, egalitarianism, honesty and respect is not likely to alienate the probationer 
and is considered the more effective approach. The officers are careful to ensure that 
appropriate boundaries are maintained. In Jersey, the views were similar. Describing 
his relationship with the probationers, JP02M a probation officer echoes the views of 
the other officers:
Its one of mutual respect. It’s not a friendship but it’s got to be a 
sort of good working relationship. It’s got to be one of trust. It’s 
got to be one of shared goals, its gotta be goals that are mutually 
agreed... JP02
Thus, the officers strive to develop good relationships in order to encourage 
compliance, whilst maintaining appropriate boundaries.
8.9: Conclusion
In the attempt to secure compliance, the officers’ actions are affected by several 
contradictions. To secure compliance, the officers strive to manage these 
contradictions. Central to this is the formulation of client centred strategies 
characterised by an individualised approach that is responsive to individual
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circumstances and maintaining good relationships. Thus, departing from 
managerialist objectives and the demands for standardised enforcement, the officers 
believe that an individualised and non-authoritarian approach that is also responsive 
to needs should ensure the successful engagement of the probationer to a greater 
degree than a standard punitive approach.
As noted earlier, the officers’ reactions to violations ultimately shape the nature of 
compliance. This chapter examined contradictions that affect how the officers react to 
violations in order to provide a contextualised understanding the officers’ actions; the 
next chapter explores the actual nature of the officers’ reactions and the links between 
the latter and compliance.
220
Chapter Nine: Confronting unpredictability: reactions to violations
9.1: Introduction
This chapter examines the actual processes of enforcing compliance with community 
penalties. In this chapter it becomes clear that compliance and enforcement are 
interwoven processes. This is because the activities of the officers in reacting to the 
unpredictability of their clients contribute to an understanding of the nature of 
compliance. The previous chapter explored how the officers manage several 
situational and structural contradictions in order to secure compliance. This chapter 
demonstrates how the officers utilise their professional discretion to formulate more 
responsive rules in order to secure compliance.
9.2: Situational contradictions: the unilateral definition of compliance
As already noted above, the standard definition of compliance applied in practice is a
unilateral one namely, attendance. This definition of compliance may encourage
technical compliance and the normalisation of forms of non-compliance. The officers
below define non-compliance:
...the standard failure to attend and that can have all different 
kinds of reasons to it acceptable or non... P016M
...not attending appointments without good reason and without 
providing evidence for that. ... Often it’s the non-attendance that 
ends up in court but that’s not the only thing... P019F
The same definition also applied in the Jersey probation service:
I think missing without contacting us for whatever reason and they 
might give a reason at a later date, but I find that that’s probably 
the basic one... JP03M
Perhaps one reason for this narrow focus is that as mentioned earlier, attendance rates
are easily quantifiable. The rates may then be held to represent the indices of
successful compliance unlike other more qualitative forms of compliance such as
successful engagement or securing the willing participation of the probationer.
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These forms of compliance are not as easily amenable to quantification. Furthermore, 
recorded attendance rates can be used to support breach prosecutions. These records 
may help to reduce the evidential burden in the event of a contested breach. The 
officers did point out that it may be difficult to adduce evidence to prove other forms 
of non-compliance such as a failure to engage in cases where the probationer contests 
breach action in court.
One possible implication of the unilateral definition is that it may encourage 
‘technical compliance’™™1 and the normalisation of other forms of non-compliance. 
Technical compliance occurs where the probationer fails to engage fully with the 
objectives of the order but only attends to fulfil the basic attendance requirements. An 
example can be seen in the case of P8F already mentioned above. Her officer P07F 
reported that although the probationer - P8F - had physically attended her
appointments and is as such was defined as compliant, P8F failed to adequately
engage with the work being done to effect change. Therefore, P8F’s attendance was 
tantamount to merely ‘physical’/technical compliance. The probationer concerned was 
re-interviewed in the follow up stage and she reported that she had fully complied 
with her order and was hopeful that her order would be revoked early for good 
behaviour. Describing her experiences of supervision so far the probationer -P8F 
states:
It’s been okay actually, it’s been really good because they are a 
great bunch anyway and they are really helpful.... it’s been good. I 
mean hopefully it’s going to be over soon. I think I am just about 
due for being discharged... P8F
However, according to her officer, P8F’s compliance record is tantamount to
‘technical compliance’. This can be differentiated from actually engaging and
fulfilling the terms of the order. The officer P07F illustrates this point:
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Compliance is attendance yes and actually engaging with the 
officer I suppose, but complete compliance obviously is 
addressing the needs, but as far as physical compliance is yeah 
she’s [P8F’s]been absolutely fine. P07F
I
The officers also cited other forms of technical compliance such as where the
probationer produces documentary evidence to support several absences even where it
is clear to the officer that there is no genuine reason for the absences:
...there is lady I was dealing with until a couple of months ago and 
she constantly phoned in this, that and the other. But she did 
manage to produce a lot of medical certificates which did surprise 
me. But I didn’t believe a lot of what she told me but then if 
they’re coming in with evidence you have to accept the evidence.
...P014M
Another officer provides an additional example of the degree of
manipulation encouraged by the unilateral definition.
There are other forms of non-compliance, as in not addressing 
your needs or putting barriers up to make sure that you can’t 
comply. Sometimes because we have to accept certain absences, if 
they are due to childcare issues, illness supported by a doctor’s 
note and things like working as long as your employer will speak 
to us or send us a letter on headed note paper stating that this is the 
case ...but you see we can’t count that as non-compliance because 
of the fact that they are evidenced. But there are some people that 
would use those issues and there are some people who would go 
into the doctors’...I need a sick note...they would give them one in 
retrospect...Technically its compliance. If we took it back to court 
of course they would challenge that and we couldn’t prosecute a 
breach.
How do you feel about that?
Sometimes it makes me cross because they are missing an 
opportunity; they really are missing an opportunity. P07F
The problem of technical compliance was also replicated in the case of probationer -
P13M. He was re-interviewed during the follow up phase and he reported that he had
been fully compliant.
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The probationer - P13M’s definition o f compliance was again restricted to attendance
or providing notification of an absence:
How do you comply then, what must you do to make sure you 
comply?
I turn up. I stick to all my time and dates I know when and what 
time I am supposed to turn up. If I can’t make it then I ring in 
advance and let [P08F- my officer] or whoever happens to be 
here know...
Apparently they can half it by so many months, but that depends. I 
think they will half it for the simple reason is I haven’t breached,
I’ve always turned up, I’ve done all they’ve asked so in all 
fairness I think I deserve half my months knocked off. If I had 
been breached for not turning up then I can understand for them to 
keep the full 18 months but I think it would be rather unfair for 
them to keep the 18 months on me considering I’ve been here 
every time...and I’ve come in like today to help you with your 
work. So I think in all fairness it will be nice if  they can knock my 
month. P13M
His officer disagreed with his assessment of his compliance record. She reported that
although P13M had fulfilled the attendance criteria, he had failed to adequately
engage with the rehabilitative objective of his order. Below P13M’s officer highlights
the extent of his compliance:
... As far as coming here is concerned, I think he’s okay when he 
comes in. He knows what he needs to do. His motivation isn’t 
always what I would like it to be. Sometimes I have to give him a 
bit of a motivational talking to really and he’s very ambitious, I 
don’t know how realistic his ambitions are and he will talk about 
what he could do...And it isn’t necessarily appropriate for keeping 
him out of trouble because we’ve done that bit of work but it will 
be nice to know that he was able to move on in life generally and I 
tried to get him to go to careers...I don’t think he has done it. Saw 
one of my colleagues who was an ex-careers officer who does 
some work with him and he seemed quite enthusiastic and then 
they asked him to come...as far as I am aware he hasn’t actually 
turned up. So you know, I think he’s gonna end up being in a bit of 
a rut in a couple of years time if he doesn’t make a move...
... Will he have an early termination?
Well I cannot do anything with him until he’s finished his UW.
There’s another at least 6 weeks for him to go. I will look at it in 
May. P08F
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From the foregoing it appears that the reliance on the reduced definition of 
compliance may produce forms of compliance that have been described as ‘technical 
compliance’. It may also engender the normalisation of other forms of non- 
compliance such as not engaging or failing to fulfil other requirements. Nevertheless, 
this the definition of compliance applied in practice. Reactions to violations are 
primarily reactions to absenteeism. Below is an examination of the actual processes of 
reacting to violations and the impact of the reactions on compliance.
9.3: The nature and extent of discretionary enforcement
A more standardised enforcement approach is prioritised by policy and the current
enforcement policy restricts discretionary enforcement. There are monitoring
exercises to ensure compliance with the National Standards during enforcement as
described below by an officer:
... the files are assessed on a sort of random basis each month, then 
compliance and the acceptability or unacceptability of absence 
would be one of the things that will be looked at... P03F
The objective of the exercise is to limit the amount of discretion available to the
officers. Notwithstanding these, it became apparent at an early stage of analysis that
the use of unofficial discretion traverses enforcement practices. The study sought to
understand the nature and extent of discretionary enforcement and how it may affect
compliance if at all.
9.3.1: Examining covert discretion
Unofficial discretion would necessarily entail a degree of covertness that is not readily 
amenable to empirical observation. My experiences during the initial stages of 
interviewing clearly demonstrate this. Here I will recount my experiences showing 
how I came close to overlooking what I initially dismissed as irrelevant but which 
subsequently appeared to be integral to an understanding of compliance.
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During the negotiations to gain access to conduct this study in the probation area in 
Wales, I met with a member of the management team to discuss my proposal. At the 
meeting, I explained that one of the underlying objectives of the study is to examine 
the possibility of covert discretionary enforcement given the restrictive enforcement 
provisions. As noted in chapter one, studies have shown the use of covert discretion 
during enforcement decision making to be a likely outcome of strict enforcement 
guidelines (see for example Vass 1990). The manager informed me that discretionary 
enforcement practices would be practically impossible given the high degree of 
monitoring to which the officers are subject. In her words, any use of unofficial 
discretion would be ‘picked up’ promptly by a senior officer/manager.
I entered the field convinced that the use of unofficial discretion would not form any 
important aspect of an inquiry into the nature of compliance. I deemphasized the 
importance of this concept although I remained faithful to the tenets of Grounded 
Theory and thus open to any possibilities that would be revealed by the data. In 
general, grounded theorists advise against a priori theorising or theorising ahead of 
the data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). This may prematurely foreclose your 
investigation and hence limit your ability to fully examine the phenomenon in 
question. Therefore by prioritising developments in the data over preconceived ideas 
or predetermined concepts, I was able to recognise the existence, extent and 
importance of unofficial discretion early in the study. This unravelled during my 
interviews with the probationers -  P1M and P2M -  the first two probationers 
interviewed. They reported several violations -attending under the influence of 
substances and missing appointments. These violations appeared to be overlooked 
with a degree of flexibility that appeared to surpass the degree permitted by the strict 
enforcement provisions.
226
With this finding in mind, I revisited the data generated from my interviews with the 2 
officers based in that office. The data yielded further insights into discretionary 
enforcement. Importantly the data demonstrated that although the 2 officers 
acknowledged the existence of wide discretion, they attempted to minimise its 
influence. This alerted me to the possibility that given the covert nature of unofficial 
discretion, more subtle questioning would have produced greater insights into its 
nature and the implications for compliance. I revised the interview schedules and my 
findings are discussed further below.
Meanwhile, here I have reproduced extracts from my interviews with the first officer
interviewed and his client. POIM, the first officer interviewed, suggested that he
would demand physical documentary evidence to support every absence. In
subsequent interviews, most of the officers reported that they would not usually
demand documentary evidence to support every absence. The officers rightly alluded
to the impractically of such an approach given that documentary evidence is not
always obtainable. Contrastingly, POIM above reported that he would demand
documentary evidence to support all absences. Below he describes the great lengths
he would go to in order to obtain such evidence:
...If you say fo r  example transport difficulties, how would you 
provide evidence o f that?
I guess that would difficult. It might be that we would phone, if it's 
a bus company and the offender says the bus didn't turn up until 
10.45 we'd phone the bus company and say did you have a 
problem? Do you mind us asking, did you have a problem with 
your bus for so and so? And if they are happy to answer then 
obviously that would support it... if  the offender's car breaks down, 
then we say: well were you recovered? Did it go in the garage?
Can you show us the bill? It's a very difficult one. It's about the 
offender. The responsibility is with the offender to provide the 
evidence. POIM
Meanwhile, the quote below was made by POlM ’s client. He contradicts POIM by 
describing the extent to which POIM overlooks the need to obtain documentary
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evidence and minimises violations. Below is the probationer’s description of his
actions following an absence:
Do you give him [POIM your probation officer] a valid reason 
and then you carry on as normal?
...I wouldn't say all the reasons were valid but a few times I just 
forgot blatantly.
In cases that you forgot what do you say to him?
Car broke down, couldn't get a lift, whatever. I've never 
vindictively not come just because I didn't wanna come. I mean if I 
had a car outside I would have driven here. But I don’t think he 
would have swallowed oh! I forgot, do you know what I mean? So 
I had to make it up but he probably knew, he's not a silly man. He 
probably saw past it, but he could see the sincerity in why I wasn't 
there... I think I might have missed a couple of appointments 
because I was stoned. Because I smoke weed yeah, and I think a 
couple of times, I probably had a big fat spliff and then ah! No I 
should be in probation.
What do you say to PO IM  on those occasions?
That I was ill, I fell ill.
Did he ask you to bring some sick certificate or anything?
No he was never that precious about it. He could have been that 
precious and like wanted everything; he saw that that wouldn't 
help the situation.
But you wouldn't risk coming in stoned?
No, I did a couple of times.
Did PO IM  know that you were stoned when you came in?
He might have known, he might have blanked it...
Did he say anything?
Oh no he never said a word. P2M
The discussion above highlights the degree of flexibility and discretion in
enforcement. Further the quote contradicts the suggestion that all absences must be
validated by some form of evidence. Importantly, it suggests that probationers are
aware of the arbitrariness of enforcement decision making. From the probationer’s
perspective, the officer is able to accept apparently false excuses and to overlook
violations.
Given these findings, the interview schedules were revised at the early stage of 
interviewing in order to ensure that more subtle inquiries into the nature and extent of 
discretionary enforcement and also its links to compliance could be made.
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9.3.2: The extent o f  discretion
Most of the officers in the remaining offices did not prevaricate whilst discussing the
extent of discretion, nor did their supervisees. They unambiguously highlighted the
wide use of discretion in responding to absences. Thus, the strict monitoring and
prescriptive rules designed to curb discretionary decision making did not significantly
impact on the use of unofficial discretion. The officers below confirm this:
....I think there's still a bit of leeway ...it is getting more 
prescriptive...but there's still a lot of leeway. I'll accept things 
knowing that, I might get told off for this. But there's still a lot of 
leeway for my decisions anyway... P04M
This certainly appears to be the case. Further, an unpaid work officer also confirmed
the use of discretion in enforcement:
Under what circumstances will you withdraw the original...?
(Warning letter)
If the explanation that they offer is acceptable. Well then, there is 
no definition in the whole probation service what is acceptable or 
unacceptable. I would say it differs from office to office or area to 
area. From office to office from individual to individual...
UW02M
The officers’ activities in activating or deactivating the enforcement process clearly 
illustrate the nature and extent of this discretion. These are examined in more detail 
further below. Therefore, the earlier proposition emerging from the claim that officers 
would demand evidence (certified or uncertified) in all cases of absence was 
discarded as an unverified hypothesis.
9.4: Managing structural contradictions: the responsive informal rules
Interviews with the officers revealed that to secure compliance, the officers would, 
using their professional discretion, devise more responsive and flexible informal rules. 
The use of discretion traverses the entire enforcement process from defining the 
acceptability of absences to initiating breach action in court. Thus, the use of
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professional discretion underlies the informal enforcement rules devised by the
officers to counteract the rigid formal rules in order to ensure compliance.
We can recall that in devising the informal rules, the officers are motivated by the
realisation that flexible enforcement is crucial for fostering compliance. The officer
below reiterates this point:
You will get: you will do this; you will do that. That’s not how you 
deal with people. If you treat them with respect all the time you get 
respect back. If you're gonna be this sort of robotic probation 
officer then I think you're gonna be breaching a lot of people.
People who've been through the system you know, right from 
school, you will do this, you will do that and they fight against that 
but it depends how you deal with people....I've worked with 
people in the past in other areas who've been really strict and not 
liked at all by anyone. So I think it’s about respect really. You 
respect people and they respect you back. That’s how it works.
P04M
The case of the probationer P02M already discussed in chapter four further illustrates
this finding. P02M breached his order because his officer’s strict enforcement
approach was in his words, tantamount to acting like a ‘robot’. The officer lacked
empathy and was unwilling to understand the emotional difficulties that were in his
view, linked to his failure to attend his appointments. The officer was in the
probationer’s words a ‘by the book’ enforcer:
I tell you the first PO I met here (...) didn’t like him at all 
Why didn’tyou like him?
....he was very, he was a robot, by the book kind of. There was no 
humanity and I am sorry to achieve an effect in someone’s life you 
have to have some love no matter how distant you have to be and 
how professional you have to be, you have to express love... I told 
him how I felt about the way he talked to me that he was very 
negative ... to achieve any effect on a human being you have to 
have a positiveness and support.
P2M reacted against the rigid approach. This prompted further violations culminating 
in breach action in court. The ‘robotic’ and authoritarian approach also undermined
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the perceived legitimacy of authority in that the probationer felt that the quality of 
treatment he received was unfair.
9.4.1: Implementing the informal rules: ignoring violations
Reactions to violations are based on professional discretion. These reactions tend to 
vary according to the nature of the evolving relationship and the nature of the 
violation. Where an established relationship exists, the officer is more likely to apply 
more flexible enforcement strategies. Where an absence is defined as ‘minor’, an 
excuse is provided ‘in advance’XXXV1!1 of the absence. Minor violations are typically 
ignored:
What i f  the probationer notifies you in advance that they won’t be 
able to attend an appointment?
Well that’s something we encourage because that shows like 
problem solving and transparency really ... So we encourage you 
know positive things like that but what we usually try and do is to 
arrange for a time later in that week to see them... P19F
Back to the issue then o f warning letters, what do you do when the 
probationer notifies you in advance that they ’re going to be absent 
fo r whatever reason?
I will just make another arrangement then, just make alternative 
arrangements. PI OF
What i f  they phone you in advance to let you know that they can Y 
make an appointment will that be acceptable?
Yeah I generally, I mean even on the day if somebody phones up 
on the day and says I’m stuck in (...) and its flooded.... I can 
rearrange. I mean even if they phone up and its not a traditionally 
acceptable reason... P18M
What happens i f  they tell you in advance though [that they will not 
attend]...?
Ohhh that’s fine, oh that’s fine, that’s fine. Again, I am human, I 
have children. I have a life, life impacts on us all. Pick up the
phone and tell me I can suspend National Standards, I can do
lots of things as long as they tell me. They tell me that’s fine.
PO llF
Therefore with minor absences, the enforcement process is not initiated - no final 
warning letter is sent to activate the process. The importance of the temporal
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proximity of the notification varies across the different officers. The officer below 
discusses her response to advance notification received on the day of a scheduled 
appointment:
...where a probationer tells you, notifies you in advance that they 
can’t make an appointment what do you do?
It depends how much notice there is. If they ring you at five to 
two and they got a two o’clock appointment, saying I cant come in 
today,., cos I got a dental appointment, then I would not accept 
that. That’s a missed appointment because you shouldn’t make a 
dental appointment when you know you’ve got a probation 
appointment. Unless you had an emergency tooth ache in which 
case I need evidence that you’ve been to the dentist. I often tell my 
cases look if  you give me enough notice that an appointment is 
clashing with something important, by like the latest, the day 
before, then I could possibly re-arrange for you. But today P17F 
the girl you saw, she rang asking if she could come in a bit late in 
the afternoon. But I don’t have a slot for this afternoon I am choc a 
bloc and that was because she had made another appointment 
...that’s bad planning then and so I wouldn’t in those 
circumstances... P013F
For many officers, advance notification is encouraged irrespective of its temporal
proximity to the actual appointment:
... ideally it’s nice to have a phone call before, but if someone 
phoned me up at 12 o’clock and they said I am sorry I couldn’t 
make my appointment this morning at 10 o’clock, then I probably 
would try to be a bit flexible and try to fit them in later that day. If 
they don’t phone then I’d automatically send out a warning letter...
P015M
The nature of the excuse provided is not nearly as important as the presence of an
excuse. Further, the excuse need not be supported by certified documentation or other
documentary evidence:
But would you always physical evidence all the time?
We're supposed to but it can't always be provided to be honest.
P07F
But do you always require proof?
...I think although we try and get documentary evidence for 
everything we have to use a bit of discretion as well and I think if 
you give somebody a chance once, you get to know if they're 
pushing it and pushing it... P05F
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... I f  a probationer notifies you in advance will you still demand 
evidence?
... We rarely ask for evidence because of the fact they always make 
a new appointment anyway and if it’s within 2, 3 days and it 
would be with our opening arrangements, then that’s fine... P07F
If no excuse is provided before the absence, the enforcement process is activated.
Deactivation follows receipt of an excuse and the absence is defined as a minor
absence:
... what happens i f  they (the probationers) don’t say anything and 
then they come in afterwards, after the appointment date?
If they didn’t say anything and then they came in afterwards and 
they had an acceptable reason, I will withdraw it and I would tell 
them that they need to tell me in advance in future, but I would 
withdraw it. PI OF
The processes of deactivating the enforcement process also provided further insights 
into the nature of discretionary enforcement. It appeared that the officers are able to 
ignore violations or deactivate the enforcement process using their discretion. There is 
no automatic process by which absences are officially recorded. The entire process 
rests with the discretion of the individual officer.
9.4.2: Deactivating the enforcement process
As noted earlier, where no excuse is provided before the absence, the officer would
usually activate the enforcement process by sending a final warning letter. This is not
an automatic process; it relies on the actions of the officer:
When a probationer fails to attend are warning letters generated 
automatically by the computer or do you type them up yourselves?
No...you can type certain information and it will generate the 
letter but it needs you to actually record that they haven’t come.
It’s not that automatic, you don’t get reminders either or anything 
like that, it’s up to you to manage that process...
But i f  the probationer fails to attend and you send a warning letter 
and then they give you an acceptable reason how do you withdraw 
the warning letters?
Basically in CRAMS, you will go into CRAMS, you could go in 
and open the letter which you haven’t locked because after you’ve 
done reports and letters, you lock them, and you go in and put
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cancelled or something like that on them and then lock it. But 
quite often you will go into CRAMS there’s: failed to attend? 
attended? Yes or no? And you put no and then there’s follow up 
within two days and you tick that if it’s within two days, and then
you tick, acceptable or not. Well if you automatically tick that as 
unacceptable if they don’t turn up, but then if they come back to 
you and they provide an acceptable reason, you go back in and you 
change that to yes and you put in, there’s a list of reasons that you 
can tick like: explanation now received and acceptable and you put 
in a note of why... PO13F
The quote above describes the ease with which the officers are able to amend
electronic records of enforcement decision making. Some of the officers reported that
they would tend to postpone activating the enforcement process (sending the final
warning letter) in order to give the probationer more time to make contact. Once
notification is received, the officer may then destroy the letter. In most cases, the
letters are sent to the client because the officers are mandated to commence
enforcement action following an absence where no excuse is provided before the
absence (see Home Office 2000b). There is little room for the use of discretion in
such instancesxxxlx. This restrictive requirement denies the officers the opportunity to
apply their discretion in relevant cases:
Under what circumstances will you withdraw a Warning Letter?
... quite often I know people areb********g me, he’ll still have a 
doctor’s note and I know that they just got a doctors note because 
they know they have to and there hasn’t been anything wrong with 
them. The second they got that medical proof there’s nothing I can 
do about it so I have to let it go... POl7F
The quote above also demonstrates the prescriptive nature of enforcement and the
corresponding reduction in professional autonomy. The upshot is the possibility that
officers are mandated to perform certain functions in an almost robotic fashion
without the ability to question apparent discrepancies. In the Jersey Probation
Service, there is greater autonomy. For instance, the officers are not mandated to
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automatically issue final warning letters following an absence. This ensures that the
process is less convoluted because it reduces unnecessary bureaucratic functions.
... I mean that’s very difficult about breach in England. If someone 
misses two it’s all so automatic the breach paper work to get 
ready. Then that person may turn up the following week with a 
sick note. Then you’ve gotta withdraw all this paperwork and here 
I can almost keep a tight hold of things till the very latest point.
You kind of prevent all that kind of unnecessary paperwork.
JP03M
Further eroding autonomy, in England and Wales, once breach action in court 
commences, there is no option for the officer to reverse the process even where the 
client has subsequently re-engaged. Even with the disciplinary breaches there were no 
options available for halting proceedings. The officer below rightly questions the 
prudence of such an inflexible breach process that also strips officers of their 
autonomy:
What happens where the probationer complies in between the start 
o f the enforcement process and the breach in court? Will that 
affect the outcome... ?
They still go to court if you breach them. This is National 
Standards and this is a waste of everybody’s money. Absolute 
waste of everybody’s money because we are breaching them for 
failure to comply. We are offering them appointments they’re 
keeping in contact, why waste money for court proceedings? Why 
can’t we just pull out and say okay I’ll take it away this time and 
we save £500 of the treasury’s money? But no, its gotta go to 
court. It clogs the court up and in all of this, the thing’s been taken 
away has been the probation officers’ authority and the respect you 
know? Not the respect, his autonomy or their autonomy to do the 
job with confidence. Because when I first joined, probation 
officers had that authority, had that confidence. I would go into 
court and the magistrates will hang on every word I said and the 
judges will say they wouldn’t sentence without asking your 
opinion. Now it’s gone away it’s been taken away. Now it’s all 
papered now ...you know we’ve lost the plot somehow we have 
lost the plot. P016M
Although it appears that there is an effort to erode flexibility and autonomous decision 
making, the discretion with which the officers are able to deactivate the enforcement 
process at its earliest stages reasserts a degree of autonomy. Using their discretion,
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the officers are able to arbitrarily define the acceptability o f absences, withdraw
warning letters and amend computerised records. The officers below discuss their role
in the early stages of enforcement.
... if  it is your case you make that decision as long as you file a 
report on CRAMS which we fully record why we’ve made that 
decision and if you change something, if you put it in as an 
absence it asks you if they’ve attended and then you put no and 
then it asks if its been followed up and then you put whether it is 
acceptable and if  you change that no to a yes, there's a box [that] 
comes up and you have to put in why.
How do you withdraw it?
You just, you just decide whether or not you are gonna accept their 
explanation and then stamp the letter with your withdrawn thing.
Here we are (officer shows me the stamp) and sign it and put it on 
the file and on the computer... POIOF
Usually I put on the system...which is highlighted in red, the 
minute somebody fails to attend you always put first of all that it is 
not an acceptable absence (until we get evidence, yeah) on 
CRAMS and that highlights in red. If you get an acceptable reason 
I’ll go back and mark that to be a yes it was acceptable. Because 
obviously when we are doing reviews and stuff, we click on 
National Standards compliance button and it gives you the number 
of appointments they’ve attended or they’ve been offered and how 
many they’ve failed to attend. So we’ve got to make sure that 
information is right. There is a letter that we are supposed to send 
but I don’t know anyone at this moment who actually sends out to 
say your evidence was acceptable. There is a letter like that being 
brought in but I don’t know anybody ..I mean to be as long as you 
change the system and you let the offender know that’s enough...
P019F
...if we sent out a warning letter to somebody, cos we do them 
within two days if they haven’t contacted, they theoretically got 
five days to tell us. But if they haven’t contacted us in two days we 
send a warning letter and say they didn’t turn up on a Monday, if 
they haven’t contacted us on the Wednesday I will send out the 
warning letter then and then perhaps they call the office on a 
Thursday or a Friday say I’m really sorry I wasn’t well...or 
whatever and then I will say okay fine your next appointment is -  
and then I’ll withdraw it then and date it when I was given the 
explanation. And then we’ve actually got the facility on CRAMS 
now to put in retrospect when we accept something that’s was 
unacceptable before. P07F
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The extent of discretion remains the same even in offices where probation service 
officers perform enforcement functions. The probation officer is able to arbitrarily 
deactivate the process by sending an email notifying the PSOs of their decision:
How do you withdraw it then?
I just usually tell or email, I usually email just to cover as well... 
and they don’t question, its up to us really... P09F
The several mechanisms that enable the use of discretion were also noted in Jersey.
Discussing the processes of deactivating enforcement the officer below states:
You can just change it on the system to say that it’s an 
acceptable...yeah. It’s on the system that you change it yeah, you 
switch something and then you put in some recording... 
JP05/M10-20
These quotes reveal the processes of deactivating the enforcement process and in
doing so; the quotes reveal the nature of discretionary enforcement. Despite the strict
monitoring processes operating in England and Wales, the officers are able to make
manual entries of enforcement decisions into the computerised or file based records.
As such where a final warning letter is sent to the client, this activation of the
enforcement process is only partial. Deactivation involves the withdrawal of the final
warning letter on receipt of notification from the probationer. The quotes above also
provide further insights into the implications of deactivation. In such cases, the
violation is minimised and redefined as a ‘minor violation’. It appears that the
probationers are also aware of the ease of deactivation (withdrawing the final warning
letter). The quote below by a female officer illustrates this:
... when they [the probationers] do come in next time [after a 
warning letter has been sent], I explain that I had to send the letter 
and most people know that those letters go out as soon as they 
don’t attend. But we can withdraw them so as soon as they come in.
P02F
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In general the probationers are aware of the variability of responses to violations. 
From a deterrence perspective, this may undermine the extent of perceived certainty 
of punishment, an important variable in achieving deterrence, according to the 
deterrence literature (see generally von Hirsch et al. 1999).
9.4.3: Activating the enforcement framework
Full activation of the enforcement process (breach action in court) would usually be
the response to persistent violations. We can recall that persistent violations involve
persistent absenteeism with no contact made or total lack of contact. Discussing her
decision to commence breach action, the officer below points to the persistent
absenteeism of the client:
What made you decide to breach despite the excuse he had 
given...?
Because there were too many absences and there was no sort of 
communication from them to me about what was going on until it 
had come to the crunch and they were being breached and then 
they came up with a few different things which didn’t cover 
everything...
... Some people just sort of push it too far really and then they 
don’t get medical information or anything to back things up. In the 
end you just, you have to...
What do you mean push things too far, what kind o f things will 
they be doing?
Just missing too many times and coming up with a variety of 
reasons. Nothing to actually sort of verify anything... my car broke 
down or I forgot or I had to take my child to the hospital and no 
sort of proof of that and if there too many and no sort of 
commitment...
Thus the quote demonstrates that persistent violations would typically attract less
flexible enforcement. Persistent violations occur where the probationers ‘push it too
far’ or where there have been ‘too many absences’ with ‘no communication’. The
quotes below also illustrate this point:
...what’s normally resulted in me breaching people is people not 
just bothering to turn up for their appointments ... the main reason 
I breach people is basically just for a lack of contact. They’ve not 
bothered to come in and see me. P014M
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... We ’re talking about P5F (a probationer) you said she's been 
breached... Can you describe what happened?
She just didn’t keep her appointments so I had no contact with her 
at all. P08F
What will you say that is the type o f  non-compliance that would 
normally result in breach action?
Failing to turn up obviously and not getting in touch with me and 
telling me why you haven’t turned up. If you don’t turn up twice, 
frequently three times, cos I go outside National Standards cos I 
am naughty, then you could you go back to court. And I’ve never 
actually breached somebody on bad behaviour. I’ve never had 
anybody who’s come in and has been aggressive towards me or 
has been unpleasant or anything like that. For me, it’s always been 
not turning up with being breached. P017F
What form o f compliance would normally result in breach action 
in court?
Having no contact whatsoever, that’s the easiest route. ... they 
don’t show up for induction, they don’t show up for the week we 
don’t even get phone calls to say I am sick or my grandmother’s 
legs were off or whatever ha ha. I think those are the ones you 
know you ...you do kind of take them back... P09F
Therefore, persistent absenteeism with little or no contact made with the office would
usually prompt the activation of the enforcement process.
The infrequency of contested breaches may also indicate the tendency to commence 
breach action mainly in cases involving persistent violations. It is possible that in
these cases there would be accumulated evidence to support breach action. In one
office, the frequency of contested breaches was noted. This was traced to the activities 
of a specific team of solicitors. They tended to question the definition of acceptability 
in breach cases thus placing the onus on the officers to justify their decisions.
The officers based in the remaining areas reported that very few breaches are 
contested. This is because breach action is typically reserved for persistent violations 
with no notification provided by the probationer, reducing the evidentiary burden on 
officers whilst leaving the probationer with little option but to plead guilty, given the 
extent of their non-compliance.
239
So very few  breaches are contested...
Yeah.
Why do think that is?
Because by the time you actually get to breach somebody, they wouldn’t 
have a leg to stand on...and it’s so obvious you know, with me if I’m 
actually going to breach somebody it’s very rare that they’ve got a reason 
why they should be pleading not guilty, because, either they’ve come up 
with explanations and I’ve accepted them and withdrawn it you know by 
the time we get to that point usually they accept yeah I’m out of order and 
I’m gonna be breached. I mean the only one, the thing with the dog, it was 
withdrawn. I wanted to breach but she was going to plead not guilty and I 
don’t know what would have happened with that. We have to get the 
county solicitor I think but it doesn’t come to that very often.
Will the court demand a lot o f evidence i f  i t ’s contested breach?
I don’t know it’s very rare that there’s been a contested breach. I don’t 
know if that the same with other people ...most of the breach we’ve ever 
done, people have admitted the breach. POIOF
As the quotes above suggest breach action is typically reserved for cases of persistent 
absenteeism. Thus, as noted in chapter five, only 8 of the 17 probationers who 
reported several violations were breached. They reported that they were breached 
because they failed to attend several appointments (in one case up to 6 appointments) 
without due notification.
The tendency to reserve breach action for cases involving persistent violations was
also observed in community service/unpaid work supervision. The unpaid work
supervisor below alluded to this tendency:
Okay so do you think then that the threat o f taking them back to 
court actually works as an effective deterrent to make them come 
in?
I think in my own experience that doesn’t happen a lot.
That’s being taken back to court?
They [those serving unpaid work orders] know that. I think they’re 
[the officers are] too lenient ...we would have far better attendance, 
we would have far better behaviour if they were really serious 
about following it through... UWS1M
The quotes above suggest that full activation of the enforcement process is typically
reserved for persistent violations. Full activation entails sending a final warning letter
and initiating breach action in court.
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9.4.4: Interim behaviour and breach outcomes
Breach outcomes would depend on whether the officer invokes either a prosecutorial 
function or a defence role. Both are strategic actions determined by several 
conditions. Where the client reengages in the interim, the officer invokes the defence 
role. Where violations persist in the interim, the officer invokes the prosecutorial 
function. Therefore, the probationer’s response determines whether the breach will be 
constructive or punitive. The officers offer the probationers several appointments in 
the interim between initiating breach action and the breach hearing. This provides the 
probationers with the opportunity to reengage up to the point of the breach hearing. 
Where they fail to comply in the interim, the officer adopts a prosecutorial role and 
produces a negative breach report containing a recommendation for a revocation and 
resentence:
In writing your breach report for the court what sort o f  
circumstances would you take into consideration?
... the biggest thing in the breach report would be whether or not 
the person is re-engaged after the missed appointments. Because 
that completely changes the way you handle the breach. If they 
have re-engaged then you’re going to be generally looking at 
allowing the order to continue but you would also be looking at 
what were the reasons behind the breach. They might not have 
been able to provide evidence but you may well be aware that 
there are significant emotional difficulties going on and you will 
be making that known to the court. So that they can see the 
difference between a deliberate flouting of the order and somebody 
who’s just really struggling... P03F
As mentioned above, with persistent interim violations, confrontations will be severe;
officers will embark on punitive breach. This entails adopting a prosecutorial role,
producing a negative breach report for the courts which will contain a
recommendation of revocation or resentence. The recommendations would normally
be applied by the courts as the quotes below by some officers demonstrate:
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Do the courts accept your recommendations?
They do. I don’t think they've rejected any of my recommendations 
touch wood so far. UWOIF
So does the court normally accept your recommendations?
In the vast majority cases.P03F
So do the courts accept your recommendations?
Almost always in breach cases... P06M
The officers also indicated that the risk of custody for non-compliance increases in
cases involving persistent violations that persist in the interim between initiating
breach action and the actual hearing. A custodial sentence may also be the court’s
response where the probationer has failed to reengage and has had previous breach
action against them. Below an officer makes this point:
In what sort o f  cases then would there be a re-sentence and 
custody?
That would be in cases where somebody’s breached and then 
completely failed to re-engage. Because what will happen is, 
they’ll have the warning letter and the breach letter. They’ll be told 
that we’re breaching them but then we would continue to send 
them appointments encouraging them to re-engage, If by the point 
we get to court they haven’t re-engaged, at that point the court will 
be looking at re-sentencing exercise then they will adjourn for PSR 
(Pre Sentence Report). For it to end up in custody the person has 
then got to be saying well I’m not gonna comply because 
otherwise the court would tend to try and give them another 
chance, give them another order. P03F
These quotes suggest that interim violations place the probationer at greater risk of a
custodial sentence. It appears that the constructive breaches provided an avenue for
collaboration between the practitioners and the courts to promote compliance. A
reprimand as recommended by the officer in appropriate cases ensured that the
probationers involved were given more chances to complete their order. Meanwhile,
in the Jersey Probation Service there was evidence of active collaboration between the
courts and the probation service to avert unnecessary recourse to breach action. The
probation officer below highlights this
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Our courts I think on the whole are very compassionate. We have 
two stipendiary magistrates who tend to know people well, tend to 
know offenders well. And when they put people on probation, 
their hope is that people succeed. They don’t want every mistake 
to be reported back to them... JPOIM
It is quite possible that the disciplinary breaches provided an avenue for this level of
collaboration with England and Wales. Disciplinary breach was viewed as a
negotiating tool useful deterring future violations. Meanwhile, the data highlighted the
pragmatism and altruism underpinning the formulation of the informal rules.
9.5: The pragmatic objectives underpinning the revised rules
As a pragmatic response to violations the informal rules reduce the extent of
unnecessary or premature breaches. The officers confirmed this. They reported that
flexible discretionary enforcement is vital because it serves the pragmatic purpose of
averting excessive breach rates. Without the discretion to define arbitrarily validated
absences as compliance, supervision will be almost impossible as most probationers
will be breached at court. To explore this further the following question was put to the
officers during theoretical sampling:
'What do you think will happen i f  you didn’t have that discretion to 
withdraw warning letters?
Their responses further highlight the extent of unpredictability. They also demonstrate
that the informal rules serve a pragmatic purpose. They reduce breach rates:
Oh...we’d have people breaching all over the place, we really 
would yeah. We will have breaching all over the place without a 
doubt. P07F
...I think that’s what probation would like, I think they like a 
bloody system where you press a button and its generated that’s it.
But I think ..the rate of people in prison and in court would rocket 
to the ceiling. I think you have to, I think if the average person on 
probation was people who were coming here everyday at 9 o’clock 
and blah blah blah that perhaps there wouldn’t be probation...
P09F
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Oh there would be loads more breaches; yeah there would be loads 
more breaches... POIOF
It [breach rates] would probably go up wouldn’t it I would imagine 
because if you can’t withdraw something then it just stays. Yes 
definitely because I would imagine that a high percentage of final 
warnings and breach letters are withdrawn because the evidence is 
produced or officers feels oh well I will give them a chance.
P012F
... It [the courts] will be clogged up. We'll be doing nothing but 
breaches probably and where would that actually leave us? We'll 
be working like automatons and you've gotta see people as people 
with real lives. P05F
I think it’s probably the best system we've had really because we 
do still have a little bit of leeway with it. If it was totally rigid I 
don't think it will be very good at all because we will breaching far 
more than we do. P08F
The officers in Jersey reinforce this point. A client centred approached based on the
use of discretion to ensure fair decision making was noted:
I guess enforcement levels will change quite considerably. If 
somebody just didn’t turn up and there was no flexibility, then 
enforcement will just have to kick in .. .and people will go to court 
much quicker...if people have got genuine reasons that would 
damage relationships. [It] will make us became more of the 
enforcer rather than the worker. ... clients need to know where 
they stand and have clear sort of boundaries and that’s kind of 
reinforced in the consequences of non-compliance. What I tend to 
do is stay on the softer end... JP02
Although the informal rules are intended to serve a pragmatic purpose it was not 
initially clear from the data generated from the probation officers whether the rules 
are devised to fulfil this pragmatic function or whether the reverse is the case. That is, 
the pragmatic function of the informal rules is nothing more than an unforeseen 
outcome of the rules. In discussing the reluctance to enforce unpaid work 
requirements as strictly as required by the National Standards, an unpaid work 
supervisor interviewed suggested that the former is the case. The rules are proactively 
devised to serve a pragmatic purpose:
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We have 15 names every Saturday and we’ve had 15 names on our 
books every Saturday for at least three months and we’re lucky if 
get 5 or 6.
What does (UWOIF unpaid work officer) do about it?
Nothing...I think the main problem is because community 
punishment has got to be seen to be working they want to put a 
tick in the box. They don’t want to put down that they’re absent.
They don’t want to put down that they’re sick...I think they’re 
terrified of doing anything...Basically I think it’s because if they 
don’t get people through the community punishment then it’s 
gonna be seen as failure. .. .If you keep putting back to court then I 
think it’s gonna be seen as a failure and I think that is spot on.
UWS1M
The unpaid work officer below is based in another office. She also reiterates this
apparent reluctance to commence breach action:
Those cases where the offenders don’t come in for two or three 
weeks do you contact them or try to follow up ... ?
I don’t, I email absences to Offender Managers and then it’s up to 
them. But I am now getting to the point when I email absences to 
them I’m saying can you please let me know what the situation is 
here? As this is the third absence in a row... UW02F
It appears that the informal rules are devised for their pragmatic role in reducing
breach rates. The informal rules curb excessive breach action whilst strict reliance on
the formal rules would engender high breach rates. Further, it is possible that the high
breach rates would be construed by the courts and by other audiences as being
reflective of a failure by the service to successfully engage clients on their orders.
9.6: The altruism of the revised rules
Also underlying the informal rules is the altruism evident in the flexibility permitted 
by the rules. This flexibility ensures the officers are able to pursue individualised 
enforcement practices that accommodate the wide range of issues affecting 
compliance. It also ensures that the officers are able to overlook several violations 
thus reducing breach rates. This ensures that more probationers are able to 
successfully complete their orders. In addition one might argue that a potential 
strength of the informal rules is the possibility that it could enhance perceived
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legitimacy. The responsiveness and individualisation permitted by the rules may 
ensure that enforcement practice is perceived to be fair by the probationers. The case 
of probationer P2M described in Chapter seven illustrates the link between perceived 
fairness during enforcement decision making and compliance.
Although the informal rules permit greater flexibility, accommodate the realities of 
practice and may enhance perceived legitimacy, it also poses several implications for 
compliance. It may undermine the perceived certainty of punishment. This according 
to the deterrence theorists is crucial for achieving deterrent effects. The potential loss 
of certainty is exacerbated by the finding that many probationers are aware of the 
flexibility permitted by the informal rules. At different stages of their interactions with 
their officers, the probationers become privy to the informal rules and the variable 
responses to violations these rules engender.
9.7: Communicating the informal rules
The probationers confirmed that they become aware of these rules at the start of the 
order:
When you started this order were you told what you should do i f  
you can’t come in?
Yeah they said you phone up and say either a day before or a 
couple of hours before if you can’t turn up... P22F
... What were you told to do i f  you can’t come...?
Phone before your appointment...as soon as even if it’s a day 
before. P26M
The probationers also become aware of the informal rules through the officers’ 
actions in reacting to violations. Having deviated from the formal rules, the 
probationers either experience enforcement action -  (constructive or punitive breach), 
minimisation -  (no warning letter sent) - or deactivation -  (warning letter sent and 
withdrawn). Through these processes, they become aware that breach action is
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typically reserved for persistent absenteeism with no contact made to the officer or to
the office. POIM below reveals the extent of violations that triggered breach action:
I got breached at the beginning of the year cos I missed like six 
appointments. I was going through quite a bad stage in my life.
Lots of things were going wrong and I couldn’t deal with facing 
this you know? And I didn’t come in ... P02M
Similarly the probationer below describes his experiences of flexible enforcement:
... they did give me a few warnings you know, they did give me a 
bit of leeway and then obviously...I missed a few appointments 
and they were like you should come in otherwise you are gonna 
turn up back at court and stuff 
Oh! did you miss some appointments.
Yeah I missed, I missed quite a few I was supposed to come in 
every week and I missed like 3 weeks or something.
Did you phone them?
No that's the thing I didn't phone them. Well, I did phone them 
about a week or later on every incident and they were like you 
should phone us or you should try and get here and then I missed 
one appointment and it was like fair enough he's passed that 
boundary now. So they had to send me back to court. P7M
Above the probationer recognises that his failure to maintain adequate contact may
have triggered breach action. Other probationers confirmed this; their reports
indicated that a link exists between the experience of the officer’s reaction to
violations and subsequent knowledge of the need to comply with the informal rules in
the event of future absences. Thus, in applying the informal rules, the officers
unwittingly reveal the extent of discretionary enforcement. The probationers are
aware of the ease with which the officers are able to deactivate the enforcement
process using their professional discretion. It has been noted earlier that many
probationers are aware of the variability of the officers’ reactions to violations.
Below, a female probation officer acknowledges that a potential link exists between
knowledge of discretionary enforcement (variability of the officers’ reactions to
violations) and undermined certainty.
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.... How do you feel that the use o f discretion affects effectiveness 
in enforcement?
if you've got someone who isn't attending but that order is not 
being enforced in the officer's discretion because they are 
accepting the absences all the time, then they are not gonna 
comply because they think that they don't have to and they get 
away with it. P02F
This suggests that knowledge of discretionary enforcement may undermine the 
perceived certainty of punishment. According to the deterrent theorists, of the three 
principles of punishment namely the severity, celerity and certainty of punishment, 
the certainty of punishment tends to produce the strongest deterrent effects (von 
Hirsch et al. 1999).
The current study found that the informal rules devised by the officers ultimately 
affect the nature of compliance achieved. The links between the informal rules and 
compliance may become more evident in the exploration of the probationers’ 
reactions to the informal rules further below. The probationers’ reactions typically 
assume the form of adaptation to the informal rules.
9.8: Managing contradictions: variations according to officer demography
An attempt was made to explore whether there are variations in enforcement 
philosophy and practice across the offices visited and the officers sampled and also 
how the variations may be linked to compliance. Limited variations were found 
across gender, age or officer training styles. The study found that for most of the 
officers, the informal rules are crucial for ensuring a degree of compliance.
It has been suggested anecdotally that the attributes of individual officers may affect 
the nature and quality of supervision offered (Bottoms 2001). For instance, one may 
presume that the officers trained under the new style correctionalist training 
arrangements may enforce orders more readily than their social work trained 
counterparts. This was implied by one of the officers interviewed. However there was
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limited evidence that the newly trained officers are more committed to a more rigid
enforcement approach than their more experienced colleagues. P04M was trained in
Social Work principles and below he discusses his newly qualified colleagues:
I know people who, if people are late they will breach them ... 
there’s a lot of younger or newly qualified who will try and stick to 
the book the rules and will breach people really quickly. I mean 
the chap who came in this morning he was breached and he works 
but then he had to provide proof and it was withdrawn.
This implication that the recently qualified officers may resort to breach action more
readily has been challenged empirically (Treadwell 2006). P04 below is a newly
trained officer. She acknowledged the correctionalist trend in probation practice
although she also reported that she applies a more responsive and flexible response to
non-compliance:
I say to people straight on at the beginning, you know what you 
got to do, you got to keep your appointment but if there's a genuine 
reason then I'll look at it and stuff. So I try and come across as a 
human person not this machine. P04M
The quote above also demonstrates the process of communicating the informal rules
during proactive rule clarification. In all, no significant differences were noted in the
manner in which the officers respond to violations. Most officers tended to apply the
informal rules in order to secure compliance. The current study found that the
probationers subsequently develop adaptation techniques to ensure that their
compliance patterns conform to the informal rules.
9.9: Adaptation techniques
The probationers internalise the flexible enforcement processes incorporated in the 
informal rules and they adjust their behaviour accordingly by developing adaptation 
techniques. The techniques ensure that they remain within the limits of informal 
boundaries. Adaptation entails compliance with the informal rules, that is, notifying 
the officer of an intended absence or contacting the office after an absence. For
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instance, having experienced enforcement action, P7M below demonstrated
adaptation techniques:
So i f  there's something that you need to do you wouldn't come in?
I'd phone and check first you know, and fair enough [P06M-my 
probation officer’s] someone like that he would say alright this is 
important I'll send you another date.
So i f  you are tired and can't be bothered to come in what would 
you do?
I'll phone now yeah I’ll phone them up yeah, or get someone else 
to phone for me if I can’t like get out of bed or if I'm really ill I'll 
get someone to phone for me.
Has that [phoning in to explain absence] happened since you were 
taken to court do you remember?
It’s happened once or twice but generally I'm looking after myself 
a bit more and that.
And what did [P06M-yourprobation officer] say?
Well P06M basically said: why aren't you coming in? And I give 
him a reason why and he said that's fair enough we'll set another 
date sent me a letter so I come in on that date, you know?
And what i f  you forget have you ever forgotten to come in?
Once or twice yeah 
What did you do then?
He’s P06M ’s asked me why haven't I come in and I said I just 
forgot cos sometimes cos you get given a slip for your next date 
and sometimes you lose it and like last week I lost my one so I 
phoned up last week cos its only it’s like once a month now so I 
thought it was this week so I phone up and checked but I told he 
said come in at twelve so I was here at b***** twelve o'clock.
P7M
Added to those who had experienced enforcement action, other probationers who had
experienced flexible reactions to non-compliance (their absenteeism or other
violations had been minimised or ignored) also revealed similar adaptation
techniques. Below P4M serving his order for a sex offence describes his actions when
he fails to attend his appointment:
Well at the moment I am attending other hospital appointments but 
I'll tell them if I don't in advance and he said don't worry about 
that...we'll give you another date which is he's being very very
fair as long as you let them know what's going on they're
happy. P4M
Other probationers demonstrate similar adaptation techniques:
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What did you do then... ? [When you failed to attend].
I telephoned to say I didn’t have any money I couldn’t make it. He 
was alright then, he just said...I’ll let it go this time but try not to 
miss any appointments, which is fair enough I don’t mind. P26M
So what did you do (when you failed to attend) phone them?
Yeah you just phone and explain and then... if you do that then I 
think it’s alright. But if you were miss to it and didn’t phone or 
come in and didn’t bother to do nothing then you get...
Who did you speak to?
Receptionist and then they get in touch with [P014M - my 
probation officer] and then P014M phones me... P19F
So what do you do i f  you can Y attend probation?
I normally phone the [P016M-my probation officer] and I explain 
to him... P20M
These statements reveal an internalisation that absences with no form of contact will 
usually attract breach liability. Given the degree of flexibility permitted by the 
informal rules (several absences are either ignored or minimised provided there is 
notification) it is not surprising that the probationers also become aware that breach 
action is typically reserved for persistent absenteeism without advance or subsequent 
notification. This is one of the possible outcomes of the informal rules, other 
implications are considered below.
9.10: Implications of adaptation
Several implications of the tendency to adapt to the informal rules were noted namely, 
undermined perceived certainty, unwitting exploitation, the failure to adhere to 
routine appointments, the tendency to minimise forms of non-compliance and the 
normalisation of deviance.
9.10.1: Undermining perceived certainty and exploitation
Whilst many probationers did not demonstrate a clear understanding of the formal 
rules, all were aware that there are risks associated with non-compliance. Although 
there was a high perception of risks, all had missed one or several appointments and 
most had violated the formal rules at some point of the order. Where these violations
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had been ignored or minimised, the perceived certainty of punishment may be 
undermined. Although most of the probationers reported that they were fully aware 
that the officer is mandated to fulfil their enforcement role, the possible deterrent 
effect of this realisation may have been undermined by the variability of responses 
and the flexibility engendered by the informal rules.
In addition, the study found that some probationers unwittingly exploit the more
flexible rules. For instance, in Chapter six, it was noted that some probationers
provide false excuses for absences. The case of P24F was discussed in Chapter six but
it is worth recounting here as it illustrates a possible exploitation of the flexible
informal rules. Below she describes how the officers respond to her violations:
Id just ring up and make an excuse. I’ve done that before. I wanted 
to go shopping with my little boy...I done that once.
And what did they say?
They just said its fine ...
So have you ever got a letter saying you did not come in... ?
Yeah, loads...Well I’ve probably had, I know they threatened to 
send me to court twice, which I think that was on the last order 
though that was about a year ago now, they’re pretty soft here...
What happens when you get the letter?
I just rip them up and then I come and see them.
But so far you haven’t been taken to court?
No. P24F
The probationer P24F adopts breach avoidance techniques by ensuring that she 
maintains adequate contact even where the reasons for absence are unacceptable. This 
suggests that the probationers may be aware that in many cases any type of excuse 
will suffice. Maintaining contact is the determining criteria. The nature of the excuse 
provided is not as significant.
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The officers’ willingness to reschedule appointments on receipt o f a notification of an
absence may undermine the policy objective of ensuring that structural appointments
encourage routine compliance:
So i f  there's something that you need to do you wouldn't come in?
I'd phone and check first and fair enough [P06M-my probation 
officer’s] someone like that, he would say alright this is important 
I'll send you another date. P7M
What do you do then i f  you can’t come in... ?
I phone up then and say can I speak to [P016M my probation 
officer] and I say I can’t come in because A is bad or B is bad or 
..But I’m always here...If I don’t come here then it’s because either 
he’s bad (her son) or she’s bad, my little girl is bad ...nothing else 
I bring them with me...
What do they say when you tell them that?
Oh it’s alright I book you neither appointment for the next 
week... P21F
So i f  there’s something important that you want to do or you need 
to do and you can 7 come in to your appointment what will you do 
then?
I’d phone [P013F-my probation officer] to let P013F know to see 
if she could change the time and the day or to see if  they can either 
swap my probation appointment round... P24F
Probationers are therefore aware of the flexibility with which officers re-arrange 
scheduled appointments. Compliance is then defined to include the failure to attend 
scheduled appointments. This definition of compliance may undermine the 
importance of scheduled appointments as a mechanism for introducing greater 
structure into chaotic lifestyles by encouraging routine compliance. Further, the study 
found that the tendency to frequently reschedule appointments may produce 
‘subversive non-compliance’xl in which the probationers manipulate situations in 
order to avoid attending structured appointments. Such manipulation represents a 
potential consequence of the more flexible processes permitted by the informal rules. 
Below an officer makes this point:
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... I get people trying to sort of, its sort of subversive non- 
compliance... I’ll turn up but I'll phone you and I’ll turn up two 
hours late. And it’s that sort of thing that I usually get. They will 
move appointments around and I suspect it’s because they know 
I’m a bit of a soft touch that way...
In what sort o f circumstances will you reschedule an appointment, 
fo r  example i f  someone phones in is not able to make it or i f  
someone misses an appointment what will you normally do?
I explain to them they have to be seen in a week. So if somebody 
rings in saying my dogs been run over, okay fine come in 
tomorrow and I’ll give him a time and if he doesn’t come in 
tomorrow then you’re gonna have to get a warning letter you 
know? I’m aware I’m a lot more flexible than perhaps other 
probation officers will approve of so yeah. P017F
It follows that frequently rescheduling appointments may encourage manipulative
behaviour. The probationers alter reporting arrangements to suit their purposes
thereby undermining the role of scheduled appointments in reintroducing the non-
criminogenic routines that may engender longer term compliance (see also Bottoms
2001).
9.10.2: The normalisation o f deviance
Internalising and adapting to the informal rules that minimise violations may 
encourage definitions of compliance that include behaviours that would constitute 
non-compliance within the formal rules. This was observed in the finding that missed 
appointments that would normally constitute non-compliance according to the 
requirements of the National Standards were being classified by probationers as 
compliance. By ignoring these types of violations or by reacting to these forms of 
non-compliance by deactivating the enforcement process, the violations appeared to 
have been validated by the officers exercising their professional discretion. As noted 
in Chapter five this tendency to minimise violations was noted during interviews with 
the probationers. The question ‘have you ever missed any appointment since you 
started this order? ’ or ‘have you attended all your appointments since this order 
started? ’ tended to attract responses denying any missed appointments. Although the
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probationers would subsequently reveal that they had indeed failed to attend their 
appointments sometimes on several occasions. Absences where the probationer makes 
contact with the officer or with the office were being defined as compliance even 
where -
• The rates of absenteeism exceeded the limits permitted by the standards and/or
• The absences appeared to be unsupported by evidence and/or
• The absences appeared to be for unjustifiable reasons and were indeed 
recognised as invalid absences by the probationers
This finding alerted me to the possibility that absences falling within the three
categories above were being almost automatically normalised and redefined as
compliance by both the officers and the probationers. Below is an example of how
the probationers tended to respond to the initial questioning:
So have you attended all your appointments since the last time we 
met?
Every single one. P8F
At a later stage of the interview the probationer states:
I mean I missed the very very first one I ever had. Basically I just 
completely forgot. I was honest enough about it. I said to [P07F- 
my probation officer] there was no need in lying to her because 
that would have got us off on the wrong foot in the first place. I 
said look I am sorry I just did forget completely forgot about it and 
I went off the day and it wasn’t till I was wandering along ..I 
thought I’m meant to be at probation office- Oh dear! P8F
The quote above demonstrates the tendency to normalise violations. The probationer 
failed to attend her first appointment because she forgot but almost automatically, she 
responds to the initial question by declaring that she has attended ‘every single one’. 
Other probationers displayed this tendency. Therefore, it was clear that with this line 
of questioning, it would become difficult to understand the nature of compliance. 
Redefinitions and normalisations as in the example provided above would tend to
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mask the extent of non-compliance thus undermining the ability to generate an 
accurate picture of the nature of compliance with community penalties. Consequently, 
in order to generate an accurate picture of compliance patterns and the extent of 
absenteeism, I had to revise the interview schedules as described in Chapter five.
The interview data were reinforced by the data generated from the analysis of a cross 
section of case records, from some observations of interactions between the officers 
and the probationers and also from informal chats with the officers. In all, the data 
pointed to the tendency to reserve rigid enforcement (in line with the provisions of the 
National Standards) to cases involving the persistent failure to attend appointments 
with no contact made to the officer.
9.11: Conclusion
Compliance is linked to three processes namely: reacting to the formal rules; 
confronting unpredictability and adapting to informal rules. There are situational and 
structural contradictions underpinning the three processes. The probationers are 
confronted with the problems posed by interactional factors and the obstacles that 
affect how they comply. Further, the officers strive to manage several contradictions 
posed by policy constraints and the unpredictability of their clients in order to secure 
compliance. Ultimately, the officers’ actions in managing these contradictions affect 
the nature of compliance. It appears that the actions of most of the officers’ are also 
underpinned by the altruism and welfarism associated with probation practice in its 
early formations, although on a pragmatic level, the officers also recognise that a 
welfare oriented approach is necessary for successfully engaging the probationer. 
Consequently, the compliance mechanisms employed by most of the officers depart 
significantly from the enforcement mechanisms proposed by policy. The compliance 
strategies most officers adopt incorporate the use of discretion to circumvent the
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restrictions posed by the contradictions that affect their efforts to secure compliance. 
Utilising their discretion, the officers formulate informal rules and more flexible rules. 
The informal rules are mutually beneficial rules. They are beneficial to the officers 
because they serve the pragmatic purpose of reducing breach rates. Reductions in the 
rates of court breach may be construed as evidence that the service is able to 
effectively engage the probationers. Likewise, reduced breach rates suggest that the 
service is able to provide credible punishments that also serve as effective 
mechanisms for protecting the public and managing risks. Thus, the flexible rules 
ensure that the service is able to demonstrate that the key objectives of supervision 
particularly the punitive objectives, are being achieved. These indices of effectiveness 
may preserve the credibility of the service with sentencers and with wider audiences. 
The informal rules also serve an altruistic purpose. They ensure that during 
enforcement, the officers adopt an individualised approach to enforcement that 
accommodates the wide range of factors that affect compliance, factors that are not 
properly accounted for by the ‘prescriptive’ enforcement standards. The study 
explored how these informal rules may be linked to compliance patterns if at all. The 
data revealed that the informal rules are subsequently internalised by the probationers. 
Thus, although many probationers had limited knowledge of the formal rules, most 
demonstrated an awareness of the informal rules. They would have experienced the 
officers’ actions in activating or deactivating the enforcement process, or in ignoring 
and minimising violations. The probationers’ experiences of the officers’ reactions to 
violations foster a heightened awareness; internalisation and subsequent adjustment to 
the informal rules. Thus the probationers develop adaptation techniques. These are 
breach avoidance techniques that consist of ensuring that compliance patterns fall
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within the parameters permitted by the formal rules (absences are supported by some 
form of contact).
There are several implications of adaptation. The probationers operating within the 
informal rules may knowingly or unwittingly exploit the new and more flexible rules 
they permit. Likewise, flexible reactions to violations in which the officers readily 
reschedule routine appointments may impinge on the ability to introduce some 
structure into chaotic lifestyles in order to foster routine compliance as defined by 
Bottoms (2001). The revised rules may also encourage the minimisation or 
normalisation of non-compliance. Finally, part of the adaptation process involves an 
internalisation that certain punishment would typically be reserved for persistent non- 
compliance without contact. This undermined certainty of punishment should 
according to the deterrence theorists; undermine the deterrent effects of the 
enforcement framework although from the participants’ accounts, the framework 
appears to have limited impact on behaviour.
In sum, the third process underpinning the reality of compliance is adaptation to the 
less demanding compliance requirements developed by the officers and internalised 
by the probationers. The informal rules appear to be more significantly linked to 
compliance patterns than the formal rules. They permit violations and absences that 
exceed the legally prescribed limits. By adapting to the informal rules, the 
probationers are able to attain the low level of compliance required of them. This level 
of compliance falls short of the formal requirements.
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Chapter Ten: Contextualising the findings within the extant literature
10.1: Introduction
In this chapter, an attempt is made to contextualise the findings of this study by 
juxtaposing the study with the extant literature. First the chapter identifies the key 
findings of the study in order to contextualise these within the existing literature. This 
facilitates an exploration of the points of convergence and divergence. A crucial 
divergence from the findings of the empirical literature is highlighted. This pertains to 
the nature of compliance as the product of symbols that define specific behaviour. 
These symbols emerge during interactions. Thus, in examining the perspectives of the 
parties involved in negotiating compliance, the symbolic nature of compliance with 
community penalties emerged. This insight into the nature of compliance provides the 
basis for resolving the research problem underpinning this study.
10.2: Revisiting Bottoms’ mechanisms of compliance
The framework for understanding as devised by Bottoms (2001) provided a 
conceptual framework that guided this study. However, the study found that the three 
key processes already explored in the previous chapters appeared to be more 
significantly linked to compliance. These are: reacting to the formal rules; confronting 
unpredictability and adaptation techniques. Nevertheless, the findings also provide 
insights into how the mechanisms identified by Bottoms may affect compliance. 
10.2.1: Routine compliance
An attempt was made to ascertain whether lifestyle and routines affect compliance in 
line with Bottoms’ (2001) conceptualisation of routine compliance. This study found 
that routines may act as obstacles to compliance. The adverse impact of routines is 
most potent where routine substance misuse fuels chaotic lifestyles. The previous
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chapters discussed the officers’ efforts to secure compliance despite the challenges 
posed in these cases.
In addition, the tendency to readily re-schedule fixed supervision appointments was 
noted. This undermines the importance of establishing scheduled appointments in 
order to introduce some structure and encourage routine compliance. Officially it is 
expected that rescheduling should be reserved for ‘rare’ cases (National Standards 
2000). It has been suggested that the observed readiness to reschedule appointments 
may be linked to its role in inflating compliance records in order to achieve funding 
linked performance targets. Hartland (2007) points out that, appointments rearranged 
before the scheduled appointments are recorded not as ‘appointments offered’ but as 
‘appointments re-arranged’. The latter are not counted for the purposes of 
performance assessment. Given that many appointments are rearranged, this practice 
inflates the number of appointments recorded as ‘appointments kept’.
Putting this rather ingenious recording process to one side, one might argue that 
adhering to structured appointments may over time, engender routine compliance that 
may be replicated in other situations. The ability to maintain a degree of structure in 
one’s life is a skill that can be useful as part of a comprehensive rehabilitation strategy 
aimed at replacing chaotic or other criminogenic lifestyles with structured pro-social 
routines.
10.2.2: The classical theories o f  compliance
We can recall that two of the mechanisms of compliance devised by Bottoms (2001) 
are theoretically rooted in classicism and the perceived rationality of human action. 
The study found limited evidence of the importance of disincentives or the use of 
constraint based mechanisms although as perceived by the participants, the use of 
incentives to encourage compliance (an instrumental mechanism) appeared to be an
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important compliance mechanism. Several incentives were cited by the probationers 
to be more fundamentally linked to compliance than the disincentives prescribed by 
policy or the degree of constraint imposed.
10.2.2.1: Constraint based compliance
The degree of constraint associated with probation supervision is restricted to the 
enhanced reporting arrangements reserved mainly for those assessed as high risk. 
Revealing the limitations of this constraint-based mechanism, P1M a male probationer 
assessed as high risk reported that the central factor motivating him to comply is the 
opportunity to talk with his supervisor and ‘dump’ or ‘talk out’ his problems. He 
reported that the risk of custody for non-compliance was not of any significance to 
him. His views of custodial sentences were recounted in Chapter seven. Meanwhile, 
although he was subject to enhanced reporting arrangements and under MAPPA 
surveillance, his attendance was at best sporadic. I was able to observe this because of 
my frequent visits to the office.
10.2.2.2: Instrumental compliance
The rationalistic conceptualisation of the offender pervades the current government’s 
thinking about the characteristics of offenders and hence the reliance on instrumental 
compliance mechanisms. At policy level, deterrence is the key disincentive whilst 
early revocation for good compliance is the primary incentive offered to ensure 
compliance.
10.2.2.3: Disincentives: the deterrent framework
As noted in Chapter one, studies show that despite the punitive enforcement 
framework, non-compliance rates remain high. This highlights a disparity between 
policy objectives and actual outcomes. I hypothesised that two explanations may be 
posited for this disparity between policy objectives and actual outcomes: the
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possibility that actual practices may diverge from strict enforcement recommendations 
and also the possibility that the punitive framework may in itself be an ineffective 
strategy for ensuring compliance.
This study found a high rate of absenteeism despite heightened perceptions of risk. 
This suggests that the deterrent framework appeared to produce limited deterrent 
effects. Further the enforcement framework appeared to impinge on the officers’ 
ability to retain a degree of autonomy and discretion in enforcement decision making. 
The processes linked to compliance were the informal rules devised by the officers 
and the adaptation techniques developed by the probationers to ensure that they are 
able to comply with the informal rules. The rules aim to resolve the contradictions 
posed by prescriptive policy provisions and the unpredictability of the probationers. 
10.2.2.4: Incentivised compliance
The study found that the primary compliance mechanism employed by the officers is 
incentive-based. As was shown in Chapter One, studies exploring the probationer’s 
perspective reveal a widespread belief that the objective of supervision is to secure 
rehabilitation through the provision of help to resolve socio-economic, practical, 
therapeutic and other problems. This study confirmed this. It found that instrumental 
mechanisms in the form of incentives were construed by the probationers as the 
benefits of supervision and cited by them as the most motivating compliance 
mechanisms. The study also found that the officers utilise incentives based on the 
clients’ expressed needs and interests to encourage compliance. From the outset at the 
reporting writing stage before sentencing, prospective probationers are informed of 
the benefits of supervision. This is repeated during induction at the start of the order 
and one officer reported that they tend to ‘sell’ what they have on offer as part of their 
compliance strategy. Perhaps this contributes to the documented tendency among
probationers to define the objectives of supervision mainly in terms of the accruing 
benefits.
It appears that the use of incentives to encourage compliance is endorsed not only in 
wider policy but also in the relevant literature. For instance, Underdown (2001.120) 
recommends that ’The heavy emphasis on disincentives needs also to be enriched by 
some balancing incentives - often remarkable by their absence from the community 
penalties system'. He calls for 'stronger incentives' which should be 'consistent and 
predictable, and established within a legislative framework'. Equally, Hedderman and 
Hough advise:
Encouraging offenders to appreciate ‘what’s in it for them is another 
obvious strategy. Appealing at the outset to their self interest by 
spelling out the help which can be accessed in relation to 
employment, education, accommodation, finances, childcare and 
transport may encourage attendance in a way that promising to work 
with them on their offending behaviour may not.... making 
offenders realise that their efforts and self motivation will accrue 
significant benefits such as early termination, or that they can 
receive help with practical social problems such as employment and 
so on, may encourage compliance more than promising to enhance 
their cognitive behaviours (2004: 164-16/191)
Hedderman and Hough (2000; 2004:158; 191) go further to recommend 'a graduated 
system of positive rewards which could be incorporated into the National Standards' 
(see also Heamden and Millie: 56). They also recommend disincentives such as 
reinforcing the risks of non-compliance. Bottoms and Gelsthorpe (2001) advocate ‘a 
more imaginative, incentives-based and encouragement-based approach’. Others point 
to incentives based strategies that may be devised by the individual (Underdown 
2001).
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10.2.2.5: Problematising incentivised compliance
There are several reasons to reject the use of incentives to encourage compliance and 
engagement with the order. Before I proceed with a full discussion of these reasons, I 
should acknowledge that the commentators cited above do offer compelling 
arguments for the use of incentives. Further, the importance of being responsive to 
needs as part of a comprehensive compliance strategy cannot be overemphasised. 
Nevertheless, a reliance on instrumental mechanisms of compliance reinforces the 
classicist position that the social actor is essentially self -gratifying and that human 
behaviour is the product of calculations of self interest. This negative view of human 
nature reflects the belief of some social control theorists that without adequate 
controls which ensure that the costs of crime outweigh the benefits, most people 
would offend (Hirschi 1969).
Apart from the pessimistic view of human capabilities orchestrated by an instrumental 
view of compliance, another implication of this reliance on the use of incentives as the 
primary compliance mechanism is that it overrides the normative potential of 
supervision. From a commonsense perspective, one can argue that normative 
compliance is a more sustainable form of compliance given that it does not rely on the 
constant interplay between the often cost intensive incentives and disincentives 
associated with classicist oriented mechanisms (see also Tyler 2003). Furthermore it 
fits well with the current government’s cost effectiveness drive as it requires 
considerably less resources to sustain it based as it is on internalised obligations. 
However, normative mechanisms require time intensive work that is more difficult to 
implement in a fast paced, time restricted and target driven practice context. In 
proposing the use of incentives, Hedderman and Hough (2004) acknowledge that 
normative mechanisms are more difficult to implement although cognitive
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behavioural approaches, the influence of family members and prosocial modelling 
techniques may encourage normative compliance.
Perhaps indicating the extent to which incentivised compliance appears to prevail in
practice, the study found that although the probationers tended to evaluate their
officers positively, the evaluations were based on the perceived benefits of their
engagement with the officers. Positive evaluations of an authority would usually
imply that the authority is perceived to be legitimate. Such perceptions have been
shown to correlate with compliance (Tyler 2003). However where the positive
evaluations are based on calculations of the benefits accruing from interacting with
that authority, the compliance achieved is not normative. Rather, it is instrumental and
based on considerations of self interest:
if people feel their interests are being furthered by the authorities, 
they will support the authorities for reasons of short term 
gain...evaluations of performance should therefore be distinguished 
from legitimacy, which is a perceived obligation to obey based on 
motivations other then short term self-interest’ (Tyler 2005:50).
Therefore, legitimacy theorists differentiate between instrumental compliance based 
on anticipated benefits or incentives, and normative compliance. Incentivised 
compliance stems from perceived short term benefits. This can be differentiated from 
normative compliance based on the internalised obligation to obey irrespective of self 
interest.
10.2.2.6: Reinserting the normative dimension o f supervision
The supervision relationship is a potential avenue for encouraging normative 
compliance. It was noted in Chapter Two that normative compliance can emerge 
from bonds with authority and the perceived obligation to obey because the authority 
is perceived to be legitimate. The present study found that where enforcement 
decision making is perceived to be unfair, it can engender non-compliance. In
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addition, the study found that a crucial element central to enhancing perceived 
legitimacy and ensuring compliance is the nature of the relationship between both 
parties. Where a positive relationship has not been established, the probationer is 
more likely to consider that the decision making process is unfair and to thereby defy 
the directives of the officer.
In Chapter six, two cases were cited as evidence of this. In both cases, both 
probationers refused to attend their appointments because of the perceived poor 
quality of treatment received. They subsequently resumed their attendance having 
been transferred to different officers who then completed the enforcement process. 
They accepted the legitimacy of the punishment for breach and they reported that their 
defiance was triggered by the poor quality treatment received and not by the officers’ 
decision to initiate breach action. Perhaps a striking aspect of this finding is that both 
probationers evaluated their new officers in positive terms although it was these 
officers that completed the enforcement process. They accepted the legitimacy of the 
officers’ authority in prosecuting them for breach and were happy to comply with 
their directives.
Therefore, although the current focus appears to be on the use of instrumental 
mechanisms of compliance, the normative potential of the supervision relationship 
may be developed to enhance normative compliance. Prioritising the relational 
element of supervision and its role in shaping perceptions of legitimacy may be a 
more productive approach to securing compliance. During interactions between both 
parties the bonds or the attachments with people in authority that may foster 
normative compliance based on perceived legitimacy may be developed.
266
10.2.2.7: Effective practice skills
A second example of the normative potential of interactions between both parties is 
provided by the finding that the relationships between both parties were largely 
positive and thrived on: welfarism (caring and supportive not authoritative); 
reciprocity; egalitarianism (most probationers described their officers as ‘a friend’), 
trust and honesty. This reveals a normative base that can be developed by replacing 
the reliance on instrumental compliance mechanisms with normative mechanisms. 
Furthermore, there are several empirically verified techniques that may be employed 
by the officers in this respect. The effective practice literature identifies these skills 
and techniques (Dowden and Andrews 2004). The skills derive from the cognitive 
behavioural approaches and also from the prosocial modelling approaches. The skills 
can only be implemented during interactions with the probationers and they should 
form the core of the relational dimension of supervision. These techniques revolve 
around the effective use of authority, problem solving, motivational interviewing 
techniques, and prosocial modelling techniques (See generally, Trotter 1996; Miller 
and Rollnick 2002; Dowden and Andrews 2004; Raynor 2004.203). They aim at 
promoting the ability of the probationer to make the changes that they identify for 
themselves. Problem solving becomes a collaborative effort. In the process, the 
probationer develops the skills necessary for sustaining prosocial lifestyles. Therefore, 
the officer’s role in helping to improve the probationer’s self efficacy and self 
concept, whilst promoting pro-social behaviours are central to this approach.
Given that they encourage collaborative working relationships and good quality 
treatment, employing the effective practice skills should ensure that the antecedents of 
perceived legitimacy namely, ‘responsive regulation’ as defined by Murphy (2005) or 
‘procedural justice’ as defined by Tyler are incorporated in practice. Perceived
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legitimacy can also be reinforced by the projected role the officer adopts in order to 
transfer vicarious liability for enforcement to wider policy. It follows that the 
perceived legitimacy of authority based on perceived fair treatment can be reinforced 
where enforcement action is viewed as an institutional mandate performed almost 
reluctantly and prompted by the actions of the probationers themselves. The onus is 
on the probationer to ensure that the officer is not forced to pursue this role. In any 
event, enforcement would only arise where the actions of the probationers make it 
imperative.
In sum, it is clear that the supervision relationship provides an avenue for encouraging 
normative compliance. In line with other studies, this study has shown that 
probationers tend to report that a positive relationship with their officers in the form 
o f ‘support and encouragement’ is crucial (Rex 1999; Trotter 1996) and may enhance 
normative compliance (Rex 1999:379). The ability of officers to exert a ‘positive 
moral influence over probationers’ as mentioned in chapter two has also been noted 
empirically (Rex 1999:380; Burnett and McNeill 2005). The current study found that 
positive relations (a good rapport) between both parties and also, the opportunity to 
discuss problems encourage compliance. It is possible that these may operate as 
compliance mechanisms even where no disincentives (or incentives) are attached to 
non-compliance. Moreover, the apparent reliance on instrumental mechanisms 
appeared to have very limited impact on compliance patterns. By refraining in 
normative terms the compliance strategies that are currently defined in instrumental 
terms, their normative potential can be realised.
10.3: Revisiting the themes from the wider literature
Broadly, this study is consistent with several themes from the relevant literature. It 
found that non-compliance typically assumes the form of absenteeism. It also found
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that most of the probationers violated their orders by failing to attend appointments 
for reasons that they described as invalid despite the existence of a deterrent 
enforcement framework. Another area of concordance with the wider literature is the 
positive evaluation of supervision typically offered by many probationers and the 
centrality of the opportunity to discuss problems. Further, the obstacles to compliance 
identified in the study were broadly consistent with the wider literature. Thus the 
study found that socioeconomic disadvantage such as unemployment or a sporadic 
employment history, accommodation difficulties, and financial problems are potential 
obstacles to compliance. Likewise, practical problems particularly travel related 
difficulties and lifestyle obstacles linked to substance misuse may also affect 
attendance as can negative relationships during interactions. Other correlates 
identified by the literature are the nature of the offence -  dishonesty offences such as 
having a burglary conviction, age, gender and the length of the order, levels of self 
motivation. Based on the participants’ accounts the study found evidence of most of 
these correlates of non-compliance.
Further, in line with the existing studies, the study found a reluctance to enforce 
compliance as rigidly as prescribed by the formal framework. It also found that 
although contemporary policy changes appeared to accelerate the shift towards 
correctionalism, the officers retain a primarily welfare-based approach to supervision 
and enforcement.
10.4: Organisational ethos: the impact of contemporary policy developments
Reinforcing the observations of several commentators cited in Chapter one, in 
describing the factors that impinge on practice, the officers highlighted inter alia: the 
prescriptive rules and the quest for standardised and cost effective practices. 
According to the officers, these policy trends undermine professional autonomy. The
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policy developments complement the government’s managerialist agenda and the 
quest for cost effectiveness, accountability and standardisation. Further, the policy 
trends are corollaries to what commentators have described as the ‘performance 
culture’ inherent in probation policy (Gelsthorpe and Morgan 2007). The current 
study found additional policy constraints that affect the nature of supervision. In line 
with the existing literature, there was evidence of fragmented models of service 
delivery. Aligned to this is the increasing demand to ensure partnership collaborations 
with external agencies, to delegate duties to ancillary staff, and also, the specialised 
models of service delivery operating in some areas which replace traditional generic 
models.
The study was conducted as the specialist models that are particularly suited to the 
Offender Management framework of service delivery were being phased in. In some 
of the offices specialist models were operative. Further, in offices operating the 
generic model, important components of the officers’ traditional roles were delegated 
to other staff mainly, trainee probation officers and probation services officers. The 
latter in particular, were engaged in interventions or case work with low risk clients. 
The probation service officers also tended to occupy the role of breach officers in 
some offices.
The probation officers offered mixed views about the impact of specialist service 
delivery models and generic models. At the practitioner level, whilst one officer 
welcomed the opportunities and additional resources offered by delegation, some 
regretted the reduced contact and perceived deprofessionalisation entailed by the shift 
from the Social Work oriented Casework approach to Case Management functions. 
There was concern about the loss of continuity in supervision. In addition, some of the 
probationers attested to the detrimental nature of having numerous supervisors in the
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course of an order. It has been argued that specialist models fuel discontinuity and this 
impinges on staff morale and job satisfaction. It may also create ‘status differential’ 
whereby specialism in high risk cases is deemed to be more prestigious than other 
roles (Robinson 2005:311-312).
10.4.1: Discontinuity
Some of the officers identified links between the fragmented model of service 
delivery and increased bureaucratic functions on the one hand and discontinuity 
during supervision on the other hand. From the respondents’ accounts, the problems 
posed by discontinuity include the difficulty of having to re-invest trust in different 
supervisors. It has also been argued that it is accompanied by the difficulties linked to 
implementing a sentence plan that was developed collaboratively by the client and a 
different officer (Raynor and Maguire 2006). Continuity enables the probationers to 
develop trust and to establish a rapport, both of which may encourage honest 
disclosure and successful engagement.
The importance of continuity during supervision and the difficulties of maintaining
continuity have been noted officially. In the Home Office sponsored study by
Partridge cited earlier, it was observed that:
It was rare for one case manager to oversee an offender throughout 
their entire community sentence. While this is an ideal way of 
ensuring continuous contact, it is often impractical in reality due to 
resource issues, staff turnover or the way a model is structured 
(Partridge 2004:5).
Partridge found that specialist Case Management models were most prevalent. 
Robinson (2005) traces the fragmentation of service delivery to the shift away from 
the traditional ‘relational model’ of supervision. The shift emerged with the 
introduction of statutory partnership working, the new Case Management approach to 
supervision and more recently, the tiering system introduced in recent policy
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(Robinson 2005:307). As mentioned in Chapter one, the current National Standards 
provide for the categorisation of probationers across four tiers on the basis of assessed 
risks. The tiers range from low to high risk with the levels of intervention and control 
increasing in intensity as the probationers progress up the four tiers. The tiering 
system is deemed to be a corollary to the risk management trend in policy 
representing the recasting of offenders as ‘portable entities to be assessed and then 
‘managed into’ appropriate resources’ (Robinson 2005:310; emphasis in original). 
Although some of the officers reported that the division of labour entailed by the 
tiering system should alleviate the problem of heavy case loads, other officers in this 
study were unequivocal in their belief that a link exists between discontinuity and 
non-compliance. In addition, some of the probationers expressed their dissatisfaction 
with having to report to different officers.
Meanwhile, other commentators suggest that continuity and its positive attributes is
preserved where a named case manager oversees the entire supervision process and
plays a role in encouraging compliance, resolving practical and motivational
obstacles, and reinforcing skills and learning derived from programs (Raynor and
Maguire 2006). This was the model operating in most of the offices I visited. Most
of the probationers were able to identify a named case manager as their probation
officer. This is also the model operative in Jersey as confirmed by a senior manager:
We also try wherever possible to keep the same probation officers.
So the person who writes the report would be responsible for the 
supervision.... we think it’s important to recognise the continuity 
principle. So wherever possible, the report writer will be the case 
manager. But the case manager in Jersey is much more, actually... 
if you ask the person who their probation officer is, they’ll identify 
with that person. They will have the relationship with that person.
They’ll see lots of people during the course of their order, but they 
will still be seeing that person, say for example while someone’s 
on a group work program they’ll still be coming in to see their 
probation officer to say how the group’s going, what they’ve learnt
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what the next things are, how’s the home work going? So that’s 
the model we use. JP04M
There is empirical evidence that good compliance rates have been achieved during the
operation of this model in the Jersey Service (Raynor and Maguire 2006; Raynor and
Miles 2007).
10.4.2: Reduced contact
With the diversionary agenda of the 1980s and its intensification over the past 
decades, the necessary outcome has been a significant increase in probation officers’ 
caseloads. To exacerbate matters, by 2001, sentencers were imposing community 
penalties for less serious offences that would normally warrant a fine or a discharge 
(Morgan 2003). More recent official data also reveal the sustained increase in case 
loads. Between 1995 and 2005 there was a 17% increase in the number of people 
commencing probation service supervision (NOMS 2006b). Further, the 
diversionary agenda underpinning the new provisions introduced by the CJA 2003 
requires officers to supervise the new suspended sentence orders added to their role in 
post release supervision. These contribute to the increasing caseloads that may reduce 
the level of contact between both parties and affect the nature of supervision. 
Alongside these developments, the transformation of probation practice is such that 
the shift away from working with clients parallels the move towards the increasing 
computerisation of duties. The current study found that contemporary policy changes 
may have engendered a transformation in the way some of the officer1 define their 
role. They are now 'case managers' 'enforcers' 'computerised managers'.
Recognising the transformations to the role of the probation officer, Worrall and Hoy 
write:
...professional autonomy has been steadily eroded to the point where
many probation officers see themselves as nothing more than
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criminal justice operatives, concerned only with the technological 
aspects of a bureaucratic job’ (2005:86).
There is also the fear that the policy transformations will engender the deskilling of
officers, or the de-professionalisation of officers (Bailey et al. 2007). Some of the
officers in this study alluded to this possibility. They pointed out that their areas of
specialisation have been removed and transferred to other professionals within and
external to the service. In considering this issue, Robinson (2003) argues that
perceived deprofessionalisation can be reduced if a balance can be achieved between
technical functions and other functions that are reliant on the professional expertise of
the officers.
10.4.3: Multiple initiatives and reduced staff morale
According to some of the officers, an additional source of contradiction is the 
introduction of multiple initiatives or ‘unparalleled organisational changes’ (Robinson 
and McNeill 2004:278). The service underwent a major reorganisation in 2001 with 
the creation of a more centralised National Probation Service created by the Criminal 
Justice and Court Services Act 2000 and established on 1 April 2001. Reflecting the 
government’s centralisation agenda, the new service was placed under the 
management of a National Probation Directorate (NPD) established within the Home 
Office. Further, major reorganisations were implemented with the introduction of 
NOMS and the tiered supervision models, on June 1st 2005 leading to even further 
restructuring of the organisational framework of the service.
It was noted that in 2001 alone ‘over 130 probation circulars were issued in the first 
nine months...not far short of one every working day’ (Raynor and Vanstone 
2002:101). Since then, multiple initiatives and changes have been introduced. Apart 
from the appointment of several Home Secretaries (3 since 2005 at the start of this 
study), several Home Office (now Ministry of Justice) publications have introduced
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wide ranging reviews of the system (For instance, see Carter 2003). Added to these, a 
new Criminal Justice Act was published in 2003 and two National Standards were 
published in 2005 and in 2007. Alongside these is the reorganisation of existing 
orders into a generic community order encompassing a menu of requirements.
The study found that apart from their practical implications, in some cases, the policy 
described above pose mental and physical health implications. There were examples 
of reduced morale and high staff turnover linked to work related stress. This is 
consistent with the findings of the study by Bailey and colleagues (2007:116) which 
explored the views of 157 staff in two probation areas. They found that ‘quite a 
substantial number of respondents’ reported that the multiple initiatives including the 
performance management ethos and resulting high caseloads, increased bureaucratic 
functions and the delegation of traditional roles were linked to feelings of low morale 
and stress. Describing the impact of these policy developments, Gelsthorpe and 
Morgan write:
The result has been a Service which for more than a decade now has 
been characterised by declining morale, internal feuding about 
desirable ways forward and, as a result of major structural changes, 
the introduction of new personnel and new intervention 
programmes, great uncertainty about the future and a corresponding 
lack of confidence (2007:11).
The quote below made by a female officer, qualified for less than a year illustrates 
this:
I think that the more they overload us the more things are gonna 
go wrong and you’ll see, like you’ve seen with that little girl who 
got raped yeah? You’ll see more and more and more of that 
because it will be beyond our capabilities to do the work that we 
need to do because it’s too much. And they’ll change Home 
Secretaries every year and they’ll f*** it up more...PO!7F
275
This study also found that the demand to implement these multiple initiatives impose 
time constraints that in turn impinge on the degree of contact with the probationers. 
This study found that despite these policy constraints and the shift towards 
correctionalism, core supervision practices retain much of the welfarism associated 
with early probation supervision.
10.4.4: Welfarism in a risk focused organisational context
Reflecting developments in wider society, probation policy emphasises risk reduction 
and public protection. Although the officers acknowledge that this has been inscribed 
by policy, the perception that the officer’s role is rehabilitative and not punitive still 
remains. It is clear from this study that officers were more inclined to define their 
roles in terms of outcomes such as effecting change. For some of the officers there is 
still a belief in the clients’ rehabilitative potential. In addition, studies demonstrate the 
reluctance to enforce as rigidly as prescribed. Several explanations for this were 
offered namely:
• humanistic considerations of the adverse impact of a punitive approach,
• the ‘rehabilitation ideal’ of pre-1970s probation,
• the diversionary agenda of the 1980s,
• the prioritisation of social and practical help which persisted after the 
introduction of the National Standards in the 1990s,
• administrative inconvenience and the convoluted processes involved in 
processing breach and discretionary decision making.
The literature also reveals that breach action is most likely where there is:
• persistent absenteeism with no notification provided;
• failure to attend the first appointment;
• the absence of a positive relationship between both parties
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The findings of the current study are broadly consistent with these findings recode by 
the relevant empirical literature. Two types of violations exist namely, minor and 
persistent violations. Both exceed nationally prescribed limits but with persistent 
absenteeism, no contact is made to the office. There is a reluctance to enforce orders 
as strictly as prescribed by the legal framework and breach action is typically reserved 
for cases involving persistent violations. Thus, of the 17 probationers that reported 
violations, only 8 were breached. The 8 reported that they had persistently violated 
their orders and had not maintained adequate contact. Their reports were broadly 
consistent with their case records. This study also found that the officers adopt 
compliance strategies that are responsive to the social and environmental needs of the 
probationers.
Thus, the officers adopt a welfarist approach to securing compliance by attempting to 
address the socio economic obstacles to compliance. According to the officers, they:
• refer the probationers to the relevant agencies equipped to assist with socio­
economic, substance misuse and other lifestyle difficulties;
• reimburse travel costs, in order to resolve practical obstacles;
• offer flexible reporting practices to alleviate childcare and practical problems;
• offer reminders or make home visits to follow up absences in specific cases;
• make home visits to alleviate reporting difficulties;
• devise more responsive informal rules;
• develop a rapport to ensure honest disclosure and trust;
• employ motivational strategies;
• ensure effective collaboration in order to encourage the active participation of 
probationers.
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The use of home visits or reminders to follow up absences is variable. For some 
officers, reminders and home visits are reserved for clients with chaotic lifestyles or 
other established difficulties. Equally, some officers rejected the use of follow up 
strategies to encourage compliance. They adopted a responsibilising stance which 
located the responsibility for compliance on the probationer. Although previous 
National Standards located responsibility for compliance within the client, the latest 
standards recognise that compliance requires a collaborative effort between both 
parties (NOMS 2007a).
The foregoing provides an overview of how the current study reinforces existing 
findings. New insights into the nature of enforcement and compliance as defined by 
the key parties involved also emerged from this study. We can recall that several 
commentators have decried the paucity of research examining the reasons for non- 
compliance, pointing out that this represents a gap in knowledge (Bottoms 2001; 
Farrall 2002a; Hedderman and Hough 2004). The commentators point out that such 
research should focus on the perceptions and perspectives of those mandated to 
comply in order to develop insights into the correlates of compliance. New insights 
gained from this study should contribute towards filling this gap in knowledge. These 
are discussed below.
10.5: Unravelling the complexities of compliance
This study broadly echoes previous findings. Added to these, it uncovered three 
processes central to an understanding of compliance. These are:
• Reacting to formal rules
• Confronting unpredictability
• Adaptation techniques
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10.5.1: Complexity and continuity o f social phenomena
The almost cyclical pattern displayed by the 3 processes central to an understanding 
of compliance and outlined above was observed repeatedly in the data. However, the 
3 key processes are not linear processes. There are a range of variables that may affect 
the direction of the 3 processes. It has been shown in the previous chapters that 
several intervening factors may underpin the three processes. These were 
conceptualised as ‘contradictions’. Further, not all cases fit into these three categories. 
For instance, although the probationers would typically adapt to the informal rules, 
adaptation is not always complete. Some probationers would violate the informal 
rules and become liable to breach action. Likewise in certain conditions, some of the 
officers are unwilling to activate punitive enforcement even in the event of persistent 
breach with no contact. These are in exceptional cases. An example is where the 
probationer has maintained a good compliance pattern and is approaching the end of 
an order; some officers reported that they would more flexible in their reactions to 
persistent violations in these cases. Likewise, where the officer assesses the 
probationer’s circumstances and concludes that breach action will have a detrimental 
impact on progress already made, the officer is less likely to fully activate the 
enforcement process. These are exceptional cases and reactions to violations are again 
subject to the officers’ discretion in each case.
The complexity underpinning the 3 key processes reflect the interactionist position on
the complexity and continuity of human actions and interactions (Blummer 1969).
Reinforcing this point, Downes and Rock write:
The orderly production of deviance and deviants therefore hinges 
on a complicated set of interchanges. It cannot be distilled down 
into a series of mechanical and predictable processes....General 
themes do dominate analysis, but they are not held to have the 
character of iron laws. On the contrary, outcomes are treated as 
uncertain and possibly surprising’ (2003: 191).
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In sum, the 3 processes reveal the centrality of the officers’ actions in defining the 
nature of compliance achieved. Below is an outline of the nature of compliance 
achieved.
• Compliance is restricted to attendance and this reflects the unilateral definition 
of compliance adopted in practice.
• Frequent absenteeism exceeding policy prescribed limits is defined as 
compliance provided notification is received
• The symbolic definition of compliance adopted in practice engenders the 
normalisation of minor violations and the redefinition of minor violations as 
compliance
The situational and structural contradictions linked to these processes are the 
interactional contexts and the obstacles to compliance affecting the probationers; the 
policy constraints and the unpredictability of probationers that impact on the work of 
the officers. The activities of the officers in resolving these contradictions were most 
closely linked to compliance. The officers adopt a predominantly welfare oriented and 
discretionary approach to securing compliance.
10.6: Industrial deviance
From the foregoing it is clear that in responding to violations the officers try to 
resolve the contradictions posed by policy constraints and the unpredictability of the 
probationers by replacing the formal rules with the more informal rules that are more 
responsive to the realities of practice. The informal rules permit violations that would 
normally constitute non-compliance within the parameters set by the National 
Standards. As such, the application of the informal rule constitutes a form of 
‘industrial deviance’. Pearson’s (1975:30) concept of ‘industrial deviance’ 
conceptualises instances where practitioners who are mandated to operate under
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highly regulated and restrictive conditions develop alternative and more flexible 
strategies. Industrial deviance is a pragmatic response to unpredictability. It entails 
‘...the bending and breaking of rules and regulations... in order to advance work with 
clients’ (1975:25). The informal rules are designed to overcome the contradictions 
posed by restrictive and unworkable policy conditions and those posed by the 
practicalities of dealing with the unpredictability that confronts them. Indeed, Pearson 
(1975:25) cites the failure to ‘strictly enforce’ probation orders as a typical example of 
industrial deviance or official rule breaking. Broadly, industrial deviance represents: 
‘a gap between the official aspirations...and the actuality of practice’ (Pearson 
1975:24). It is the point at which:
‘rules, training, values and action intersect...that is, the bending and 
breaking of rules and regulations... in order to advance ...work with 
clients and the turning of ‘blind eyes’ towards clients who only
seem to ‘get by’ by ‘getting round’ the ...system (Pearson 1975:25).
It is the product of opportunity and will manifest itself in various forms across
different organisational settings. This echoes Vass’s (1984) findings that in any
situation where an individual is required to apply formal rules and regulations to a 
group of people, their actions would often be influenced by the practical realities of 
enforcing these rules in real life contexts. Rule violations are met with considerable 
‘flexibility, argument, persuasion, exertion of pressure (activation of sanctions if 
everything else fails) compromises and negotiations’. Some may resort to subterfuge 
in order to maintain a fa<?ade of efficiency and secure professional progress. This may 
assume the form of ‘evading and distorting control mechanisms ...’ (Vass 1984.45). 
This study shows that the arbitrary processes of selecting an enforcement criteria in 
each case, provides ample opportunities for industrial deviance to flourish. This will 
necessarily engender a discrepancy between officially recorded rates of compliance
281
and actual compliance rates. Indeed the dark figure of non-compliance has long been 
noted given the many instances where officers ignore non-compliance for several 
reasons (Hine 1995 cited in Farrall 2002a).
Pearson advances three types of industrial deviance namely, alleviating the burden of 
mundane tasks, facilitating the work process and inserting a degree of autonomy into 
practice in order to achieve objectives. This study suggests that the industrial deviance 
displayed falls within the second and the third categories. There are numerous 
incidents in the data that highlight the belief that the ability to minimise or overlook 
non-compliance is crucial to the continued existence of a probation service: ‘for large 
bureaucracies to function effectively sometimes, workers must ignore and break 
bureaucratic rules’ (Taylor and Walton 1971 cited in Pearson 1975). Therefore, 
without the ability to deviate from national standard requirements, supervision will be 
impossible as most probationers will be breached at court. Breach rates will escalate 
to phenomenal proportions.
Furthermore, industrial deviance enables the practitioner to inject their personal 
ideologies into practice. The data reveals the altruism that pervades probation 
supervision. This may be linked to the humanitarian foundations of probation 
ideology. To secure compliance, officers replace correctionalist processes with a 
welfarist approach. This constitutes a: ‘professional challenge to bureaucratic rules’ 
correcting ‘official standards of bureaucratic and legal social controls’ (Pearson 
1975:30-31).
Writing about the tendency of officials charged with enforcement compliance to focus 
on persistent or serious violations and to overlook minor violations, Downes and 
Rock observe that according to the labelling theorists:
It is not the simple presence of deviance but its quality, scale and
location which typically shape a reply. Very often, deviation can be
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normalised and accommodated inside the fabric of accepted life. It 
is only when it is inexplicable, disordering, harmful or threatening 
that a gross reaction can take place’ (2003.187).
Therefore, the professionals eschew strict enforcement requirements to accommodate 
the practicalities of working with unpredictability. Strict enforcement is then reserved 
for cases involving persistent violations.
10.6.1: The altruism o f  industrial deviance
It is worth noting that industrial deviance is not motivated solely by the need to 
manage the contradictions inherent in reconciling the restrictive policy aspirations 
with the practicalities of supervision. According to the data, it is also primarily 
motivated by an altruism which seeks to promote the welfare of the individual 
probationer by reducing unpredictability, facilitating compliance and ultimately, 
rehabilitation. It is an attempt to re-infuse the professional altruism that is traditionally 
associated with probation practice.
10.7: Labelling
The concept of industrial deviance describe activities that mirror the observations of 
the labelling theorists who argued that in reacting to rule violations, much will depend 
on the objectives and capacities of the enforcers (Becker 1963; Downes and Rock 
2003). Authorities charged with securing compliance rather than with enforcement, 
may employ ‘compliance-based strategies’ in which minor violations are minimised 
(Downes and Rock 2003.189). Persistent and flagrant violations on the other hand are 
met with the conferment of a deviant label. As such, those subject to enforcement 
employ several mechanisms (escape clauses or other gaps and anomalies) permitted 
by the law in order to avoid full compliance as required by law.
This is particularly the case where agencies that are ill-equipped to effectively 
challenge persistent non-compliance devise alternative and more manageable means
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of securing compliance. Routine unpredictability and non-compliance are minimised 
and normalised through processes that seek to encourage the cooperation of the 
deviant. The deviants are ascribed roles which will not antagonise their perceptions of 
self. Downes and Rock (2003) cite the example of debt collectors who overtly define 
payment defaulters not as dishonest, but as honest and forgetful people. Another 
example is the definition of unwed mothers as victims of misadventure rather than as 
irresponsible women. These definitions may differ from the manner in which the 
enforcers actually perceive the deviants. Nevertheless they are employed to facilitate 
compliance and cooperation with authority.
In sum, industrial deviance is the process through which authorities mandated to 
secure compliance with legal rules replace the formal rules with more responsive 
informal rules. In n doing so, the authorities redefine the nature of compliance 
achieved. Compliance then, is the product of this redefinition. It is a label attached to 
behaviours so defined by the relevant authorities.
10.7.1: Adaptation: the normalisation o f  deviance
Industrial deviance based though it is on pragmatism and altruism may engender the 
normalisation of deviance. This study shows that the probationers tend to adapt to 
informal rules and to internalise the revised definition of compliance inherent in these 
rules. The redefined term is markedly different from the definition intended by policy. 
It normalises actions that would properly constitute non-compliance within the formal 
rules. Interactionists would argue that this redefinition ensures that deviancy labels 
which impact adversely on the ‘self with stigmatising and deviancy perpetuating 
implications are not imposed. Downes and Rock write:
When acts and states can be reassessed as worthy or innocuous, 
when they can be presented as not ‘really’ deviant, it is a little easier 
to accept them’ (2003:184).
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This may explain the ease with which the probationers who, though they had reported 
violations, were able reconcile their actions (providing false excuses and wilfully 
failing to attend) with the perception that they had been fully compliant. Here, the 
‘regulation of deviance contributed roles that protected the self of the rule-breaker’ 
(Downes and Rock 2003:190).
One unintended consequence of the normalisation of deviance is that the deviants 
become confirmed in their ascribed roles with an increased potential for further acts of 
deviance. In both instances, labelling theorists will acknowledge that:
There is...a tendency to treat rules as resources rather than as 
binding instructions. It is a tendency that creates considerable 
flexibility in the organisation of relations between deviants and 
agents of control. Rule-breakers may be co-opted as allies or 
informants, they may become part of a game-like and well-regulated 
exchange, they may be effectively ignored, or they may be pursued 
with great vigour (Downes and Rock 2003.190).
Therefore, normalisations may trigger further violations. Downes and Rock (2003)
acknowledge the pragmatism of such normalisations given that they avert frequent
cost intensive enforcement processes. However, they point out that, utilising rules as
resources in this manner ‘rather than as binding instructions’ creates further acts of
deviance as the normalised acts of deviance are perpetuated (p. 190).
Another source of normalisation is the unilateral definition of compliance endorsed in 
practice. This definition is based mainly on attendance and hence, it normalises other 
forms of rule violations.
10.7.2: The unilateral definition o f  compliance
The tendency to define compliance purely in terms of attendance was noted in the 
literature (Ellis et al. 1996). Although it is a multi dimensional concept, non-
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compliance is defined solely in terms of absenteeism. Other forms of non-compliance 
are ignored. This may be because absenteeism is the most visible form of non- 
compliance and is therefore more amenable to demonstrative enforcement. Given that 
it is more amenable to recording and quantification processes, it may also alleviate the 
evidential burden on the officers where breach action is contested. It is more onerous 
to adduce the evidence required to prove the more qualitative forms of non- 
compliance such as disruptive or unacceptable behaviour during supervision. The 
current study found that the nature of compliance achieved in practice is directly 
linked to its definition in this unilateral sense. The unilateral definition is regrettable 
because there are adverse implications accruing from the narrow definition.
10.7.3: Unilateral compliance and the normalisation o f  deviance 
Compliance involves complex processes involving inter alia, the co-construction of 
meaning during interactions. As interactions evolve, both parties acquire an 
understanding of a revised definition of compliance. One potential outcome is that the 
redefined concept of compliance is a narrow version that normalises incidents of non- 
compliance and other violations exceeding the boundaries of the redefined concept. 
Thus wilful absenteeism can be redefined as compliance provided that there is 
notification. Maintaining adequate contact normalises this violation. This is also an 
unintended outcome of the informal rules.
xli10.7.4: Encouraging technical or subversive compliance
Another implication of the unilateral definition is that it erroneously equates frequent 
attendance with good compliance and reduced reconviction (Hartland 2007). This 
constitutes an inaccurate measure of compliance. There are several possible types of 
non-compliance even where the probationer meets the minimum attendance 
requirements. Attending appointments under the influence of substances, disruptive
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behaviour or refusing to engage are some examples of the forms of non-compliance 
that may be overlooked in the narrow focus on attendance. Therefore, the unilateral 
definition of compliance may encourage forms of compliance that negate the 
objectives of the order even where the probationer meets the minimum requirement 
(attendance). As noted in Chapter Two, socio-legal theorists specialising in regulatory 
studies highlight the distinctions between normative compliance based on an 
internalised obligation to obey and forms of compliance in which compliance is 
restricted to fulfilling minimum requirements without any apparent commitment to 
the objectives of the law. The current study found that the unilateral definition may in 
some cases encourage what has been described by one of the officers as ‘technical 
compliance’ and by another as ‘subversive compliance’. It may also encourage 
manipulation whereby the probationers provide legitimate evidence to support 
illegitimate reasons or absence. Given the loss of autonomous decision making in 
such cases, the officers are constrained to endorse the absence as an acceptable 
absence. Two cases studies were provided in the study to illustrate this.
10.8: Developing effective strategies to encourage compliance 
The study found that three key processes explain compliance:
• Reacting to formal rules
• Confronting unpredictability
• Adapting to informal rules
In exploring these processes, the study also identified several strategies which, if 
incorporated in policy, should encourage compliance with community penalties. 
These require policy intervention and are described further below in the discussion 
about the policy implications of this study. Meanwhile, the study examined the two
factors that may explain the noted disparity between policy objectives and outcome
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namely, the effectiveness of the policy framework and the actual implementation of 
policy provisions in practice. We have seen the limited effectiveness of the objective 
deterrent framework. Most probationers reported that they were motivated to comply 
primarily by the perceived benefits of supervision. In addition, most violated the 
formal rules despite heightened perceptions of risks. The second factor linked to the 
disparity between policy and outcomes is examined in more detail below.
10.9: Revising policy requirements to ensure compliance
In line with previous findings, this study discovered there are disparities between 
policy provisions and actual practices. In some cases, these divergences extend to the 
practitioners’ perspectives of the most effective modes of service delivery.
It has been suggested that correctionalist policies devised at the centre from the 1980s 
onwards were translated at management level into punitive practices designed to 
expedite enforcement rates. Provisions were introduced to ensure limited discretion, 
the standardisation of enforcement practices and the effective implementation of 
deterrent objectives (Hartland 2007). Enforcement studies conducted in the wake of 
the introduction of the restrictive standards implied that based on recorded breach 
rates, some areas were indeed implementing a rigid or ‘tough’ enforcement approach. 
Others revealed the rise in recorded enforcement rates. Further, official inspections 
revealed that enforcement targets were being achieved in many probation areas (see 
generally, Chapter one). Implying that the ideological conflict that may have 
underpinned the documented reluctance to pursue a breach ethos had been resolved in 
favour of correctionalism, it was officially noted in 2003 that: ‘the cultural issues 
about enforcement have been addressed’ (National Probation Directorate, 2003:5, 
quoted in Worrall and Hoy 2005:75).
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One may argue that although the policy and organisational changes were real and
were designed to affect the nature of service delivery, they may not have orchestrated
a shift in actual practices in any straightforward manner. This study demonstrates this.
The concept of industrial deviance for instance, highlights the disparities between
policy recommendations and actual practices. Reinforcing this finding, recent studies
reveal the prevailing welfarism coexisting with a punitive policy agenda. Drawing on
their study of practitioner views, Bailey and colleagues write:
...the values of complex organisations cannot necessarily be 
changed effectively either by central diktat or by administrative 
reorganisation. There is evidence that some practitioners (and some 
managers) cling resolutely, if often covertly, to the values which 
initially attracted them to probation work’... (2007:120).
It is widely acknowledged that these values define actual practices despite policy
changes that aim to restructure the nature of service delivery (Burnett et al. 2007).
Commentators acknowledge that ‘the practical tasks’ (Mair 1997:1203) or ‘the model
of practice for working with offenders’ remains almost unchanged since 1907
(Burnett et al. 2007:210). In short, it is rightly argued that: ‘pressures for change do
not instantly produce re-alignment of the probation officer’s modus operandi...’
(Fielding 1984:2). Therefore, although the ‘official’ position on the underlying ethos
of the service may have signalled a shift away from social work or welfarism, actual
practices largely appear to be rooted in welfarism. This has also been observed in
other aspects of probation policy. For instance, public protection and risk management
feature prominently in official and academic discourses concerning the role of the
service and in the articulation of a ‘new penology’ of risk (Feeley and Simon 1994).
Notwithstanding this, Kemshall and Wood (2007) point out that the empirical
evidence suggests that the official preoccupation with managing risks have not
impacted on actual practice to the degree presupposed:
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...in practice ‘sea changes’ take longer and are significantly 
mediated by the practices and values of staff and the culture of the 
organisation within which they are working’ (2007:384).
Likewise, there is evidence that in practice, some resistance to the fragmented service 
delivery models engendered by statutory partnership working exists, with officers 
reluctant to refer clients to other service providers in order to avoid discontinuity of 
supervision (Burnett 1996). Gelsthorpe (2007:509) sums up the inevitable disparities 
between policy and practice with the observation that ‘the image of puppet-like 
adherence to managerial control is certainly not appropriate’. Likewise, describing the 
problems posed to frontline staff by the offender management model, Robinson 
(2005:311) highlights the disparities that exist between policies set at managerial 
level and practitioner perspectives, with the argument that: ‘arrangements that make 
sense at the level of offender management do not necessarily offer the same benefits 
for those working on the ground’ (Emphasis in original). Highlighting that the 
correctionalist agenda inherent in contemporary probation policy have not fully 
filtered through to practice, McNeill (2000) found in his study of practitioners’ 
perceptions that rejecting the apparent orthodoxy of constructing effectiveness in 
terms of reoffending and reconviction rates, effectiveness was defined in terms of 
achieving the rehabilitation of the probationer by reducing reoffending and reducing 
social difficulties. In their view, effective practice did not include quantitative outputs 
that may be derived from measuring rates of: enforcement; diversion from custody, 
compliance with national standard requirements or meeting the expectations of 
external audiences including sentencers. McNeill (2000) found that the traditional 
altruistic practice of addressing needs and developing relationships still persists. 
Consequently, although organisational and national policies have been designed to 
change the nature of service delivery, studies find that ideological changes are more
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difficult to achieve. Many practitioners retain the welfarist ideological associated with 
the service. The current study found this to be the case. As noted in chapter one and 
also above, other studies of probation practice have recorded similar findings. 
Further, a recent study that explored enforcement practices within probation areas in 
Wales recorded findings similar to the current study (Deering 2008). Reinforcing the 
findings of the current study, the study by Deering also found that many of the 
officers sampled tend to prioritise the objective of ensuring compliance over 
enforcement. As such, there appears to be no significant commitment to a rigid 
application of the deterrent enforcement framework rather, most of the officers adopt 
a flexible and discretionary enforcement approach irrespective of individual officer 
biography, training style or theoretical/philosophical basis for practice.
The current study found that the welfarism and flexibility observed may be based on 
pragmatic and altruistic considerations. The recognition that a caring approach is 
more productive than a controlling approach underpins most of the officers’ approach 
to enforcement and to supervision in general. Perhaps one testament to the altruism of 
probation practice is the concept of industrial deviance. It provides the means of 
replacing the authoritarianism intended by policy with humanitarianism.
Thus, the literature reveals that policies and discourses emerging from the centre and 
at organisational level reflect the shift from neo-conservative populism and 
penological pragmatism to correctionalism and the effort to enhance the credibility of 
the service through ‘tough’ enforcement policies. It appears that this shift at the level 
of policy making has not orchestrated a corresponding change in actual practices. The 
strategies devised by the officers in this study to secure positive outcomes are 
typically discretionary and welfare based. The concept of industrial deviance 
represents these processes.
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10.10: Policy implications
The findings of this study pose several possible policy implications. Industrial 
deviance even where underpinned by altruism and welfarism is ‘unofficial rule- 
breaking’. As such, it is necessarily a covert activity that might engender 
discrimination. By relying on arbitrary decision making, it places some probationers 
at risk of differential treatment or at worst, at risk of unfair treatment. Furthermore, 
the concept permits the normalisation of deviance; it is inconsistent with the 
standardisation of practice intended by policy. Indeed, enforcement practice clearly 
demonstrates the disparities between policy and practice. Likewise, the objective 
existence of the deterrent framework appears to have limited impact on compliance 
patters. Most probationers violate the formal rules even where they have heightened 
perceptions of the risks of non-compliance.
The policy implications posed is the need to revise the existing enforcement 
framework. There is a need for policy intervention to ensure that policy definitions 
may become aligned with actual practices, reducing the extent of industrial deviance 
and covert decision making and hence, ensuring transparency and reducing the 
disparities between policy and practice. This study reveals the strategies that if 
incorporated in policy, should encourage compliance. The effective strategies may be 
outlined as below.
• Greater flexibility in enforcement and an individualised approach in order to 
ensure that decision making is responsive to the needs and circumstances of 
each probationer. Greater flexibility should ensure that the officers are able to 
operate within the formal policy framework. This should in turn reduce the 
possibility that in applying the informal rules, the officers inadvertently model 
rule breaking to the probationers.
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• Greater flexibility in enforcement may also enhance the perceived legitimacy 
and consistency of outcomes. Further, the currently applied risk assessment 
tools facilitate the assessment of dynamic risk factors encompassing a wider 
range of obstacles to compliance than would be possible if the focus was 
solely on criminogenic needs or static risk factors (see also Raynor and 
Vanstone 2002; Raynor 2003). Therefore, the assessment tools should ensure 
that the probationers’ needs are addressed as part of a comprehensive 
compliance strategy.
• Facilitating continuity in supervision in order to enhance its relational 
dimension
• Encouraging practitioners to employ the core correctional skills empirically 
linked to effective engagement. If incorporated in practice, studies show that 
these skills should enhance self motivation and should generally; produce 
cognitive and behavioural change (Dowden and Andrews 2004; Raynor and 
Maguire 2006; McGuire 2007; Poporino and Fabiano 2007). Further, it has 
been shown to effectively address the problems of lack of motivation 
identified by some officers as the most fundamental obstacle to compliance. 
Importantly, the motivational interviewing process enables the officer to fulfil 
a crucial aspect of supervision that most probationers identify as the central 
factor that encourages them to comply namely, reflective listening and 
empathy. This ensures that the probationers are able to ‘talk out’ their 
problems as part of the problem solving process vital for effective outcomes.
• Refraining incentives in normative terms to encourage compliance based not 
on self interest, but on the perceived obligation to comply and perceived
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fairness. The ‘effective practice skills’ described above can also encourage 
normative compliance.
• Ensuring that the enforcement process is based on dialogue and respect and is 
responsive to the client’s concerns. This approach is likely to enhance 
perceived fair treatment an antecedent of the perceived legitimacy of authority 
(see also Tyler 1990). The study found that an approach that is didactic and 
devoid of empathy is perceived to be unfair. It can produce non-compliance.
• Replacing the unilateral definition of compliance with a more qualitative 
definition of compliance that incorporates progress made during the order, or 
other indices of compliance such as higher levels of motivation and 
engagement.
• Replacing the discourse of enforcement, with an approach that emphasises 
compliance strategies such as those currently employed by the practitioners: 
fixed appointments to reduce forgetfulness, appointment cards, follow-up 
reminders and home visits.
• Also, replacing the potentially self defeating discourse of risk and similar 
correctionalist terminology with discourses that enhance the probationers’ self 
identity and self belief in their ability to comply (see also McNeill 2000).
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10.11: Conclusions
The study identified the three key processes that are central to an understanding of the 
nature of compliance. In doing so, the study highlighted how the ineffectiveness of the 
formal enforcement framework contributes to an understanding of the disparities 
between policy objectives and actual outcomes. Limited links were found between the 
rigid policy provisions and the compliance patterns of the probationers sampled. 
Furthermore, in the effort to secure compliance, the officers devise informal rules that 
are more responsive to the realities of practice than the formal rules. The nature of 
compliance achieved is typically below the standards prescribed by the formal rules. 
However, according to the officers, a rigid application of the formal rules would 
significantly increase the rates of breach action in court.
The effort to recast the image of the service in more correctionalist terms was 
intended to filter through to the level of practice. Whilst this trend towards 
correctionalism may have impacted upon national and organisational level objectives, 
it appears that at the level of actual practice, most of the officers sampled in this study 
adopt a welfarist approach to securing compliance. One acknowledges that there are 
several disparities between the area sampled in this study and other probation areas. 
These have been noted in Chapter three. However, as noted earlier, the finding that 
many officers prioritise a welfarist enforcement approach over a more authoritarian 
approach is consistent with the findings of several studies cited in Chapter one. In the 
current study, the probationers attested to the supportive and caring approach to 
supervision and enforcement. They tended to view their supervisors as their advisor, 
and ‘friend’ with a brief that focuses mainly on problem solving.
To be sure, the shift towards correctionalism placed the officers under intense 
pressure that may have affected several aspects of service delivery including
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enforcement, but studies examining how official policies translate in practice 
contribute to our understanding of the observed disparities between the policies and 
objectives set at national or managerial level and actual practices. This is particularly 
the case where such policies ignore ‘the fit (or otherwise) between ‘official’ 
statements of purpose and the views of those who are actually engaged in the 
supervision of offenders’ (Robinson and McNeill 2004:277). Thus, although some of 
the officers in this study acknowledged that practice has become aligned with the 
discourses of risk management, public protection and enforcement, many officers 
described their role in welfarist terms differentiating it from other criminal justice 
agencies that have been traditionally associated with an enforcement ethos. Similarly, 
enforcement decision making was found to be individualised and cognisant of the 
extenuating influence of several difficulties that act as obstacles to compliance. This is 
in line with the existing studies that show that the creative use of discretion prevails 
over the ‘mechanistic’ interpretation of the National Standards (Gelsthorpe 2007:509). 
Unlike the rigid formal rules, the informal rules represent an altruistic and 
individualised approach to enforcement.
One must not overlook the possibility that the individualised approach may engender 
unequal treatment and feelings of unfair treatment. But this should be balanced 
against the consideration that a rigid implementation of the formal rules may 
ultimately impinge on relationships between officers and their clients. It may 
engender non-compliance because it is likely to be viewed as unfair treatment thus 
undermining perceived legitimacy. This study found this to be the case confirming the 
findings of legitimacy theorists. In addition, the study supports existing studies in its 
findings that a strict application of the deterrent framework will render supervision
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virtually impossible in practical terms given that it would be unresponsive to the range 
of factors that have been shown to affect compliance.
Gelsthorpe (2007: 489) points out that policy objectives must not override autonomy, 
creativity and discretion although there is a need for a balance between ‘uniformity 
and individualisation of treatment’ (Gelsthorpe 2007:509). She differentiates between 
‘negative discrimination’ characterised by unjustifiable decisions marked by 
inconsistent and disparate treatment and positive discrimination which represents a 
more individualised and humanistic approach. The latter conceptualises the approach 
noted in this study. The informal rules are more responsive and they ensure that the 
probationer is given adequate opportunity to complete their orders successfully 
without undue recourse to court breach action.
However, apart from the possibility of discriminatory practices, the informal rules 
may also engender the normalisation of deviance. The definition of compliance as a 
unilateral concept encourages the normalisation of other forms of non-compliance. 
Perhaps exacerbating matters, the study found that compliance is the product of the 
definition that officers apply to specific conduct namely, persistent absenteeism with 
no contact made to the officer or to the office. This redefinition of compliance also 
engenders the normalisation of violations that would normally be defined as non- 
compliance within the formal rules.
In sum, the study found that apart from the mechanisms of compliance developed by 
Bottoms, compliance is best understood as the product of three processes that emerge 
as both parties manage several situational and structural contradictions. The processes 
begin with the violation of the formal rules by the probationers. The activities of the 
officers in confronting the unpredictability of their clients represent the second stage
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of the process. By adapting to the informal rules developed by the officers, the 
probationers complete the process.
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Chapter Eleven: Evaluating the methodology
11.1: Introduction
A critical reflection on the methodology employed by this study is provided in this 
chapter. To this end, the chapter begins with an examination of the practical and 
theoretical limitations posed by Straussian Grounded Theory methodology and its 
interactionist basis. The chapter proceeds with an evaluation of the study’s design 
and the range of tools that can be used to assess the quality of research employing 
qualitative methods in general, and more specifically, Grounded Theory methodology. 
In doing so, particular attention is paid to the epistemological and ontological 
positions underpinning the study. Evaluations of a study should not be isolated from 
its philosophical stance. To be classified as good research a study should be able to 
demonstrate to its audiences that it has accurately utilised the research methods, skills 
and techniques consistent with the tenets of their chosen philosophical framework. 
Therefore this chapter assesses the technical and operational quality of the study with 
reference to its philosophical framework. Finally, drawing on the findings of this 
study, the chapter concludes with a discussion of possible areas for future research. 
11.2: The methodology and its philosophical basis
A common critique of approaches rooted in interactionism is that the degree of 
flexibility permitted by the design and implementation of the study introduces 
unwarranted subjectivity into the research process (Plummer 2000). This critique may 
be levelled against all studies employing a qualitative design (see also Bryman 2001). 
It is an epistemological critique that pertains to the question of what constitutes valid 
scientific knowledge.
Perhaps linked to the issue of subjectivity, some have questioned the degree of value 
neutrality presumed by the rejection of a priori conceptualisation and theorising.
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Perhaps this reflects another misunderstanding o f the methodology in its totality or a
‘caricature’ of the methodology linked to the ‘misleading impression’ that the
methodology is based on ‘crude inductivism’ (Atkinson and Housley 2003:123).
Rejecting the presumed empiricism associated with this approach (see also Downes
and Rock 2003), it has been noted on a philosophical level that the epistemological
basis of the Straussian methodology is not: ‘a recipe for a purely inductive view of
scientific or lay knowledge’. It is not an: ‘attempt to celebrate pure ‘experience’ as the
only basis for knowledge acquisition (Atkinson and Housley 2003:123).
One acknowledges the inductivism prioritised by the methodology given the emphasis
on the embeddedness of findings in the data. Indeed one might argue that such
inductivism minimises the risk of imposing pre-determined constructs on the data.
Downes and Rock (2003) point out that:
Indeed, interactionists would say that an explorer can never know 
what he or she is exploring until it has been explored. It is all too 
easy to impose an alien explanatory scheme that obscures vision, 
ignores problems and pre-empts solutions...Above all it is held that 
analysis must grasp the meaning that animates and shapes social 
activity. Consequently, meaning is that employed by the social 
actors themselves, not by the sociologist; interactionism is 
designed to take the observer and audience as far as is practicable 
into the actors’ own perspectives on selves acts and environments’
(2003: 179-180).
Straussian Grounded Theory methodology as all approaches rooted in interactionism, 
rejects a priori theorising as this encourages the imposition of constructs generated by 
the researcher (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Theoretical constructs are embedded in the 
data and the task confronting the researcher is to identify and conceptualise them. 
Nevertheless, on a practical level, Strauss and Corbin (1998) acknowledge the 
importance of the extant literature in providing an initial framework from which 
researcher may approach the research problem. They write:
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...most of us are familiar with the literature in the field. Literature 
can be used as an analytic tool if we are careful to think about it in 
theoretical terms. Used in this way the literature can provide a rich 
source to stimulate thinking...it can furnish initial ideas to be used 
for theoretical sampling...The researcher brings to the inquiry a 
considerable background in professional and disciplinary 
literature...of course the discipline, school, and perspective of the 
researcher will greatly influence how much literature he or she 
comes with and how it is used...Before beginning a project, a 
researcher can turn to the literature to stimulate questions that act 
as stepping off point during the analysis process...Bringing the 
literature into the writing not only demonstrates scholarliness but 
also allows for extending, validating, and refining knowledge in 
the field (1998:47-52).
Further, Strauss and Corbin recognise the importance of external influences such as 
professional knowledge and experience as sensitising tools that aid the comparative 
process during analysis provided these do not replace the meanings embedded in the 
data. Therefore at any stage, the researcher may make incursions into the extant 
literature in order to generate insights required to further develop the emergent 
concepts. The proviso stated is that the insights should not replace data, rather, they 
may sensitise the researcher to what a puzzling piece of data actually means (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998:47).
Another critique offered against the philosophical position adapted by the study is that 
it is astructural focusing mainly on the sites of social interaction or the situational 
aspects of social phenomena. It is argued that in doing so, interactionism excludes a 
proper account of the macro structural factors that also influence social phenomena 
(Plummer 2000; Downes and Rock 2003). This critique overlooks the range of 
analytic devices that ensure that wider structural factors are incorporated in analysis. 
We have seen how the analytic tools -  the paradigm’ and ‘the matrix’ - employed 
during analysis permitted the effective contextualisation of the emergent concepts 
within their structural bases. They were useful tools for ensuring that the study
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accounts for the wider structural processes and conditions relevant to a holistic 
understanding of the research problem.
11.2.1: The Straussian methodology
With Grounded Theory methodology, other critiques centre on the time consuming 
iterative process associated with the methodology and the confusing terminology for 
instance, the conflation of the terms ‘concepts and categories’ (Bryman 2001). 
Implementing an iterative strategy involves a great deal of time and effort. I found 
that extending the analytic process by moving from the data to the field and back to 
the data are indeed time consuming and strenuous activities. These are even more 
difficult to implement where the time and resources available are limited and where 
the study is conducted by a sole researcher. Exacerbating these problems were the 
widespread geographic locations of the offices requiring long distance journeys to 
secure interviews, the unpredictability of the probationers and the access difficulties 
discussed earlier.
Furthermore, in terms of the second critique, the terms ‘concepts and categories’ and 
even ‘sub-categories’ are indeed often imprecisely delineated in the Grounded Theory 
literature. Ascertaining their different roles in the analytic process requires a thorough 
reading of the Grounded Theory literature accompanied by the actual implementation 
of the methodology. Eventually, it becomes apparent that although in some instances 
the terminologies are employed interchangeably, there are important differences in the 
way they are applied in specific stages of analysis (see Chapter four).
Another challenge posed to prospective users of the methodology is the variants that 
have evolved from its original format as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The 
specific genre of Grounded Theory employed in this study was developed by Strauss 
to provide a more systematic approach to the generation of Grounded Theory. This
302
genre has since been criticised for being too prescriptive, conceptual and atheoretical 
(Glaser 1992; Bryman 2001). I chose to employ Straussian Grounded Theory 
precisely for its systematic approach. Perhaps, crucial to the novice researcher is the 
systematic and rigorous approach permitted by the Straussian variant. In addition, as 
Creswell (1998:5) points out, its detailed verification techniques enhance the quality 
of findings. Further, it incorporates additional tools for ensuring that the intellectual 
rigor central to Social Science research is maintained.
Yet, whilst the Straussian variant provides a systematic and creative approach to the 
application of the methodology, Glaser describes it as a rigid approach that defeats the 
inductivism of analysis and risks the forcible categorisation of incidents in the data 
into predetermined constructs. My experience of utilising the methodology is that it 
retains the embeddedness of concepts, categories and theoretical constructs in the 
data. There is a close link between the data and the emergent constructs at all times 
although the theoretical constructs would necessarily represent the researcher’s 
abstractions from the level of the data.
Yet another variant of the methodology exists to compound these difficulties. In 
developing her ‘constructivist’ version of Grounded Theory, Charmaz (2000) rejects 
the objectivism that is in her view, implicit in the other variants. Her relativist 
approach which defines all knowledge of the social world (derived from the accounts 
of both the researched and the researcher) as social constructions, contrasts with the 
formalism of the Straussian methodology. Bryman (2001) rightly points out that much 
of the work endorsed within Straussian methodology has been interpretive and 
cognisant of the role of social actors in defining their reality. Indeed, one might add 
that the interactionist basis of this methodology emphasises this point. With its roots
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in Simmelian formalism, the methodology averts the relativism of extreme social 
constructionism.
11.3: Examining the quality of research
There are mutually reinforcing technical and operational limitations that affect the 
quality of research.
11.3.1: Technical quality
‘Rigour in carrying through the theoretical project’ is of crucial importance (Hughes 
1990:144). An examination of the technical processes -  methods of data collection 
and analysis - should underpin the attempt to establish that the expected standards of 
intellectual rigour have been attained. Further, these should be situated within the 
context of the study’s philosophical stance. This is because the design of a study 
would necessarily derive from its theoretical standpoint (Denzin 1972), which should 
be clearly articulated in order to ensure that research audiences are able to understand 
the processes of interpretation and analysis (Hughes 1990). That is, the audiences 
should be able to assess the reliability and validity of the study.
It has been argued that the established tools for evaluating research - reliability and 
validity - are more suited to quantitative research studies (Kirk and Miller 1986; 
Bryman 2001). Therefore although qualitative studies should ensure that data 
collection and analysis proceed in a systematic form, the methods utilised in such 
studies are not as standardised as those employed in quantitative research.
Clearly one can see how the application of the same evaluative criteria to studies 
adopting different philosophical standpoints would be inappropriate. The important 
point is that each philosophical position prescribes different research methods: 
‘Evidence is not free standing, immutable and universal. It is bound into the model 
that produced it and gave it meaning’ (Shipman 1988:162). Ultimately, the criteria for
304
judging the quality of research must account for its epistemological and ontological 
bases. Consequently, commentators advocate the use of different evaluative tools for 
interpretivist research (Shipman 1988; Bryman 2001). In all, the commentators 
emphasise the importance of reflexivity in qualitative research whereby researchers 
remain alert to their impact on the research process (see also Davies 1999).
Strauss and Corbin (1998) have devised several tools for specifically evaluating 
studies utilising Grounded Theory methodology. These different criteria take 
account of the fundamental difference between positivist studies and interpretivist 
positions. These may be traced to their ontological positions on what constitutes social 
reality. The study bases its evaluation of the methodology employed on these criteria. 
11.3.2: Reliability
Reliability or reproducibility (Strauss and Corbin 1998:266), replicability (Bryman 
2001) or ‘transferability’ (Henwood and Pidgeon 1988) all focus on the degree to 
which the study findings can be repeated using the same methods. Where this is 
possible, it enhances the quality of the study. One way of achieving this in 
qualitative studies in which measures and other tools are not usually documented in 
any standard format is through the broader process of ensuring reflexivity during the 
research process. Inherent in this is the need to maintain accurate records of how 
theoretical constructs are devised. These records should chart the processes of 
elucidating analytical definitions. To this end, Chapters five and six provided a 
detailed description of the analytic processes. In addition, a detailed description of my 
efforts to remain reflective is provided below.
It is often argued that the ability to replicate research findings is fraught with 
problems linked to the difficulty of incorporating the exact variables present in the 
original study (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Further, replication is less viable with
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qualitative studies given the contextual and relational variability of the methods of 
data collection. The processes of analysis are also difficult to replicate because of the 
flexibility and interpretive processes that are almost unique to the qualitative 
researcher during the complex analysis of textual data (see Shipman 1988; Bryman 
2001). There is also the difficulty of ensuring that the evaluative study captures the 
social contexts and circumstances of the original study. However, theoretical 
replicability can be examined by a restudy utilising a similar theoretical and 
methodological approach and also conducted within similar conditions. Reliability is 
achieved where the restudy yields broadly similar findings even where they are 
conceptualised using different terms. By uncovering the meaning of compliance as 
articulated by the key parties involved in defining its form, this study filled a gap in 
knowledge. However, some of its findings are also broadly consistent with the 
findings of other studies that have explored a broadly similar theme as described in 
the previous chapter. This enhances the reliability of my findings (See also, Strauss 
and Corbin 1998).
11.3.3: Validity
Another key criterion for ascertaining the quality of research is validity. This concerns 
the accuracy of the study’s findings. Validity assesses three issues namely, the 
interrelatedness of the data and the eventual theory, the generalisability of the findings 
and the issue of establishing causality and correlations. With qualitative research, the 
fit between the data and the findings is closely linked to the propriety of the 
researcher’s interpretations or abstractions from the data. This affects the entire 
research process from the nature of the data generated to the quality of the processes 
of analysis. From a Grounded Theory perspective, the latter concerns the degree to 
which the findings are embedded in the data. To evaluate the validity of this study on
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these bases, I relied on the 7 criteria proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998) as listed 
below.
1. The sampling methods
2. The major categories
3. The incidents (or indicators) that highlighted the categories
4. The categories that directed theoretical sampling, the impact of theoretical 
sampling on the emergent categories (were they still reflective of the data or 
were they revised)
5. The formulation of the provisional hypotheses devised during axial coding
6. How these hypotheses were validated or discarded (where appropriate), and 
finally,
7. The selection of the core category.
I ensured that these processes were detailed in Chapters three to six of this Thesis as 
part of my effort to ensure that the information required for evaluating my findings 
are comprehensive and explicit.
11.3.4: Causality
Where the aim is to ascertain the validity of claims about causality, this dimension of 
the validity criteria may be more suited to measuring the validity of quantitative 
studies given that the concern of qualitative studies such as the current study is to 
understand social phenomena rather than to establish correlations or causality.
11.3.5: Generalisability
Validity is also concerned with the generalisability of findings. Qualitative studies are 
by the nature of their sampling and other procedures, and by their theoretical 
concerns, not able to and not concerned to, make statistical generalisations (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998). As Bryman (2001:282) puts it: ‘...it is the quality of the theoretical
307
inferences that are made out of qualitative data that is crucial to the assessment of 
generalisation’. Therefore, the focus is on producing contextualised understandings of 
phenomena that may be theoretically generalisable to other sites of human interaction 
or to existing theories.
As described in Chapter three some consistencies exist between the achieved sample 
and the national population of probation officers, probationers and probation areas. 
Equally, there are several aspects in which the achieved sample differs from the 
national average. This is not surprising given that the probation area sampled was 
selected on the basis of pragmatic considerations pertaining to accessibility. Further, 
the study sample was selected on the basis of theoretical sampling and not random 
sampling processes.
Broadly, an unrepresentative sample such as that used in this study provides no basis 
for the statistical generalisability of findings (Bryman 2001). Nevertheless, the 
sampling procedure employed in this study accords with the tenets of interactionism. 
The aim is to explore specific incidents in the data (or substantive aspects of human 
behaviour) in order to generate formal understandings of human behaviour. The latter 
transcends the immediate spatial and temporal contexts from which it emerges. In 
other words, it is theoretically or analytically generalisable to other contexts. 
Consequently, Yin (1994:10) rightly highlights the difference between ‘statistical 
generalisation’*1" and ‘analytical generalisation’. Qualitative studies rooted in 
interactionism would necessarily aim for the latter given its roots in formailsim. For 
instance, Whyte’s (1943) widely cited study of youth subcultures in an inner city 
setting, generated formal theory which has since been generalised to other situations 
or conditions in other neighbours and within different time periods. Likewise 
Becker’s (1963) study of a group of marijuana users in Chicago contributed to the
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development of labelling theory. The current study specifies the range of conditions 
that create the strategies (actions, /interactions) that parties involved in negotiating 
compliance devise and also the resulting conditions/consequences (Strauss and Corbin 
1998). These help explain the nature of short term compliance and these may be 
applicable to other sites of interaction involving the regulation of short term 
compliance.
11.3.6: Avoiding selectivity: devising sampling scenarios
The probationers sampled in the study were selected by their officers and were 
interviewed in probation offices. It is quite possible that the probationers sampled 
were those who were most likely to comply with the directives of their officers by 
adapting to the informal rules. This may have created a selective sample of typically 
compliant probationers thus reducing the opportunity for a broader exploration of the 
concept from the perspective of the non-compliant (persistently absent or absconded) 
probationers.
To alleviate this problem, the tracking methods I employed were designed to reduce 
the extent of selectivity. All the interviews were scheduled to coincide with the 
probationers’ routine appointments with their officers. It was envisaged that this 
would ensure that probationers who failed to keep their supervision appointments 
could be tracked and interviewed whenever they attended their appointment at a later 
date. This would cause minimal disruption to all probationers and their officers. 
Further, it should ensure that even the non-compliant probationers could be included 
in the study. Thus, I made repeated trips to probation offices to secure scheduled 
interviews with named probationers who had been scheduled for interviews but who, 
by failing to attend their probation appointments, had at the same time, failed to attend 
the interview (given that both were scheduled for the same day). This provided the
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added advantage of observing patterns of attendance and absenteeism. All but one of 
the probationers sampled were tracked in this manner.
Added to this, the methodology employed provided several opportunities for reducing 
the selectivity of the sample. Through theoretical sampling, I was able to include in 
the study some of the probationers categorised by the officers as being either typically 
compliant or typically non-compliant. In all, theoretical sampling ensured that in line 
with the interactionist position I was able to focus on the areas that were defined by 
the research participants as central to generating an understanding of their social 
reality of securing compliance or complying with community penalties.
11.3.7: Reimbursements
Another factor that may affect the nature of data is the use of financial incentives to 
encourage participation (Noakes and Wincup 2003). Part of the effort to recruit 
participants into the study involved the payment of £5 to the participating 
probationers on the recommendation of one of the Divisional Managers. I considered 
that this would act not as an incentive but as a fair reimbursement for their time and 
effort. To avoid the potential misconstruction of the payments as representing an 
incentive to participate in the study, one condition was that the officers would not 
inform the prospective participants of this payment before the interview. My position 
was that the payment would be made after the interview. To a degree I believe that 
this avoids the criticism that offering financial incentives is tantamount to ‘buying 
people’s stories’ (Noakes and Wincup 2003:151). The participating probation officers 
were not reimbursed.
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11.3.8: Taped interviews
Yet another potentially undermining factor is the use of tape recorded interview data. 
The benefits of tape recorded interviews are obvious. They are more reliable than 
memory and also hand written notes which in themselves may be distracting. Further, 
in this study, the transcripts were downloaded to the NVIVO software which aided the 
detailed analysis and re-analysis of the data.
However, the limitations associated with transcripts of data may be analytical and 
practical. The analytical problems reside in the difficulty of accurately depicting the 
contextualised nature of such data and the co-production of meaning inherent in semi­
structured or unstructured interviews (Bryman 2001). However, the notes and diaries I 
maintained throughout the data collection process served as useful reminders during 
analysis. Other analytical limitations are the possibility that the interviewee’s reports 
and disclosure may be undermined by their apprehension at the prospect that their 
views are being captured on tape (Bryman 2001). To encourage honest disclosure, 
informed consent and reassurances of anonymity were offered before and during the 
interviews.
The practical problems associated with tape-recorded data pertain to the considerable 
amount of time expended on transcribing the tapes in as much detail as possible. 
Fortunately, the sophisticated recorder I borrowed from my department produced 
good quality recordings that were digitally transferred to the computer and transcribed 
without the need to obtain a transcription machine. The difficulties of transcribing and 
organising the data were quite significant and time consuming although they were 
somewhat alleviated by the use of these sophisticated tools.
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11.3.9: The data sources: observations, case records and self reports 
Some of the analysis was based on observational data. Data triangulation in this 
manner is encouraged because it broadens the range of data obtained thus enhancing 
the quality of analysis. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that a potential 
limitation of overt observational methods is the possibility of ‘reactive effects’. This 
also affects the data generated during interviews and it occurs where the impact of 
observation is such that the observed engage in atypical behaviours (Bryman 2001; 
Webb 1966:13). Recognising this potential problem at the start of the study, other 
methods of enquiry were employed including an analysis of a cross section of case 
records. This also poses the limitation linked to Farrall’s (2002b) observation that case 
files typically reveal only the perspective of the officer which may be designed to gain 
managerial approval.
In terms of the key source of data namely, self reports, a potential threat to the quality
of data based on self reported behaviour is the possibility of exaggerated or untrue
reports. Nevertheless, self reports supplemented by official records may help
overcome this problem (Farrall 2002b). More importantly, qualitative interviewing
method ensures that research participants are able to express at depth the definitions
and meanings with which they make sense of their experiences and adapt their
behaviour accordingly. The ontological basis for this study hold that these meanings
as central to understanding social phenomena.
‘The emphasis is on how the interviewee frames and understands issues 
and events -  that is, what the interviewee views as important in 
explaining and understanding events’ (Bryman 2001).
Thus, unlike positivist methodologies, the focus is not on the search for objective 
‘truths’ but for the definitions and meanings with which the participants make sense 
of their experiences. These are the definitions that affect behaviour.
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11.4: Operational limitations
Added to these technical limitations there are operational limitations linked to the 
contexts of the interactions between the researcher and the research participants. 
These may also affect the quality of research findings.
11.4.1: The researcher’s characteristics
There are several demographic attributes that may affect the nature of interactions 
during interviews and possibly, the nature of the data obtained. Age, gender, and 
ethnicity are a few (Wolf 1996; Davies 1999). As an ethnic minority researcher I was 
very interested in the potential impact of my ethnicity on the research subjects and the 
nature of the data they could provide. The literature provided some insights into this. 
There are mixed views about the possible impact of ethnicity or other socio-cultural 
differences. Some argue that these differences may equip the researcher positioned on 
the outside, with a degree of neutrality and objectivity that may indeed ensure access 
to more accurate and intimate information (Wolf 1996). Interestingly, Tixier Y Vigil 
and Elasser (1976 cited in Wolf Ibid.) found that racial differences between them and 
the participants affected the nature of responses, but in not the manner anticipated. 
Participants were less likely to disclose intimate secrets to the researcher with whom 
they shared a similar ethnicity. Furthermore, with ‘outsiders’, there is a reduced 
chance of ‘going native’ and losing sight of research objectives (Wolf 1996). 
Reflecting on my experience, it is impossible to posit the exact impact of my ethnicity 
on my interactions with the research subjects. I can only surmise that my status as a 
student and the guarantee of anonymity may have been propitious in a research site 
dominated by official inspections and auditing processes. The opportunity to discuss 
one’s perceptions and beliefs at some depth without fear of reprisals may have 
enhanced the accuracy of the data obtained. Moreover, I tried to overcome potential
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barriers to effective communication by obtaining informed consent before and during 
each interview (see Appendix 2; Noakes and Wincup 2004), by reminding the 
participants of the confidentiality of data and the promise of anonymity.
As the study progressed, it became apparent to me that some of the processes central 
an understanding of compliance with community penalties were covert processes that 
contravened policy requirements. As such, to enhance disclosure, it was vital for me 
to reassure the officers that my intention was not to spy on their activities in order to 
produce a negative report. In addition, midway through data collection the probation 
service came under sustained media attacks over the issue of public protection and 
risk management. This brought probation practices including compliance under 
critical scrutiny. Thus the study was conducted at a time when the service was being 
vilified in the press because of two high profile murders committed by probationers. 
Therefore, the subject matter of the research became topical because compliance 
relates directly to how probationers are managed in the community to reduce risks and 
protect the public. Consequently, there was a possibility that the research participants 
particularly the officers would be unwilling to divulge information about actual 
practices including the covert enforcement practices that fall sort of the requirements 
contained in the National Standards. I had to reformulate the interview schedules so 
that most of the questions did not appear to be intrusive, implicating or critical of their 
activities. I believe that they would have become suspicious of my motives if I had 
asked them direct questions about covert activities. The questions used to explore the 
extent of professional discretion and covert practices are detailed in Appendix 9.
In all, to enhance accurate disclosure, I reassured the participants of my status as a 
student researcher and I informed them that I was not conducting an official enquiry 
into enforcement practice. As such, I informed the officers that my primary concern
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was not with the extent to which they comply with the requirements of the National 
Standards. I simply wanted to understand the factors that affect how probationers 
comply with their orders. I made every effort to socialise with the officers wherever 
possible, whilst retaining a degree of distance necessary to maintain the integrity of 
the study. I would go on coffee breaks with some of the officers and invariably they 
would begin to discuss the research problem. These breaks produced insightful data 
but also enabled me to examine the organisational culture to a degree. Issues like the 
differing ideologies of frontline and management staff were discussed. Also discussed 
were views about specific probationers and the nature of their offending.
To gain cultural access, the interview schedules were designed to ensure effective 
communication. Drawing on Arksey and Knight (1999) and Rubin and Rubin (2005), 
the first few questions were designed to help put the participants at ease. It gave them 
the opportunity to give their opinion about non-contentious, unchallenging and 
mundane issues. I envisaged that these questions should encourage them to reflect on 
their experiences in very broad terms.
Table 11.1: Interview Strategies
Strategy Implementation
knowledge of objectives of interview Pilot study
Purpose and structure of interview set Informed consent
Clear questions and gentle approach Questions designed to ensure coherence
Reflective listening Attentiveness and empathy
Open and steering questions Semi-structured qualitative questioning
Remembering Referring to previous exchanges
Interpreting Repeating statements for clarification
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As far as possible I tried to adapt my interviewing style to specific strategies that have 
been linked to productive outcomes. Several commentators provide insights into 
these strategies (Kvale 1996; Arksey and Knight 1999; Biyman 2001; Rubin and 
Rubin (2005). Table 11.1 above describes the strategies and how they were 
implemented during the study (see also Bryman 2001).
My personal judgement is that I was received positively by the participants. I think
my status as a student and the methodology I employed helped me to overcome
potential barriers. The probationers appeared to be happy to discuss their experiences
including private issues about their life. Most declined my offer of £5 for their time.
11.5: Enhancing technical quality: triangulation, validation and reflexivity
Other strategies used to enhance the quality of the study include data triangulation,
and adducing contradictory evidence and reflexivity. With data triangulation, the aim
was to broaden the scope of the data and the interpretive process (Noakes and Wincup
2004.91). In addition, exploring evidence or data that appear to contradict emergent
findings may enrich data and the eventual analysis. In discussing ‘a contrastive
approach’ to policy analysis whereby the researcher should welcome emerging data
irrespective of whether such data contradicts the researcher’s hypothesis (in
quantitative studies) or original albeit tentative ideas (in qualitative studies) ,
Mukheijee and Wuyts observe that the during data analysis, it is prudent:
‘to check the firmness of the idea you hold and to be able to correct for 
errors, it is best to confront it with rival ideas and see how well it stands 
up to the insight they bring to bear on the problem...evidence allows you 
to judge how to chose between rival notions’ (.239).
The Grounded Theory methodology facilitated this process. Analytic tools and 
devices such as constant comparisons, interrogating the data to validate theoretical 
constructs or conceptualisations against the existing or incoming data are useful for
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this purpose. This comparison method is inherent in all variants of the methodology 
(see also Glaser 1992; Charmaz 2000). It is a verification process that ensures that 
emergent constructs are explored for their full range of possibilities, that is, for all 
possible alternative explanations (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Data triangulation 
methods may also aid this process.
Interactionists advocate a reflective approach during the entire research process. A 
reflective approach in which the researcher carefully documents the processes of 
interpretation and analysis provides an avenue for assessing the validity and reliability 
of qualitative studies (Davies 1999; Noakes and Wincup 2003). Demonstrating ‘what 
was actually done’ (Henwood and Pidgeon 1993:44) or ‘what is done, and why it is 
done, at all phases of the research process’ (Shipman 1988:25) enhances 
accountability. It is even more pertinent for interpretivist researchers to provide an 
account of methods and the justifications for such methods given that unlike 
quantitative studies, there is no established framework for structuring and analysing 
data (Shipman 1988). It is such records that make qualitative research amenable to 
evaluation. Thus, added to the detailed documentation of the analytic processes in 
Chapters four to six, by maintaining detailed memos and diaries of my experiences, I 
also reminded alert to the influence of my role and my philosophical and theoretical 
positions on the processes of data collection and analysis.
This degree of reflexivity is useful for accountability irrespective of precision of the 
data collection and analysis methods employed. This is because, the outcome of all 
studies are dependent on the decisions which inform the choice of problem to be 
addressed and also on the assumptions made in reaching the research outcome 
(Murheijee and Wuyts 1988). Further, theoretical positions inform the 
‘preconceptions’ with which the researcher approaches a study (Shipman 1988:21).
317
These theoretical positions arm the researcher with preconceptions which are far from
absent during analysis and interpretation:
...the chronically elusive idea of a theory neutral observation language 
failed to provide the bedrock upon which positivism’s intellectual 
edifice depended, with the reluctant admission that the investigation of 
the world is inevitably theory-laden. There was no theory independent 
way of observing the world. Accordingly, far from being a passive 
reporter, the researcher is an active agent in the construction of accounts 
of the world through the ideas and themes incorporated in the forms of 
knowledge (Hughes 149).
Rejecting the claims of value neutrality inherent in the nominalism of positivist 
approaches (Kolakowski 1993), this study was conducted whilst maintaining a 
detached but reflective approach (Noaks and Wincup 2004). Strategies for ensuring 
reflexivity were inter alia: acknowledging the theoretical or other influences that 
shaped my thinking ahead of data gathering, paying particular attention to, and 
adapting theoretical concerns to new developments in the field. Fundamentally, I 
remained alert to how the roles and identities ascribed to me by the research 
participants, may affect the research process (Junker 1960). The last strategy was 
described more fully in the section above on operational limitations. Meanwhile, it is 
noted that the research diary aids the process of reflexivity. In it, one documents 
internal conversation with oneself as one tries to make sense of one’s perceived role, 
and of the experiences and insights gained in the field (Junker 1960). In all, the 
researcher maintained a reflective dialogue with the ‘self which is also a tool or 
instrument that may affect the quality of research. The ‘self can potentially 
contaminate the research process and should be accounted for much like the 
apparatuses the natural scientists employ in their study of the natural world (Junker 
1960; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Memos, research diaries and other conceptual notes 
also central to Grounded Theory methodology, facilitate the process of capturing and 
reflecting on the thought processes and other experiences that may affect the research
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process. I believe that by remaining reflective throughout the research process I may 
have reduced the bias that may stem from researcher subjectivity, interactions with the 
research participants and other experiences in the filed that may impinge on the 
quality of the data achieved (Henwood and Pidgeon 1988).
11.6: Reflections: the research experience
Before undertaking the study, preliminary enquiries revealed the importance of 
selecting an area of research that would sustain my interest over (what now seems to 
me to be) a considerable length of time. This piece of advice proved to be very useful. 
Conducting this study was a positive and fulfilling experience and I attribute this to 
my personal interest in the subject matter of the research and the support I received 
from my supervisor. There are however several aspects of my experiences that I wish 
to describe here because they were unforeseen and quite challenging.
The first concerns the issue of access to study participants. In Chapter three, I 
described the five levels of negotiations involved in the effort to recruit participants. 
Briefly I may recount them as negotiations with:
• Level one: the gatekeepers
• Level two: the divisional managers
• Level three: the officers and probationers
• Level four: the follow up interviews
• Level five: gaining cultural access to the social worlds of the research 
participants
I did not envisage the difficulties I encountered in levels two to four. Reflecting on 
my experiences now, if I had anticipated these difficulties from the outset, I would 
have proactively initiated the drive to recruit the participants during the different 
phases of analysis. I presumed wrongly that having gained access at the gatekeeper
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level; I would have no difficulty in gaining access across levels two to four. A 
considerable amount of time was expended on progressing from level two to three (in 
one office up to 6 months).
The second challenge was more anticipated than the first. It pertains to the 
unpredictability of the probationers although I was forewarned of this inevitability. 
Linked to this is the third challenge which was a geographic one. The offices were 
located in sparsely populated areas spread across a large land mass. The travelling 
distances were sometimes up to 120 miles across narrow country roads. This 
difficulty was exacerbated by the unpredictability of the probationers. By failing to 
attend scheduled probation supervision appointments they automatically failed to 
attend my interviews with them. This became a quite a problem where I needed to 
conduct a follow up interview or where the theoretical sampling required interviews 
with specific probationers. In these cases, I had to make repeated journeys until I was 
able to secure interviews with the specific probationers. I chose this sampling method 
because of the benefits of being able to examine how the probationers comply with 
attendance requirements. Perhaps an alternative sampling approach may have been to 
interview the specific probationers in their homes or at other locations convenient for 
them. This may have avoided considerable time and financial expense although I 
would have been unable to observe the extent of unpredictability.
11.7: Answering the research questions
This study aimed to fill the gap in knowledge created by the paucity of research on the 
nature of compliance. Several commentators have acknowledged that an account of 
compliance based on the perceptions of those subject to deterrent policies or to 
restrictive enforcement polices is required to fill this gap in knowledge. I believe that 
the contribution of this study to knowledge rests on its effort to fill this gap. It
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illuminates the nature of compliance with community penalties. Understanding the 
nature of compliance is crucial as it affects the service, the practitioners, the 
probationers they supervise and the wider society.
This study successfully answered its central research questions. We can recall that the 
study set out to examine the mechanisms that affect compliance with community 
penalties based on the accounts of the key actors involved namely, the probation 
officers and their clients. The aim was to develop an effective compliance strategy. 
This entailed an exploration of the how the mechanisms of compliance developed by 
Bottoms (2001) may affect compliance.
Chapter nine summarised the answers to these questions. Meanwhile, the study 
identified areas for further study. These are discussed below.
11.8 Maintaining ethical standards
Several steps have been taken to ensure that the study maintains adequate ethical 
standards. During the study, I made efforts to safeguard the wellbeing of the research 
participants and I took steps to address several ethical issues that arose as the study 
progressed.
11.8.1: Confidentiality
Given the potentially contentious nature of the issues explored by the study 
particularly the insights into the covert enforcement practices that emerged during the 
study (the informal rules), efforts were made to ensure confidentiality and to ensure 
that any reports arising from the study would not stigmatise any of the participants. 
Thus, all the participants were granted anonymity and efforts were made to ensure 
that no participant may be identifiable from any reports arising from the study. 
Further, the probation officers were informed that no information provided by their 
probationers during interviews would be relayed to them and the probationers were
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reassured of this during the processes of obtaining their informed consent to 
participate in the study. Likewise, the probation officers were also reassured that none 
of the information they provided would be relayed to their managers. All the 
participants were informed that the objective of the study was not to incriminate them. 
These assurances of confidentiality were upheld throughout the research in order to 
ensure that there was no possibility that any participant would suffer any reprisals.
At all times, I was mindful of the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and 
the Human Rights Act 1998 which protect the rights of research participants. Efforts 
to ensure confidentiality and to limit the possibility of reprisals included the use of 
codes rather than the participants’ names and the decision not to name the probation 
area in Wales in which the study was conducted. Permission was obtained from the 
Jersey Service to name the service in this study.
In addition, in disseminating the insights that have emerged from the study, efforts 
have been made to ensure that research participants are represented accurately and 
steps are taken to ensure that no negative stereotypes can be developed or reinforced. 
11.8.2: Informed consent
It has been noted that the principle of informed consent underlies the attempt to 
ensure that the social researcher balances the interest of research participants against 
the interests of his or her research (Noaks and Wincup 2004). To secure the interests 
of the participants, I obtained their informed consent before the start of the study and 
also intermittently during the interview. This involved introducing the study and my 
role, informing the participants of the objectives of the study and the content of the 
interviews. The processes of informed consent were conducted verbally and also in 
written form. The contents of the letters of consent given to the probationers were also 
read out to them. The aim was to ensure a clear understanding of the informed consent
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processes particularly where literacy deficiencies may affect the ability to read and 
understand formal letters. The consent forms utilised for this purpose have been 
appended (see Appendix Two).
During the process of obtaining informed consent, I clearly informed the participants 
that their participation is voluntary and that they may decline to answer any questions 
they do not wish to answer. This form of informed consent helps to empower the 
interviewee and to reassure them that they have control over the degree of disclosure. 
11.8.3: Redressing typical power differentials in the research context 
Research methods which utilise the participants solely as tools for generating data 
objectify the research participants. The conversation style interviews I conducted may 
have ensured that the participants were able to discuss their perspectives on a research 
problem that also impacts on their lives. Further, to avoid objectification, I responded 
honestly to the participants’ enquires into the objectives of the research. The aim was 
to foster a reciprocal research relationship in which the participants were able to give 
and receive useful information. Unlike the conventional detached interviewer stance, 
this approach facilitates bilateral information sharing (Noaks and Wincup 2004; 
Oakley 1981).
Gelsthorpe rightly observes:
The researched have a perfect right to ask questions and they have a 
right to reasonable answers which signify respect for them as people.
In this way feminist researchers do at least approach some of the 
issues of power and control (1990.93).
Closely related to the issue of reinforcing power differentials, is the one-sided nature
of much social research. I recognise that social research may have longer term
benefits for the participants particularly where it contributes to knowledge that can
help improve the lives or social conditions of the participants. However one must also
recognise that, research often works to the researcher’s advantage. The researcher
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defines the research agenda and extracts vital information from the participants 
(Oakley 1981; Wolf 1996). Such information often works to the researcher’s 
academic or professional advantage with no immediate practical value accruing to the 
participants. As such, I did not hesitate when one of the ‘gate keepers’ (a senior 
probation manager) requested that a £5 payment be made to reimburse the costs 
accruing to the participating probationers. Importantly, although a key aim of this 
study was to contribute to knowledge, another important aim was to improve service 
delivery in ways that can positively alter the conditions in which the probationers and 
their officers interact and also in ways that enable both parties achieve a central 
objective of supervision -  compliance.
11.9: Possible areas for further enquiry
This study was conducted during the operation of two restrictive National Standards. 
This provided an almost unique opportunity to examine from a deterrence point of 
view, the possible impact of variations in punitiveness on compliance. Although they 
retain the punitive provisions of the previous standards by permitting individualised 
enforcement, the current National Standards to some extent, recognise the need for 
more responsive enforcement strategies. This policy development appears to be linked 
to a growing policy interest in devising compliance strategies to parallel the 
enforcement strategies (Ministry of Justice 2007c). Furthermore, there appears to be a 
growing recognition of the need to balance the focus on enforcement targets against 
compliance targets (Hartland 2007). This represents a positive step away from the 
unproductive focus on enforcement. Further research may examine how the new 
standards have impacted on practice if at all. A recent study by Hartland (2007) 
examined these issues and found that the areas sampled could be categorised across 
three levels depending on the extent of the shift towards a more compliance driven
approach. There were areas promoting a primarily enforcement approach to securing 
compliance, some were in flux between compliance and enforcement strategies whilst 
the remainder relied on compliance strategies.
With the shift from enforcement-driven strategies to compliance-driven strategies, the 
courts may be recruited into the drive for enhanced compliance. The finding that the 
courts would typically accept the leniency plea contained in the breach reports 
prepared during disciplinary breaches suggests a mutual effort between the courts and 
the officers to ensure that punitive response is reserved for persistent and wilful 
breaches. Further research on this subject may explore the degree of collaboration 
between the courts and the probation services, the underlying objectives and the 
outcome of these practices for compliance levels. This is particularly pertinent in the 
light of the recent decision to repeal disciplinary breaches.
During this study, new legislation requiring the courts to re-sentence the probationer 
found guilty of breach was introduced. This effectively removed the opportunity to 
simply reprimand the probationer or to impose a fine. The officers in this study 
predicted that more onerous requirements will escalate breach rates. Further research 
may explore the implications of the new legislation.
Changes to supervision practice may accompany the new Offender Management 
model given the fragmentation of duties. Much of the current study was undertaken 
during the gradual phasing in of the continuity principle and ‘case management team 
approach’ proposed in the study by Partridge (2004). With the latter model, a 
probationer is allocated to a team of workers including the probation officer who 
oversees or case manages the entire order from beginning to end. One member of the 
team retains continued contact with the probationer and provides feedback to the rest
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of the team. Further research is required to examine how the extent of discontinuity in 
supervision engendered by these changes may affect compliance.
It is possible that the impact of the typologies devised by the officers is such that it 
encourages selectivity during report writing. Officers may be reluctant to recommend 
supervision for groups of probationers labelled as typically non-compliant or lacking 
in the requisite levels of motivation as defined by the officers. Future research may 
examine this possibility. Aligned to this, further research may examine how the 
actuarial trend in policy and practice exacerbates the imposition of spurious labels that 
may affect the nature of supervision and indeed, outcomes.
A final area for further enquiry identified is the noted disparities between 
management level and practitioner level perspectives. On my visit to one of the 
offices, I was privy to a discussion in which the practitioners decried the apparent 
tendency of senior management to ignore the realities of practice in formulating 
organisational policies. Studies have explored the views of management and ‘front­
line staff*7"' in order to examine how the punitive trend in probation policy translates 
in actual practice. Some find that the service’s reaction to the correctionalist trend in 
probation policy has been the ‘jettisoning’ of its inclusionary and welfarist approach 
and the prioritisation of the exclusionary discourse of public protection (Bailey et al. 
2007:116). According to Bailey and colleagues, the latter best describes the role of 
probation senior managers in formulating organisational policy. It is argued that 
senior managers tend to promote correctionalist and other polices enacted at the centre 
even where they question the viability of these polices. They are motivated by the 
quest to preserve the ‘public credibility and legitimacy’ of the service to a greater 
degree than the practitioners (Bailey et al. 2007:117). This tendency to approach 
national polices with covert scepticism mixed with overt optimism where the
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objective is to preserve the credibility of the service was also noted in a study that 
explored the perspectives of Chief Probation Officers regarding the ‘What Works’ 
initiative (Mair 2004).
According to Bailey and colleagues, the pragmatic acceptance of national policies 
explains the zeal with which probation senior managers appeared to embrace the 
punitive enforcement practice that emerged with the introduction of the National 
Standards. Further research might explore whether these disparities exist in the realm 
of enforcement and compliance. The disparities between management level and 
practitioner views were not replicated in the Jersey area. Endorsed at both levels were:
• A client-centred approach
• Discretion in enforcement
• Emphasis on securing compliance rather than enforcing orders
• Motivational rather than enforcement processes 
11.10: Conclusion
The originality of this study stems from its contribution to an understanding of the 
processes through which compliance may be achieved. With existing studies there is: 
‘typically little indication of how the offender perceives their supervision, what they 
might have learnt and how they may have applied these in their lives to effect 
behavioural change’ (Farrall 2002a). Studies of probation enforcement typically rely 
on official records and this poses limitations to the degree to which the findings may 
be contextualised within the processes and conditions that affect the social actors 
involved. The current study explored the contexts of supervision and one to one 
interactions between both parties and was able to uncover effective strategies for 
encouraging compliance based on the accounts of both parties. According to 
Hedderman (1998.10) the supervision context represents the core of probation
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supervision and would therefore have a significant bearing on outcomes. Hedderman 
writes:
In order to get a rounded picture of what is happening and what 
works, we need to have studies which investigate both process and 
outcome (1998 5).
This study has cited several case studies to illustrate the links between process and 
outcome. It highlights the correlates of compliance as perceived by the key actors. 
Importantly it draws attention to the interrelatedness of control and compliance.
The mechanisms of compliance devised by Bottoms (2001) provided the conceptual 
framework underpinning the current study. However, the study found that compliance 
is best understood if one contemplates the manner in which people in authority, 
utilising their discretion, define and construct compliance. This finding is congruent 
with the position of the labelling theorists (see Becker 1963; Downes and Rock 2003). 
Nevertheless, the framework directs attention to aspects of current policy and practice 
that contribute to an understanding of compliance. For instance, routine mechanisms 
aim to encourage compliance with prosocial routines. The study found that the 
officers are able to reschedule appointments with ease and this may undermine the 
importance of employing routine appointments as a mechanism for encouraging 
routine compliance particularly where the probationer’s lifestyle is chaotic or 
characterised by an adherence to criminogenic routines. In terms of constraint based 
compliance, the study found limited evidence that strict surveillance practices were 
linked to compliance patterns. Like their low risk counterparts, the high and medium 
risk probationers sampled appeared to conform to the informal rules.
Furthermore, if one may revisit the instrumental mechanisms as defined by Bottoms 
which underpin the current enforcement framework, it is not difficult to contemplate 
that the existence of objective indices of certainty and severity of punishment would
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deter crime. This presumption lacks empirical basis and hence the assertion that 
although deterrence theory is a ‘logically compelling’ theory, it suffers from an 
‘apparent contradiction between logic and evidence’ (Achen and Snidal 1989:144). 
Studies ignoring its perceptual dimension encounter problems in the attempt to 
observe its ‘transmission from doctrinal formulation to behavioural influence’ 
(Robinson and Darley 2004: 174). One might argue that the presumed rationality 
underlying the deterrence doctrine constitutes a flawed perception of human 
behaviour. It decontextualises it from the range of extraneous variables that also affect 
behaviour. This study found limited evidence of deterrent effects although a reliance 
on the use of incentives to encourage compliance was observed. Thus, in practice, the 
compliance achieved is typically incentivised. This raises a difficult question: How 
can one ensure longer term compliance where there are no incentives on offer? I have 
noted earlier that incentives are not typically offered by the criminal law (von Hirsch 
et al 1999). Incentivised compliance is therefore unlikely to be sustainable in the long 
term. The inherent difficulty lies in securing compliance once the rewards for 
compliance are removed.
This study advocates a normative approach to securing compliance given its finding 
that people are more responsive to decision making processes that they perceive to be 
fair than to deterrent measures emphasizing the threat of severe punishment. This 
finding is consistent with previous findings that point to the links between the 
perceived legitimacy of the law (of which perceived fairness is an antecedent) and 
compliance. There are several avenues for ensuing that these interactions can foster 
normative compliance. The effective practice skills cited in Chapter nine provide 
potential avenues for reframing the problem solving role of the officer in normative 
terms. The effective practice skills emphasise the quality of treatment. According to
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legitimacy theorists, perceived fair treatment is an antecedent of the perceived 
legitimacy of authority. The latter has been linked to normative compliance.
Normative mechanisms are more sustainable given that they can produce compliance 
even against considerations of self interest. Voluntary compliance is the best form of 
compliance from a policy perspective because compared with a coercive model of 
compliance (the rigid application of punitive rules); it entails the investment of fewer 
resources in sometimes convoluted and protracted enforcement processes. A coercive 
model may also undermine the perceived legitimacy of authority and engender non- 
compliance. A case study illustrating the negative impact of a coercive model on 
compliance was provided in Chapter seven. In all, normative mechanisms 
incorporating the core correctional skills may provide an avenue for improving both 
social and human capital. Desistance theorists recognise these as necessary for 
ensuring longer term desistance (McNeill 2004). Furthermore, in pursuing these aims, 
practitioners are able remain responsive to needs by providing advocacy and practical 
help whilst remaining alert to the need to ensure normative development.
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APPENDICES
Appendix One: The Research Questions and the Empirical Questions 
Research questions
The central research question the study set out to answer is:
As perceived by the key actors involved namely, the probation officers and the 
probationers they supervise, what are the mechanisms that affect how people comply 
with community penalties?
The mechanisms of compliance developed by Bottoms (2001) formed the study’s 
conceptual framework.
The Empirical Questions
1. Do probationers’ perceptions of severity and certainty of punishment for non- 
compliance influence their decision to comply?
2. As perceived by probationers, how and why do the other mechanisms of 
compliance influence compliance?x,lv
3. Are they motivated to comply by any specific methods of supervision?
4. What methods do probation officers employ to encourage compliance?
5. How far do they consider such methods to be effective? Can they cite 
examples of specific cases where such methods have proved to be effective?
6. Why do they perceive such methods to be appropriate within specific 
contexts?
7. Are they concerned to help probationers address social and situational 
problems that may affect compliance? (several studies show that probation 
officers are more concerned with helping probationers overcome social 
difficulties such a s unemployment, than enforcing community penalties (see 
Willis 1983).
8. Or, do they rely on the regulatory framework and its focus on instrumental 
mechanisms such as letter writing and threats of punitive sanctions?
9. Have they found the use of threats particularly effective in ensuring 
compliance?
10. Or is an approach which facilitates the use of discretion more effective?
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Appendix Two: Consent forms sent to probation officers and 
probationers.
Probation Officers
I am a research student at Swansea University and my research aims to find out the 
type of issues that affect how people comply with community penalties. Therefore, in 
this interview I will explore your views and experiences of enforcement. This will 
ensure that any theory of compliance arising from the study properly accounts for 
actual experiences of enforcement as articulated by the professionals who work daily 
with probationers.
This interview is voluntary and you will not be required to answer any questions you 
indicate you do not wish to answer. Whatever you say to me will be held in 
confidence and the research report will be stored in accordance with Swansea 
University’s strict guidelines for storing confidential information. I will make every 
effort to ensure that you will not be identifiable in any reports arising from this 
interview or in the final report itself.
To demonstrate your willingness to participate in this interview, please sign below.
I  have read the above statement and I  am willing to participate in this interview. 
Signed.................................................................................Date..........................................
Thank you 
Pamela Ugwudike
Probationers
I am a research student at Swansea University and my research aims to find out the 
type of issues that affect how people comply with community penalties. Therefore, in 
this interview I will ask you questions about how you carry out the requirements of 
your order. I will also ask you how your order has affected you or other people who 
may be important to you. There will be some general questions about your daily 
activities and your background. These will help me understand your experiences of 
complying with your order.
This interview is voluntary and you will not be required to answer any questions you 
do not want to answer. I will hold what you say to me in confidence and the research 
report will be stored according to Swansea University’s requirements for storing 
confidential information. I will make every effort to ensure that you will not be 
identifiable in any reports arising from this interview or in the final report itself.
To confirm that you are willing to participate in this interview, please sign below.
I  have read the above statement/been informed o f  the purpose o f  the research project 
and that my participation is entirely voluntary. I  have also been informed that 
complete anonymity will be provided and I  am willing to participate in this interview.
Signed................................................................................. Date..........................................
Thank you
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Probationers: consent form for access to confidential records
I have been interviewed by Pamela Ugwudike about the issues that affect how I 
comply with my community order.
She has explained to me that her research aims to find out the type of issues that affect 
how people comply with community order.
She now requests access to confidential information held in my name by the Probation 
Service.
I give her my permission to examine my case records including pre-sentence reports 
and OASYs assessment records, as part of her research project.
Name.
Signed................................................................. Date.
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Appendix Three: Request for interviews sent to divisional managers
and potential participants
This research outline explains the key points underpinning an ongoing research project in 
your Probation Area. It is hoped that all offices in the area will participate. So far, probation 
officers and probationers have been interviewed at several offices.
The Research Topic
Developing an effective strategy for encouraging compliance with community penalties. 
Objectives
I am a Doctoral student at Swansea University, working on a research project which aims to 
develop a theory of compliance with the law. The study seeks to ascertain how different 
mechanisms may be interactively or independently linked to compliance. The central research 
question is:
As perceived by the key actors involved in enforcement namely, the probation officers and 
the probationers they supervise, what are the mechanisms that affect compliance with 
community penalties?
Interviews
A conversational style of interviewing will be employed. This enables the participants to 
express their views at some depth. The aim is to generate insights into how participants 
perceive, define or understand the issues surrounding compliance.
Participants
Participation is voluntary and it is hoped that each participating officer will refer three of their 
clients to the researcher. The officer may inform the probationer that the study aims to 
understand their experiences of compliance and that the researcher will explain the objectives 
of the study in more detail before the interview commences. It may be expeditious to conduct 
the interviews in the probation office and also on the days that the participating probationers 
are expected to attend their regular appointments with their probation officer. The exact 
timing of interviews will of course depend upon accessibility and other organizational 
requirements. This ensures that interviewing does not significantly disrupt organizational 
schedules. Finally, it is hoped that where possible, a follow up interview will be conducted 
with some of the participating probationers.
Content of Interviews
1. Interviews with probation officers will explore their views about current enforcement 
policies and compliance related issues.
2. Interviews with probationers will examine their experiences of complying with their 
orders.
Confidentiality
Subject to the consent of each participant, interviews will be tape recorded purely for the 
purpose of analysis. All participants will be granted anonymity. As such, no one will be 
identifiable in any documents arising from the research or in the final report. Furthermore, it 
is envisaged that interviews will last a period of forty five minutes to one hour.
Access to confidential material
1. Access to specific probationer records will be required, subject to the consent of the 
specific probationers involved in the study.
2. A final source of data will be observations of interactions between participating 
probation officers and probationers, particularly where the issue of compliance is the 
subject of such interactions.
Finally
My sincere appreciation goes to all who agree to participate in this study.
Thank you in advance.
Pamela Ugwudike, Department of Applied Social Sciences, University of Wales, Swansea. 
Email: pugwudike@msn.com.
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Appendix Four: Request for interviews sent to the Jersey Probation
and Aftercare Service.
Request for interviews with Probation Officers.
I am a Doctoral student at Swansea University, working on a research project which aims to 
develop a theory of compliance with the law. The study will explore how several mechanisms 
of compliance identified in the literature may be interactively or independently linked to 
compliance. This research outline explains the key points underpinning the study.
So far, several Probation Officers and the Probationers they supervise have been interviewed 
in a Probation area in Wales. I have decided to interview Probation Officers because I believe 
that they are the key professionals directly involved in motivating compliance on a daily 
basis. Insights into their experiences of encouraging and securing compliance with 
community penalties should illuminate the many factors that affect compliance.
Furthermore, I am aware that the Jersey Probation and Aftercare Service operates a different 
enforcement policy to what obtains in England and Wales. There are several prima facie 
positive points of departure from practices in England and Wales. This study seeks to explore 
what impact these have, if any, on compliance.
The Research Topic
Developing an effective strategy for encouraging compliance with community penalties.
The central research question is:
As perceived by the key actors involved in enforcement namely, the Probation Officers and 
the Probationers they supervise, what are the mechanisms that affect compliance with 
community penalties?
Interviews
A conversational style of interviewing will be employed. This enables the participants to 
express their views at some depth. The aim is to generate insights into how the research 
participants perceive, define or understand the issues surrounding compliance.
Participants
Participation is voluntary and the exact timing of interviews will of course depend upon 
accessibility and other organizational requirements. This ensures that interviewing does not 
significantly disrupt organizational schedules.
Content of Interviews
Interviews with Probation Officers will explore their views about current enforcement 
policies and other relevant compliance related issues.
Confidentiality
Subject to the consent of each participant, interviews will be tape recorded purely for the 
purpose of analysis. All participants will be granted anonymity. As such, no one will be 
identifiable in any documents arising from the research or in the final report. Furthermore, it 
is envisaged that interviews will last a period of forty five minutes to one hour.
Finally
My sincere appreciation goes to all who agree to participate in this study.
Thank you in advance.
Pamela Ugwudike, Department of Applied Social Sciences, University of Wales, Swansea. 
Email: pugwudike@msn.com.
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Appendix Five: The Interview Schedules
1. The Pilot Study— Probation Officers
The schedule incorporated 10 ‘benchmark questions’ (Arksey and Knight 1999:85). It 
was envisaged that these will open up the lines of enquiry. The first few questions 
were designed to explore the participants’ biographical details. These should generate 
‘fact sheet information ...useful for contextualizing people’s answers’ Bryman 
(2001:317). Further, the initial set of questions in all the schedules were designed to 
put the participants at ease before the build up to slightly more challenging questions 
(Rubin and Rubin 2005).
The interview
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Before we start, it might be helpful 
to briefly highlight the main purpose of this research again and also inform you of the 
purpose of this interview.
I am a research student at Swansea University and the project aims to explore:
How and why probationers comply with their orders
To gain a comprehensive view of compliance, I hope to interview three probationers 
you are supervising who agree to participate. As such, some of the interview questions 
will refer directly to your experiences of supervising these specific probationers.
This interview will cover several aspects of enforcement.
• Enforcement practice in general.
• Your experiences of enforcement.
• Your understanding of the obstacles that may affect compliance.
• Your views about enforcement policy and practice.
• Your philosophical approach to supervision.
This initial introduction was followed by the process of obtaining informed consent. 
Each participant was given a consent form to sign (see Appendix Two).
Biography
• Do you have any questions before we commence?
• Are you a main grade probation officer?
• How long have you been a probation officer/community punishment officer?
• What was your previous occupation?
• Why have you decided to work with probationers? (Altruism, punishment,
rehabilitation, neutral).
Question 3 was used to explore the finding that the officers’ professional background 
may affect approaches to supervision (Bottoms 2001, Trotter 1996).
Translating enforcement policy in practice
• What are the procedures for enforcing breach?
• Is there a specialist breach/enforcement officer?
• Have you received any training in enforcement practice?
• Are there any arrangements between this area and the courts for handling 
breach cases?
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• Are there delays in breach hearings? How do you feel about this?
• There may be cases where you know that warning or breach letters would not 
encourage compliance how do you react?
Officers trained in social work practice have been found to be very reluctant to enforce 
compliance strictly as it is inconsistent with their philosophical approach to dealing with 
clients in need to social work interventions (Ditton and Ford 1994). Some however, felt that 
breach was a way of maintaining the credibility of the service with sentencers particularly 
where a further offence has been committed. Much however depended on the ‘worker’s 
general view of probation, as with the circumstances of the actual offence’ (Ditton and Ford 
1994:56). Studies also suggest that the breach process is sometimes considered to be too 
convoluted and that the difficulty of proving breach may explain the reluctance of many 
officers to initiate breach proceedings (Vass 1980).
• How do you respond to probationers who breach requirements towards the end 
of their order?
Studies suggest that officers may be less willing to enforce in such cases (Ellis et al. 1996).
• What criteria do you use in deciding on unacceptable absence?
• In what sorts of cases have you used your discretion in deciding whether or 
not to enforce compliance?
The lack of a precise definition of what may constitute an ‘unacceptable absence’ leaves some 
room for professional judgement in these cases. There is however a possibility that this may 
contribute to inconsistencies in enforcement practices (Ellis et al. 1996). This in turn may 
engender feelings of unequal treatment and unfairness which may ultimately undermine 
legitimacy (Tyler 2003). However, it has been argued that where officers are able to apply 
their professional judgements appropriately it also enables them to build an informal code of 
conduct with probationers, which is based on mutual trust and encouragement to complete the 
order (Vass 1980).
• How do you monitor attendance at rehabilitation programmes? (Good 
communication with program providers?
The study by Ditton and Ford (1994) found little or no coordination between the probation 
officers and the specialist agency to which 20 probationers had been referred as part of the 
additional requirements of their order. There was inadequate role clarification concerning the 
responsibilities of the probation officer whilst the probationer was participating in these 
programmes. Furthermore, conflicting philosophies between staff in these external agencies 
and probation officers may affect responses to the behaviour of the probationer. There may 
also be difficulties in overcoming confidentiality issues for instance where a drug abusing 
probationer is unable to confide in staff at a drug treatment centre for fear that what they say 
may be communicated to their supervising officer with adverse consequences. There may be 
cases where the order is progressing satisfactorily although the probationer has failed to meet 
the requirements of an external rehabilitation program. Many officers were reluctant to breach 
in these cases (Ditton and Ford 1994).
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Incentives
• Where a probationer fails to attend or comply do you do a home visit to find 
out why?
• Do you phone them to find out why? Why/why not?
• Do you offer reminders? Why/why not?
• Apart from warning letters and breach action what other methods of 
encouraging compliance do you use?
• Have you ever considered using incentives to encourage a probationer to 
comply?
• If no? Why not?
Practicalities of securing compliance
• What are the possible obstacles that may affect compliance?
• How do you respond to probationers who breach requirements because of 
these obstacles?
• How far are you able to alleviate these obstacles to ensure compliance?
• How do you encourage compliance where these obstacles exist?
• Which specific method/s of enforcement work best?
• How adequate is the current enforcement framework for addressing these 
issues?
Typologies
• What type of probationer is typically non-compliant?
• What type of probationer is typically non-compliant?
Exploring perceptions of policy changes
• What are your thoughts concerning the decision to merge both 
services/possibility of privatization and contestability?
The significant changes to probation policy and practice in the past three decades have had a 
profound impact on the care/control dualism that underpins probation supervision. There is 
therefore a need to explore how probation officers perceive their role in the context of the 
reformulated ethos of the service and how such perceptions are manifested in enforcement 
practice. The questions below should provide further insights into how probation officers see 
their role in the context of contemporary change.
Philosophical approach to supervision
• Can you briefly describe your philosophical approach to supervision (care, 
control, help, enforcement)
• Should standard enforcement practice apply to all? Why?
• Should the probationer contribute to the supervision plan?
• What makes you feel this way?
Ditton and Ford (1994) rightly point out that any attempt to assess the effectiveness of 
probation supervision should be underpinned by an understanding of how probation 
officers perceive their role in the context of the reformulated ethos of the service.
In addition, studies highlight the link between the perceived legitimacy of authority, and 
collaborative decision making (Trotter 1996; Tyler 2003; Bottoms 1999). It is also argued that 
collaborative decision making processes may foster a sense of commitment to the aims of 
supervision on the part of the probationer (Rex 1993).
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2. The Pilot Study- Probationers
Before we start, it might be helpful to tell you briefly highlight what this interview is 
about. I am a research student at Swansea University and I want to understand how 
and why people comply with orders. Therefore, this interview will look at your 
experiences of complying with your orders.
The interview will cover:
• What you feel the purpose of the order is;
• Any difficulties you may have that may affect how you attend;
• Your daily activities;
• Your experiences of supervision;
• What motivates you to comply;
• Your understanding of what is required of you in terms of attendance and 
complying with the order;
• Any previous experience of community orders you may have; and
• Some questions about your current circumstances.
As before, this initial introduction was followed by the process of obtaining informed 
consent. Each participant was given a consent form to sign (see Appendix Two).
The order
• Do you have any questions before we commence?
• What order are you on?
• Additional/Programme requirement or just appointments?
• Some people say probation/cpo/cpro/cpo/ is not punishment and that it is easy, what
do you think?
• Can you tell me what do you think the purpose of the order is?
• Can you tell me what (or who) motivates you to attend your appointments?
Obstacles to compliance
• Is there anything that makes it difficult for you to attend your appointments? -travel, 
lifestyle, routines, employment, childcare, substance use, financial, memory etc.
• What did your PO say/do?
• Has this made you miss appointments?
Routine compliance
• How do you pass your time during the day? (Hang out with friends? job 
centre, drink, drugs, stay at home).
• Can you describe a typical day for you before you started probation?
• Many people drink when they are out with friends at the pub or on other
occasions, do you drink at all? (Based on Arksey and Knight 1999.111).
• How often and how much will you say?
• Some combine drinking and smoking, do you smoke? Do you use other drugs?
• Has it [alcohol/drugs] ever affected your attendance in any way at all?
• Have you ever come in under the influence of drugs/alcohol?
• What does your officer do? Say?
Farrall (2002b) found that the major ‘obstacles’ to desistance were drugs and alcohol.
Normative: Bonds with significant others
• How does your family/partner feel about you being on this order?
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Normative: Legitimacy (Tyler 2003)
• What do you think of your sentence? (Fair or unfair) Why? -
Ditton and Ford (1994) found varied experiences of court hearings ranging from
‘humiliation and fear, through anxiety, to comparative confidence (from experienced 
probationers who knew the system and felt they had a good case).’ Tyler’s (2003) 
comprehensive review of the literature on procedural justice points to the significance 
of the criminal process in determining perceived legitimacy.
• Can you describe how you felt the police handled your case?
• How do you feel the probation officer’s report was?
Normative: Bonds with authority
• Can you describe your relationship with your officer?
Constraint: rigid attendance requirements/surveillance
• How often are you supposed to attend?
• What do you do when you come in?
• Is it fair to come in for this reason?
• What makes you feel this way?
• How far do you have to travel?
• Is it fair to travel this distance for appointment?
Instrumental: Perceived certainty/severity
The deterrence literature highlights the importance of ascertaining how potential 
probationers come to acquire knowledge of penal sanctions (Cook 1980). Heamden 
and Millie (2003:10) suggest that one reason for the failure of ‘strict’ enforcement 
(breach rates) is that ‘Offenders may simply lack the necessary information to assess 
the strictness of the regime to which they are exposed....’
Likewise, Bottoms (2001) suggests that probationers may not believe that their 
officers will implement breach. Thus, inadequate rule clarification is one of the 
factors that may undermine the perceived certainty of punishment.
• Have you ever missed an appointment?
• What happened?
• What did your PO do?
• What do you think your PO will do if you fail to attend?
• How many times can you be absent before your PO takes you to court?
• Do you think she will take you to court?
• What makes you think so?
• Who told you what will happen if you fail to attend?
• When were you told?
• What will the courts do?
• Have you been breached for non-compliance?
• What happened?
• Do you feel it was fair that the officer took you to court?
• What makes you feel this way?
• How fair do you think the court’s response was?
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• Do you know anyone whose order was terminated for non-compliance/what 
happened to them? /fair/unfair?
General questions about your circumstances
• Rented/own accommodation. Any accommodation difficulties? Affects 
attendance? /supervisor’s response
• Highest level of education/any training since school/age when left 
school/memories of school/jobs since left school/periods of unemployment? 
currently employed?/source of income/age/partner
Before we end the interview, do you have any questions? Anything to add?
Thank participant and debrief-reassure of confidentiality, ask for questions, and give
payment.
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3. Second interviews - Probation Officers
Following open sampling, the guides below were designed to aid the theoretical 
sampling process.
The interview schedule
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Before we start, it might be helpful 
to briefly highlight the main purpose of this research again and also inform you of the 
purpose of this interview.
I am a research student at Swansea University and the project aims to explore:
How and why probationers comply with their orders
To gain a comprehensive view of compliance, I hope to interview three probationers 
you are supervising who agree to participate. As such, some of the interview questions 
will refer directly to your experiences of supervising these specific probationers.
This interview will cover several aspects of enforcement:
• Enforcement practice in general.
• Your experiences of enforcement with specific reference to the probationers 
you are supervising who will also participate in this project.
• Your understanding of the obstacles that may affect compliance.
• Your views about enforcement policy and practice.
• Your philosophical approach to supervision.
(As before, this initial introduction was followed by the process of obtaining informed 
consent. Each participant was given a consent form to sign (see Appendix Two).
Biographical information
• Do you have any questions before we commence?
• Are you a main grade officer?
• Which orders do you supervise?
Enforcement
• How do the probationers you supervise get to know what is expected of them in terms 
of compliance?
• What are the things that make it difficult for probationers to understand what is 
expected of them?
• In cases where probationers are required to attend externally provided 
programmes, how do you monitor their attendance?
Typologies
• What type of probationer is typically difficult to engage?
• How do you engage reluctant/uncommitted probationers?
Obstacles to compliance
• Talking about the probationers you are currently supervising or that you have 
supervised in the past, can you cite some examples of the possible obstacles 
that have affected their compliance?
• (think about accommodation problems/employment or unemployment/literacy 
levels/substance misuse/hostility/
• How do you respond to non-compliance in these cases?
• Are there any provisions for addressing these issues?
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• What encourages compliance better- addressing these obstacles or
enforcement? Why?
Incentives
• Where a probationer fails to attend or comply do you do a home visit to find 
out why?
• Do you phone them to find out why? Why/why not?
• Do you offer reminders? Why/why not?
• Apart from warning letters and breach action what other methods of
encouraging compliance do you use?
• Have you ever considered using incentives to encourage a probationer to 
comply?
• If no? Why not?
Warning letters and breach proceedings
• Have you ever sent a warning letter
• In what circumstances will you demand certified evidence of absence?
• Where the probationer is unable to provide evidence for failure but you know the 
absence is genuine, how do you respond?
• Do you decide what is an unacceptable or an acceptable reason for absence 
yourself or do you have to refer it to someone else?
• Are you monitored on enforcement practice?
• How have you dealt with probationers who have shown good progress but 
subsequently fail to comply, why?
• How do you respond to probationers who breach requirements towards the 
end of their order?
The breach process
• What do you define as non-compliance that warrants enforcement?
• What form of non-compliance is the most common?
• What form commonly results in breach?
• Why do you think this form of non-compliance is the one that usually results in
breach action?
• What do you do when probationers attend intoxicated or under the influence of illegal 
substances?
• What do you do if the probationer is aggressive, abusive, and 
uncooperative/uncommunicative?
• Is there a specialist breach/enforcement officer in this office?
• Are there any arrangements between this area and the courts for handling breach
cases?
• How would you describe the breach process (is it straight forward or convoluted?
• Are there delays in breach hearings? Do you think it affects probationers in any way? 
How do you feel about this?
• What do you think about new regulations revoking disciplinary?
• In what sort of cases of non-compliance did you use disciplinary breach?
• What happened if the probationer reengaged in the interim?
• Were they told that if the re-engage, they may get a more favourable outcome in
court?
• How has the new requirement affected your decision making when it comes to
initiating breach action?
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• Have you ever initiated breach action for one unacceptable absence? Why?
• Have you ever initiated breach action where custody is the likely outcome? 
Example? Why?
• Have you ever recommended a revocation and resentence? Describe 
circumstances?
• How far do the courts accept the recommendations in the breach report?
• Has (probationer to be interviewed) been prosecuted for breach?
• What happened immediately leading up to non-compliance?
Deskilling and continuity
• Are there probationers in your case load that you don’t supervise on a regular 
basis?
• Are you responsible for enforcing compliance in these cases?
• How will you describe your relationship with them?
• Have you supervised (the probationer to be interviewed) since he/she 
started this order?
• If not, has the change affected supervision in any way? How?
• Where probationers have different case mangers in the course of 
supervision, does it affect supervision? How? Why?
• How will you describe your level of contact with the probationers you 
supervise?
• How far are probation service officers involved in supervision and 
enforcement?
• How do you feel about this?
• How do you monitor attendance at external programmes run by 
partnership agencies?
Philosophical approach to supervision
• What is the most effective means of securing compliance?
• What philosophical approach to supervision guides your work with 
probationers?
• How will you describe your relationship with the probationers you 
supervise?
• Should standard enforcement practice apply to all? Why?
• Should the probationer contribute to the supervision plan?
• What makes you feel this way?
• With probationers who are not attending accredited programmes or any other 
voluntary programme but are required to attend on specific dates, what do they 
gain from reporting?
• What do you think motivates them to attend?
Finally
Before we end the interview, do you have anything to add? Any questions? Debrief
and thank participant.
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4. Second interviews - Probationers
Before we start, it might be helpful to tell you briefly highlight what this interview is 
about. I am a research student at Swansea University and I want to understand how 
and why people comply with orders. Therefore, this interview will look at your 
experiences of complying with the order.
The interview will cover:
• What you feel the purpose of the order is;
• Any difficulties you may have that may affect how you attend;
• Your daily activities;
• Your experiences of supervision;
• What motivates you to comply;
• Your understanding of what is required of you in terms of attendance and 
complying with the order;
• Any previous experience of community orders you may have; and
• Some questions about your current circumstances.
As before, this initial introduction was followed by the process of obtaining informed 
consent. Each participant was given a consent form to sign (see Appendix Two).
The order
• Do you have any questions before we start?
• What order are you on?
• Did the courts say you have to attend a program? Have you started/completed\?
• Some people say probation/cpo/cpro/cpo/ is not punishment and that it is easy, what 
do you think?
• Can you tell me what do you think the purpose of the order is?
Constraint/Motivation to comply
• Can you think of anything that motivates you to attend 
appointments/programme:
• Can you think of anyone in particular that motivates you to attend 
appointments/programme:
• If you are tired and can’t be bothered to come in what do you/will you do?
• If there is something really important you have to do and you cannot attend your 
appointment, what will you do? What do you think your officer will do/say?
• Has this happened before? What did your officer say/do? Did he/she want to see 
something in writing explaining why you did not attend?
• What do you do/will you do if you forget to come in?
• Have you ever forgotten to attend?
• What happened?
• What did you PO do/say?
• How often are you supposed to attend?
• What do you do when you come in?
• Is it fair that you have to come in even if you have nothing you wish to discuss 
with the PO?
• How often is it fair for you to come in?
• Does/will coming in create any problems? Travel, employment, child care, 
other problems?
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• How do you feel about this?
• PO’s response? Fair?
• If you are in two minds about going to meet a probation appointment for 
example if your friends are going to the pub for a drink and you want to join 
them , or if there are other things you want to do which are important to you, 
which will you choose?
• Why?
• The government thinks that taking people back to court will make them 
attend? What do you think? Why?
Routine compliance
• How do you pass your time during the day? (hang out with friends? job centre, 
drink, drugs, stay at home).
Can you describe a typical day for you before you started probation?
Many people drink when they are out with friends at the pub or on other 
occasions, do you drink at all? (Based on Arksey and Knight 1999.111).
How often and how much will you say?
Some combine drinking and smoking, do you smoke? Do you use other drugs? 
Has it [alcohol/drugs] ever affected your attendance in any way at all?
Have you ever come in under the influence of drugs/alcohol?
What does your officer do? Say?
Inst umental: perceived certainty/severity
Were you given any information about the order and what is expected of you?
Who gave you this information? Was it written or verbal?
Is there anything that makes it difficult for you to understand what written in these 
leaflets?
How clear is this information? Should it be made clearer? How?
What were you told to do if you cannot attend? Ring? Attend next 
appointment? Certification.
How do they say you should contact them if you cannot come in?
If ring, did they say before or after appointment is due? How soon?
What did they say will happen if you do not attend?
Did they say there will be a letter? What type of letter?
What will the court do if your officer takes you to court for not complying with your 
order?
How do you know this?
Did you know this before starting this probation/cpo/cpro?
Do you have family or friends that have been on probation/cpo/cpro before?
What do they say about probation? What happens if they miss appointments?
Do you know anyone whose probation/cpo/cpro or CPO was terminated for non­
compliance/what happened to them?
Since this order started have you missed appointments for any reason? What 
happened?
Did you contact PO?
What did PO say?
What did PO do? Fair?
Since this order started have you been breached? Can you tell me what happened?
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• What do you feel about the court’s decision?
• Have you attended all your appointments since you were breached? What happened
• Have you had a previous order?
• How did it end?
Instrumental- perceived certainty
• In doing the incident that brought you to probation, how likely did you think it was 
that you will be caught?
• Certainty- What did you think the police will do?
• Severity- What did you think the court will do?
• Have you done something like this before? What did the police/court do?
• How often are you supposed to attend to see your probation officer?
• How many times can you be absent before your probation officer does something 
because of it?
• What will your probation officer do? Will he/she really?
Obstacles to compliance
• Is there anything that makes it difficult for you to attend your appointments? -travel, 
lifestyle, routines, employment, childcare, substance use, financial, memory etc.
• What did your PO say/do?
• Has this made you miss appointments?
Normative: Bonds with authority
• Do you see anyone else regularly when you come here? Who? Describe relationship.
• Have you had the same PO since you started CS/Probation/CPRO? Feelings?
• If no: Has change affected how you attend?
• How will you compare your relationship with previous PO and current PO?
• Can you describe your relationship with your officer?
Perceived legitimacy-obligation
• Should you do what your officer says, even if you feel it’s wrong?
• If you are sure you will not be taken back to court for failing to attend appointments,
will you still attend? What makes you say so?
• Is it right to say that the police/probation officer/judges/magistrates are generally 
honest?
• What makes you feel this way?
• Is it right to say that the police/probation officer/judges/magistrates are always fair?
What do you consider to be fair treatment?
• How much respect do you have for the police/the courts/ probation officers?
• What makes you feel this way?
• Some people say that the police/probation officer/judges/magistrates treat all citizens
equally. What do you think?
• In dealing with people authority how will you want them to treat you?-fair/protect 
rights/equal treatment.
• What is the best thing about being on probation?
• What is the worst thing about being on probation 
The first 9 questions were borrowed from Tyler (1990).
Normative: bonds with society/significant others
• Rented/own accommodation. Any accommodation difficulties? Affects attendance? 
/supervisor’s response
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• Currently employed? Has probation affected getting employment?
• Close contact with family/parents, feelings of the order and extension /feelings if 
order is revoked? Any help from them?
• Highest level of education/any training since school/age when left school/memories 
of school/jobs since left school/periods of unemployment? /source of 
income/age/partner
Questions, additions, follow-up in a few months/ payment/ thanks
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4. Third stage interviews - Probation Officers - selective coding
After open and axial coding further theoretical sampling was conducted to saturate or fully 
develop the emergent categories. Below are the schedules for the third stage of interviewing.
The interview
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Before we start, it might be helpful 
to briefly highlight the main purpose of this research again and also inform you of the 
purpose of this interview.
I am a research student at Swansea University and the project aims to explore:
How and why probationers comply with their orders
To gain a comprehensive view of compliance, I hope to interview three probationers 
you are supervising who agree to participate. As such, some of the interview questions 
will refer directly to your experiences of supervising these specific probationers.
This interview will cover several aspects of enforcement.
• Enforcement practice in general:
• Your experiences of enforcement with specific reference to the probationers 
you supervise who will also participate in this project.
• Your understanding of the obstacles that may affect compliance.
• Your views about enforcement policy and practice.
• Your philosophical approach to supervision.
As before, this initial introduction was followed by the process of obtaining informed 
consent. Each participant was given a consent form to sign (see Appendix Two).
Biographical information
• Do you have any questions before we commence?
• Are you a main grade officer?
• Which orders do you supervise?
The breach process
• How do the probationers you supervise get to know what is expected of them in terms 
of compliance?
• When do you inform the probationer of consequences of breach?
• How far do they understand it?
• What would you define as failure requiring breach action?
• How would you describe the breach process (is it straight forward or convoluted?).
• Is there a specialist breach officer?
• What happens where the probationer enters a not guilty plea?
• What type of evidence will the courts require during breach action? Is it difficult to 
obtain?
• What factors do you take into account in writing a breach report?
• What do you think about new regulations revoking disciplinary?
• In what sort of cases of non-compliance did you use disciplinary breach?
• What happened if the probationer reengaged in the interim?
• Were they told that if the re-engage, they may get a more favourable outcome in 
court?
• How has the new requirement affected your decision making when it comes to 
initiating breach action?
• Have you ever initiated breach action for one unacceptable absence? Why?
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• Have you ever initiated breach action where custody is the likely outcome? Example? 
Why?
• Have you ever recommended a revocation and resentence? Describe circumstances?
• How far do the courts accept the recommendations in the breach report?
• Has (probationer to be interviewed) been prosecuted for breach?
• What happened immediately leading up to non-compliance?
Securing compliance
• Where a probationer fails to attend or comply do you do a home visit to find out why?
• Do you phone them to find out why? Why/why not?
• Do you offer reminders? Why/why not?
• Apart from warning letters and breach action what other methods of encouraging 
compliance do you use?
• Have you ever considered using incentives to encourage a probationer to comply?
• If no? Why not?
Typologies
• What type of probationer is typically difficult to engage?
• How do you engage reluctant/uncommitted probationers?
Obstacles to compliance
• Talking about the probationers you are currently supervising or that you have 
supervised in the past, can you cite some examples of the possible obstacles 
that have affected their compliance?
• (think about accommodation problems/employment or unemployment/literacy 
levels/substance misuse/hostility/
• How do you respond to non-compliance in these cases?
• How effective are warning letters and threat of breach effective in addressing 
non-compliance where these obstacles exist?
• What makes you feel this way?
• In a case where you believed that the use of threats of punishment would not 
work for a particular probationer who failed to comply with requirements, how 
did you respond?
• Are there any provisions for addressing these issues?
• What encourages complacence better- addressing these obstacles or 
enforcement? Why?
Discretionary enforcement
• Have you ever sent a warning letter?
• How do you respond to probationers who breach requirements towards the end of 
their order?
• In deciding whether an absence is acceptable or not do you have to refer it to 
someone else or do you make the decision yourself?
• What if the probationer forgets?
• Do you always require evidence to prove an excuse for absence? What kind?
• Where the probationer fails to provide evidence for failure but you know the absence 
is genuine, how do you respond?
• How would you record physical evidence? Do you file it? Where?
• How do you withdraw warning letters?
• How do you make a record of each warning letter you send?
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• Are you monitored on enforcement practice?
Deskilling and continuity
• Are there probationers in your case load that you don’t supervise on a regular basis?
• Are you responsible for enforcing compliance in these cases?
• How will you describe your relationship with them?
• Have you supervised (the probationer to be interviewed) since he/she started
this order? If not, has the change affected supervision in any way? How?
• Where probationers have different case mangers in the course of supervision, 
does it affect supervision?
• How will you describe your level of contact with the probationers you 
supervise?
• How far are probation service officers involved in supervision and 
enforcement?
• How do you feel about this?
• How do you monitor attendance at external programmes run by partnership 
agencies?
Philosophy
• What is the most effective means of securing compliance?
• What philosophical approach to supervision guides your work with 
probationers?
• How will you describe your relationship with the probationers you supervise?
• Should standard enforcement practice apply to all? Why?
• Should the probationer contribute to the supervision plan?
• What makes you feel this way?
• With probationers who are not attending accredited programmes or any other 
voluntary programme but are required to attend on specific dates, what do they 
gain from reporting?
• What do you think motivates them to attend?
Debriefing and thank you.
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5. Third stage interviews -Probationers - selective coding
Before we start, it might be helpful to tell you briefly highlight what this interview is 
about. I am a research student at Swansea University and I want to understand how 
and why people comply with probation/cpo/cpro/cpo/cpro. Therefore, this interview 
will look at your experiences of complying with the probation/cpo/cpro/cpo/cpro.
The interview will cover:
• What you feel the purpose of probation/cpo/cpro is;
• Any difficulties you may have that may affect how you attend;
• Your daily activities;
• Your experiences of supervision;
• What motivates you to comply;
• Your understanding of what is required of you in terms of attendance and 
complying with the probation/cpo/cpro/cpo/cpro
• Any previous experience of probation/cpo/cpro you may have; and
• Some questions about your current circumstances.
I will also need to interview you again some time in the future in order to fully 
understand your experiences of complying with probation/cpo/cpro/cpo/cpro.
The order
• Do you have any questions before we start?
• What order are you on?
• Did the courts say you have to attend a program? Have you started/completed\?
• Some people say probation/cpo/cpro/cpo/ is not punishment and that it is easy, what 
do you think?
• Can you tell me how, if at all, this order has affected you?
• Can you describe what you feel is the most important thing that you have learned 
from this supervision/program?
• Can you tell me what do you think the purpose of the order is?
Constraint: rigid attendance requirements/surveillance
• Can you think of anything that motivates you to attend 
appointments/programme:
• Can you think of anyone in particular that motivates you to attend 
appointments/programme?
• If you are tired and just can’t be bothered to come in what do you/will you do?
• If there is something really important you have to do and you cannot attend your 
appointment, what will you do? What do you think your officer will do/say?
• Has this happened before? What did your officer say/do? Did he/she want to see 
something in writing explaining why you did not attend?
• What do you do/will you do if you forget to come in?
• Have you ever forgotten to attend?
• What happened?
• What did you PO do/say?
• Is it fair that you have to come in even if you have nothing you wish to discuss 
with the PO?
• How often is it fair for you to come in?
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• Does/will coming in create any problems? Travel, employment, child care, 
other problems?
• How do you feel about this?
• PO’s response? Fair?
• The government thinks that taking people back to court will make them 
attend? What do you think? Why?
Routine compliance
• How do you pass your time during the day? (Hang out with friends? job 
centre, drink, drugs, stay at home).
• Can you describe a typical day for you before you started probation?
• Many people drink when they are out with friends at the pub or on other
occasions, do you drink at all? (Based on Arksey and Knight 1999.111).
• How often and how much will you say?
• Some combine drinking and smoking, do you smoke? Do you use other drugs?
• Has it [alcohol/drugs] ever affected your attendance in any way at all?
• Have you ever come in under the influence of drugs/alcohol?
• What does your officer do? Say?
Proactive rule clarification
• Were you given any information about the order and what is expected of you?
• Who gave you this information? Was it written or verbal?
• Is there anything that made it difficult for you to understand what written in 
these leaflets?
• How clear is this information? Should it be made clearer? How?
• Were you given the order to sign? Who gave it to you? What was written on 
it?
Informal protocols
• What were you told to do if  you cannot attend? Ring? Attend next 
appointment? Certification.
• How do they say you should contact them if you cannot come in?
• If ring, did they say before or after appointment is due? How soon?
• What did they say will happen if you do not attend?
• Did they say there will be a letter? What type of letter?
Instrumental-perceived severity
• Were you given any information about the order and what is expected of you?
• Who gave you this information? Was it written or verbal?
• Is there anything that makes it difficult for you to understand what written in 
these leaflets?
• How clear is this information? Should it be made clearer? How?
• What will the court do if your officer takes you to court for not complying 
with your order?
• How do you know this?
• Did you know this before starting this probation/cpo/cpro?
• Do you have family or friends that have been on probation/cpo/cpro before?
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• What do they say about probation? What happens if they miss appointments?
• Do you know anyone whose probation/cpo/cpro or CPO was terminated for 
non-compliance/what happened to them?
Instrumental- perceived certainty
• In doing the incident that brought you to probation, how likely did you think it 
was that you will be caught?
• Certainty- What did you think the police will do?
• Severity- What did you think the court will do?
• Have you done something like this before? What did the police/court do?
• How often are you supposed to attend to see your probation officer?
• How many times can you be absent before your probation officer does 
something because of it?
• What will your probation officer do? Will he/she really?
Implementing terms/adaptation techniques
• If there is something really important you have to do and you cannot attend 
your appointment, what will you do? What do you think your officer will 
do/say?
• Has this happened before? What did your officer say/do? Did he/she want to 
see something in writing explaining why you did not attend?
• If you are in two minds about going to meet a probation appointment for 
example if your friends are going to the pub for a drink and you want to join 
them , or if there are other things you want to do which are important to you, 
which will you choose?
• Why?
• What do you think your officer will do/say?
• Has this happened before? What did your officer say/do? Did he/she want to
see something in writing explaining why you did not attend?
• Since this order started have you not attended appointments for any reason?
What happened? What did your officer do? Was it fair? How do you feel
about that?
• Did he/she want to see something in writing explaining why you did not 
attend?
• Have you been ill before and unable to attend? And what happened? Did 
he/she want to see something in writing explaining why you did not attend?
• Since this order started have you been breached? Can you tell me what 
happened? Did you contact PO?
• How did you feel about the officer’s decision? How do you feel now?
• What did you think will happen?
• Did you believe that your officer will take you to court?
• Looking back, how did that affect your decision to miss appointments?
• What did you think the courts would do?
• How did that affect your decision to miss your appointments?
• Did the officer show you a breach/written report before you went to court?
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• What did the report say? How do you feel about that?
• So what happened in court then when you were breached? Can you tell me
what happened?
• What do you feel about the court’s decision?
• Have you attended all your appointments since you were breached? What
happened?
• Since this order started have you received a letter saying that you must explain
why you did not attend?
• How many? Why did you receive the letter? Did you expect it?
• What did you do when you received the letter? Attend, phone, wait for next 
appointment.
• What reason/s did you provide?
• How valid was the reason?
• Have you had a previous order?
• How did it end?
Obstacles
• What are the main things that are connected with/caused the incident that 
brought you to probation?
• Are they being looked at? How well?
• Is there anything that makes it difficult for you to attend your appointments? - 
travel, lifestyle, routines, employment, childcare, substance use, financial, 
memory etc.
• What did your PO say/do?
• Has this made you miss appointments?
• What motivates you to attend despite these problems, you have mentioned?
Normative: Bonds with authority
• Do you see anyone else regularly when you come here? Who? Describe 
relationship.
• Have you had the same probation officer since you started/
• If no: Has change affected how you attend or how you behave when you 
attend?
• How will you compare your relationship with previous PO and current PO?
• Can you describe your relationship with your officer?
Perceived legitimacy-obligation
• Should you do what your officer says, even if you feel it’s wrong?
• If you are sure you will not be taken back to court for failing to attend 
appointments, will you still attend? What makes you say so?
• Is it right to say that the police/probation officer/judges/magistrates are 
generally honest?
• What makes you feel this way?
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• Is it right to say that the police/probation officer/judges/magistrates are always 
fair? What do you consider to be fair treatment?
• How much respect do you have for the police/the courts/ probation officers?
• What makes you feel this way?
• Some people say that the police/probation officer/judges/magistrates treat all 
citizens equally. What do you think?
• In dealing with people authority how will you want them to treat you?- 
fair/protect rights/equal treatment.
• What is the best thing about being on probation?
• What is the worst thing about being on probation 
The first 9 questions were borrowed from Tyler (1990).
Normative: Bonds with society/significant others
• Rented/own accommodation. Any accommodation difficulties? Affects 
attendance? /supervisor’s response
• Currently employed? Has probation affected getting employment?
• Close contact with family/parents, feelings of the order and extension /feelings 
if order is revoked? Any help from them?
• Highest level of education/any training since school/age when left 
school/memories of school/jobs since left school/periods of unemployment? 
/source of income/age/partner
Is there anything else you think I should know to understand your experiences of 
complying with your order?
Questions, additions, follow-up in a few months/ payment/ thanks
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6. Third stage interviews with Probation Officers - 
Further selective coding
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Before we start, it might be helpful 
to briefly highlight the main purpose of this research again and also inform you of the 
purpose of this interview.
I am a research student at Swansea University and the project aims to explore:
How and why probationers comply with their orders
To gain a comprehensive view of compliance, I hope to interview three probationers 
you are supervising who agree to participate. As such, some of the interview questions 
will refer directly to your experiences of supervising these specific probationers.
This interview will cover several aspects of enforcement.
• Enforcement practice in general.
• Your experiences of enforcement with specific reference to the probationers 
you are supervising who will also participate in this project.
• Your understanding of the obstacles that may affect compliance.
• Your views about enforcement policy and practice.
• Your philosophical approach to supervision.
As before, this initial introduction was followed by the process of obtaining informed 
consent. Each participant was given a consent form to sign (see Appendix Two).
Biographical information
• Do you have any questions before we commence?
• Are you a main grade officer?
• Which orders do you supervise?
Proactive rule clarification
• How do the probationers you supervise get to know what is expected of them 
in terms of compliance?
• Who conducts the induction?
• Who draws up the sentence plan?
• What is your role in drawing up the sentence plan?
• What is the probationer’s role?
• How do you feel about the probationer’s role?
• What other aspects of decision making permit the collaboration of the 
probationer?
• What do you tell them to do if they cannot attend?
• What do you tell them to do if they cannot produce a certified excuse?
• How do the probationers you supervise get to know the consequences of non-
compliance?
• Under what circumstances are you able to renegotiate with the probationer the 
terms of any additional requirements imposed by the courts?
Rule clarity
• What are the things that make it difficult for probationers to understand what 
is expected of them?
• What role does their literacy level play?
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• How accessible is the wording of induction material?
• What do you do to overcome this?
• Do you think??? Knows about what would be an acceptable explanation for 
absence?
Efficient enforcement machinery
• Is there a specialist breach officer who handles all breach cases?
• Can you describe the processes involved in breaching a probationer?
• Have there been any delays between filing for a summons and the actual
hearing?
• What protocols are in place for avoiding breach hearing delays?
Officers: minimizing non-compliance
• What do you define as non-compliance that warrants enforcement?
• What form of non-compliance is the most common?
• What form commonly results in breach?
• Why do you think this form of non-compliance is the one that usually results
in breach action?
• What do you do when probationers attend intoxicated or under the influence of 
illegal substances?
• What do you do if the probationer is aggressive, abusive, and 
uncooperative/uncommunicative?
Professional discretion
• Have you ever sent a warning letter?
• How accessible is the wording of warning letters?
• Can I see a copy?
• In deciding whether an absence is acceptable or not do you have to refer it to 
someone else or do you make the decision yourself?
• When a probationer fails to comply is the WL automatically generated or is it 
generated manually by you?
• Under what circumstances will you withdraw a warning letter?
• How do you withdraw a warning letter?
• What would happen if you didn’t have the discretion to withdraw warning 
letters? (Breach rates?).
• What would happen if you didn’t have the discretion to define whether an 
absence is acceptable? (Breach rates?).
Deactivating NS: Warning letters
• What do you do where the probationer notifies you in advance of an intended 
absence?-send warning letter?
• What if they notify you on the appointment day?
• What if they notify you after the appointment day?
• How soon after the appointment will be acceptable?
• What sort of notification will be acceptable to you?
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In what sort o f circumstances will you reschedule the appointment?
• Do you always require evidence to prove an excuse for absence? What kind?
• Where the probationer fails to provide evidence for failure but you know the 
absence is genuine, how do you respond?
• What influences your decision in such cases?-type of probationer, stage of 
order etc.
• What do you do where you have prior knowledge of an obstacle to 
compliance, will you request more evidence when this obstacle causes non- 
compliance?
• In what circumstances will you demand certified evidence of absence?
• With what type of probationer will you demand certified evidence of absence?
• Where the probationer cites work as an excuse for absences will you request 
proof? What kind?
• What impact does this have on employment? (Labelling?)
Demonstrating enforcement
• Is there a standard way of recording your decisions where probationer fails to 
attend?
• How would you record physical evidence? DO YOU file it? WHERE
Deactivating enforcement: evolving relationships
• In what sort of cases will you be more flexible in terms of demanding 
evidence or sending warning letters?
• How far does your personal knowledge of the probationer’s characteristics and 
circumstances affect your decisions concerning whether or not to demand 
physical evidence explaining an absence?
• How do ascertain whether a probationer can be trusted to provide an honest 
reason for absence?
• What do you do where a probationer you trust fails to comply but is unable to 
provide certified excuse?
• If a probationer has a good compliance record and is approaching the end of
the order what do you do where they subsequently fail to comply?
Internalising unpredictability-labelling
• What type of probationer would usually be compliant?
• What would be the signs that someone is genuinely struggling to comply?
• What do you do to engage them?
• What should be done to facilitate compliance in these cases?
• How have you learned to handle this group?
• What do you do where a probationer misses appointments although you feel 
that the probationer is genuinely struggling to comply?
• What impact will their behaviour have on how you decide on acceptability 
where they fail to comply?
• What type of probationer would usually be non-complaint?
• What would be the signs that someone is blatantly violating requirements?
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• What do you do to engage them?
• What should be done to facilitate compliance in these cases?
• How have you learned to handle this group? What do you do where the 
probationer is blatantly violating rules?
• What impact will their behaviour have on your definitions of acceptability 
where they fail to comply?
• Over time do you get to know who is being honest about reasons for absences? 
How?
• How does this affect your decision making in terms of accepting excuses for 
absence?
Impact of constructive enforcement-positive breach report
• Is there a specialist breach officer who handles all breach cases?
Actual severity
• In what sort of cases would the court impose custody for breach?
• Would breach normally result in custody?
• What is the typical sentence for breach?
• How appropriate do you feel this is?
Courts: minimising non-compliance
• What type of evidence will the courts require during breach action? Is it 
difficult to obtain?
Prosecutor/defence dualism
• In writing your breach report what circumstances will you take into account?
• After initiating breach and before the case is heard, will you try to encourage 
them to attend?
• What if it’s the first breach? Will it affect your recommendations?
• How do the courts respond to your recommendations?
• What do you think about new regulations revoking disciplinary?
• In what sort of cases of non-compliance did you use disciplinary breach?
• What happened if the probationer reengaged in the interim?
• Were they told that if  the re-engage, they may get a more favourable outcome 
in court?
• How has the new requirement affected your decision making when it comes to 
initiating breach action?
• Has??? missed an appointment since you started supervising him/her
• Can you briefly describe the circumstances? What was your response? Home 
visit?
• Did you send WL to???
Projected role
• Has ??? been prosecuted for breach? /Can you describe the circumstances?
• How do probationers respond to you after breach action?
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• What do you do in response?
• What makes you respond in this way?
Addressing obstacles
• Talking about the probationers you are currently supervising or that you have 
supervised in the past, can you cite some examples of the possible obstacles 
that have affected their compliance?
• (think about accommodation problems/employment or unemployment/literacy 
levels/substance misuse/hostility/
• How do you respond to non-compliance in these cases?
• Are there any provisions for addressing these issues?
• What encourages complacence better- addressing these obstacles or 
enforcement? Why?
Policy constraints: deskilling
• Are their probationers in your case load that you case manage but don’t 
supervise on a regular basis?
• Are you responsible for enforcing compliance in these cases?
• How will you describe your relationship with them?
• Where probationers have different case mangers in the course of supervision, 
how does it affect supervision?
• Have you supervised ??? Since he/she started this order? If not, how has the 
change affected supervision if at all?
• How will you describe your level of contact with the probationers you 
supervise?
• How far are probation service officers involved in supervision and 
enforcement?
• How do you feel about this?
• How do you monitor attendance at external programmes run by partnership 
agencies?
• How do you feel about their level of involvement in the roles traditionally 
reserved for probation officers?
• How do you feel about having to delegate the functions traditionally reserved 
for probation officers, to external agencies?
Policy constraints: case loads
• What is your case load like?
• How does it affect the quality of supervision you are able to provide?
• Is there a system of low grade reporting/reporting centre? For what category of 
probationers?
Practitioner philosophy
• What is the most effective means of securing compliance?
• What philosophical approach to supervision guides your work with 
probationers?
• How will you describe your relationship with the probationers you supervise?
• Should standard enforcement practice apply to all? Why?
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• Should the probationer contribute to the supervision plan?
• What makes you feel this way?
• With probationers who are not attending accredited programmes or any other 
voluntary programme but are required to attend on specific dates, what do they 
gain from reporting?
• What do you think motivates them to attend?
Age/questions? Thank you.
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7. The Follow-up Interviews-Probation Officers.
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Before we start, it might be helpful 
to briefly remind you of the main purpose of the research and this interview.
I am a research student at Swansea University and the project aims to explore:
How and why probationers comply with their orders
During our interview ... months ago we discussed your experiences of enforcing and 
encouraging compliance. Today we will discuss your experiences and the experiences 
of the participating probationers since the last interviews. This interview will also 
cover several aspects of enforcement practice.
As before, this initial introduction was followed by the process of obtaining informed 
consent.
Reacquainting
• How have things been for ??? since the last interview?
• Are you still his/her supervisor?
• Has his/her order changed in any way? What happened?
• Has??? missed an appointment since then? Can you briefly describe the 
circumstances? What was your response?
• Has ??? been prosecuted for breach? /Can you describe the circumstances?
• What type of relationship do you have with ??? now?
Proactive rule clarification
• Under what circumstances are you able to renegotiate with the probationer the 
terms of any additional requirements imposed by the courts?
Deactivating NS: Warning letters
• What do you do where the probationer notifies you in advance of an intended 
absence?-send warning letter?
• What if they notify you on the appointment day?
• What if they notify you after the appointment day?
• How soon after the appointment will be acceptable?
• What sort of notification will be acceptable to you?
• In what sort of circumstances will you reschedule the appointment?
• What do you do where the probationer is unable to officially certify their
absence but you know the reason for the absence is established, genuine or 
obvious?
• What influences your decision in such cases?-type of probationer, stage of 
order etc.
• What do you do where you have prior knowledge of an obstacle to
compliance, will you request more evidence when this obstacle causes non-
compliance?
• In what circumstances will you demand certified evidence of absence?
• With what type of probationer will you demand certified evidence of absence?
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• Where the probationer cites work as an excuse for absences will you request 
proof? What kind? What impact does this have on employment? (Labelling?)
Professional discretion
• Under what circumstances will you withdraw a warning letter?
• How do you withdraw a warning letter?
• What would happen if you didn’t have the discretion to withdraw warning
letters? (Breach rates?).
• What would happen if you didn’t have the discretion to define whether an 
absence is acceptable? (Breach rates?).
• How do you feel about your ability to decide what is acceptable or what is 
unacceptable?
Deactivating enforcement: evolving relationships
• In what sort of cases will you be more flexible in terms of demanding 
evidence or sending warning letters?
• How do ascertain whether a probationer can be trusted to provide an honest
reason for absence?
• What do you do where a probationer you trust fails to comply but is unable to 
provide certified excuse?
Policy constraints: deskilling
• Where probationers have different case mangers in the course of supervision, 
how does it affect supervision?
• Have you supervised ??? Since he/she started this order? If not, how has the 
change affected supervision if at all?
• How do you feel about the level of contact you have with the probationers you 
supervise?
• How will you compare the level of contact you have now with what obtained 
the past?
• How do you feel about this?
• How do you feel about the level of bureaucratic functions involved in your 
work?
• What aspects of probation practice are psos involved in? Induction, sentence 
plan, regular supervision and enforcement?
• How do you feel about their level of involvement in the roles traditionally 
reserved for probation officers?
• How do you feel about having to delegate the functions traditionally reserved 
for probation officers, to external agencies?
• How do you liaise with staff responsible for other components of an order to 
ensure enforcement?
Policy constraints: case loads
• What is your case load like?
• How does it affect the quality of supervision you are able to provide?
• Is there a system of low grade reporting/reporting centre? For what category of 
probationers?
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8. The Follow-up Interviews-Probationers.
Before we start, it might be helpful to remind you of what this interview is about. I am 
a research student at Swansea University and I want to understand how and why 
people comply with orders. I interviewed you...months ago about your experiences of 
complying with your orders. Today we will discuss your experiences since the last 
interview.
As before, this initial introduction was followed by the process of obtaining informed 
consent.
The interview
• Do you have any questions before we start?
• How, if at all, has probation affected you?
• Can you describe what you feel is the most important thing that you have 
learned from this supervision/program?
• Can you tell me what (or who) motivates you to attend your appointments?
Implementing terms/adaptation techniques
• Since the last time I spoke to you in ....have you attended all your 
appointments?
• If no What happened? What did your officer do? How do you feel about that?
• Have you missed appointments for any reason? What happened? What did 
your officer do? Was it fair? How do you feel about that?
• Did he/she want to see something in writing explaining why you did not
attend?
• Have you been ill before and unable to attend? And what happened? Did 
he/she want to see something in writing explaining why you did not attend?
• Since the last time I spoke to you in ....have you been breached? Can you tell 
me what happened? What was going on in your life then?
• How did you feel about the officer’s decision? How do you feel now?
• What did you think will happen?
• Did you believe that your officer will take you to court?
• Looking back, how did that affect your decision to miss appointments?
• What did you think the courts would do?
• How did that affect your decision to miss your appointments?
• Did the officer show you a breach/written report before you went to court?
• What did the report say? How do you feel about that?
• So what happened in court then when you were breached?
• What do you feel about the court’s decision?
• Have you attended all your appointments since you were breached? What 
happened?
• Since the last time I spoke to you in... have you received a letter saying that 
you must explain why you did not attend?
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• How many? Why did you receive the letter? Did you expect it?
• What did you do when you received the letter? Attend, phone, wait for next 
appointment.
• What reason/s did you provide?
• How valid was the reason?
• How do you feel about receiving a warning letter/s?
• How, if at all, has receiving the letter/s affected how you comply?
Routine compliance
• Can you describe a typical day for you before you started probation?
• Can you describe a typical day for you now that you have started probation?
Obstacles
• Is there anything that makes it difficult for you to attend your appointments? - 
travel, lifestyle, routines, employment, childcare, substance use, financial, 
memory etc.
• What did your PO say/do?
• Has this made you miss appointments?
• What happened? What did officer do? Did he ask for certified evidence?
• How do you feel about that?
• What motivates you to attend despite these problems, you have mentioned?
Perceived legitimacy-obligation
• What is the best thing about being on probation?
• What is the worst thing about being on probation?
Perceived legitimacy-evaluations of the service
• Have you had the same probation officer since you started/since the last time 
we met?
• How do you feel about this?
• Can you describe your relationship with your officer?
Is there anything else you think I should know to understand your experiences of 
complying with your order?
Questions, payment/ thanks.
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Appendix Six: Initial concepts
1. Addressing obstacles
2. Brokerage- accommodation
3. Brokerage-substance misuse
4. Caring role
5. Certified notification
6. Complete absconsion
7. Compliance obstacles
8. Constructive enforcement
9. Defence role
10. Defining formal rules
11. Defining formal rules
12. Demonstrate enforcement
13. Deskilling
14. Discretionary enforcement
15. Early revocation
16. Efficient enforcement machinery
17. Evolving relationship
18. False excuses
19. Flexible appointments
20. Full activation
21. High caseloads
22. Ignoring perceived risks
23. Ignoring the formal rules
24. Increasing bureaucracy
25. Instrumental mechanisms (incentives)
26. Interim compliance
27. Internalise unpredictability
28. Limited enforcement options
29. Limited facilities
30. Literacy deficiencies
31. Negative breach report
32. Notification after absence
33. Overestimating risks
34. Partial activation
35. Perceived obligation
36. Persistent violations
37. Poor quality supervision
38. Positive breach report
39. Prescriptive rules
40. Problem solving role
41. Projected role
42. Prosecutorial role
43. Punitive enforcement
44. Quality of treatment
45. Responsibilising the probationer
46. Risk management role
47. Rule ambiguity
48. Rule clarity
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49. Rule violations
50. Sporadic compliance
51. Standard enforcement
52. Substance misuse related reasons
53. Typologies
54. Unilateral definition of non-compliance
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Appendix Seven: Integrating the emergent concepts
OFFICER DEFINED MECHANISMS
Addressing childcare problems 
Addressing employment related obstacles 
Addressing travel related problems 
Brokerage- substance misuse 
Brokerage- accommodation 
Flexible appointments 
Motivating compliance 
Unofficial discretion 
Support
Problem solving
Maintaining positive relationships 
Client-centred approach
PROBATIONER DEFINED MECHANISMS
Instrumental mechanisms 
Perceived obligation 
Officer empathy
POLICY DEFINED MECHANISMS
Enforcement machinery 
Proactive rule clarification 
Early revocation 
New sentencing for breach
REACTING TO THE FORMAL RULES
Overestimate risks 
Rule violations 
Undermined risk perceptions 
Personal experiences 
Peer influence
Individualised sentencing for breach 
Variable sentencing for breach 
Flexible enforcement
OBSTACLES TO COMPLIANCE
Emotional problems 
Practical problems 
Situational problems 
Literacy deficiencies
CONFRONTING UNPREDICTABILITY
Internalise unpredictability 
Punishing blatant violations 
Evolving relationship 
Unofficial professional discretion 
Prosecutorial role
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Defence role 
Projected role 
Uncertified excuse 
Constructive enforcement 
Defence role 
Evolving relationship 
Inflexible enforcement 
Projected role 
Prosecutorial role 
Discretionary enforcement 
Persistent violations 
Typologies
Notification after absence 
Informal rules 
Minor violations 
Notification before absence 
Full deactivation 
Constructive negotiations 
Reprimands
Communicating informal rules 
Pragmatic discretion 
Altruistic discretion 
Ease of discretionary enforcement
POLICY CONSTRAINTS
Undermined quality of supervision, 
Demonstrating enforcement 
High case loads 
Limited facilities 
Increasing bureaucracy 
Prescriptive rules 
Limited enforcement options 
Demonstrate enforcement 
Deskilling
INFORMAL RULES
Ignored violations 
Minimised violations 
Normalised violations
ADAPTAION TECHNIQUES
Breach avoidance techniques 
Notification before or after absence 
Normalising violations
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Appendix Eight: The three key categories
REACTING TO THE FORMAL RULES
Probationer mechanisms of compliance 
Obstacles to compliance
CONFRONTING UNPREDICTABILITY
Officer defined mechanisms 
Policy constraints 
Informal rules
ADAPTATION TECHNIQUES
Probationer mechanisms of compliance 
Obstacles to compliance
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Appendix Nine: Sample Questions
To ascertain the extent of professional discretion and covert practices I asked the 
following questions:
• When a probationer fails to comply is the warning letter automatically 
generated or is it generated manually by you?
• Under what circumstances will you withdraw a warning letter?
• What would happen if you didn’t have the discretion to withdraw warning letters?
• What would happen if you didn’t have the discretion to define whether an absence is 
acceptable?
• In deciding whether an absence is acceptable or not do you have to refer it to someone
else or do you make the decision yourself?
• What do you do where the probationer notifies you in advance of an intended
absence/after a failure to attend?
Exploring accountability
• Are your enforcement decisions monitored?
• How do you withdraw a warning letter?
• Is there a standard way of recording your decisions where probationer fails to attend?
• How would you record physical evidence? DO YOU file it? WHERE
These revealed that although there are provisions for recording decisions in order to 
facilitate accountability, the officers were able to amend the records retrospectively 
and to make unverifiable entries. This reduces accountability and standardisation of 
practices. Further, the questions generated considerable insights into the extent of 
covertness. They helped to uncover the extent of and the motives for industrial 
deviance.
Questions to explore how probationers implement the requirements of their 
orders.
• Have you ever missed your appointment for any reason? What did your 
supervisor do?
• Have you ever attended under the influence of any substances? What did your 
supervisor do?
These revealed the extent of non-compliance with impunity.
Questions used to explore adaptation techniques
• What do you do/will you do if  you forget to come in?
• What does/will your supervisor say or do if you do not attend your appointment?
These revealed the extent to which probationers adapt to the revised and more flexible 
enforcement processes.
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2001).
v This study was conducted during the operation of the 2002 and later the 2005 
National Standards (National Probation Service 2002; NOMs 2005). Both standards 
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alongside enforcement strategies. For instance, the 2007 Standards encourage the 
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‘where circumstances permit’ (NOMS 2007).
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received fines and non-payment may have placed them at risk of infiltrating the 
system further.
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protocols for expediting breach action.
v,llHirschi (1969) traced young offending to a weakening of the bonds between the 
young offender and society. The components of social bonds were conceptualized as: 
attachment (to significant persons), commitment (stakes in conformity), and 
involvement. Revising this theory, he later de-emphasized the importance of social 
bonds and normative beliefs. He argued instead that crime is the product of 
inadequate self control, opportunity and rational decision making based on 
considerations of self interest (Gottffedson and Hirschi 1990).
lx Specific deterrence is concerned with the possibility that the actual experience of 
punishment would deter an offender from re-offending in the future. General 
deterrence on the other hand, focuses upon the likelihood that the existence of 
punitive sanctions would deter the general public from engaging in prohibited 
behaviour. Both are not different mechanisms rather; they are ‘the same mechanism 
applied to different populations’ (Beyleveld 1979.211).
x Official records reveal that many crimes are undetected, unrecorded and occur with 
impunity (Home Office 1995). It is noted that: 'for every 100 offences committed only 
two criminal convictions are obtained' (see Goldblatt and Lewis 1998.89).
X! Some studies do show that experiential effects may produce deterrent outcomes. 
Apospori and Alpert (1993) surveyed 178 respondents with previous antecedents and 
found that the perceived severity of punishment was a more effective deterrent among 
those respondents who had received more severe sanctions. The study by Piquero and 
Pogarsky (2002) recorded different findings. By contrast, it has been found that those 
with higher criminal antecedents are more likely to re-offend and more likely to 
underestimate the risks of certain punishment compared with those with lower
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antecedents, thus contradicting the presumptions of specific deterrence (Piquero and 
Paternoster 1998). This is traced to the likelihood that those who have been punished 
tend to underestimate the certainty of punishment for future offending compared with 
those who have been punished less. 
xn See previous chapter.
xni Several commentators have discarded the contentious notion of rationality and 
settled for a more moderate variant of the concept namely, ‘bounded rationality’ (von 
Hirsch et al. 1999.6). This entails a contextualised consideration of the utility or 
disutilities associated with offending. Such considerations are specific to the particular 
circumstances of the potential offender, and also to the limits of their appraisal of 
probable risks even where these tend not to correspond with actual risks. Bounded 
rationality therefore accommodates subjective conjecture and speculation. In doing so 
it accords with the writings of classical theorists -  Bentham and Beccaria both of 
whom highlighted the perceptual nature of deterrence and the specificity of 
rationalisations underpinning human behaviour (Erickson, Gibbs and Jensen 1977). 
Similarly, bounded theory also recognises that it is misleading to assume that there is 
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individuals differ in the extent to which they are willing to accept risks or the extent to 
which they assess risks. Others commentators adopt the concept of ‘limited 
rationality’. This alterative concept also accommodates the limited ability of people to 
‘acquire and process information’ (Cook 1980.220; Simonl957). With limited 
rationality, offenders utilise experiential factors to regulate behaviour. 
xlv Blummer (1998) coined the term ‘symbolic interactionism’ and extended Mead’s 
theoretical position (Denzin 1992; Plummer 2000:196). Like Mead, he emphasises the 
ability of the individual to converse with the self in order to ensure that behaviour 
conforms to the expectations of others, this he terms ‘self interaction’ (1966:535). 
Blummer presents his version of symbolic interactionism in a more dogmatic or 
‘canonical’ form Denzin (1992: xiv) For Blummer, human behaviour is the product of 
three processes namely, the meaning ascribed to things, these meanings arise in the 
context of social interactions and the meanings are subsequently modified by the 
individuals during symbolic introspective dialogue with the self and during symbolic 
interactions with others.
xv Strauss and Corbin (1998:1) define of the term ‘methodology’ as ‘a way of thinking 
about and studying social reality.’ This definition suggests that the term encompasses 
the notions of epistemology and ontology which pertain to philosophical questions 
about the nature of knowledge. ‘Methods’ are the techniques for data collection and 
analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1998).
XV1 See chapter one
xvn The Office of National Statistics (2006) estimates that the average household 
income in Wales is more than £100 below the UK average.
XVU1 It is worth noting that this relates specifically to the rates of recorded crime and 
not actual crime rates. This is because, although recorded crime rates are lower than in 
England, ‘the percentage of detected crime for which no action is taken by the police’ 
is higher in Wales than in England (Welsh Assembly Government 2007:111).
xx The new style community order (CO) was introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 and came into force for all offences committed on or after the 4th of April 2005.
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XX1 Concepts were the abstract interpretations of segments of data. They were the first 
level of abstraction from the data. Conceptualising incidents in data facilitated the 
labelling incidents in data sharing similar characteristics. Concepts were also derived 
from the words of the participants themselves in which case they were classed as ‘in 
vivo codes’ (Strauss 1998.105). In all, efforts were made to ensure that the labels or 
codes were directly relevant to the context, condition or background of the labelled 
incident in data (Strauss and Corbin 1998.106). Further, at all times, attempts were 
made to conceptualise incidents from the perspective of the participants bearing in 
mind that they act according to their perceptions (Strauss and Corbin 1998:158).
xxn Categories represented a higher level of abstraction from the point of data (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998). They explained what a group of concepts denote. As such, groups 
of concepts pointing to the same phenomena were grouped into categories for ease of 
analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1998).
xxin The subcategories comprised the conditions and the actions and interactions that 
pertain to the category. The concepts integrated into each category represented these. 
XXIV Process is defined as ‘a series of evolving sequences of action/interaction that 
occur over time and space...in response to the situation or context’ (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998: 165).
xxv ‘Structure creates the context for action/interaction’ (p. 166)
XXV1 Invivo code
xxvii Invivo code
xxviii Invivo code
XX1X This concept is borrowed from Heamden and Millie (2004)
xxx To ascertain the meaning of a concept, each concept was explored for it properties 
and possible dimensions. Strauss and Corbin (1998:101) define properties as the: 
‘characteristics of a category, the delineation of which defines and gives it meaning’ 
(p. 101). As such, exploring the properties and dimensions of a concept aided the 
process of defining that concept in its different manifestations.
XXX1 A property incorporates several dimensions. These are the criteria that qualify the 
property. The dimensions of a property sensitise the researcher to further indications 
or instances of the properties in the data. They enable the researcher to explore 
categories from several possible angles in order to develop them fully. Every concept 
has many properties and dimensions and the data was explored fully to discover these. 
xxxn A category is saturated where no new incidents in the data that expand on the 
properties and dimensions of an existing category can be identified (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998:136).
xxxm ‘An analytic device to stimulate analysts’ thinking about the relationship between 
macro and micro conditions/consequences both to each other and to process’ 181.
xxxiv Invivo code
xxxv Invivo code
xxxvi Invivo code
xxxvii In vivo code
xxxviii Invivo code
xxxix j j ie most recent standards are more flexible. They do not contain the requirement 
to activate enforcement where no excuse is provided in advance (see NOMS 2007).
xl In vivo code
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xh In vivo code
xln It is worth noting that limited generalisability affects all other forms of social 
research irrespective of sampling method. As such, Bryman puts it that with all 
studies:
..even where a sample has been selected using probability sampling, any findings can 
be generalised only to the population from which the sample is taken (2001:101). 
Therefore a study involving a random sample of participants in a probation area can 
only be generalised to that probation area.
xlm The term ‘frontline’ refers to main grade probation officers working closely with 
probationers. It is borrowed from McNeill (2000)
xllv Numbers one and two above are the factors identified by penologists as central to 
understanding whether a deterrent strategy has an effect on behaviour (see von Hirsch 
and colleagues 1999). If it can be shown that perceptions of seriousness and severity 
have no effect on the decision to comply, or that other factors apart from the existence 
of deterrent measures influence probationers’ decision to comply, then one can 
accurately conclude that the coercive sanctions for non-compliance do not produce 
any discernible deterrent effect.
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